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The research question addressed in this dissertation is whether sufficient reasons 
exist for embracing a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement in 
usufruct law. In South African law the requirement is generally approached in a rigid 
way, although there seems to be indications that an equitable outcome would be 
favoured where a usufructuary is vulnerable and subject to unreasonable treatment. 
A shift towards a flexible approach finds some support from comparative, policy, 
theoretical and constitutional considerations. Comparative law indicates that the 
nature of and conceptions regarding family wealth have changed to promote support 
of the surviving spouse. Additionally, pragmatic considerations require empowering 
the usufructuary to allow for the development of usufructuary property to maintain or 
increase its value. Theoretical arguments also support a shift to flexible rules for the 
sake of efficiency and sharing. As an example of governance property, usufructuary 
property requires flexible governance norms and coordination devices. Finally, non-
property constitutional provisions require a mandatory shift to a flexible approach in 
certain circumstances. This shift would entail enlarging exceptions to the obligations 
of the usufructuary or not enforcing those obligations strictly, especially when it would 
result in termination of a usufruct. A shift towards greater flexibility would result in a 
deprivation of the bare owner’s property right, but this deprivation would not be 
arbitrary. Courts have the common law power to develop the law of usufruct to bring 
about the required shift.




Die navorsingsvraag in hierdie proefskrif is of daar voldoende redes bestaan om ’n 
buigsame benadering tot die salva rei substantia-vereiste ten aansien van vruggebruik 
te volg. In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg word die vereiste meestal op ’n rigiede wyse 
benader. Daar is egter aanduidings dat howe voorkeur sal verleen aan ’n billike 
uitkoms waar ’n vruggebruiker weerloos is en onderwerp word aan onredelike 
behandeling. ’n Skuif na ’n billike benadering word ook ondersteun deur 
regsvergelykende, beleids-, teoretiese en grondwetlike oorwegings. Regsvergelyking 
toon dat die aard van opvattings rakende familiewelvaart sodanig verander het dat die 
onderhoud van die langslewende toenemend bevorder word. Vir pragmatiese redes 
is dit ook nodig om die vruggebruiker te bemagtig om vruggebruikseiendom te 
ontwikkel sodat die waarde daarvan in stand gehou kan word of kan toeneem. 
Teoretiese argumente ondersteun ook ’n skuif na ’n buigsame benadering om 
doeltreffendheid en gedeelde gebruik van eiendom te bevorder. As ’n voorbeeld van 
bestuurseiendom vereis vruggebruik buigsame bestuurs- en 
koördineringsmeganismes. Ten slotte skryf nie-sakeregtelike grondwetlike bepalings 
’n verpligte skuif na ’n buigsame benadering voor in bepaalde omstandighede. Hierdie 
skuif behels die uitbreiding van uitsonderings op vruggebruikersverpligtinge of dat die 
verpligtinge nie streng afgedwing word nie, veral as dit beëindiging van ’n vruggebruik 
beteken. ’n Verskuiwing na groter buigsaamheid sal tot gevolg hê dat die blooteienaar 
van ’n saaklike reg ontneem word, maar die ontneming sal nie arbitrêr wees nie. Die 
howe beskik oor die gemeenregtelike bevoegdheid om die vruggebruiksreg te 
ontwikkel en die vereiste verskuiwing teweeg te bring.
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 Introduction 
The subject of usufruct has been a topic of interest to scholars originating from the 
southernmost part of Africa since the first period of Dutch colonisation. In fact, Jan van 
Riebeeck’s son Abraham, the second recorded child born to a colonist in the Cape of 
Good Hope, received his doctorate on the subject of usufruct1 at Leiden University on 
25 March 1673.2 In terms of content, 3 as was typical of dissertations on usufruct in the 
Netherlands dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth century, his dissertation was 
not original and relatively terse.4 Dissertations of the time usually followed the same 
pattern, discussing the definition, establishment, object, rights, obligations and 
extinction of usufruct.5 The discussion typically concentrated on controversies and 
debates derived from contradictory or unclear texts in the Corpus Juris. 
                                                          
1 A van Riebeeck Disputatio Juridica Inauguralis de Usufructu (1673).  
2 AV van Stekelenburg and JM Claassen (comp & ed) “The Cape in Latin and Latin in the Cape in the 
17th and 18th Centuries” (2003) 48 Akroterion 89-109. 
3 AMM Canoy-Olthoff “Een Onderzoek naar de Inhoud van een Aantal Zeventiende en Achttiende 
Eeuwse Dissertaties over Vruchtgebruik” in G van Dievoet & G Macours (eds) Justicie ende 
Gerechticheyt. Colloquium Gehouden op 17 en 18 Mei 1982 aan de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid 
van de KU Leuven, Afdeling Kortrijk (1983) 23. 
4 In the addendum to her article AMM Canoy-Olthoff “Een Onderzoek naar de Inhoud van een Aantal 
Zeventiende en Achttiende Eeuwse Dissertaties over Vruchtgebruik” in G van Dievoet & G Macours 
(eds) Justicie ende Gerechticheyt. Colloquium Gehouden op 17 en 18 Mei 1982 aan de Faculteit der 
Rechtsgeleerdheid van de KU Leuven, Afdeling Kortrijk (1983) 30 states that his dissertation was 5,5 
pages long, consisted of 15 propositions, ca 140 lines with 65 references to the Corpus Juris but no 
references to legal literature. 
5 19. 
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Almost three and a half centuries later, the South African legal literature on 
ususfruct and related personal servitudes such as the right of habitation still deals with 
many of the same questions. Certainly, it is not a very popular topic and relevant 
literature is scant.6 What seems to be a peripheral but certainly relevant and inevitable 
issue that has to date received far less academic attention, is the impact of the 
Constitution on the South African law of personal servitudes in the current legal 
landscape. Although some recent publications acknowledge the Constitution as a 
consideration, real engagement with and consideration of a constitutionally inspired 
approach has seldom emerged in the discourse on personal servitudes. To my mind, 
the interesting legal questions which should be addressed in a transformative context 
are not only the traditional doctrinal questions but also their constitutional implications. 
Against this background I attempt to address a conceptual question that has to a 
limited extent been acknowledged in literature on South African personal servitudes7 
but has not been examined from a constitutional perspective.  
The obligation on the usufructuary to preserve the substance of the object of the 
usufruct forms part of the heritage of Roman law still present in modern civilian 
jurisdictions. In Roman law the salva rei substantia requirement was an element of 
                                                          
6 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University wrote the most extensive dissertation on usufruct 
dealing with the institution from a property perspective. For examples of recent literature dealing with 
questions corresponding to doctrinal topics investigated in the seventeenth and eighteenth century see 
JC Sonnekus “Bewoningsreg (Habitatio) – Aard van die Regsobjek en die Effek Dáárvan op die 
Registrasie van die Reg” (2015) 26 Stell LR 63-85; J Scott “Effect of the Destruction of a Dwelling on 
the Personal Servitude of Habitatio” (2011) 74 THRHR 155-169; CG van der Merwe “Extinction of 
Personal Servitude of Habitatio” (2010) 73 THRHR 657-665; JC Sonnekus “Bewoningsreg (Habitatio)—
Verval dit Weens Versteuring (Vernietiging) van die Bouwerk?” 2009 TSAR 450-469.  
7 R Zimmermann Das Römisch-Holländische Recht in Südafrika. Einführung in die Grundlagen und 
Usus Hodiernus (1983) 175; CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-
20. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3 
 
certain definitions of usufruct.8 Pugliese notes that the obligation was “witnessed or 
implied by many texts or solutions”, adding that he views it as an established duty of 
the usufructuary.9 The salva rei substantia requirement subsequently formed part of 
the heritage of Roman law, as is evident from the legal history of various European 
countries and certain jurisdictions retaining aspects of the civilian tradition. During the 
nineteenth and twentieth century some modern civil codes incorporated provisions that 
reproduce the salva rei substantia requirement, for example in the definition of 
usufruct.10  
The basic sources of South African law include the uncodified common law, 
which was influenced by English and Roman Dutch law. In turn, Roman Dutch law has 
its roots in Roman law and Germanic customary law.11 Writers on South African 
property law argue that property law in general retains a strong influence from Roman 
                                                          
8 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 10 n 1 notes that the 
requirement appears in the definitions of usufruct in D 7 1 1 and I 2 4 pr. 
9 G Pugliese “On Roman Usufruct” (1966) 40 Tul L Rev 523-554 548. 
10 G Pugliese “On Roman Usufruct” (1966) 40 Tul L Rev 523-554 548 n 77 mentions the French Civil 
Code art 578 (1804), the Louisiana Civil Code art 533 (1870), the Italian Civil Code art 477 (1865). The 
requirement is paraphrased in § 1037 of the German Civil Code (1870). The concept “economic 
destination” is used in § 1036 of the German Civil Code, art 769 of the Swiss Civil Code (1907) and art 
981 of the Italian Civil Code (1942). The French and English translations of the current Swiss Civil Code 
might create the impression that a stricter stance on the salva rei substantia requirement has been 
taken. The English translation refers to “intended use” and the French translation to “destination” whilst 
the German, Italian and Romanian translations refer specifically to the economic destination. See 
Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft “Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch von 10 Dezember 1907” (01-07-
2014) Der Bundesrat: Das Portal der Schweizer Regierung <http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-
compilation/19070042/index.html> (accessed 28-08-2015). 
11 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
6. 
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Dutch principles.12 Servitude law, and specifically the law of usufruct, still illustrates 
the prevalence of Roman Dutch13 and by extension Roman influence.14 South African 
law thus shares the heritage of Roman law with civilian European countries via the 
Roman-Germanic tradition and in particular, recognizes usufruct as a limited real right 
to use and enjoy the property of another, to take its fruits without impairing the 
substance and to return it salva rei substantia on termination of the usufruct.15  
Recent South African legal discourse and case law on personal servitudes or 
referring to relevant doctrine indicate that the law with regard to the salva rei substantia 
requirement is still relevant, but approached inadequately by the courts. The most 
recent study that refers to the salva rei substantia requirement in some detail is an 
article by Leos, dating from 2006.16 The Cooper v Boyes NO decision17 he refers to 
deals with the requirement in terms of legal historical analysis and sets out the old 
authorities regarding usufruct. However, this laudable approach has not been 
                                                          
12 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
6; CG van der Merwe “Things” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 27 
(1 reissue 2001) para 196. 
13 E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146 131. 
14 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das Römisch-Holländische Recht: 
Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 und 18 Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 594 remarks that the law of 
servitude as an area of Roman Dutch law is firmly rooted in Roman law. See also CP Bezuidenhout 
Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 85.  
15 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 86-88, 89-90 highlights these attributes of the 
personal servitude after comparing definitions by Innes JA in the first decision of the Court of Appeal 
on usufruct (Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 281), Hall and Kellaway, 
Steyn, Lee and Honoré, Van der Merwe and Corbett. 
16 E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146. 
17 1994 4 SA 521 (C). 
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sustained. A 2007 decision on usus, Vairetti v Zardo,18 contains references to case 
law but strongly leans on general reference work and textbooks. The 2013 decision, 
Lola v Rimon,19 disconcertingly does not even refer to established law concerning the 
common law maintenance duty, of which the applicant in this case was contractually 
absolved.20 Instead, Molahlehi AJ defines the duty to maintain purely with reference 
to the Merriam-Webster dictionary and Blacks Dictionary.21 Furthermore, in Kluh 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commisioner, South African Revenue Service22 Rogers J 
(Traverso DJP and Allie J concurring), while noting the duty of a usufructuary to 
maintain the property subject to the usufruct and to restore it to the owner on 
termination of the usufruct salva rei substantia,23 does not refer to suitable authority 
for this statement as convention would require.24 These decisions indicate a worrying 
trend: courts no longer approach legal questions regarding usufruct, and for that 
matter the salva rei substantia requirement, with reference to established and 
accepted practice.25 This tendency could be a motivating factor for reconsidering 
doctrinal questions regarding usufruct based on credible and accepted sources.26 
Furthermore, doctrinal questions regarding the salva rei substantia requirement and 
                                                          
18 [2010] ZAWCHC I46. 
19 2013 JDR 0783 (GSJ). 
20 3 paras 2 and 5. 
21 7-8 para 17. 
22 2015 1 SA 60 (WCC). 
23 Kluh Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2015 1 SA 60 (WCC) 
78. 
24 Para 74 only cites LAWSA as a source confirming this obligation. 
25 These decisions do not seem to be exceptional judgments in this regard. See in general J Scott “A 
Growing Trend in Source Application by Our Courts Illustrated by a Recent Judgment on Right of Way” 
(2013) 76 THRHR 239-251. 
26 See for an article motivated by the same impulse regarding praedial servitudes J Scott “A Growing 
Trend in Source Application by Our Courts Illustrated by a Recent Judgment on Right of Way” (2013) 
76 THRHR 239-251. 
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related issues also surfaced in recent foreign scholarship. Two of these foreign 
sources consider the flexibility of usufruct,27 while the third examines the standard of 
behaviour required of the usufructuary.28 
Perhaps the most urgent issue justifying a study in this regard is the constitutional 
implications of the salva rei substantia requirement. Van der Walt has pointed out the 
lack of engagement with constitutional questions in servitude case law29 and 
developed a methodology of constitutional analysis that can be applied to servitude 
cases. This study provides an opportunity to apply this methodology to the salva rei 
substantia requirement as it is currently interpreted in case law and literature, and 
furthermore, allows an exploration of the constitutional implications of a flexible 
approach to the requirement. 
 
1 2 Research question 
The question I consider in this dissertation is whether there are sufficient reasons for 
embracing a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. Conceptually, 
this inquiry is approached by firstly determining the substantive content of the salva 
                                                          
27 A Apers & A Verbeke “Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 TSAR 117-129; A 
Verbeke, B Verdickt & D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in C van der Merwe & A Verbeke 
(eds) Time-Limited Interests in Land (2012) 33-56. 
28 E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference to an Arbitrator?” (2011) 
4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19. Giannozzi recently defended her dissertation Le 
Bonus Vir en Droit Romain on the 28th of March 2015. This dissertation on the arbitratus boni viri 
standard as a measure of flexibility will be published too late to be included in this dissertation. See for 
the abstract : Anonymous “Madame Elena Giannozzi – Le Bonus Vir en Droit Romain” (19-03-2015) 
Université Pantéon-Assas Paris II Recherce 
<http://www.u-paris2.fr/1426761645189/0/fiche___actualite/&RH=EDOCT> (accessed 28-08-2015) 
29 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756; AJ van 
der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Prop L Rev 3-35. 
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rei substantia requirement as it is currently applied. Since the overarching question 
assumes that different interpretations of and approaches to the salva rei substantia 
requirement can be identified, I subsequently set out legislation, case law and 
literature to determine what different interpretations of and approaches to the 
requirement might entail. A rigid approach would strictly prohibit the deterioration or 
impairment of the object of the usufruct, without considering contextually relevant 
factors. It implies that the usufructuary would not be able to change the economic 
destination of the object of the usufruct, even if its value would be increased by the 
alteration.30 A flexible approach normally allows for some physical interference, 
provided that the economic destination of the object of the usufruct is not altered. 
Secondly, it might also entail replacing the salva rei substantia requirement with the 
more flexible salva rei aestimatione standard31 and finally, a flexible approach might 
also entail accepting economic gain (in the sense that it increases the value of the 
object of the usufruct) as a valid and sufficient reason for changing the economic 
destination of the object of the usufruct.32 
Following from this initial overview, I aim to establish whether a shift has taken 
place from a rigid to a flexible approach or whether these approaches coexist in the 
South African legal context. Should such a shift be identified, the reasons for it need 
to be identified. If, on the other hand, such a shift is not evident, the next question is 
whether it should be promoted in South African law and if so, for what reasons. 
                                                          
30 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 14. 
31 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 15 explains the term as 
preserving the value of the usufructuary object. 
32 R Zimmermann Das Römisch-Holländische Recht in Südafrika: Einführung in die Grundlagen und 
Usus Hodiernus (1983) 175. 
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Finally, the issue is whether either rigid application of the salva rei substantia 
requirement or a shift from a rigid to a flexible approach to the requirement has 
constitutional implications. Constitutional implications may arise where either the salva 
rei substantia requirement as it is currently employed or as it might be applied in case 
of a shift from a rigid to a flexible approach breaches or will breach constitutional 
provisions. Particularly, where any of the provisions allocating rights in the Bill of 
Rights is prejudiced, such as the right to equality and non-discrimination, human 
dignity, property or access to housing provisions, the development of the salva rei 
substantia requirement is either necessary or prohibited.33 I ask what the constitutional 
implications of a shift to a flexible approach are and how South African law should deal 
with them. 
 
1 3 Chapter outline 
In chapter two I examine the position regarding the salva rei substantia requirement in 
terms of current South African law. To determine the content of the salva rei substantia 
requirement in personal servitudes, I firstly distinguish praedial from personal 
servitudes to indicate how, flowing from the nature of these servitudes and their 
differing impact on the servient owner and bare owner respectively, they need similar 
as well as different types of regulation to protect the relevant parties. In terms of similar 
regulation, I discuss the civiliter requirement. However, since personal servitudes 
substantially differ from praedial servitudes, they must also be regulated in a 
specialised manner. To explain this particular type of regulation, it is necessary to 
expound on the nature of personal servitudes and particularly usufruct as the most 
                                                          
33 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 745. 
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comprehensive personal servitude. Accordingly, I give a cursory overview of the 
nature, rights and obligations of the usufructuary. This synopsis underpins the 
conceptual discussion of the salva rei substantia requirement as a specialised 
mechanism regulating personal servitudes. Apart from providing a conceptual 
interpretation of the construct, I also articulate how a rigid approach to the requirement 
would differ from a flexible one. On these grounds I subsequently consider how the 
civiliter requirement, which applies to both types of servitudes, differs from the salva 
rei substantia requirement and why both are necessary according to traditional 
doctrinal considerations. This provides the scaffolding for considering the research 
question.  
The foundational question is how the salva rei substantia is expressed and 
interpreted in South African law. I investigate how the requirement is articulated and 
interpreted in terms of the rights and duties that it generates, as well as its termination 
and relevant remedies that pertain to the requirement, mainly focusing on case law. In 
terms of the right of use and enjoyment (ius utendi) allocated to the usufructuary, I 
discuss the entitlements to possession,34 administration,35 and control36 of the object 
of the usufruct. I consider whether the treatment of these entitlements in case law and 
literature allows the usufructuary some measure of flexibility where the salva rei 
                                                          
34 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
340 cite Voet 7 1 32. 
35 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 585 n 1 cite Garmany v Templeton’s Executors 1936 SR 139 159; 
Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 CPD 109 112; Van der Merwe v Van Wyk 1921 EDL 298 302 and 
Furnivall v Cornwell’s Executors (1895) 12 SC 6. 
36 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & 
E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 386 cite Geldenhuys v CIR 1947 3 SA 
256 (C) 264 and Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 CPD 109 112. 
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substantia requirement is concerned. In particular, I consider whether they reveal a 
flexible measure of disposition and if so, under what conditions. Regarding the duties 
imposed on the usufructuary, I contemplate whether the duties to frame an inventory 
of the property subject to the usufruct, to render security for the proper use, enjoyment 
and return thereof and to take responsibility for the ordinary repairs and expenses 
necessary for normal maintenance of the property37 are applied strictly and how the 
courts deal with noncompliance. The question is whether noncompliance is met by 
severe sanctions and whether contextual factors are taken into account in these 
decisions. Finally, I consider remedies and causes of termination in which the salva 
rei substantia requirement plays a role. I briefly consider the actio negatoria as a 
possible remedy available to the bare owner when the requirement is breached. 
Subsequently I consider methods of extinction that are relevant to the salva rei 
substantia requirement, namely termination by permanent impossibility of exercise or 
enjoyment and termination by misuse. This chapter should accordingly indicate 
whether a flexible and rigid approach to the salva rei substantia requirement co-exist 
or whether a shift towards a flexible approach can be identified. 
In chapter three I address the reasons why a shift to a flexible approach either 
has taken place or should be implemented in South African law. To develop this 
argument I undertake a comparative analysis of the position in five jurisdictions, 
namely France, Belgium, the state of Louisiana, Germany and the Netherlands. I 
analyse the definitions or descriptions of usufruct, the rights and obligations of the 
usufructuary, the instances in which termination is triggered by violation of the salva 
rei substantia requirement and the remedies available to the bare owner in case of 
                                                          
37 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 594. 
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breach of the requirement. This analysis is contextualised with reference to the 
function and categories of usufruct available in the specific jurisdiction and evidence 
of developments in the law of usufruct. From this comparative analysis I identify the 
reasons for amending the law of usufruct and different strategic approaches to the 
institution of usufruct, prompted by context-specific needs and changes in the 
comparative jurisdictions and conclude whether these reasons are or could be relevant 
in the South African context and whether different strategic approaches could be 
implemented in the South African legal landscape. 
In chapter four I proceed with the search for reasons for an existing or future shift 
to a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. Initially I argue that policy 
as a concept is not defined in a way that makes it a useful and relevant research tool. 
The question is whether policy arguments in favour of a flexible approach to the salva 
rei substantia requirement are readily found. I consider whether policy might have an 
effect and whether material in this regard can be used to identify clear and strong 
arguments in favour of a flexible approach. However, theory underpins policy and 
accordingly I devote the larger part of chapter four to theoretical considerations that 
might bolster an argument for a flexible approach. 
Firstly, I consider whether Law and Economics theory, with its focus on efficiency, 
provides support for a flexible approach to the requirement. After outlining the Coase 
theorem,38 I discuss the extension of his work by Calabresi and Melamed.39 Their 
property and liability rules model was extended by Bell and Parchomovsky40 in terms 
                                                          
38 RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44. 
39 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128. 
40 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
 
of pliability rules. I argue that especially the latter can provide useful theoretical support 
for a flexible interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement. On the other hand, 
I also show that Law and Economics theory only supports a flexible approach up to a 
certain point. Flexibility might result in fragmentation and opportunism, outcomes not 
favoured by Law and Economics theorists, as is evident from the work of Parisi41 and 
Mackaay.42 I argue that the salva rei substantia requirement traditionally counters both 
fragmentation and opportunism. Secondly, I reflect on the work of two Progressive 
Property theorists, namely Alexander43 and Dyal-Chand,44 both of whom point out that 
the traditional dominant paradigm of ownership with its focus on exclusion results in a 
perception that sharing is a peripheral phenomenon in property law. In fact, however, 
sharing is more prevalent in property institutions, as their examples show. I argue that 
usufruct may also be viewed as an instance of sharing and usufructuary property as 
an example of governance property. Therefore, usufruct necessitates internal 
governance rules that provide for flexibility and adaptable remedies in case of breach 
of these rules. To summarise, in lieu of strong policy reasons I rely on both Law and 
Economics and Progressive Property theory to support a shift to a flexible approach. 
In chapter five I investigate the constitutional implications of both a rigid and a 
flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. The constitutional provisions 
that inform the analysis in this chapter are the equality and non-discrimination,45 
                                                          
41 F Parisi “Entropy and the Asymmetric Coase Theorem” in D Porrini & GB Ramello (eds) Property 
Rights Dynamics: A Law and Economics Perspective (2007) 69-93 71-72. 
42 E Mackaay Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems (2013) 260. 
43 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887. 
44 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Conn L Rev 647-723. 
45 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9. 
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housing46 and property47 clauses. Firstly, in terms of a rigid approach, I focus on the 
consequences of noncompliance with the requirement. Noncompliance with the 
requirement, either wilfully or as a result of circumstances, may result in the 
termination of the usufruct where (a) the obligation to frame inventory and the 
obligation to provide security are not complied with in response to a court order, (b) 
the usufructuary property is subjected to disfigurement or serious abuse, (c) the 
usufructuary property is destroyed and (d) the usufructuary property is substantially 
changed. In pursuit of this aim I initially refer to the subsidiarity principles in order to 
determine the applicable sources of law. The subsidiarity principle particularly relevant 
to servitude disputes states that a party alleging an infringement of a constitutional 
right should rely on legislation enacted in order to protect the relevant right.48 He may 
not in the presence of applicable legislation rely on the common law to bring an 
action.49 However, should legislation be absent he may directly rely on either the 
common law or a relevant constitutional provision. After determining the relevant 
sources of law, I use the normative and methodological considerations developed by 
Van der Walt50 in his recent servitude articles to inform my constitutional analysis. 
                                                          
46 S 26. 
47 S 25. 
48 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 739-740. 
49 739-740. 
50 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756; AJ van 
der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Prop L Rev 3-35. 
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In terms of the constitutional analysis I rely on the two-stage approach to Bill of 
Rights litigation51 and its particular application in the FNB decision52 to determine the 
constitutional validity of the outcome of the preservation requirement in cases of 
noncompliance. The “two-stage approach”53 firstly identifies a limitation of a right in 
the Bill of Rights and secondly evaluates the justifications for the restriction.54 To claim 
protection under a provision of the Bill of Rights, a litigant must firstly prove that he is 
entitled to that right and that the right is subject to limitation.55 If he is successful, the 
opposing party may subsequently prove that the limitation may be justified under 
section 36 of the Constitution. The FNB test was developed in First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance.56 It consists of seven questions 
and is summarised as follows by Van der Walt:  
“(a) Is there a protected property interest involved? (b) If there was property, was 
there a deprivation of that property? (c) If there was a deprivation, was the 
deprivation arbitrary? (d) If the deprivation was arbitrary, can it be justified in terms 
of section 36(1)? (If the arbitrary deprivation cannot be justified, it is 
unconstitutional and that ends the constitutional inquiry.) (e) If the deprivation was 
not arbitrary or if it could be justified in terms of s 36(1), does it also constitute 
                                                          
51 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 301; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law (3 ed 2011) 74. 
52 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
53 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 301; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law (3 ed 2011) 74. 
54 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 153. 
55 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 301; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law (3 ed 2011) 75. 
56 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
15 
 
expropriation? (f) If the deprivation does constitute expropriation, does it comply 
with the requirements in s 25(2)? (f) If the expropriation does not comply with the 
s 25(2) requirements, can it be justified in terms of s 36(1)? If the expropriation 
does not comply and cannot be justified, it is unconstitutional.”57 
The first constitutional provisions I explore are the obvious ones that guarantee 
democratic liberty in a democratic society.58 Van der Walt reasons that in the early 
stage of a constitutional argument “non-utilitarian rights that serve a democratic or 
liberty-enhancing purpose, such as equality and human dignity”, should be 
considered.59 Given the gender-qualified exceptions to compliance with specifically 
the duty to provide security, I consider whether the equality and non-discrimination 
clause60 is compromised by the exemption awarded to a father nominated as 
usufructuary in cases where his children are bare owners.61 Subsequently, I ask 
whether the “less obvious but nevertheless relevant”62 right of access to housing63 is 
contravened where usufruct is terminated due to one of the reasons connected to the 
salva rei substantia requirement mentioned above. The housing clause64 grants 
everyone the right of access to adequate housing, places an obligation on the state to 
progressively realise this right with its available resources and prevents the eviction 
from or destruction of a home without a court order given after consideration of all the 
                                                          
57 J van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 749-750. 
58 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Prop L Rev 3-35 32. 
59 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 742 n 
80. 
60 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9. 
61 Voet 7 9 7; Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 39 3; Carpzovius Definitiones Forenses 2 10 
9; Huber HR 2 39 23; Holl Cons 1 57 2; Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 3; CG van der Merwe (2 ed 1989) 
Sakereg 517. 
62 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Prop L Rev 3-35 32. 
63 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 26. 
64 S 26. 
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relevant circumstances. Furthermore, legislation may not permit arbitrary evictions. 
Finally, the question is whether the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property65 is 
affected by a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement.66 I make use 
of the FNB analysis67 to consider the effect of developing the law towards a flexible 
approach to the termination of usufruct, specifically on the bare owner. In particular I 
test whether a shift to a flexible approach amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the 
bare owner’s right to property. 
 
1 4 Methodology and qualifications 
The title of this dissertation refers to personal servitudes and not to usufruct per se. 
However, I focus predominately on usufruct and define the salva rei substantia 
requirement within this context. As the most “comprehensive” (“omvattendste”) 
personal servitude,68 observations and conclusions reached regarding usufruct can 
generally be applied to the other personal servitudes of usus and habitatio as well. 
This is also consistent with the treatment of personal servitudes in South African 
literature. The choice to focus on usufruct is also motivated by developments in 
comparative jurisdictions. In the current Burgerlijke Wetboek (BW) of 1992 the rights 
of habitation and use were doctrinally subsumed under the right of usufruct. Likewise, 
the German Civil Code (BGB) does not recognise use as a personal servitude in its 
                                                          
65 S 25. 
66 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Prop L Rev 3-35 33 distinguishes 
the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property from the s 9 and s 26 rights in the sense that it is an 
economic rather than a democratic right. 
67 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
68 See CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 506. 
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own right but should the need arise, it may be constituted as a limited usufruct or an 
innominate limited personal servitude.69 Furthermore, in Louisiana the servitude of use 
and its detailed provisions were abolished in 1976 and replaced by rights of use.70 
This revision indicated that the servitude of use “had little, if any, practical 
significance”. The fact that use has been subsumed under the category of usufruct in 
foreign jurisdictions justifies a comparison that concentrates on usufruct. In chapter 
two I consequently analyse South African case law and doctrine on usufruct to 
determine the current position in South African common law regarding the salva rei 
substantia requirement. Nevertheless, given the lack of current literature on the South 
African law of usufruct, compared to the availability of relatively recent case law and 
articles on habitatio, it is useful to refer to examples and literature on habitation, 
particularly where examples from the latter usefully supplement the discussions of 
usufruct. 
In terms of the scope of this dissertation, I have chosen not to investigate quasi-
usufruct as this legal construction differs significantly from usufruct. Whereas a 
usufructuary has limited entitlements to possess, use and enjoy the usufructuary 
property throughout the existence of the usufruct, he does not have the ius abutendi.71 
The quasi-usufructuary, on the other hand, has ownership72 of the consumable or 
fungible property that is the object of the quasi-usufruct and “which, when used for the 
first time in the normal way, changes in substance, is extinguished or is readily 
                                                          
69 AN Yiannopoulos Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Vol 3 Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights 
of Use (5 ed 2011) 520 n 3. 
70 520. 
71 Ex parte Eloff 1953 1 SA 617 (T) 619-620; Ex parte Pierce 1950 3 SA 628 (O) 631; CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508; MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM 
Corbett, JR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 387. 
72 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 509. 
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consumed by use”.73 Therefore, the distinction between the ius utendi and fruendi that 
allows a usufructuary to use, enjoy and draw the fruits of the usufructuary property, as 
opposed to the ius abutendi and disponendi which are not allocated to a usufructuary 
but normally permits an owner to abuse or destroy the property, loses its 
significance.74 Moreover, since quasi-usufruct already allows maximum flexibility, 
since the quasi-usufructuary only has the obligation to return the equivalent in quality 
or quantity or value of the property (salva rei aestimatione) as established on the date 
when the quasi-usufruct commenced,75 it does not pose the same interesting 
challenges that the institution of usufruct does in terms of the salva rei substantia 
requirement.76 
Furthermore, I have chosen to exclude the usufruct of shares from this 
dissertation. Firstly, the application of property principles to shares seems to be 
contentious. In this regard Leos has shown that application of the principles of property 
law to company shares may lead to “anomalous conclusions”.77 Earlier, other 
authors78 have also questioned aspects of such an exercise in relation to Tigon Ltd v 
Bestyet Investments (Pty) Ltd.79 In particular, Larkin and Cassim did not agree with 
the labelling of a share as incorporeal movable property where it is accepted that the 
                                                          
73 E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146 132. 
74 132. 
75 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 509. 
76 I am indebted to Professor AJ van der Walt for a helpful discussion in this regard. 
77 E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146 126. 
78 See for example MP Larkin & FHI Cassim “Company Law (Including Close Corporations)” 2001 
ASSAL 506-530-533; AJ van der Walt & PJ Sutherland “Dispossession of Incorporeals or Rights – Is 
the Mandament van Spolie the Appropriate Remedy?” (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 95-102.  
79 2001 4 SA 634 (N). 
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entitlements originating from the share are designated as personal rights.80 Van der 
Walt and Sutherland also caution that the classification of shares should be 
approached with circumspection.81 Secondly, since “there is no simple definition of a 
share”,82 as Van Zyl J acknowledges, concluding that shares may only be subject to 
usufruct and not to quasi-usufruct does not take account of the complex characteristics 
of different kinds of shares. Leos83 is accordingly troubled with the decision in Cooper 
v Boyes NO.84 He argues that certain shares may be considered as consumables or 
fungibles and identifies problems resulting from holding that all types and classes of 
shares may be subject to usufruct.85 Accordingly, since quasi-usufruct is not the 
subject of this dissertation and the complicated problems relating to shares and their 
application make them susceptible to both quasi-usufruct and usufruct, I choose not 
to venture into the discussion of shares so as to avoid a fragmented perspective of the 
topic.  
Another question that might have been considered is whether a discussion of the 
usufruct of shares might not arise during a discussion of a usufruct of universalities, 
                                                          
80 MP Larkin & FHI Cassim “Company Law (Including Close Corporations) 2001 ASSAL 506-554 530-
533. 
81 AJ van der Walt & PJ Sutherland “Dispossession of Incorporeals or Rights – Is the Mandament van 
Spolie the Appropriate Remedy?” (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 95-109 100-102. 
82 Cooper v Boyes NO 1994 4 SA 521 (C) 535B. 
83 See E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146 127-
128 and 138: 
“Any conclusion that shares could not be subject to a quasi-usufruct whatever the 
circumstances, presupposes not only that the legal nature of a share is all-encompassing 
and immutable, but also that the complex of personal rights comprising a share is, and 
remains, homogenous at all times.” 
84 1994 (4) SA 521 (C). 
85 See E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146 138-
146. 
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as part of a broader discussion on strategies for a flexible approach to the salva rei 
substantia requirement. Arguments for a modern adaptation of usufruct over 
universalities have been advanced by inter alia extending the scope of application of 
universalities to examples such as databases, businesses and stock portfolios.86 
Doctrinally, this seems to be a challenge in South African law. It is accepted that a 
universality or collection of things (res universalis)87 can be the subject of usufruct. 88 
Complex things are subdivided into composite things (universitas rerum 
cohaerentium); aggregates or collections of similar things (universitas rerum 
distantium) and universalities of rights and things (universitas iuris).89 Composite 
things consist of predominantly single corporeal things comprising a principal thing 
and either accessory or auxiliary things.90 Shares do not comfortably fit into this 
category since they are not corporeal. Furthermore, they are not listed as the subject 
of usufruct.91 Aggregates or collections of things are made up of similar individual 
corporeal things “subsumed under one designation” that do not lose their identity by 
virtue of being part of a collection.92 Again, shares do not fit into this category since 
they are not corporeal. A universality of rights and things consists of incorporeals 
                                                          
86 A Apers & A Verbeke “Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 TSAR 117-129. 
87 According to PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (5 ed 2006) 41 a complex thing consists of various parts or components which are treated by 
the law as a unit. 
88 D 7 4 31; Voet 7 1 15; Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Gr 2 39 2; Geldenhuys v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue 1947 3 SA 256 (C) 264; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 339; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 509. 
89 D 4 1 3 30 pr; Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Gr 2 1 6-7; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 41. 
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(rights) and corporeals that, as separate components, exist independently as things.93 
A collection of shares per se, although incorporeal, would not meet the requirement of 
including corporeals as well and therefore does not fit into this category either. 
Accordingly, conceiving of a portfolio of shares as a universality on its own to allow for 
a more flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement would not easily fit 
into the traditional doctrinal structure unless the doctrine is amended or expanded. 
There has been no mention of or support for this proposition in case law up to this 
point. Therefore, so as to maintain the focus of the research question, I am not 
considering usufruct of shares in this dissertation. 
The choice of jurisdictions considered in this dissertation merits a short 
explanation. In chapter three I embark on a comparative analysis of the salva rei 
substantia requirement in French, Belgian, Dutch, German and Louisiana state law to 
identify viable alternative approaches to the salva rei substantia requirement. As 
civilian or partly civilian jurisdictions they all share the Roman heritage of the law of 
usufruct, but each jurisdiction has developed different strategies to cope with the 
inherent limitations of the salva rei substantia requirement. 
The inclusion of a discussion on the French law of usufruct is necessitated by its 
relation to the Belgian, Dutch and Louisiana state law of usufruct. A discussion of 
Belgian law would scarcely be possible without referring to French law. With the 
exception of amendments, Belgian property law is still based on the provisions of the 
French Civil Code (CC) and French law has exerted a huge influence on Belgian 
scholars and case law.94 Furthermore, the Dutch Civil Code (BW) has been influenced 
                                                          
93 43. 
94 V Sagaert “The Fragmented System of Land Burdens in French and Belgian Law” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Towards a Unified System of Land Burdens? (2006) 31-52 32. 
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by both German and French Law.95 Dutch legislation dating from 1838 was premised 
on the CC.96 In 1992 the BW was transformed under the influence of German law. 
Akkermans remarks that Dutch law now takes the middle ground between French and 
German law but is at the same time complicated by traditional choices in the 1992 
BW.97 The Louisiana Civil Code (La CC) is also based on the CC and Louisiana 
scholars rely extensively on the writings of French legal scholars for their doctrinal 
discussions.98 
Recent academic writing on the law of usufruct in Belgium provides a useful 
starting point for rethinking the doctrinal and practical impact of usufruct in a modern 
context. Contributions on the Belgian law of usufruct were prompted by the need for 
clarity articulated by practitioners and the aspiration to optimize the boundaries of 
usufruct both fiscally and in terms of civil law.99 Creative ways are for instance sought 
to optimize usufruct within the context of the law of succession for the benefit of the 
                                                          
95 B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law (2008) 9. B Akkermans, 
V Sagaert & W Swadling “Introduction: Essential Directions on Using the Casebook” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law (2012) 1-36 35 note that Dutch law has a 
position in-between French and German law. 
96 B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law (2008) 10. AN 
Yiannopoulos Civil Law System Louisiana and Comparative Law a Coursebook: Texts, Cases and 
Materials (2 ed 1999) 52 remarks that the BW of 1838 “preserved much of the spirit, content and 
legislative technique” of the CC. 
97 B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law (2008) 10-11. 
98 JD Smith “Foreword” in M Planiol & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) 
(Translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 
(1959)) iii-v iii. See also AN Yiannopoulos Civil Law System Louisiana and Comparative Law a 
Coursebook: Texts, Cases and Materials (2 ed 1999) 52. 
99 See V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 
dust cover and A Verbeke “Inleiding” in A Verbeke Creatief met Vruchtgebruik M & D Seminars (2001) 
3-7 3-4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
23 
 
testator and the heir, while minimizing loss of control and income.100 Belgian law 
emphasises the destination of the object rather than its material identity to enable 
certain acts of disposition; allows for alteration of the destination where socio-
economic transformation in society is evident; and utilizes a strategic construction of 
the object of the usufruct. These mechanisms allow for a flexible approach to the salva 
rei substantia requirement.  
The Dutch law on usufruct as it is articulated in the 1992 BW provides perhaps 
the most compelling evidence of a shift in the approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement.101 By eliminating the requirement from the definition of usufruct in the 
BW and removing the obligation to return the object of the usufruct, Dutch law prompts 
the question whether the salva rei substantia requirement is still relevant. 
The transformation of the Dutch law regarding usufruct indicates a radical 
doctrinal shift in the position of the usufructuary. From a comparative perspective this 
departure provides ultimate flexibility, compared to French and Belgian law. Apart from 
omitting the salva rei substantia requirement, the removal of the distinction between 
consumables and traditional objects of usufruct thus redefines the duties, rights and 
position of the usufructuary. An investigation into the implications of the legislative 
change in Dutch law and the policy considerations underlying this transformation might 
augment the South African discourse on the need for a flexible approach to the salva 
rei substantia requirement. 
                                                          
100 A Verbeke “Inleiding” in A Verbeke Creatief met Vruchtgebruik M & D Seminars (2001) 3-7 4. 
101 JPM Stubbé, TJ Mellema-Kranenburg, CA Kraan & IJFA Van Vijfeijken Vruchtgebruik Preadvies 
Koninklijke Notariële Beroepsorganisatie (1999) 11 note that usufruct generated a lot of interest 
because of the broader application possibilities opened up by the BW of 1992. In the context of the 
revised law of succession the institution of usufruct takes on new significance: the surviving spouse can 
be compelled to transfer property to the heirs, but with the retention of usufruct. 
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It has been suggested that the German law on usufruct was potentially more 
flexible regarding the salva rei substantia requirement than the French and Louisiana 
state law (that is, before the revision of the La CC during 1976).102 LeVan and 
Yiannopoulos note that the BGB exhibited a conservative approach,103 but according 
to Yiannopoulos it was more flexible in application than the theory of destination in the 
CC.104 German law excludes the salva rei substantia requirement from the definition 
of usufruct but includes it in other provisions of the BGB.105 The emphasis is on the 
economic destination of the object, although the material identity of the object must 
still be preserved, with certain exceptions. The foregrounding of the economic 
destination, along with the noted exceptions, may be important points to consider in 
South African law.  
The recent revision of the Louisiana law on usufruct106 provides an interesting 
point of departure for reassessing the treatment of the salva rei substantia obligation 
in civil law jurisdictions in general. The inflexibility of the obligations relating to the 
salva rei substantia requirement led to the codification of the usufructuary’s power and 
                                                          
102 AN Yiannopoulos “Obligations of the Usufructuary; Louisiana and Comparative Law” (1967) 42 Tul 
L Rev 1-51.  
103 G LeVan “The Usufructuary’s Obligation to Preserve the Property” (1962) 22 La L Rev 808-818 817 
views the German position as “perhaps too limited in the context of a modern economy”. 
104 AN Yiannopoulos “Obligations of the Usufructuary; Louisiana and Comparative Law” (1967) 42 Tul 
L Rev 1-51 25 and AN Yiannopoulos Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Vol 3 Personal Servitudes: Usufruct 
– Habitation – Rights of Use (2 ed 1978) 269. AN Yiannopoulos Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Vol 3 
Personal Servitudes: Usufruct – Habitation – Rights of Use (2 ed 1978) 268-269 notes that art 558 of 
the La CC (revised 1976) “has suppressed the theory of destination”. He therefore does not refer to the 
La CC as being less flexible than the BGB in his 1978 publication. 
105 Compare for example §§ 1036(2), 1037 and 1048 BGB. 
106 M Nathan “2010 Revision of the Law of Usufruct” (2011) 57 Loy L Rev 227-236 227 refers to Act no 
881 of the 2010 Legislative Session of Louisiana which adopted revisions as result of the 
recommendations from a four year study on the laws of usufruct and bare ownership done in the light 
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
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right to dispose of nonconsumables in 1976. Recent revisions attempted to clarify the 
power of the usufructuary by stating that the power to dispose includes the right of 
alienation, lease (even beyond the length of the usufruct) and encumbrance of the 
property. Scholars are divided on the impact of the revision. Louisiana state law also 
provides an example of a jurisdiction where innovations in the law of usufruct were 
implemented during the twentieth century, with unanticipated consequences which 
resulted in practical and theoretical problems. Similar to the BW and the BGB, the La 
CC definition does not contain the salva rei substantia requirement but acknowledges 
that the nature of the object plays a pivotal role in the determination of its 
characteristics.  
Exploring whether the balance between the usufructuary and the owner has 
shifted in South African law, and whether it should shift, could prove to be an 
interesting question. Another point to ponder would be if the current balance is 
warranted, considering constitutional objectives. Exploring the implications of the 2010 
revision might also contribute to the question of whether more flexible interpretations 
of the salva rei substantia requirement indeed do provide the answer. 
To summarise, a preliminary comparative overview of the five foreign 
jurisdictions indicates a range of responses to the inherent limitations of the salva rei 
substantia requirement. In some jurisdictions a significant shift from a rigid to a flexible 
approach occurred due to pragmatic reasons, socio-economic changes or legal 
developments. Approaches range from eliminating the preservation requirement and 
increasing the disposition capacity of the usufructuary to creative interpretations of the 
destination and substance concepts. Analysis of foreign usufruct law serves to identify 
alternative approaches to the limitations of the salva rei substantia requirement with 
the aim of subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny. 
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To conclude, a few comments on my methodological orientation are in order. It 
is not the purpose of this dissertation to provide a legal historical analysis of the salva 
rei substantia requirement, tracing its development from Roman law to modern South 
African law.107 I would like to reconsider the position of the usufructuary vis-à-vis the 
bare owner with reference to the salva rei substantia requirement as a hierarchy-
confirming device within a constitutional context, without merely reiterating the 
preservation requirement as another inevitable mechanism affirming the dominant 
position of ownership in South African servitude law.  
 
                                                          
107 For more material that may be used as a starting point in this regard, at least as far as Roman and 
Roman Dutch law is concerned, see CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University and CG van der 
Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
THE CURRENT POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
2 1 Introduction 
Definitions of usufruct in both Roman Dutch and South African law can generally be 
traced back to the one formulated by Paul:1 “Usufructus est ius alienis rebus utendi 
fruendi salva rerum substantia”.2 The salva rei substantia requirement forms a 
significant component of this definition and was adopted by Roman Dutch3 and South 
African legal writers.4 Therefore, insight into the requirement is significant for the 
proper understanding of usufruct as a legal institution.  
However, as foreign5 and South African literature6 indicates, the requirement 
presents conceptual difficulties. These problems have always been inherent in the 
requirement, as is evident from the discourse on the content of the original term. Two 
brief examples serve as illustration. According to Schön the Latin term “substantia” is 
                                                          
1 D 7 1 pr. 
2 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 11, 46 & 48. 
3 See definitions by Grotius 2 38 5, Van Leeuwen RHR 2 9 1, Voet 7 1 3 & 14, Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 38 5 & Vinnius ad I 2 4 pr. 
4 See for example CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 
ed 1973) 164. See also R Zimmermann Das Römisch-Holländische Recht in Südafrika: Einführung in 
die Grundlagen und Usus Hodiernus (1983) 175-176. 
5 W Schön Der Nießbrauch an Sachen: Gesetzliche Struktur und Rechtsgeschäftliche Gestaltung 
(1992) 5-6. 
6 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20. It is notable that even a 
recent student textbook such as H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J 
van Wyk The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 250-251 devotes a separate 
excerpt to the salva rei substantia requirement and the challenges it presents. 
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derived from the Greek “hypostasis”.7 This term refers to the persisting underlying 
essence of a thing and not the accidental characteristics of and alterations to the 
object.8 This definition is unsatisfactory, since a quality can only be described as 
persisting if it continues over time and therefore lasts throughout the duration of the 
usufruct. Whatever continues to exist until the termination of the limited real right 
accrues to the bare owner. Applied to the usufructuary’s obligation not to impair the 
substance of the property subject to the usufruct, it amounts to a petitio principii: what 
is due to the owner is the quality of the property that outlasts the usufruct.9 This 
exposition of the requirement seems to render the prohibition on impairing the 
substance pointless. If only that which persists qualifies as the substance of the 
usufructuary property, it follows that any attribute which will not endure and which is 
therefore vulnerable to impairment will not qualify as substance. An obligation not to 
impair the substance is therefore a contradiction in terms. In response to this deadlock, 
Schön asserts that the requirement can at best be interpreted as a general obligation 
on the usufructuary to act lawfully.10 To determine the ambit of the lawful conduct of 
the usufructuary, his range of obligations must nevertheless be determined.  
Another illustration of the conceptual difficulties inherent in the requirement is 
evident from the ambiguous definition of usufruct as included in the first modern civil 
                                                          
7 W Schön Der Nießbrauch an Sachen: Gesetzliche Struktur und Rechtsgeschäftliche Gestaltung 
(1992) 5. 
8 6. 
9 W Schön Der Nießbrauch an Sachen: Gesetzliche Struktur und Rechtsgeschäftliche Gestaltung 
(1992) 6 n 10 notes that I Kant Kritik der Reinen Vernunft 125 Rz 184 also aptly commented on the 
logical deadlock inherent in the definition of the concept: “Ïn der That ist der Satz, daß die Substanz 
beharrlich sei, tautologisch. Denn blos diese Beharrlichkeit ist der Grund, warum wir auf die 
Erscheinumg die Kategorie der Substanz anwenden”. 
10 W Schön Der Nießbrauch an Sachen: Gesetzliche Struktur und Rechtsgeschäftliche Gestaltung 
(1992) 6. 
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code. The French Civil Code defines usufruct as “‘the right to enjoy things, of which 
another has the ownership’, as the owner himself but subject to the charge of 
preserving the substance of things”.11 This definition is unclear, since the latter part of 
the definition requires elaboration with reference to the rights and obligations of the 
usufructuary.12 Although Planiol and Rippert admit that the phrase might mean that 
the usufructuary should not change that which is essential to the usufructuary property, 
by altering its destination or the manner in which it is exploited, they do not agree that 
this would have been a correct translation of the ambiguous “salva rerum substantia”.13 
They interpret the Latin phrase as referring to the “extinction of the right through the 
loss of the thing”.14 These examples from foreign literature show that the phrase is 
problematic. Certain interpretations tied to the etymology of the word “substantia” 
seems to lead to conceptual deadlocks and furthermore, authors do not agree on the 
content of the phrase “salva rerum substantia”. In South African law the phrase salva 
rei substantia is translated as “without impairment of the substance”.15 This translation 
incorporates the conceptual vagueness referred to earlier in the South African law of 
usufruct. South African legal writers have also recognised the conceptual and practical 
difficulties inherent in the salva rerum substantia requirement.16  
                                                          
11 M Picard Traité Pratique de Droit Civil Français par Marcel Planiol et Georges Ripert Tome III (2 ed 
1952) 754 para 757: “le droit de jouir des choses don’t un autre a la propriété, comme le propriétaire 
lui-même, mais à la charge d’en conserver la substance”. 
12 M Planiol & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (Translation Louisiana State Law 
Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959)) 630 para 2747. 
13 663 para 2818. 
14 663 para 2818. 
15 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
340; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 508. 
16 H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The Principles of the 
Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 250-251; CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” 
(1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 10, 19-20. 
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Although the requirement has been incorporated in South African servitude law,17 
South African literature on the subject is sparse and fairly limited in scope.18 Apart 
from Van der Merwe’s article19 and textbook,20 Bezuidenhout provides the most 
comprehensive discussion on the topic.21 
In South African academic literature the phrase “without impairment of the 
essential qualities of things”22 signifies the obligation of the usufructuary to preserve 
the substance of the object of the usufruct.23 South African authors mostly tend to 
adopt a pragmatic approach and describe this requirement in terms of the duties it 
entails.24 This approach is also reflected in case law from the constitutional era.25 
However, Van der Merwe has attempted to analyse the requirement conceptually in 
earlier work.26 His recognition of the conceptual difficulties presented by the phrase 
                                                          
17 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
340; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 508. 
18 It is apparent from the literature that the salva rei substantia requirement is problematic in South 
African law. The obligation seems to present challenges on a typological, conceptual and a pragmatic 
level. 
19 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20. 
20 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516-520. 
21 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University. 
22 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
340. 
23 See for example H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The 
Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 250-251; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 340. 
24 See for example PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (5 ed 2006) 340. 
25 See for example Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 11, 
where Van der Byl AJ describes this obligation as entailing maintenance, the defraying of costs of “‘all 
current repairs necessary to keep it in good order and condition’”, except for fair wear and tear, and the 
payment of all rates and taxes. 
26 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 10-16, 19-20. 
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“salva rei substantia”27 affirms the challenges illustrated in foreign literature. As a 
consequence of this conceptual vagueness, South African case law does not portray 
a uniform approach to the requirement. Furthermore, South African case law on 
usufruct does not differentiate clearly between a rigid and a flexible approach to the 
requirement. Although McGregor J in Fourie v Munnik28 seems to allow for some 
flexibility with regard to the use of the object where enjoyment might become 
“unsubstantial, unproductive or illusory”, he nevertheless states that the principle 
remains that “no destruction or substantial impairing or undue deterioration to the 
usufructuary property” should take place.29 This affirmation of the requirement 
therefore suggests a rigid interpretation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate and establish the South African 
common law position regarding the salva rei substantia requirement within the context 
of personal servitudes and specifically usufruct as the most comprehensive and 
prevalent personal servitude. More specifically, the research questions addressed in 
this chapter are what a flexible and a rigid approach to the requirement would entail; 
whether both a flexible and a rigid approach can be discerned in South African case 
law; and whether a predilection for one or the other exists. To establish the current 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement, I determine the content of the salva 
rei substantia requirement in personal servitudes by firstly distinguishing praedial from 
personal servitudes to indicate how, due to the nature of these servitudes and the 
relative burdens they impose on the servient owner and bare owner respectively, they 
need similar as well as different types of regulation to protect the parties. The civiliter 
                                                          
27 10, 19-20. 
28 Fourie v Munnik 1919 OPD 73. 
29 87. 
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requirement provides protection in the case of both praedial and personal servitudes 
and regulates these servitudes in general. However, since personal servitudes 
substantially differ from praedial servitudes, they require specialised regulation. To 
explain this particular type of regulation, it is necessary to explain the nature of 
personal servitudes, and particularly usufruct as the most comprehensive personal 
servitude. Accordingly, I give a cursory overview of the nature, rights and obligations 
of the usufructuary. This synopsis underpins the conceptual discussion of the salva rei 
substantia requirement as a specialised mechanism regulating personal servitudes. 
Apart from providing a conceptual interpretation of the salva rei substantia 
requirement, I also articulate how a rigid approach to the requirement would differ from 
a flexible one. I subsequently consider how the civiliter requirement differs from the 
salva rei substantia requirement and why both are necessary according to traditional 
doctrinal considerations. This provides the scaffolding for reflecting on the research 
question. The foundational question is how the salva rei substantia is expressed and 
interpreted in current South African law. I examine how the requirement is articulated 
and interpreted in terms of the rights and duties allocated to the usufructuary; how the 
requirement plays a role in the termination of usufruct; and how noncompliance with 
the requirement triggers remedies available to the bare owner. In terms of the right of 
use and enjoyment (ius utendi) allocated to the usufructuary, I discuss the entitlements 
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to possession,30 administration,31 and control32 of the object of the usufruct. Does the 
treatment of these entitlements in case law and literature allow the usufructuary a 
measure of flexibility where the salva rei substantia requirement is concerned? In 
particular, I consider whether they reveal a flexible measure of disposition and if so, 
under what conditions. In terms of the usufructuary’s obligations, I contemplate 
whether the duties to frame an inventory of the property subject to the usufruct, to 
render security for its proper use, enjoyment and return, and to provide for ordinary 
repairs and expenses necessary for the normal maintenance of the property33 are 
applied strictly. I also consider how the courts deal with noncompliance by the 
usufructuary. The question is whether noncompliance is met by severe sanctions or 
whether contextual factors are taken into account in these decisions. Finally, I consider 
remedies and causes of termination in which the salva rei substantia requirement 
plays a role. I briefly discuss the actio negatoria as a possible remedy available to the 
bare owner when the requirement is breached. Subsequently I consider methods of 
extinction that are relevant to the salva rei substantia requirement, namely termination 
by permanent impossibility of exercise or enjoyment and termination by misuse. 
 
                                                          
30 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
340 cite Voet 7 1 32. 
31 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 585 n 1 cite Garmany v Templeton’s Executors 1936 SR 139 159; 
Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 CPD 109 112; Van der Merwe v Van Wyk 1921 EDL 298 302 and 
Furnivall v Cornwell’s Executors (1895) 12 SC 6. 
32 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & 
E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 386 cite Geldenhuys v CIR 1947 3 SA 
256 (C) 264 and Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 CPD 109 112. 
33 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 594. 
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2 2 Praedial and personal servitudes 
2 2 1  Distinction 
In South African law a servitude is defined as a limited real right that enables the 
servitude holder either to use and enjoy another person’s property or to require that 
the latter desists from exercising particular ownership entitlements regarding his 
property.34 Accordingly, this ius in re aliena suspends or restricts certain entitlements 
of the owner35 and establishes a direct relationship between the holder and the 
relevant property.36 The restriction on the entitlements of the owner by the concurrent 
servitude, and therefore the relationship between the owner and the servitude holder, 
is regulated by certain guidelines.37 The most relevant guideline to this dissertation is 
the civiliter principle that pertains to servitudes in general. The salva rei substantia 
requirement extends and specifies this principle within the realm of personal 
servitudes. In order to understand the relationship between the two, it is necessary to 
distinguish praedial from personal servitudes. 
Praedial servitudes differ from personal servitudes in several respects.38 
Essentially, the difference is related to the distinct economic functions of praedial and 
personal servitudes.39 The former is intended to enhance the use of the dominant 
                                                          
34 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
321; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 458-459. 
35 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 459. 
36 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
321. 
37 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 464-467. 
38 Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk 1972 2 SA 400 (A); Lorenz v Melle 1978 3 SA 1044 
(T) 1049-1050; Resnekov V Cohen 2012 1 SA 314. 
39 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 459. 
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tenement, whereas the latter aims to benefit an individual in his personal capacity.40 A 
praedial servitude benefits a dominant tenement while it simultaneously burdens a 
servient tenement.41 The holder of a praedial servitude exercises it in his capacity as 
owner of the dominant tenement and enforces the servitude against the servient owner 
in his capacity as owner of the servient tenement.42 The identities of the owners are 
therefore immaterial and the benefits and burdens relating to the land are passed to 
consecutive owners when the land is transferred. Conversely, a personal servitude 
benefits a specific person by conferring the specified right of use and enjoyment of the 
bare owner’s property to the servitude holder and 43 is consequently not transferable 
by the servitude holder.44 However, personal servitudes may be enforced against the 
servient owner, irrespective of his identity.45  
A second difference between praedial and personal servitudes which also relates 
to their diverse economic functions is their duration.46 Since they are inseparably 
connected to the servitude holder, personal servitudes are restricted to a specific 
period or connected to the lifespan of the beneficiary, except in the case of legal 
                                                          
40 Van Leeuwen CF 1 2 14 2; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460. 
41 Van Leeuwen CF 1 2 14 2; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 321-322. 
42 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
322. 
43 Van Leeuwen CF 1 2 14 2; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 322. 
44 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 281; Lorentz v Melle 1978 3 
SA 1044 T 1049C-D; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460. 
45 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
322. 
46 See also 2 3 2 below. 
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entities, where the maximum duration is restricted to a century.47 Therefore, they may 
not be alienated or inherited. In contrast to personal servitudes, praedial servitudes 
may be perpetual, although time limitation is also possible.48  
A third difference relates to the scope of the servitudes, both in terms of the 
objects on which they can be constituted and the burden in terms of use. Praedial 
servitudes can only be constituted on immovables, whereas personal servitudes can 
be constituted on both movables and immovables.49 In terms of use, praedial 
servitudes impose a rather limited burden on the servient owner compared to the 
scope of use of the most important personal servitude, usufruct.50 In the case of the 
latter the bare owner is necessarily excluded from the use of the property subject to 
the usufruct.51  
All of these characteristics burden and restrict the ownership entitlements of the 
owner. They therefore necessitate measures to ensure that both the owner and the 
servitude holder are treated reasonably. Nevertheless, the burdens imposed by 
praedial servitudes differ from those imposed by personal servitudes. Consequently, 
both the civiliter principle as general guideline applicable to praedial and personal 
                                                          
47 Grotius Inleiding 2 39 5; Voet Commentarius 7 4 1; Bhamjee v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 
4 SA 555 (T) 560; Goliath v Estate Goliath 1937 CPD 312; SAR&H v Paarl Roller Flour Mills Ltd 1921 
CPD 62; Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 282; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460; 506. 
48 Sections 75 and 76 of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937 were amended by sections 34 and 35 of the 
Amendment Act 43 of 1957; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460. 
49 Van Leeuwen CF 1 2 14 2; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 322; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460. 
50 Dernburg Pandekten para 245; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460-461; 506. 
51 JC Sonnekus “Bewoningsreg (Habitatio) Aard van die Regsobjek en die Effek Dáárvan oo die 
Registrasie van die Reg” (2015) 26 Stell LR 63-85 67; JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die 
Uitoefening daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-370 353. 
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servitudes and the salva rei substantia requirement, which only concerns personal 
servitudes, exist to regulate the relationship between the two parties. The question 
arises why both these mechanisms exist. How do they relate to one another?  
 
2 2 2 Civiliter principle 
As stated above, the ownership entitlements of a servient owner are inherently 
restricted by servitudes.52 Principles governing the relationship between the two 
parties are therefore necessary.53  
In general, four principles apply to the relationship between the holder of a 
servitude and the owner of the object of the servitude. Firstly, the servitude holder 
enjoys priority concerning the exercise of the servitude, while the servient owner may 
only use the object in a manner that does not restrict the rights of the servitude 
holder.54 Secondly, the servitude holder must be able to perform all acts necessary for 
the proper exercise of the servitude.55 Thirdly, the civiliter modo principle56 governs 
                                                          
52 JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die Uitoefening daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-
370 352. 
53 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 464. 
54 464-465. 
55 465-466. 
56 J Scott “A Growing Trend in Source Application by Our Courts Illustrated by a Recent Judgment on 
Right of Way” (2013) 76 THRHR 239-251 243 discusses the correct use of the term “modo” and 
concludes that although the term should be translated as “only, “merely” or “but”, the prevailing 
translation as “manner” is so entrenched as a “handy shorthand way to express the gist of the (longer) 
Latin rule” that it will probably continue to be applied. There seems to be a divergent approach to the 
nature of the civiliter modo principle in South African literature. According to MJ de Waal “Die Vereistes 
vir die Vestiging van Grondserwitute: ’n Herformulering” (1990) 2 Stell LR 171-185 180-181 the principle 
has been labelled a requirement for the establishment of praedial servitudes by some Pandectist, 
Romanist and South African writers. However, it has also been described as a general characteristic. J 
Scott “Aquaductus en Sommige Gevolge van Goeie Buurmanskap” 2013 TSAR 561-575 565 uses the 
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the way in which the holder may exercise the servitude.57 The servitude holder must 
exercise his servitude in a considerate way, causing as little inconvenience to the 
servient owner as possible. The express or implied terms of the servitude determine 
the burden on the servient land.58 Therefore, the dominant owner may not cause this 
burden to be more onerous than these terms indicate.59 The degree of care and 
consideration is determined by the bonus paterfamilias standard.60 Fourthly, the 
servient owner may exercise the entitlements of ownership that are not contrary to the 
servitude and may grant other servitudes if the latter would not infringe upon the 
exercise of existing servitudes.61 
For the purposes of this dissertation the third principle requires closer 
examination. Although the civiliter principle has been investigated in relation to praedial 
                                                          
term requirement (“vereiste”) and established characteristic (“gevestigde eienskap”) to describe the 
principle. CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 464 refers to guidelines (“riglyne”). MJ de Waal “Die 
Vereistes vir die Vestiging van Grondserwitute: ’n Herformulering” (1990) 2 Stell LR 171-185 182 
suggests that a distinction must be drawn between requirements and characteristics. The civiliter modo 
principle, he submits, cannot be characterised as a requirement for the establishment of a praedial 
servitude, but comes into play when the emphasis is on the exercise of the servitude. In this regard he 
distinguishes between the allowed content and the acceptable exercise of the servitude, a distinction 
which is also mentioned in German commentaries. 
57 See CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466-467 and specifically in regard to praedial servitudes 
JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die Uitoefening Daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-
370. 
58 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 544. See also CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed 1973) 12 and 
23. 
59 CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C 
Himonga, D Hutchison, K Lehmann, R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 593. 
60 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466-467. 
61 467. 
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servitudes,62 case law on the application of the principle to personal servitudes63 and 
particularly usufruct64 in South African law is scarce. Accordingly, the principle is 
explained with reference to case law on praedial servitudes. 
The civiliter modo principle is described as one of the “principles of 
reasonableness”.65 However, the term “reasonableness” in this description should be 
contextualised, given the doctrinal predisposition towards a notion of absolute 
ownership.66 Essentially, this principle amounts to use that causes “the owner of the 
servient tenement the least damage or inconvenience”.67 Rumpf AJA has singled out 
the ethical element of “courteousness” as essentially characteristic of the principle.68  
With reference to Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd69 
Sonnekus states that the civiliter principle has been acknowledged as the only starting 
                                                          
62 JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die Uitoefening Daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-
370.  
63Texas Co (SA) Ltd Appellant v Cape Town Municipality Respondent 1926 AD 467. 
64 Houghton Estate v McHattie and Barrat (1894) 1 OR 92 104 compares the rights of a lessee regarding 
sylva caedua with the entitlements of a usufructuary and in this regard mentions that a usufructuary 
may cut and sell such timber on condition that he does so “civiliter modo, as a good husbandsman”. 
See also CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 104, 108; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 
ed 1973) 168. 
65 J Scott “A Growing Trend in Source Application by Our Courts Illustrated by a Recent Judgment on 
Right of Way” (2013) 76 THRHR 239-251 242. Also see J Scott “Aquaductus en Sommige Gevolge van 
Goeie Buurmanskap” 2013 TSAR 561-575 565; JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die Uitoefening 
Daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-370.  
66 See in this regard AJ van der Walt The Law of Neighbours (2010) 42-43; 384. 
67 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466; J Scott “A Growing Trend in Source Application by Our 
Courts Illustrated by a Recent Judgment on Right of Way” (2013) 76 THRHR 239-251 239. Scott 242 
also refers to Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 2 SA 202 (A). Also see JC Sonnekus 
“Erfdiensbaarhede en die Uitoefening Daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-370 352. 
68 HP Viljoen The Rights and Duties of the Holder of Mineral Rights LLD dissertation Leiden University 
(1975) 58 citing Rumpf AJA in Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 A 233. 
69 2007 2 SA 363 (HHA) 373A-B. 
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point for the balancing of the conflicting interests of the servitude holder and the 
servient owner,70 although Brand JA does not view this principle in isolation but 
considers it along with the complementary principle that the servient owner must 
permit the servitude holder to do “whatever is reasonably necessary for the proper 
exercise of his rights”.71  
The scope of the civiliter modo principle is determined by the bonus paterfamilias 
standard.72 The phrases arbitratu boni viri,73 ac si optimus paterfamilias uteretur74 and 
bonus paterfamilias75 prima facie all seem to refer to this standard76 and are mentioned 
                                                          
70 JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die Uitoefening Daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-
370 352. 
71 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 2 SA 363 (HHA) 373 para 21-22. 
72 HP Viljoen The Rights and Duties of the Holder of Mineral Rights LLD dissertation Leiden University 
(1975) 58 citing Hoexter JA in Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 A 231. 
73. CG van der Merwe CG & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 593 cites I 2 1 38. CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van 
Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
28 cites D 45 1 1 pr 6. JC van Oven Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (1948) 157 refers to the 
more comprehensive formula “uit frui boni viri arbitratu” and notes that the formula was extremely 
flexible. Through case law Roman jurists gradually developed the content of the formula based on the 
measure as paraphrased by Ulpian in D 7 9 1 3 “non deteriorem se causum ususfructus facturum 
ceteraque facturum quae in re sua faceret”. 
74 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 28 refers to D 7 1 38-39. 
75 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 28 refers to D 7 1 15 2, 7 1 45, 7 1 65 pr, 7 9 1 3 
and I 2 1 38. See also CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 518 n 446 and MM Corbett “Usufruct, 
Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of 
Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401389 n 72. 
76 Compare CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 25, 28, 65, 67, 121 & CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466, 518. See also E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour 
or Reference to an Arbitrator?” (2011) 4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19 17 referring 
to G. Grosso Usufrutto e fi gure affi ni nel diritto romano 1968 285. 
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in connection with usufruct.77 The bonus paterfamilias standard78 can be interpreted 
as conduct deemed “right” or “proper” and resembles the boni viri arbitratu measure, 
which is often used as “a standard of proper conduct or fair judgment”.79 A functional 
translation of boni viri arbitratu would be “as a good man would judge fit”.80 The ac si 
optimus paterfamilias uteretur norm, “to use in a proper manner”, is also equated to 
the boni viri arbitratu standard.81 However, Giannozi draws a distinction between the 
bonus paterfamilias and the arbitrium boni viri standard.82 To her, although both 
phrases refer to “the idea of respectability and integrity”, the scope of the vir bonus is 
larger in the sense that it does not only refer to liability for behaviour in conflict with the 
                                                          
77 E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference to an Arbitrator?” (2011) 
4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19 14. 
78 F Parisi “Alterum non Laedere: An Intellectual History of Civil Liability” (1994) 39 Am J Juris 317-351 
322-323 notes that the bonus paterfamilias standard had its origin in Aristotle’s idea of the “prudent 
father of the family”. It was deemed an objective standard, and a measure that could be implemented 
by a layman. This was necessitated by the fact that the evaluation of fault in an Aquilian action was 
undertaken by a layman, the iudex unus. The Roman iudices frequently consulted expert jurists in 
delictual or quasi-delictual cases and were advised to apply an objective standard of behaviour. Lack 
of compliance with the bonus paterfamilias standard amounted to culpa, absence of conduct which 
could be expected of a diligent paterfamilias under the circumstances. 
79 HJ Roby An Introduction to the Study of Justinian’s Digest: Containing an Account of its Composition 
and of the Jurists Used or Referred to therein, together with a Full Commentary on One Title (De 
Ususfrutu) (2010 digitally printed version) 70.  
80 68. 
81 HJ Roby Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines Volume 1 (1902) 487. 
82 E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference to an Arbitrator?” (2011) 
4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19 17 bases this distinction on a text by Venuleius 
D 45 1 137 2: “Cum ita stipulatus sum “Ephesi dari?” inest tempus: quod autem accipi debeat, quaeritur. 
Et magis est, ut totam eam rem ad iudicem, id est ad virum bonum remittamus, qui aestimet, quanto 
tempore diligens pater familias confi cere possit, quod facturum se promiserit […] She quotes the 
definition by Watson: “When I stipulate thus, ‘to be paid at Ephesus’ time is implicitly allowed. How 
much is questioned. It is preferable to have recourse to the judge, as a good man, who will assess the 
time which the conscientious head of a household would need to do what is promised”. 
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bonus or diligens pater familias standard of behaviour, which measures culpa.83 It may 
be prudent not to use the phrases indiscriminately and further to keep in mind that the 
standard (bonus paterfamilias) should not be conflated with the norm (civiliter).84 
The dominant owner has to adhere to the degree of care required of a bonus 
paterfamilias and has to take into account the interests of the servient owner.85 
Exercise of the servitude that does not meet the required degree of care amounts to 
negligence.86 Furthermore, the holder of the servitude must not place a more onerous 
burden on the servient owner than is necessary for the exercise of his right.87  
It is questionable whether the civiliter modo principle can be excluded from a 
servitude, as was stated in Du Plessis v Pieterse.88 The servitude holder (appellant) 
obtained a servitude to lay a pipeline over the respondent’s farm. The manner in which 
the pipe had to be laid was stipulated in a notarial deed. The servient owner 
(respondent) damaged the pipe while working with a bulldozer. In the magistrate’s 
court the appellant’s claim for damages due to the respondent’s negligence was 
dismissed because he (the appellant) had inter alia not acted civiliter. In the court of 
                                                          
83 E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference to an Arbitrator?” (2011) 
4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19 18. 
84 See 2 3 3 below. 
85 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466; HP Viljoen The Rights and Duties of the Holder of 
Mineral Rights LLD dissertation Leiden University (1975) 58-59; CP Joubert “Die Vruggebruiker se 
Verpligting om Verbeterings aan te Bring” (1958) 21 THRHR 256-276 256. 
86 HP Viljoen The Rights and Duties of the Holder of Mineral Rights (1975) unpublished LLD dissertation 
Leiden University 58 citing Schreiner JA in Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 A 217. 
87 HP Viljoen The Rights and Duties of the Holder of Mineral Rights (1975) unpublished LLD dissertation 
Leiden University. 
88 Du Plessis v Pieterse 1970 3 SA 468 (C). This case has been accepted as authority by RC Laurens 
Die Ontstaan en Tenietgaan van Saaklike Regte in die Lig van die SA Stelsel van Akteregistrasie (1980) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Unisa 184-185; MJ de Waal “Die Vereistes vir die Vestiging van 
Grondserwitute: ’n Herformulering” (1990) 2 Stell LR 171-185 183. 
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appeal the appellant was granted damages because it was held that the application of 
the civiliter modo principle was excluded by the provisions of the deed of servitude. In 
this respect, argument was based on a statement by Schreiner JA in Kakamas 
Bestuursraad v Louw: 
“The more precise the description in the grant of the ways in which the servitude 
is to be exercised, the less room there is for complaint on the ground that it has 
not been exercised civiliter modo.” 89 
Diemont J noted that the parties carefully determined which steps the appellant had to 
take in the exercise of his rights and that the appellant had fulfilled his duties.90 
According to Diemont J the respondent did not act with the care expected of a 
reasonable man and the damage sustained by the appellant was caused by the 
respondent’s negligent actions.91 
However, the judgement in Du Plessis v Pieterse92 was reversed in Pieterse v Du 
Plessis.93 In this case the legal question was whether the plaintiff had laid the pipeline 
according to the instructions in the agreement. According to Van Blerk JA the deed 
does not state the degree of care to be taken by the servitude holder in laying the 
pipeline (hence not detailing the steps of the agreement and not excluding the civiliter 
modo requirement). As his point of departure in construing the agreement, the judge 
                                                          
89 Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 2 SA 202 (A) 218. 
90 The parties expressly agreed that in cases where the pipeline crosses a road the appellant would be 
obliged to lay the pipe at a suitable depth and cover it with sufficient groundcover (“genoegsame 
grondlaag”) to allow the vehicles and machinery of the servient owner to pass without damaging the 
pipeline. Furthermore the appellant had to lay the pipeline no less than 16 inches beneath the surface 
where arable or cultivated land was at issue. See Du Plessis v Pieterse 1970 3 SA 468 (C) 474. 
91 Du Plessis v Pieterse 1970 3 SA 468 (C) 474-475. 
92 Du Plessis v Pieterse 1970 3 SA 468 (C). 
93 Pieterse v Du Plessis 1972 2 SA 597 (A). 
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refers to the property principle that the servitude agreement should be interpreted 
strictly and in the least onerous way because it is contrary to the freedom of the servient 
owner. He therefore argues that the pipeline should have been laid in an expert 
(“vakkundig[e]”) manner. He supports his argument by referring to a statement by 
Schreiner JA that one may not conclude from an imperfect agreement that the parties 
thereby sanctioned imperfect works. The statement of Schreiner JA regarding the 
scope for civiliter modo-related complaints must be approached in a nuanced way and 
does not necessarily imply that the civiliter modo principle can be excluded by 
agreement.94 Van Blerk JA’s reliance on a property principle as point of departure in 
the interpretation of a servitude agreement emphasises the importance of property 
principles in the construction of servitude agreements. Given that agreements do not 
always contemplate all circumstances or stipulate every aspect in detail (as Van Blerk 
J’s judgment illustrates), there might generally be room to supplement provisions in a 
contract by means of property law principles such as the civiliter principle. To explain 
the difference between the civiliter principle and the salva rei substantia requirement, 
the nature and characteristics of personal servitudes and, in the context of this 
dissertation usufruct, need to be fleshed out. 
 
                                                          
94 CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed 1973) 3 do not mention Du Plessis v Pieterse 1970 3 SA 
468 (C) or Pieterse v Du Plessis 1972 2 SA 597 (A) but state Schreiner JA’s dictum without 
extrapolating. CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466 and CG van der Merwe CG & MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 
544 only refer to Pieterse v Du Plessis 1972 2 SA 597 (A). 
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2 3 Usufruct 
2 3 1 Introduction 
Usufruct is a personal servitude that grants the usufructuary a limited real right to use 
the object of another and to draw the fruits thereof, with the obligation to return the 
object to the bare owner without impairing its substance.95 
Usufruct functions as a means to provide the usufructuary with an income derived 
from the usufructuary object as well as the use and enjoyment of the property and fruit 
during his lifetime, while the object remains the property of another.96 Especially within 
the testate law of succession,97 usufruct functions as a means to provide for the 
beneficiary without giving the latter the right of disposal, as in the case of a surviving 
spouse.98 Various reasons might exist for this arrangement, ranging from securing the 
usufructuary object as family property by devolving it to an heir, to facilitating a solution 
where the beneficiary is not deemed a competent protector of business interests.99 
Usufruct may also be used as an estate planning instrument for advantageous tax 
                                                          
95 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508. MJ de Waal “Servitudes” In R Zimmerman & D Visser 
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 810 notes that this 
definition corresponds with the Roman Dutch definition. 
96 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508 describes this as the social function of usufruct. See 
also CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 89. 
97 The South African Law Commission Verslag oor die Hersiening van die Erfreg: Intestate Erfreg (1985) 
19 noted that a usufruct is not so commonly used in wills as to be prescribed as a norm in intestate 
succession as a measure to provide for the surviving spouse. 
98 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508. CP Joubert “Die Vruggebruiker se Verpligting om 
Verbeterings aan te Bring” (1958) 21 THRHR 256-276 256. W Abrie, CR Graham, MC Schoeman-
Malan, P de W van der Spuy, LN van Schalkwyk & HF Gerryts Bestorwe Boedels (5 ed 2003) 82 also 
remark that usufruct is particulary used in farming communities. 
99 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508 and CG van der Merwe CG & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” 
rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 581. 
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consequences.100 It is not exclusively used as an instrument in the law of succession 
and may also be established inter vivos.101 
 
2 3 2 Nature 
Certain aspects of the nature of usufruct are not strictly relevant to the argument and 
are not discussed here. These include erroneous classifications of usufruct due to its 
highly personal nature102 and the differences between a usufruct and a 
fideicommissum.103 However, it is necessary to briefly discuss the object of a usufruct 
                                                          
100 CJ Maritz Die Aanwending van Vruggebruik by Boedelbeplanning (1997) unpublished LLM thesis 
Potchefstroom University of CHE 1, 26 and 31. E Muller “Skepping van ’n Vruggebruik, hetsy deur 
Voorbehoud, of Aparte Aankoop: Pluk die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens die Vrugte?” (2007) 40 De 
Jure 353-369 368 notes that the usufructuary may benefit from a construction where the usufruct is 
retained or created for a specific period. Where the usufructuary survives the period, the usufruct is free 
from transfer duty and estate tax reverts to the bare owner.  
101 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508. 
102 As a “limited real right of a ‘highly personal’ nature” usufruct has sporadically been construed as a 
personal right. See in this regard Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd 1999 2 SA 419 (T); Kruger 
v Gunter 1995 1 SA 344 and Cowley v Hahn 1987 1 SA 440 (E). However, this interpretation has met 
with criticism. In this regard Cowley v Hahn 1987 1 SA 440 (E) is discussed by AJ van der Walt & GJ 
Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property (6 ed 2009) 237; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 339 n 150; P de W van der Spuy “Aard 
van ’n Persoonlike Serwituut” (1995) 2 De Jure 458-463; A Domanski “How Personal is a Personal 
Servitude?” (1988) 105 SALJ 205-210; MCJ Bobbert “Correspondence” 1987 De Rebus 194 and PF 
Breed “Usufruct: a Personal or a Real Right? A Ground of Eviction or a Latent Defect?” (1987) 50 
THRHR 352-356; J Scott “Koopkontrak van Grond: Aard van Vruggebruik oor Grond’ (1987) 1 De Jure 
181-185; CG van der Merwe “Law of Property (Including Mortgage and Pledge)” 1987 ASSAL 205-236 
221; AJ van der Walt “Saaklike Regte en Persoonlike Serwitute” (1987) 50 THRHR 343-352. The 
decision was described as wrong in law in Felix v Nortier 1996 3 All SA 143 (SE). 
103 In general the distinction is discussed in Estate Watkins-Pitchford v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1955 2 SA 437 (A) 447 and J Jamneck “Fideicommissum, Vruggebruik en Modus” (1991) 54 
THRHR 316-322. Although both distinguish between one party who is awarded the use and enjoyment 
(respectively the usufructuary and the fiduciarius) and another who receives or retains ownership 
(respectively the dominus and the last fideicommissarius), important differences are evident. In the case 
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in order to distinguish usufruct from quasi-usufruct, since the latter falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. Furthermore, it needs to be emphasised that the possibility 
of establishing usufruct on such a diverse range of objects of which some are more 
vulnerable to deterioration and destruction than others inevitably necessitates special 
regulatory and protective measures. In this sense demarcating the objects of personal 
servitudes explains the differences in the regulatory measures applicable to servitudes 
in general and to personal servitudes per se. In other words, it makes the distinction 
between the civiliter principle and the salva rei substantia requirement clearer. 
The object of the usufruct may be a single object or a collection of things 
(universitas rerum or facti)104 and includes the accessories and pertinences attached 
to it, serving the destination of the principal thing. Usufruct may also be established on 
                                                          
of a fideicommissum, the fiduciarius receives ownership of the fiduciary property, which is eventually to 
be transferred to the fideicommissarius, either at the appointed time or in the event of an uncertain 
future event. In the case of usufruct the usufructuary does not become the owner but is entitled to a 
limited real right which terminates eventually so that full ownership reverts to the dominus. A van der 
Linde “Inhoud van Testamente – Substitusie, Vruggebruik en Aanwas” in J Jamneck, C Rautenbach 
(eds), M Paleker, A van der Linde & M Wood-Bodley Erfreg in Suid-Afrika (2010) 182 notes that the 
nature of the testamentary interest is determined with reference to the testator. Where the testator 
intended that the ownership should vest in the first beneficiary, subject to a condition to be met or a 
specified period which has to run its course before ownership vests in the second beneficiary, the 
interest is constructed as a fideicommissum as the example Van Staden v Van Staden 1984 4 SA 507 
(T) shows. If the testator intended a specific limited real interest to vest in the first beneficiary, subject 
to the clause that when it terminates, full ownership vests in the dominus, the interest is interpreted as 
a usufruct, as the decision Schaumberg v Stark 1956 4 SA 462 (A) illustrates. According to Singh v 
Singh 1959 2 SA 192 (D); Schaumberg v Stark 1956 4 SA 462 (A) Voet 7 1 9; MJ de Waal & MC 
Schoeman-Malan Law of Succession (4 ed 2008) 150; 167 there exists a presumption in favour of a 
fideicommissum and against usufruct in doubtful cases. 
104 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 58 mention a herd of animals, a library or a whole estate and in 
n 4 cite Voet 7 1 14; Antje Komen v Hendrik de Heer (1908) 29 NLR 237 and Geldenhuys v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1947 3 SA 256 (C). 
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objects with a purely aesthetic value.105 The object may be movables106 or 
immovables,107 whether corporeal or incorporeal.108 Usufruct may however not be 
constituted over res consumptibiles109 as the property must be “intrinsically capable of 
being returned in a good condition, fair wear and tear excepted”.110 If the object 
changes in substance, can be extinguished or is consumed by use, it does not 
                                                          
105 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 509. 
106 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 509 cites Geldenhuys v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
1947 3 SA 256 (C) 
107 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 509 cites Grotius 2 39 2; Voet 7 1 14 and Van der Linden 
Supplementum ad Voet 7 1 14. 
108 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 39 n 158 give the example of shares, citing Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (C). 
109 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 40 state that res consumptibiles may be described as things consumed by use in accordance 
with their normal destiny. The scope of this classification is contested. While it is accepted that things 
which are destroyed when used for the first time fall into this category, writers differ on the classification 
of things which are impaired through a longer period of use. PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 40 suggest that the reduction in value 
which results from the normal use of such things should be determinative. A substantial reduction 
should indicate that the object should be classified as consumable. The same object, for example 
clothing, could therefore be classified as either consumable or not and consequently be subject to either 
quasi-usufruct or usufruct depending on the use and resulting deterioration of the object. In Cooper v 
Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (C) 535D-E Van Zyl J excluded shares from this category. See also R Jooste & 
J Yeats “Shares, Securities and Transfer” in FHI Cassim (ed), MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev 
& J Yeats Contemporary Company Law (2 ed 2012) 212-261 213-215 on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
including the 2011 amendments and regulations still citing Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (C) and 
confirming that shares are incorporeal and movable. See also the Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 35(1) 
amending s 91 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The implication of this exclusion from the category 
res consumptibiles is that shares may be the object of usufruct and not quasi-usufruct. E Leos “Quasi-
usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146 discussing Cooper v 
Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (C) in an article published prior to the implementation of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, criticised the view that shares should be uniformly categorised as the object of usufruct and 
suggested that the question of whether a share should be subject to quasi-usufruct should be 
approached by considering the nature of the actual share.  
110 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 583 n 1. 
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constitute a suitable usufructuary object.111 It may however be the object of quasi-
usufruct, an institution serving a similar social and economic function as usufruct. In 
the case of quasi-usufruct, the beneficiary becomes the owner of the property subject 
to the quasi-usufruct and only has to return the equivalent of the property to the 
dominus on termination of the usufruct. However, as was indicated in chapter 1, quasi-
usufruct falls outside the scope of this dissertation.  
From this brief discussion it is clear that the objects that are suitable as 
usufructuary objects, vary in durability and their proneness to wear and tear and 
destruction. To safeguard vulnerable usufructuary property special regulatory and 
protective measures are needed. 
A second aspect of the nature of usufruct that is relevant is its limited duration. 
Generally, usufruct continues during the lifetime of usufructuary.112 However, it may 
also be granted for a limited period or until the fulfilment of a condition, 113 but in such 
a case it would also be terminated by the earlier death of the usufructuary.114 This is 
the case since the usufruct is attached to the usufructuary and cannot exist apart from 
                                                          
111 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 583. E Leos “Quasi-Usufruct and Shares: Some Possible 
Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146 132 notes that the distinction between the rights allocated to 
the usufructuary, namely the ius utendi and the ius fruendi (the right of use and enjoyment) and the 
rights remaining with the dominus, namely the ius abutendi (the right of abuse or destruction) and the 
ius disponendi (the right of disposal) cannot exist. 
112 Grotius 2 39 1; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 520.  
113 Watson v Fraetas 1899 16 SC 263; Voet 7 4 11; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 520; MM 
Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn 
The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 379. 
114 Day’s Trustees v Registrar of Deeds & Another 1910 CPD 361;CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 
1989) 520; MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G 
Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 379; Voet 7 4 11, 12. 
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him.115 Consequently, it cannot be inherited when the usufructuary dies.116 
Accordingly, a point of return and of assessment as to the maintenance of the property 
is inevitable. In order to facilitate and ensure the return of the property the usufructuary 
has the obligation to return the usufructuary property salva rei substantia. 
To maintain the usufructuary object without impairing its substance so that it may 
be returned salva rei substantia, certain rights are granted to the usufructuary and 
specific duties are allocated to him. These rights and duties are noted briefly in the 
following section in order to contextualise and introduce the salva rei substantia 
requirement. 
 
2 3 3 Rights and duties of the usufructuary 
The usufructuary’s right entails the entitlements to possession,117 administration,118 
use and enjoyment of the object of the usufruct (ius utendi) and to take the fruits of the 
usufructuary property (ius fruendi).119 The fruits may be consumed or alienated, 
                                                          
115 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & 
E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 379. 
116 379. 
117 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 340 cite Voet 7 1 32. 
118 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 585 n 1 cite Furnivall v Cornwell’s Executors (1895) 12 SC 6; 
Van der Merwe v Van Wyk 1921 EDL 298 302; Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 CPD 109 112 and 
Garmany v Templeton’s Executors 1936 SR 139 159. 
119 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) citing Voet 7 1 28 and Barnett v Rudman 1934 AD 203 210 note that this entitlement extends to 
natural, industrial or civil fruits. 
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regardless of whether they are natural,120 industrial121 or civil.122 In terms of the ius 
fruendi the usufructuary therefore has the full right of disposition and he becomes the 
owner of fruits. As such, this entitlement does not demonstrate how the salva rei 
substantia requirement functions.  
Most South African academic writers proceed with the discussion of the duties of 
the usufructuary by stating a general underlying principle. Sources either refer to the 
usufructuary’s duty to exercise his entitlements like a rational man123 or sensible 
person. 124 The Latin phrase used to express this duty is “arbitratu boni viri”.125 
                                                          
120 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 586 give the examples of vegetables, crops and plantations 
planted for the purpose of being felled, services rendered by animals, milk, manure, wool, their young 
and carcasses, citing Morkel v Malan 1933 CPD 370 374 and Houghton Estate Co v FS McHattie & 
WS Barrat (1894) 1 OR 92 103; Voet Commentarius 7 1 22 and 26; Van Leeuwen CF 1 2 15 9; Van 
der Keessel Prael ad Gr 2 39 7 and I 2 1 37. 
121 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 102 cites Barnet v Rudman 1934 AD 203 and 
only distinguishes two main categories, namely natural and civil fruits. Industrial fruits are civil fruits 
which are the result of significant human contribution. 
122 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 589 give the examples of rent, quitrent and interest citing Grotius 
Inleiding 2 38; Voet Commentarius 7 1 30; Van Leeuwen RHR 2 9 3, CF 1 2 15 4; Ex parte Marks & 
Marks 1926 TPD 1 and Beneke v Van der Vijver (1905) 22 SC 523. 
123 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 593. 
124 CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C 
Himonga, D Hutchison, K Lehmann, R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 608. 
125 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 593 citing I 2 1 38; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Servitudes and 
Other Real Rights” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C Himonga, D Hutchison, K Lehmann, R le Roux, M 
Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 
591-629 608; CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 116; AFS Maasdorp “Personal Servitudes; 
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Alternatively, writers refer to the civiliter principle.126 These two phrases partly share a 
certain semantic field127 and the basis of both seems to be reasonableness.128 
Furthermore, there seems to be a conflation of the principles based on 
reasonableness denoting the behaviour required of the usufructuary and the standard 
of behaviour ascribed to the civiliter principle, namely that of the bonus 
paterfamilias.129 The general principle is usually discussed in conjunction with the 
                                                          
Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” rev Hall CG in Hall CG (ed) Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law: 
Volume II The Law of Property (10 ed 1976) 190. 
126 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989); CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 108. 
127 JG Kotzé “The Jurisprudence of Holland by Hugo Grotius Translated by RW Lee DCL” (1927) 44 
SALJ 147-157 155 reviewing Lee’s translation describes the Dutch term heusschelik, the equivalent of 
the Latin civiliter, as “‘in a way befitting an honest and good citizen’”. This description accords with the 
explanation by E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference to an 
Arbitrator?” (2011) 4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19 15 of the phrase “arbitru boni 
viri” as denoting behaviour of the usufructuary as an honest man. It seems therefore that the concepts 
of “civiliter” and “arbitru boni viri” (at least partly) denote the same manner of behaviour. Assuming total 
equivalence might be premature. The civiliter principle applies to both praedial and personal servitudes 
and according to also E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference to an 
Arbitrator?” (2011) 4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19 18-19 the phrase arbitratu 
boni viri also has a wide application in the various legal institutions such as sale, lease, corporations, 
dowry, will and fideicommissum. The sources stated as authority for both phrases do not overlap in 
South African literature on servitudes. Further conclusions in this regard might be drawn from the work 
of E Giannozzi who also defended her doctoral dissertation entitled Le Bonus Vir en Droit Romain on 
28 March 2015. See also E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or Reference 
to an Arbitrator?” (2011) 4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19. 
128 See for example JC Sonnekus “Aquaeductus en Sommige Gevolge van Goeie Buurmanskap: 
Zeeman v De Wet 2012 6 SA 1 (HHA)” 2013 TSAR 561-575 565, 571; JC Sonnekus “Waterserwitute, 
Verjaring en die Kennisleer: Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 2 SA 325 (HHA)” 2009 TSAR 776-785 778 in 
relation to the civiliter principle. Regarding the phrase arbitratu boni viri see HJ Roby An Introduction to 
the Study of Justinian’s Digest: Containing an Account of its Composition and of the Jurists Used or 
Referred to therein, together with a Full Commentary on One Title (De Ususfrutu) (2010 digitally printed 
version) 70. 
129 See for example CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 116;  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 
ed 1989) 518 and CP Joubert “Die Vruggebruiker se Verpligting om Verbeterings aan te Bring” (1958) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
salva rei substantia requirement. The principle of reasonableness and the salva rei 
substantia requirement can be interpreted as constituting one overarching point of 
departure covering the exercise of the usufructuary’s rights in general and giving rise 
to particular duties of the usufructuary. Firstly, he has to exercise his rights civiliter.130 
Secondly, he has to return the property salva rei substantia.131 This requirement is 
discussed below. 
The other duties of the usufructuary flow from this overarching point of departure. 
The usufructuary has to frame an inventory of the property subject to the usufruct, 
render security for the proper use, enjoyment and return thereof and take responsibility 
for the ordinary repairs and expenses necessary for normal maintenance of the 
property.132 The usufructuary does not have to pay for extraordinary repairs, insurance 
premiums or the replacement of buildings that have fallen into disrepair due to age or 
that have been accidently destroyed. Normal deterioration is not for the account of the 
usufructuary either and he only has to return the property in the state that it is in at the 
termination of usufruct.133 These duties are listed by all South African academic 
writers. However, Van der Merwe adds another duty, namely the duty not to damage, 
destroy or change the nature of the object substantially.134 
                                                          
21 THRHR 256-276 256 and 261 no 4. The conflation could probably be related to proximity of the 
phrases “arbitratu boni viri” and “bonus paterfamilias” in the phrase “arbitratu boni viri ac tanquam bonus 
paterfamilias” in Voet 7 1 22. Also see E Giannozzi “Uti Frui Arbitrio Boni Viri: Standard of Behaviour or 
Reference to an Arbitrator?” (2011) 4 Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 13-19 17 refering 
to G Grosso Usufrutto e figure affi ni nel diritto romano (1968) 285. 
130 See discussion of the civiliter requirement in 2 2 2 above. 
131 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516. 
132 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 594. 
133 Paras 595-597.  
134 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 519. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
 
In the following section the salva rei substantia requirement is discussed as 
overarching requirement specifically applicable to personal servitudes and as the 
requirement from which all other duties of the usufructuary flow. 
 
2 3 4 The salva rei substantia requirement 
The salva rei substantia requirement135 applies to the personal servitudes of 
usufruct,136 use137 and habitation.138 Within the context of usufruct139 it can be 
described as the obligation of the usufructuary to use and enjoy the object of the 
usufruct “without impairment of the essential quality of things”.140  
                                                          
135 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 10 uses the term 
“requirement” (“vereiste”). PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 340 utilize the term “duty”. H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W 
Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 250 and 
CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University employ the term “obligation” (“verpligting”). G 
Pugliese “On Roman Usufruct” (1966) 40 Tul L Rev 523-554 548 discusses Roman usufruct and also 
uses the term “obligation”. 
136 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508. 
137 521. 
138 523. 
139 The author defines the salva rei substantia requirement within the context of usufruct because it has 
been described as the most “comprehensive” (“omvattendste”) personal servitude. See CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 506. 
140 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 340. Case law from the constitutional era also recognises this obligation, see Mkontwana v 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality 
and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local Government and Housing 
in the Province of Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msundzi Municipality as Amici 
Curiae) 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 55 and Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 
JDR 0863 (T) 11. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in 
WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 581 and CG van der Merwe & A Pope 
“Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C Himonga, D Hutchison, K Lehmann, 
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The concept has both a physical denotation and a teleological signification.141 
Where it pertains to a physical object, it must in the first place be construed as a 
negative duty prohibiting or limiting interference with the substance, form or physical 
configuration of the object during the usufruct and in the second place as a positive 
duty to maintain the object where it consists of a corpus of for example livestock, fruit 
trees or game.142 In its teleological manifestation, the concept refers to the character 
or the economic destination of the object of the usufruct. The usufructuary must refrain 
from altering either of the two, even if such a change would not transform the matter 
or physical configuration of the object of the usufruct. 
Either a flexible or a rigid approach to the interpretation of the salva rei substantia 
requirement can be followed.143 A rigid approach would entail strictly prohibiting the 
deterioration or impairment of the object of the usufruct, without taking into account 
the nature of the object, the context (including the locality and circumstances regarding 
its enjoyment) or the practice and custom of prudent users of similar property.144 It 
                                                          
R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser Wille’s Principles of South African Law 
(9 ed 2007) 591-629 604-605 for recent definitions incorporating the requirement. H Mostert, A Pope 
(eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The Principles of the Law of Property in 
South Africa (2010) 250-251 devote an insert to the salva rei substantia requirement, concentrating on 
its practical application. 
141 Reference in this section to CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 
9-20 10-12 unless otherwise noted.  
142 Beneke v Van der Vijver (1905) 22 SC 523 529 is an example of a decision where the usufructuary 
had a positive duty to maintain the corpus of flocks and herds from the increase yielded occasionally. 
143 The existence of both a flexible and a narrow approach can be deduced from the pronouncements 
of the judiciary opting for a flexible approach. See for example Ward J in Fourie v Munnik 1919 OPD 
73 79: “I think the expression ‘without deteriorating’ used by van der Linden and the other Roman and 
Roman Dutch writers must not be taken in too narrow a sense”.  
144 The review of old authorities by Kotzé J in Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 
CPD 159 74ff in general seems to confirm the rigid approach. See also Geldenhuys v Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue 1947 3 SA 256 (C) 263-264 per Steyn J. See for an example to the contrary Ward 
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seems that a rigid approach primarily pertains to the preservation of the physical 
object, based on a literal interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement. Strict 
enforcement of the salva rei substantia requirement implies that the usufructuary 
would not be able to change the economic destination of the object of the usufruct 
even if its value would be increased by the alteration.145 In Fourie v Munnik146 
McGregor J points out the negative consequences of a narrow interpretation: 
“[F]or while on the one hand there must be no destruction or substantial impairing 
or undue deterioration of the usufructuary property, one should, conversely, not 
insist on such counsels of perfection regarding the user as to make the enjoyment 
something unsubstantial, unproductive or illusory.”  
A flexible approach normally allows for some physical interference, provided that the 
economic destination of the object of the usufruct is not altered. Interference would be 
justified by contextual factors such as the locality, established practices in the area, 
the nature of the object of the usufruct and circumstances relevant to its enjoyment.147 
Secondly, it might also entail replacing the salva rei substantia requirement with the 
more flexible salva rei aestimatione148 requirement, which would take economic 
considerations into account.149 Thirdly, it has been proposed that a flexible approach 
might also entail accepting economic gain (in the sense that it increases the value of 
                                                          
J in Fourie v Munnik 1919 OPD 73 79 who takes into account the locality (in this case a district where 
sowing supplements other farming practices and provides food for livestock) and the practice of the 
“experienced prudent farmer in the same neighbourhood”. McGregor J in Fourie v Munnik 1919 OPD 
73 86-87 takes into account the nature of the object of the usufruct and the “circumstances attending 
its enjoyment”.  
145 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 14. 
146 1919 OPD 73 87. 
147 Fourie v Munnik 1919 OPD 73 79, 87. 
148 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 15 explains the term as 
preserving the value of the usufructuary object. 
149 15-16. 
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the object of the usufruct) as a valid and sufficient reason for changing the economic 
destination of the object of the usufruct.150 This South African differentiation between 
a rigid and a flexible approach is supported by a recent international publication.151 
The discussion above prompts the question how the salva rei substantia 
requirement differs from the civiliter principle discussed in 2 2 2. In view of the 
differences between praedial and personal servitudes the two regulatory mechanisms 
can be distinguished from each other. 
 
2 3 5 Differences between the requirement and the civiliter principle152 
The civiliter principle pertains to all servitudes, whereas the salva rei substantia 
requirement applies only to personal servitudes. The civiliter principle is therefore a 
more general principle than the salva rei substantia requirement. The standard of care 
for both is that of the bonus paterfamilias.153 Furthermore, both the civiliter principle 
and the salva rei substantia requirement protect the interests of the bare owner.154  
                                                          
150 R Zimmermann Das Römisch-Holländische Recht in Südafrika: Einführung in die Grundlagen und 
Usus Hodiernus (1983) 175. 
151 A Verbeke, B Verdickt & D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in C van der Merwe & A Verbeke 
(eds) Time-Limited Interests in Land (2012) 33-56. 
152 I am indebted to Professor AJ van der Walt and the 2013 SARCPL research group for comments in 
this regard. 
153 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466 citing Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 2 SA 202 
(A) 231 and CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 518. See also CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike 
Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 25 n 94 citing I 2 1 38. 
154 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466; MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR 
Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 
378-401 379, 389. 
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The differences between the two principles relate to the differences between 
praedial and personal servitudes. Firstly, as personal servitudes are of limited 
duration155 and the object of the servitude consequently has to be returned, there 
inevitably has to be a point of return and of assessment as to the maintenance of the 
property. In order to facilitate and ensure the return of the property the usufructuary 
has the obligation to return the usufructuary property salva rei substantia. Maintenance 
and repair duties are accordingly placed on the usufructuary. Furthermore, since 
assessment of the fulfilment of this criterion is necessary, specific duties are imposed 
on the usufructuary, such as the framing of inventory and the provision of security. 
These duties are discussed in section 2 4 1. Since praedial servitudes are generally 
not of a limited duration and the object of the praedial servitude does not have to be 
returned, there is no point of return and assessment concerning the maintenance of 
the property. 
Secondly, the scope of the use and enjoyment of the property is much more 
extensive in the case of personal servitudes.156 The beneficiary of a personal servitude 
mostly has full and exclusive use of the object of the servitude,157 whereas the 
beneficiary of a praedial servitude is usually entitled to more limited use.158 This is 
particularly the case with usufruct. The bare owner is excluded from the use of the 
usufructuary property,159 while the usufructuary’s full use and enjoyment of the 
                                                          
155 See 2 2 1 and 2 3 2 above.  
156 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460-461. 
157 JC Sonnekus “Bewoningsreg (Habitatio) Aard van die Regsobjek en die Effek Dáárvan oo die 
Registrasie van die Reg” (2015) 26 Stell LR 63-85 67; JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die 
Uitoefening Daarvan Civiliter Modo” (2007) 70 THRHR 351-370 353.  
158 Dernburg Pandekten para 245; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 460-461; 506. 
159 JC Sonnekus “Bewoningsreg (Habitatio) Aard van die Regsobjek en die Effek Dáárvan oo die 
Registrasie van die Reg” (2015) 26 Stell LR 63-85 67. 
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usufructuary property provide ample opportunity for wear and tear, misuse and even 
destruction or loss. The owner of the usufructuary property therefore requires more 
customised protection to ensure that he does have the use and enjoyment of the 
usufructuary property when it reverts to him on termination of the usufruct. This 
correlation between increased protection through customised measures and greater 
substantive burdens on the bare owner’s property is not only evident when praedial 
and personal servitudes are compared. Where personal servitudes differ in terms of 
the burden they impose on the bare owner’s property and the entitlements granted, 
the respective duties also vary. In the case of usus, for example, the usuary is only 
entitled to the fruits necessary for his daily needs. The owner is not entirely excluded 
from the use of the property subject to the right of use.160 The owner may for instance 
temporarily enter the farm given in use to collect the remainder of the fruits not 
necessary for the needs of the usuary.161 Accordingly, the duties of the usuary are 
also less extensive than those of the usufructuary: the usuary is not liable for the same 
running costs as the usufructuary.162 This was confirmed in Vairetti v Zardo,163 where 
Erasmus J stated that “[t]he limited nature of the right carries, as a corollary, a 
commensurately limited set of obligations, in particular as regards the upkeep of the 
property”.164 Conversely, “an extension of the usuary’s right of use (i.e. to cater for 
increased needs) extends the usuary’s obligations”.165  
                                                          
160 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 522. 
161 522. 
162 523. 
163 [2010] ZAWCHC I46 paras 22-27. 
164 Para 25. 
165 Para 27. 
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The salva rei substantia requirement in personal servitudes therefore differs from 
the civiliter principle due to the increased scope of the burden on the bare owner’s 
property in comparison to the burden on the servient owner’s property in a praedial 
servitude. The bare owner needs more protection in comparison to the owner of a 
servient tenement where a praedial servitude is concerned. This protection is provided 
by the duties flowing from the salva rei substantia requirement. 
Thirdly, the objects of praedial and personal servitudes differ.166 Praedial 
servitudes are always tied to the use of land, while movables may be the object of 
personal servitudes. Movables are inherently more vulnerable to wear and tear and to 
destruction, and therefore they need to be protected in the interest of the bare owner 
who will eventually take possession of them on termination of the usufruct. 
All these factors contribute to the conclusion that the civiliter modo principle 
differs from the salva rei substantia requirement in the sense that the latter affords 
customised protection that is more extensive than in the case of the civiliter principle. 
Taking into account the duration, scope and object of usufruct the regulation required 
needs to be more detailed and comprehensive. 
 
2 4 The salva rei substantia requirement in case law and literature  
2 4 1 The rights and duties of the usufructuary 
As was previously mentioned, the usufructuary is entitled to the possession, 
administration and control,167 use and enjoyment of the object of the usufruct (ius 
                                                          
166 See 2 3 2 above. 
167 Voet 7 1 32; Geldenhuys v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1947 3 SA 256 2 (C) 264; In re Cooper’s 
Estate 1939 CPD 309 311; Garmany v Templeton’s Executors 1936 SR 139 159; Steyn v Registrar of 
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utendi) and to take the fruits of the usufructuary property (ius fruendi).168 Although 
some authors note that the entitlements to possession, administration and control flow 
from the entitlement to use and enjoy the usufructuary property,169 this relationship is 
not indicated by all writers.170 As a point of departure the usufructuary has the 
entitlement to use the usufructuary property to the extent necessary for the cultivation 
and acquisition of fruits.171 The question is whether this wide entitlement of use allows 
the usufructuary some flexibility where the salva rei substantia requirement is 
concerned in terms of his entitlements to administer and control the usufructuary 
property. As will be evident from chapter 3, these entitlements are fleshed out and 
                                                          
Deeds 1933 CPD 109 112; Van der Merwe v Van Wyk 1921 EDL 298 302; Furnivall v Cornwell’s 
Executors (1895) 12 SC 6; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in 
WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 585; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 340; NJ van der Merwe “Testate 
Erfreg (Vervolg) Die Inhoud van Testamente” in NJ van der Merwe, CJ Rowland & MB Cronje Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Erfreg (6 ed 1990) 250-407 267; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 510 n 381; MM 
Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn 
The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 386; AFS Maasdorp “Personal Servitudes; 
Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” rev Hall CG in Hall CG (ed) Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law: 
Volume II The Law of Property (10 ed 1976) 189. 
168 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) citing Voet 7 1 28 and Barnett v Rudman 1934 AD 203 210 note that this entitlement extends to 
natural, industrial or civil fruits. 
169 NJ van der Merwe “Testate Erfreg (Vervolg) Die Inhoud van Testamente” in NJ van der Merwe, CJ 
Rowland & MB Cronje Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg (6 ed 1990) 250-407 267; MM Corbett “Usufruct, 
Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of 
Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 386; AFS Maasdorp “Personal Servitudes; Usufruct, Usus 
and Habitatio” rev Hall CG in Hall CG (ed) Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law: Volume II The 
Law of Property (10 ed 1976) 189. 
170 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 585; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F du Bois (ed), 
G Bradfield, C Himonga, D Hutchison, K Lehmann, R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe 
& D Visser Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 469-556. 
171 Barnett & Others v Rudman & Another 1934 AD 203; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 510. 
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discussed in some detail in comparative jurisdictions in order to determine whether 
use may in any sense sanction disposition. This is not the case in South African 
literature and case law. In fact, it is not an easy task to determine the scope of these 
entitlements. In Steyn v Registrar of Deeds172 it was noted that the right to possession, 
administration and control is an essential feature of usufruct. It would therefore seem 
necessary to determine the scope of these entitlements and particularly of 
administration and control. In case law these entitlements are sometimes conflated. 
For example, in Furnivall v Cornwell’s Executors173 the right of administration was 
described as the right to especially control, along with possession and custody, of the 
usufructuary property.174 Another case in point is Garmany v Templeton’s 
Executors,175 in which Russell CJ elaborates on his statement that the usufructuary 
had not taken over control and administration of the estate, namely that the accounts 
and bank accounts were not in the usufructuary’s name and that the working of the 
farm, although undertaken under supervision of the usufructuary, was not undertaken 
by her. On the other hand, these entitlements are sometimes distinguished. In Steyn 
v Registrar of Deeds176 Watermeyer J decided that the interest involved did not amount 
to a usufruct since the survivor did not have possession, control or administration. He 
distinguishes between control and administration in casu, with the former allocated to 
                                                          
172 1933 CPD 109 112. 
173 (1895) 12 SC 6. 
174 Furnivall v Cornwell’s Executors (1895) 12 SC 6 concerned the usufruct of an estate consisting of 
movables and immovables. The usufructuary was permitted to let the houses and to take control of the 
property. She also took due care that the premises were repaired and insured. 
175 1936 SR 139 160. 
176 1933 CPD 109 112. 
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the lessee, while the latter entitlement was tied to the executor of the estate as lessor 
who would have to deal with issues arising from a lease.177  
In the case of usufruct on an estate the usufructuary is entitled to sue if debts are 
due to the estate; to call up mortage bonds; sue for money due upon the latter, but 
only in so far as it would benefit the estate.178 What clearly falls outside of this 
demarcation is the power to mortgage the farm or to risk more than the usufructuary 
interest.179 Control and administration therefore do not seem to involve the entitlement 
to conclude juristic acts such as financing farming ventures from the capital of the 
estate in usufruct, mortgaging or pledging the usufructuary property. Furthermore, it 
also excludes the entitlement to cede the usufruct to anyone except the bare owner.180 
Case law does not elaborate on the juristic acts which would be acceptable as acts of 
administration and control within the ambit of the salva rei substantia requirement. This 
aspect is subjected to more scrutiny in foreign case law, as is evident from chapter 3, 
since it also allows a measure of flexibility where the requirement is concerned. What 
is clear is that general acts of disposition do not form part of administration and 
control.181 To summarise, the entitlements of administration and control are 
acknowledged in South African law but the scope of these entitlements is not clear. 
Therefore, it is also not clear how this entitlement might facilitate a flexible approach 
to the salva rei substantia requirement in South African law.  
                                                          
177 Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 CPD 109 112. 
178 Garmany v Templeton’s Executors 1936 SR 139 161. 
179 160. 
180 Van der Merwe v Van Wyk 1921 EDL 298 302. 
181 Sheriff Bloemfontein-East v Gainsford 2013 JDR 2285 (FB) 5-6 paras 9-11; Geldenhuys v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1947 3 SA 256 2 (C) 264; Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 CPD 109; 
Van der Merwe v Van Wyk 1921 EDL 298 301-302. 
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The salva rei substantia requirement is most often discussed in relation to the 
duties that follow from the obligation not to impair the substance of the usufructuary 
object. Case law and literature dealing with the neglect of the duties flowing from the 
requirement are therefore examined in this section. The duty to defray rates and taxes 
is not discussed here as this duty does not particularly highlight the approach of the 
courts to the salva rei substantia requirement. However, case law focussing on the 
duty to frame inventory, provide security and to maintain and repair the object of the 
usufruct is examined here.  
 
2 4 1 1 Inventory 
The usufructuary is under the obligation to frame an inventory on request of the bare 
owner.182 The inventory informs the dominus of the scope and the nature of the 
usufructuary object to be returned at the termination of the usufruct.183 The inventory 
therefore plays an instrumental role in establishing whether the usufructuary property 
was returned salva rei substantia.  
Recent case law indicates that there seems to be uncertainty as to the formal 
requirements of an inventory. In Van den Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and 
Another184 an inventory was demanded but Van der Byl AJ notes that it is not clear 
what the fourth applicant intended with his request. Van der Byl AJ suggests that if the 
                                                          
182 Van Rensburg v Mulder 1998 JDR 0756 (T); Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C) 36; Schoeman v 
Schoeman and Another 1953 2 SA 441 (T) 442; Grotius 2 39 20; Voet Commentarius 7 9 2, 7 9 7; 
Groenewegen ad Grotius 2 39 2; Van Leeuwen RHR 2 9 10, CF 1 2 15 6; Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 3; 
Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 39 3; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516. 
183 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 109-110. 
184 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T). 
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purpose was to describe the condition of the usufructuary object, this was already 
taken care of by the fourth applicant himself.185 Similarly, in Heukelman v 
Heukelman186 an inventory pertaining to the corpus was demanded, but Makgoka J 
states that the first and final liquidation and distribution account in the estate served 
as the inventory for the estate and the corpus of the usufruct.187 It therefore seems 
that the judiciary takes a pragmatic approach to the framing of an inventory and judges 
are open to the use of different documents, as long as it fulfils the purpose of 
describing the property subject to the usufruct and its condition. The uncertainty 
regarding the formal requirements of an inventory may be related to the tendency not 
to demand an inventory in practice.188 
However, the framing of a functional inventory is a useful practice,189 particularly 
where the fulfilment of the salva rei substantia requirement is concerned, as was 
illustrated in Beneke v Van der Vijver.190 In this case an inventory was provided that 
was “so obviously and admittedly insufficient and incorrect” that it was set aside 
because the condition of the estate at the time it was framed could not be determined 
from it.191 The judge proceeded to determine the value of the movable usufructuary 
objects at the death of the usufructuary and used the value realised after the goods in 
                                                          
185 5. 
186 Heukelman v Heukelman NO 2012 JDR 1378 (GNP). 
187 13 para 25. 
188 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 109. 
189 109. 
190 Beneke v Van der Vijver (1905) 22 SC 523. 
191 528. 
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the estate of the usufructuary had been sold.192 Had a complete and correct inventory 
been framed at commencement of the usufruct, the value of the usufructuary property 
would probably have been higher than it would have been on termination of the 
usufruct and consequently the position of the bare owners would have been more 
advantageous.  
Taking into account the relative benefit of the framing of an inventory at the 
commencement of the usufruct, the question arises whether inventory can also be 
demanded at a later stage, since this would make it possible, and perhaps even 
encourage, the usufructuary to waste of the corpus up to the point of inventory. There 
would be no record of the initial scope and condition of usufructuary property and 
consequently it would be difficult to determine to what an extent the usufructuary has 
complied with the salva rei substantia requirement before the framing of inventory. 
However, demanding inventory at a later stage of the usufruct would at least act as a 
deterrent again subsequent wasting of the corpus.  
Academic literature and case law state that the inventory can be demanded at 
the commencement of the usufruct or at a later stage.193 In Stain v Hiebner194 the 
applicants sought an order against their stepmother in respect of certain furniture 
                                                          
192 Beneke v Van der Vijver (1905) 22 SC 523 529. See also CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte 
van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 110. 
193 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) citing Voet 3 9 11 and 
GG van der Merwe Sakereg 368. In Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C) at 36 Diemont J stated that he 
saw no reason why the applicants could not insist on an inventory and security in the light of the 
possibility that the respondent may have been disposing of the usufructuary property even though they 
had not demanded it initially. Also see CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 110, citing Stain v 
Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C) and CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516. 
194 1976 1 SA 34 (C) 35. 
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subject to usufruct.195 Diemont J states that where the subject of the usufruct “may 
easily be lost or damaged it is only reasonable that the heirs should be entitled to ask 
for inventory”.196 In this case the applicants also had “reason to apprehend that the 
usufructuary may be disposing of the property”.197 The Court ordered the usufructuary 
to provide inventory of the movable assets subject to the usufruct within 21 days of the 
order and in the event of a failure to furnish inventory or to provide security, she had 
to restore the assets to the applicants. This decision is problematic in the sense that 
the passage from Voet provided as authority for stating that security and inventory 
may be claimed during usufruct only refers to security and does not mention 
inventory.198 Voet does mention the framing of inventory in another section, where he 
refers to Ulpian’s proposition199 that the heir or legatee should give a description of the 
usufructuary property (particularly its condition) before witnesses at the 
commencement of his enjoyment so that the extent to which the usufructuary has 
diminished the value (if at all) of the property subject to the usufruct can be 
determined.200 Voet adds that the inventory can furthermore indicate “to what the 
sureties have been bound”, prevents lawsuits and relieves the proprietor from the 
“often troublesome necessity of proof”.201 Framing an inventory can be compelled “just 
as much as to give security”.202 On this point it might perhaps be argued that if the 
obligation to frame inventory might be compelled to the same degree as the provision 




198 Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C) 36 citing Voet 7 9 11. 
199 Voet 7 9 2 refers to D 7 9 1 4. 
200 D 7 9 1 4. 
201 Voet 7 9 2. 
202 Voet 7 9 2. 
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of security (or perhaps more so),203 the bare owner may also demand inventory during 
the usufruct, similar to the way in which security may be required after commencement 
of the usufruct. In the section on the remission of security,204 Voet notes that an 
inventory is obligatory even if the provision of security is not required of a parent as 
usufructuary. Gane205 suggests that the cross-reference made by Voet206 refers to 
Voet 10 2 3 dealing with the division of a family inheritance. Presumably this is to the 
section noting that division of inheritance by consent may be made between majors 
without inventory. However, in this section Voet  asserts that minors have the right of 
correction: if “noteworthy damage” has occurred, they may “lawfully claim that 
inventory be framed and that the allotment of properties, previously made unfairly or 
deceptively without inventory, be corrected in their favour”.207 From this passage it 
seems that an inventory can indeed be framed at a later stage than the division of the 
family inheritance. Although one cannot therefore find express authority for the 
decision in Stain v Hiebner,208 arguments in this regard cannot unequivocally be ruled 
out. If the law as it stands in this case is accepted, the failure to frame inventory after 
the commencement of the usufruct in response to a court order may result in the loss 
of movables subject to usufruct. 
According to Corbett there are no exceptions to the general duty to frame 
inventory and in this respect it differs from the duty to provide security.209 Whereas a 
                                                          
203 Voet 7 9 2; 7 (concluding paragraph).  
204 Voet 7 9 9. 
205 P Gane with reference to Voet 7 9 7 in Voet 7 9 7 n (c). 
206 Voet 7 9 7 concluding sentence. 
207 Voet 10 2 3. 
208 1976 1 SA 34 (C). 
209 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & 
E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 393. 
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father who is granted usufruct over his children’s property is not required to provide 
security, he still has to frame inventory.210 Likewise, the testator may not dispense with 
the obligation to furnish an inventory.211 However, Bezuidenhout mentions that a donor 
of usufruct inter vivos may relieve the usufructuary of the duty to frame inventory.212 
The importance of this duty flowing from the salva rei substantia requirement is 
emphasised by the sanction for noncompliance with the request to frame inventory. 
Where there is insistence on an inventory, compliance is viewed as a condition that 
must be satisfied in order for the usufructuary to use and enjoy the property subject to 
the usufruct.213 Accordingly, the usufructuary is not entitled to its use and enjoyment 
until he meets this condition.214 He may even be denied possession if he refuses to 
comply. The usufructuary who fails to comply with a court order demanding an 
inventory (and security) may be ejected or dispossessed (when movables are 
involved).215 These sanctions show that the determination of the content and condition 
of the usufructuary property which will enable the usufructuary to return it salva rei 
substantia is significant.  
                                                          
210 Groenewegen ad Grotius 2 39 3; Voet 7 9 7; MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo 
(ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-
401 393. 
211 Grotius 2 39 20; MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR 
Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 393. 
212 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 109. 
213 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & 
E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 391. 
214 392. 
215 Schoeman v Schoeman 1953 2 SA 441 (T). Whether such an order will still be accepted in a 
constitutional dispensation is questionable. Ejectment might infringe the s 26 right of access to adequate 
housing enshrined in the Constitution in cases where the residence subject to the usufruct is the only 
housing available to the usufructuary. This aspect is discussed in chapter 5. 
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Given that there are generally no exceptions to the duty to frame inventory, 
whereas this is permitted in the case of the duty to provide security; that refusal to 
satisfy a demand for inventory is met with sanctions like refusal to grant the 
usufructuary property, or dispossession and ejectment where the property is already 
in the possession of the usufructuary; and the possibility of demanding an inventory 
not only at the commencement of but also during the usufruct, this duty of the 
usufructuary seems to be regarded as significant. The severity of the remedies 
available to the bare owner in case of noncompliance seems to point to a strict 
interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement as far as doctrine is concerned. 
However, since case law on inventory that shows evidence of this approach in practice 
is nevertheless scant and relatively old, conclusions in this regard need to be 
approached with caution. Furthermore, in practice inventory is seldom demanded 
unless a dispute arises.216 In fact, nude owners seem to be ignorant as to the nature 
of a document that would satisfy this demand.217 On the other hand, judges appear to 
take a pragmatic and functional approach by accepting different documents such as a 
first and final liquidation and distribution account of an estate218 and a handwritten 
note.219  Bearing in mind that a demand for inventory at commencement of the usufruct 
would place the usufructuary in the position to prove that he complied with the salva 
rei substantia requirement throughout the duration of the usufruct and assist him in 
                                                          
216 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 109. 
217 See Heukelman v Heukelman NO 2012 JDR 1378 (GNP) para 25; Van der Heever NO and Others 
v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 5. 
218 See Heukelman v Heukelman NO 2012 JDR 1378 (GNP) para 25. 
219 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 5, 7, 9. 
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challenging allegations of dissipation of the usufructuary property, it still seems like a 
useful duty. Measures to encourage compliance at the outset would be constructive. 
A duty related to the framing of an inventory, namely the provision of security, is 
discussed in the following section. Compliance with these two duties should usually 
be demanded when the usufruct is established. However, as has already been evident 
from the discussion of the duty to frame an inventory, they are not always enforced in 
practice. This might lead to unnecessary litigation and usually complicates 
judgements. 
 
2 4 1 2 Security 
If required by the dominus,220 the usufructuary is obliged to provide security221 that he 
will exercise the usufruct civiliter modo222 and return the usufructuary object salva rei 
                                                          
220 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 111 notes that apart from a demand by the bare 
owner, the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 s 44 (1) requires that the usufructuary must provide 
security if the bare owner is a minor. However, this section must be read in conjunction with section 43.  
221 Van Rensburg v Mulder 1998 JDR 0756 (T) 7; Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C) 36; Ex parte Estate 
Wagenaar 1953 4 SA 435 (C) 438-439; Olivier v Venter 1933 EDL 206; Ex parte Newberry 1924 OPD 
219 223; Ex parte Pistorius 1920 TPD 297 301; Klopper v Van Rensburg 1920 EDL 239 241-242; 
Gibaud v Bagshaw 1918 CPD 202 205; Ex parte Kock 1917 TPD 713 716; Ex parte Estate Van Blerck 
1909 CTR 846; Furnivall v Cornwell’s Executors 1895 12 SC 6 10; Voet 7 9 1; Grotius 2 39 3; Schorer 
ad Grotius 2 39 3; Van der Keessel Thes Sel 371; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1 11 5; 
Antonius Matthaeus Disputationes de Servitutibus 2 no 9; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517; 
CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1990) 111; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516. 
222 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516; CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van 
Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
111. The measure of care required to satisfy the civiliter modo requirement is the bonus paterfamilias 
standard. See CP Joubert “Die Vruggebruiker se Verpligting om Verbeterings aan te Bring” (1958) 21 
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substantia223 upon termination of the usufruct.224 Returning the property in the same 
condition in which he received it would satisfy the goal of the bare owner to receive 
the property in an undamaged condition.225 However, even if the usufructuary uses 
the property in a proper manner without damaging it or allowing it to be damaged, it 
will inevitably be subject to deterioration due to age.226 The usufructuary is not liable 
for this fair wear and tear227 or for devaluation which he did not cause.228 Therefore, 
security must only provide for the depreciation in value due to misuse by the 
usufructuary and reflect the difference between the value of the property as it would 
have been if it had been properly used and the value in case of misuse.229  
Security may be demanded at the commencement or during the course of the 
usufruct.230 To determine the amount of the security that must be rendered the value 
of the object of the usufruct at the commencement of the usufruct is taken into 
                                                          
THRHR 256-276 256 and HP Viljoen The Rights and Duties of the Holder of Mineral Rights (1975) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Leiden University 58-59. 
223 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 111 and CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 
516 state that the usufructuary object must be returned in a “good condition”. 
224 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516. CP Joubert “Die Vruggebruiker se Verpligting om 
Verbeterings aan te Bring” (1958) 21 THRHR 256-276 256, 257 notes that it is acceptable to return the 
object of the usufruct in the same condition in which the usufructuary received it, fair wear and tear 
(“natuurlike slytasie”) through bona fide use excepted. 
225 Van Rensburg v Mulder 1998 JDR 0756 (T) 8. 
226 8. 
227 See n 208. 
228 Van Rensburg v Mulder 1998 JDR 0756 (T) 8. 
229 9. 
230 Voet 7 9 11; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517. 
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account.231 However, in Van Rensburg v Mulder232 Hartzenberg J argues for a 
nuanced approach to the determination of the amount of security due. In fact, he 
argued that judges, who are awarded a discretion to determine whether and to what 
amount an impecunious usufructuary should provide security, also have the discretion 
to determine a reasonable amount where an unreasonable demand for security is 
made.233 He discusses the factors that may be taken into account such as the type of 
property given in usufruct, whether improvements were made to the property, the 
extent of the improvements, the nature of the improvements and furthermore, the risks 
of depreciation involved due to improper use or negligence on the part of the 
usufructuary. 234 Particularly the risks related to the usufruct must be determined and 
security must be given against these risks. However, where factors are involved over 
which the usufructuary has no control, for example theft, the usufructuary is not liable 
for depreciation.235 Van Rensburg v Mulder236 exemplifies a nuanced and reasonable 
approach to the duty of the usufructuary to provide security.  
Traditionally, the exemptions from the duty to the provide security as well as 
arguments in favour of judicial discretion also mitigated what could be an onerous 
burden on the usufructuary in relation to the salva rei substantia requirement. In this 
regard, certain usufructuaries are exempted from the duty to provide security. These 
                                                          
231 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517; Voet 7 9 2. MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” 
in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa 
(1980) 378-401 393 notes that the amount and nature of security would normally in lieu of agreement 
between the parties be determined by the Master. 
232 1998 JDR 0756 (T). 
233 Van Rensburg v Mulder 1998 JDR 0756 (T) 11. 
234 9-10 
235 10. 
236 1998 JDR 0756 (T). 
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include a father who is usufructuary of the property where his children are the nude 
owners237 and a mother exempted by the testator from the duty to furnish security in 
the case where her children are the owners.238 This exemption also applies to the 
former owner who reserved a usufruct when he sold or donated the usufructuary 
object,239 the usufructuary exempted from the duty to provide security by a usufruct 
established inter vivos240 and the fiscus when it is appointed as the usufructuary.241 
Clauses in a will exempting a usufructuary from the duty to furnish security that do not 
refer to the above instances are invalid.242  
If the usufructuary fails to furnish security, he is not entitled to the fruits of the 
usufructuary object.243 The fruits of the usufructuary object are then deemed part and 
parcel of the capital to which the owner is entitled.244 The failure to provide security 
may even result in a court order entitling the owner to redeem the usufructuary object 
                                                          
237 Voet 7 9 7; Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 39 3; Carpzovius Definitiones Forenses 2 
10 9; Huber HR 2 39 23; Holl Cons 1 57 2; Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 3; Van Staden v Van Wyk 1958 2 
SA 682 (O) 684; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517. The original common law exception 
which clearly discriminates against mothers in this regard has not been tested in a case, but would 
probably not pass constitutional muster when scrutinized in the light of section 9 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996. This exception will be discussed in chapter 5. Other examples of 
usufructuaries that might be negatively affected by the exclusivity of this exception might be 
stepmothers as GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 87 notes, or 
two female parents.  
238 Voet 7 9 7; Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 3; Contra Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 39 3; Ex 
parte Newberry 1924; OPD 219 223-224; Van Staden v Van Wyk 1958 2 SA 682 (O); Ex parte 
Wagenaar 1953 4 SA 435 (C); Olivier v Venter 1933 EDL 206. 
239 Voet 7 9 8; Huber HR 2 39 23; Wissenbach ad Pandectas vol 2 disp 16 th 11 in medio; Antonius 
Matthaeus II De Servitutibus disp 3 th 15. 
240 Voet 7 9 9. 
241 Voet 7 9 7. 
242 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 518. 
243 Voet 7 9 1, 2, 3; Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 3; Holl Cons VI 326 in fine; Van der Keessel Praelectiones 
op Grotius 2 39 3; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517. 
244 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517. 
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in certain circumstances.245 These two sanctions indicate that the noncompliance with 
the security duty as safeguard for the fulfilment of the salva rei substantia requirement 
may be met with severe consequences, depending on the circumstances. The 
protection of usufructuary property must in the absence of security be ensured by other 
measures, for instance regarding the fruits as part of the capital that belongs to the 
bare owner or even depriving the usufructuary of the usufructuary object by means of 
a court order. However, relevant circumstances are taken into account. In cases where 
the usufructuary cannot comply with the demand for security due to financial reasons, 
the court may use its discretion by for example ordering that the usufructuary property 
should be let.246 
The problem of the impecunious usufructuary has received academic attention 
in terms of the duty to provide security.247 Wright notes that it is not unusual that the 
usufruct is the sole asset of the surviving spouse appointed as usufructuary and who 
therefore does not have the capacity to furnish security.248 The Roman Dutch 
authorities were divided on the issue and consequently the question arose whether a 
court is entitled to exempt the usufructuary from his duty to provide security.249 
According to Voet250 the judge should be able to exercise his discretion in cases where 
sufficient sureties cannot be found.251 This discretion would be in line with the intention 
                                                          
245 Schoeman v Schoeman 1953 2 SA 441 T; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517. 
246 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 112. 
247 GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91. 
248 88. 
249 86. 
250 Voet 7 9 3. 
251 GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 88. 
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of the testator to grant a usufruct as an act of generosity.252 Voet mentions three 
factors that should be taken into consideration, namely the quality of the usufructuary, 
the amount of property given in usufruct and the likelihood of loss of the usufructuary 
property.253 He suggests different options open to the judge, namely that the 
usufructuary’s oath be regarded as sufficient security, or the giving of pledges, the 
attachment of the usufructuary object for safe custody, the hiring out of the 
usufructuary object, or leave to the proprietor to gather the fruits and to hand them 
over to the usufructuary.254 Voet’s point of view is supported by Corbett,255 Van der 
Merwe,256 Nathan257 and Wright.258 
Although Van der Linden admits that Voet’s view is suited to “legal analogy and 
court practice”,259 he is of the opinion that in strict law the usufructuary may not be 
exempted from his duty to furnish security, since the directive not to grant the action 
is an emphatic statement and the obligation to render security is not impossible to fulfil, 
although it might be difficult.260 Van der Keessel is not in favour of exempting the 
                                                          
252 Voet 7 9 3; GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 88. 
253 Voet 7 9 3; GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 90 uses Voet’s 
factors as a starting point and formulates eight factors that should play a role in the exercise of the 
judge’s discretion. 
254 Voet 7 9 3; GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 88. 
255 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & 
E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 393. 
256 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517. 
257 M Nathan The Common Law of South Africa. A Treatise Based on Voet’s Commentaries on the 
Pandects, with References to the Leading Roman-Dutch Authorities, South African Decisions, and 
Statutory Enactments in South Africa vol 1 Persons and Property (1913) 480. 
258 GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 88-89. 
259 Van der Linden Supplementum ad Voet 7 9 3. 
260 Van der Linden Supplementum ad Voet 7 9 3 refers to D 7 2 13 (sic) – the reference should be to D 
7 1 13 pr; GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 88 therefore also 
cites the the wrong passage. 
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usufructuary nor of giving the judge a discretion, because a solution already exists in 
the form of allowing the bare owner to gather the fruits and handing them over to the 
usufructuary.261 Furthermore, Van der Keessel is not in favour of diverging from the 
form on the authority of the writers unless convincing evidence of a contrary practice 
exists.262 
At the time of Wright’s article South African case law was undecided on this 
point,263 with Van der Westhuizen v Van Aardt’s Estate264 ruling that the court did 
indeed have the discretion to exempt the usufructuary from his duty to furnish security, 
whilst the opposite point of view may be inferred from Ex parte Estate Wagenaar.265 
Wright concludes that Voet’s point of view is the most equitable and also gives 
effect to the intention of the testator to benefit the usufructuary, whereas Van der 
Keessel’s solution would result in practical problems and be unsatisfactory since it 
would defeat the intention of the testator.266 Wright also mentions another option 
based on Voet,267 namely that the usufructuary may renounce a part of his usufruct, 
especially where certain usufructuary objects do not hold advantages for the 
usufructuary but where he nevertheless bears the burden of providing security.268 
In 2003 Van der Byl AJ upheld Voet’s point of view and referred to Wright’s 
article, ruling that he was of the opinion that the case demanded that he should 
                                                          
261 Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 39 3; GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 
THRHR 86-91 88. 
262 Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 39 3. 
263 GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 89. 
264 Van der Westhuizen v Van Aardt’s Estate 1943 EDL 299 310. 
265 Ex parte Estate Wagenaar 1953 4 SA 435 (C) 438-439B. 
266 GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 89. 
267 Voet 7 2 1. 
268 GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 89. 
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exercise his discretion according to Roman Dutch principles, in favour of the first 
respondent.269 The latter was the stepmother of the second, third and fourth applicants 
and was granted the usufruct of the house of the testator. After initially occupying the 
house, the usufructuary let it and used the rent to pay the property tax as well as the 
maintenance costs of the house and the garden. After deduction of these expenses 
as well as the commission of the renting agent she received R1500 per month. Having 
no other assets apart from a vehicle, she was utterly dependent on this income for her 
subsistence. She vacated the house in order to let it and thus to obtain an income. 
She was neither able to do any other repairs to the house apart from general 
maintenance, nor to furnish security for the usufruct.270 Van der Byl AJ exempted the 
usufructuary from her duty to provide security and emphatically stated his 
dissatisfaction with the applicants, who should have been aware of the usufructuary’s 
inability to furnish the extremely high and unsubstantiated security (“hemelhoë en 
ongesubstansieerde sekuriteit”).271 It is disappointing that this case, along with Van 
Rensburg v Mulder,272 decided during the constitutional dispensation, makes no 
mention of the Constitution, although the judges in both clearly opt for an equitable 
outcome. Furthermore, Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another273 
would have been an opportunity to examine the rather limited and biased exceptions 
that do exist in terms of exempting the usufructuary within a constitutional context.274  
                                                          
269 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T). 
270 2. 
271 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 14. The pronouncement 
of Van der Byl AJ would also point to additional factors that could be considered in the security is 
properly substantiated. See n 108 for factors identified by Wright. 
272 1998 JDR 0756 (T). 
273 2003 JDR 0863 (T). 
274 See ch 5. 
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In terms of case law, therefore, it seems that thus far a small number of cases 
favour awarding discretion to the court to exempt the usufructuary from the duty to 
provide security. Since case law decided in this regard during the constitutional era is 
scant, the material cannot lead to a conclusive result in terms of signalling a 
predisposition towards releasing a usufructuary of the security duty in suitable 
circumstances. One case argues for discretion and a contextual approach to limit 
security where unreasonable demands are made. Furthermore, the unwillingness to 
depart from the duty to provide security except where common law principles allow a 
margin of discretion might still indicate a strict approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement in general. It does seem, however, that reasonableness has an important 
role to play in determining the extent of the duty to provide security. 
 
2 4 1 3 Maintenance and repairs 
Maintenance has been listed as a separate duty of the usufructuary and distinguished 
from the duty to repair,275 but generally this distinction is ignored by South African 
authors.276 Bezuidenhout describes maintenance (instandhouding) as work that must 
be done continually, sometimes daily or otherwise with longer breaks, to extend or 
guarantee the life of the object of the usufruct, especially due to day-to-day wear and 
                                                          
275 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 118-119 distinguishes these two concepts based 
on their dictionary meanings but does not give references to case law to support this distinction. 
276 MM Corbett “Usufruct, Usus and Habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & 
E Kahn The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 389; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 
1989) 518-519; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert 
& JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 595; Voet 7 1 36; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 
(3 ed 1973) 169. 
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tear.277 He distinguishes repairs from maintenance by asserting that the latter has a 
wider field of application278 and notes that repairs are needed when maintenance was 
not done or when damage resulted from some external occurrence, for example due 
to a fire, vandalism or an earthquake.279 It seems from Bezuidenhout’s definition of 
maintenance that the impact of wear and tear should be addressed by the 
usufructuary. However, according to other South African authors the duty to maintain 
the usufructuary property “in good order and condition” is restricted by the “fair wear 
and tear” exception,280 and on termination of the usufruct the usufructuary is therefore 
not responsible for deterioration in this regard. Case law on usufruct does not normally 
elaborate on this exception and it has mostly been discussed within the context of 
leases.281 According to Claassen282 this exception would not require repairs of 
“dilapidation or depreciation which comes by reason of lapse of time, action of 
weather, etc, and normal user”.283 Perhaps the duty can be explained as follows: The 
                                                          
277 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 119. 
278 119. 
279 120. 
280 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 12; CG van der Merwe 
& MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 
2010) para 583 n 1, 597; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law 
of Property (5 ed 2006) 340; Voet Commentarius 7 9 1. 
281 RD Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases s.v. “wear and tear”. In Cradock Municipality 
v Philps 1938 EDL 382 387 usufructuaries donated the bare property to a hospital and contractually 
bound themselves to take care of the  "upkeep and maintenance of the said premises at their or her 
own cost while they or she retain possession thereof, loss by fire or act of God excepted". It was held, 
therefore, that this obligation “much exceeded fair wear and tear, and was sufficiently large to embrace 
all damage done to the property by delict”. This case does not indicate what normal fair wear and tear 
entails.  
282 RD Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases s.v. “wear and tear”. 
283 RD Claassen Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases s.v. “wear and tear” citing Radloff v Kaplan 
1914 EDL 361. 
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usufructuary is responsible for maintenance; therefore he must also address what can 
be described as repairs necessitated by fair wear and tear during the usufruct. Fair 
wear and tear that would nevertheless, despite repairs conducted according to the 
bonus paterfamilias standard, be evident on termination of the usufruct would not 
result in liability. Therefore, the question is what type of repairs would be required as 
part of the maintenance.284 According to Joubert, South African academic writing 
corresponds to Roman Dutch law, which placed a maintenance duty on the 
usufructuary, but not a duty to improve the property.285 The usufructuary had to do 
ordinary repairs (modicae refectiones) which a reasonable person would have done 
to temporarily (ad temporaneam rei conservationem spectant) keep the usufructuary 
property in a good condition (sarta tecta). Ordinary expenses (modicae refectiones or 
sumptus modici) are distinguished from impensae necessariae or necessariae 
refectiones in the sense that the former involves the temporary maintenance of the 
usufructuary property, while the latter refers to the permanent maintenance of the 
property and can increase the value, use or enjoyment of the usufructuary property. 
The measure for determining whether ordinary repairs are necessary is the judgment 
of a reasonable person. Joubert views the criterium as flexible since it is objective. 
Although Joubert’s article gives a comprehensive overview of the usufructuary’s 
obligation in terms of repairs, he only refers to an earlier version of Maasdorp and 
                                                          
284 This question has also been investigated in comparative literature recently. See P Hellwege 
“Enforcing the Liferenter’s Obligation to Repair” (2014) 18 The Edinburgh LR 1-28; P Hellwege “Die 
Erhaltung der Nießbrauchsache: Römisches Recht, Gemeines Recht und Schottisches Recht” (2011) 
79 TRG 81-119; R Caterina “A Comparative Overview of the Fair Wear and Tear Exception: the Duty 
of Holders of Temporary Interests to Preserve Property” (2002) 6 The Edinburgh LR 85-100. 
285 Reference to CP Joubert “Die Vruggebruiker se Verpligting om Verbeterings aan te Bring” (1958) 21 
THRHR 256-276 275-276 unless indicated otherwise. 
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does not discuss case law. Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the 
contribution of case law in this regard. 
In Ex parte Praetorius286 Gardiner J confirmed that the usufructuary is liable for 
the rates and ordinary repairs and that he should defray them before he takes the 
revenue. This would have been the case even if the usufructuary would not be able to 
provide for his own living expenses if the liabilities (rates, repairs and interest) had 
been discharged. In casu the usufructuary was 76 years old, suffered from senile 
cataract in both eyes and could not work. Leave was granted to the usufructuary to 
mortgage the property287 to prevent the Municipal and Divisional Council from selling 
the property in execution in order to exact its rates and the interest incurred, and to 
enable the usufructuary to pay for repairs. Gardiner J was not without sympathy for 
the position of the usufructuary but clearly took into account the traditional legal duties 
of the usufructuary flowing from the salva rei substantia requirement and the interests 
of the bare owners in preserving the property. Here, as in the Ex parte De Douallier,288 
which was cited as authority, the court allowed for mortgages to be granted over the 
usufructuary property on request of the usufructuary where this would enable the 
usufructuary to meet his maintenance duty by repairing the property and paying rates 
                                                          
286 Reference to Ex parte Praetorius 1915 CPD 819 820-821 unless indicated otherwise. 
287 The dominium of one half of the property belonged to the usufructuary and according to Gardiner J 
the Municipal and Divisional Councils could sell this half in execution. 
288 Gardiner J referred to Ex parte Douallier (1907) 24 SC 282 as authority, but in the latter case the 
beneficiary is not referred to as an usufructuary, although the case information refers to a “life interest”. 
A mortgage was granted contrary to the condition for the bequest that she was not to mortgage or 
alienate the property. De Villiers CJ granted leave to the petitioner to mortgage the property in order to 
effect the necessary transfers and to place the property “in a habitable state of repair”. The petitioner 
was too poor to meet the costs and furthermore the eldest child was still a minor whose interest would 
suffer if means were not devised to assist the petitioner in preserving the property. The application for 
future repairs was not pressed or granted. 
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and interest incurred. Mortgaging a property given in usufruct usually requires the 
consent and collaboration of both the usufructuary and the bare owner.289 Authorising 
such a juristic act without the co-operation of the bare owner is unusual and 
consequently a court should not grant leave to mortgage without good motivation.290 
This decision accordingly indicates that the preservation of the usufructuary property 
is an important consideration. Particularly, the duties to maintain the property by 
means of ordinary repairs and to safeguard it against loss stemming from a sale in 
execution to recover rates and interest incurred are significant enough to grant leave 
to the usufructuary to mortgage the property in order to meet his obligations. Although 
this decision confirms that the usufructuary is liable for ordinary repairs, it does not 
distinguish between ordinary and other repairs. This question was addressed in Ex 
parte Standard Bank Ltd: In Re Estate Rodger,291 where Young J decided that the 
usufructuary is liable for “‘such moderate repairs as are needed to keep the property 
in proper repair’”, whereas repairs resulting from “‘buildings [that] have become 
dilapidated with age’” are not his responsibility.292 However, as Young J indicates, 
determining which amounts should be apportioned to the bare owner and the 
                                                          
289 Zulu and Others v Van Rensburg and Others1996 (4) SA 1236 (LCC) 1263; CG van der Merwe & 
MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 
2010) para 592; DP van Huyssteen “Die Persoonlike Serwituut Vruggebruik – ’n Akteperspektief (Deel 
2)” 1989 De Rebus 215-221 215. 
290 Compare Ex parte Sem NO en Andere 1970 4 SA 403 (NC) 405 regarding the competence of the 
court to confirm a transaction by a usufructuary and beneficiaries to sell property in terms of a 
provisional deed of sale where Van den Heever J stated that in cases where the consent of all the 
interested parties cannot be obtained, the court would only authorise transactions which are necessary 
to protect the estate against losses or which would beyond any doubt be beneficial to all interested 
parties.  
291 1963 3 SA 683 (SR). 
292 Ex parte Standard Bank Ltd: In Re Estate Rodger 1963 3 SA 683 (SR) 686. See also Ex parte Atkins 
and Others NO: In Re Estate Lazarus 1933 WLD 76 77-78 where it was held that the usufructuary was 
not liable for structural alterations and repairs since it amounted to capital expenditure. 
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usufructuary respectively, is no easy task and could not be established on the 
information available to the court.293 
Apart from distinguishing moderate repairs from extraordinary repairs, the duty 
of the usufructuary in terms of repairs and maintenance should further be delineated 
by distinguishing improvements from repairs. Ex parte Borland294 illustrates the 
difference between repairs for which the usufructuary may be compensated and 
improvements for which the usufructuary may not receive compensation. In this case 
Hathorn J granted the usufructuary's claim against the estate to be refunded for “the 
cost to her of ensuring that the house did not collapse”.295 The farmhouse was old, 
“had suffered from the depredations of termites” and “was in a seriously dilapidated 
condition when the testator died”. Consequently, the house had to be repaired and “a 
considerable quantity of its timbers and other materials” had to be replaced to prevent 
the usufructuary object from falling down and becoming “useless”. In contrast, the 
other claim in the same case for improvements and replacements effected to two other 
properties also subject to a usufruct in favour of the widow was not granted. 
Nevertheless, Hathorn J confirmed that it had been established that the absence of 
these improvements and additions to the latter properties made it increasingly difficult 
to let them, even to the point where it seemed likely that letting would become an 
impossibility. The additions entailed building a garage and servants' quarters, while 
the improvements amounted to alterations to the bathrooms and floors and the 
replacement of some windows and doors. Hathorn J confirmed that the usufructuary 
is not entitled to compensation for improvements. He has to keep the property in repair 
                                                          
293 Ex parte Standard Bank Ltd: In Re Estate Rodger 1963 3 SA 683 (SR) 686. 
294 Ex parte Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR).  
295 Reference to Ex parte Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR) 339-340 unless otherwise indicated. 
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at his own expense and has to pay for all ordinary expenses, but not for special or 
extraordinary costs. Compensation for the latter “may properly be claimed”. 
Hathorn J mentioned that there seems to be a discrepancy between the point of 
view of Schorer commenting on Grotius and other old authorities regarding the 
possibility of claiming for useful and ornamental improvements. This issue was 
addressed in Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon Estate and Others,296 where Sir John 
Kotze J concluded that Schorer's commentary on Grotius297 was unfounded with 
reference to the work of Huber298 and Voet299 and that compensation could therefore 
not be granted.300 Huber related the question to the prohibition against the 
transformation of the usufructuary object due to the salva rei substantia 
requirement.301 The latter also accounts for the duty to repair and the concomitant 
responsibility for expenses in this regard. However, the usufructuary may claim for 
high or extensive costs or those relating to permanent use. Voet explains the 
prohibition on claiming for improvements by distinguishing the duty to maintain from 
renovation.302 He elaborates on the consequences of the salva rei substantia 
requirement by stating that the usufructuary is not allowed to complete a building 
begun by the owner even in circumstances where the usufructuary would have no use 
of the structure, as the usufruct is not established on the portion unfit for use. Voet 
also demarcates the duty of the usufructuary by asserting that he is not responsible 
for buildings which have fallen into decay, but if he rebuilds, he has a claim for 
                                                          
296 Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159. 
297 Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 13. 
298 Huber HR 2 39 25-26. 
299 Voet 7 1 21. 
300 Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159 178. 
301 Huber 2 39 25-26; Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159 174. 
302 Voet 7 1 21; Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159 174. 
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compensation. 303 On the basis of Huber and Voet Sir John Kotze J concluded that the 
usufructuary who does what the law does not permit him to do by effecting 
improvements, does so “at his own risk and is not entitled in law to claim 
compensation”.304 The court also pointed out an important policy consideration 
underlying the prohibition against a claim for compensation for improvements, namely 
that it would allow the usufructuary to “arbitrarily impose” a claim for compensation on 
the bare owner for improvements which he did not want.305 Moreover, the usufructuary 
voluntarily made improvements, knowing that his duty was limited to maintenance of 
the usufructuary property and benefited from them in terms of convenience and 
enjoyment. 
Both Ex parte Estate Borland306 and Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and 
Others307 were criticised by Joubert as not corresponding to the common law.308 He 
argues that the judge should have enquired whether the improvements to the stands 
were of a permanent nature or not. If improvements are of a permanent nature and 
are made with the purpose to permanently preserve the property, the usufructuary is 
entitled to be compensated for both necessary (refectiones necessariae, impensae 
necessariae) and useful (refectiones utiles, impensae utiles) improvements.309 It does 
                                                          
303 Voet 7 1 35, 36; Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159 174. 
304 Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159 175. 
305 Sir John Kotze J in Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159 178 referred 
to a thesis by CHQ van Stryen De Verplichtingen van den Vruchtgebruiker (1862). This reference should 
be to CHQ van Stryen Iets over de Verplichtingen van den Vruchtgebruiker (1864). 
306 Ex parte Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR). 
307 Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 159. 
308 References to CP Joubert “Law of Property (Including Mortgage and Pledge)” 1961 ASSAL 220-241 
229 unless indicated otherwise. 
309 Expenses for necessary and useful improvements that are permanent in nature are also known as 
expensa magna, gravior sumptus, impensae grandes or impensae extraordinariae. See CP Joubert 
“Law of Property (Including Mortgage and Pledge)” 1961 ASSAL 220-241 229. 
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not seem to be clear which criterion Hathorn J would use to classify expenditure as 
special or extraordinary expenses. 
From the discrepancy between Joubert’s view and the two judgments in point, 
one might discern a divergent approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. On 
the one hand there is the rather strict approach illustrated by the judgment of Kotzé J 
that focuses on the physical violation of preservation requirement, while on the other 
hand, as asserted by Joubert, permanent improvements with the aim of preserving the 
object permanently may be encouraged by the incentive of compensation, which 
seems to indicate a more teleological approach. To summarise, it seems that ordinary 
repairs must firstly be distinguished from extraordinary repairs to demarcate the 
liability of the usufructuary in terms of the duty to repair. Secondly, repairs need to be 
distinguished from improvements. Although improvements do not form part of the duty 
to repair and maintain the property, there seems to be an incentive involved for 
improving the property to the extent that it has as a goal the preservation of the 
substance. Usufructuaries may be compensated in cases where improvements are of 
a permanent nature and has as their object the permanent preservation of the 
property. At the same time, this incentive is limited to protect the interests of the bare 
owner. In this regard, South African courts adhere to the requirement even though it 
would be economically more viable to improve the usufructuary object, not only for the 
sake of enhancing the use and enjoyment afforded to the usufructuary but to improve 
the value of the property which will be returned to the dominus.310 Therefore, the salva 
                                                          
310 Ex parte Borland 1961 1 SA 6 (SR); Brunsdon's Estate v Brunsdon's Estate and Others 1920 CPD 
159. 
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rei substantia requirement qualifies the duty to maintain and repair and the related 
question of compensation for improvements.  
 
2 4 2 Remedies and termination 
2 4 2 1 Introduction 
Remedies and termination are two other aspects of usufruct, apart from the duties of 
the usufructuary, which reflect the strict approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement. The severity with which impairment of the substance of the object of the 
usufruct is visited is a telling indicator. Historically, Roman Dutch law provided the 
actio negatoria as a remedy to an owner in cases where ownership was infringed. 311 
The infringement had to be factually similar to the exercise of either a praedial 
servitude or a usufruct. It could be instituted against anyone who unlawfully asserted 
a usufruct or who, as though he were a usufructuary, disturbed the owner in his 
possession and enjoyment of the usufruct.312 Today there still seems to be room for 
this remedy in South African law, although it is contested whether it still exists and 
case law does not provide a clear answer.313  
The grounds for termination related to the salva rei substantia requirement 
seemed to be marginally wider in Roman Dutch law, since a fraudulent transfer of land 
                                                          
311 See PC van Es De Actio Negatoria: Een Studie naar de Rechtsvorderlijke Zijde van het 
Eigendomsrecht (2005) 121-122 with reference to Voet 7 6 1, 7 6 3, 8 5 5 and Huber 2 41 8, 2 44 16; 
CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 82-83. 
312 Voet 7 6 3; CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 83. 
313 See Moller v South African Railways and Harbours 1969 3 SA 374 (N) 381B; Botha v Minister of 
Lands 1965 (1) SA 728 (A) 741; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 263. 
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by the usufructuary was also in very specific circumstances held to terminate the 
usufruct.314 Causes of termination that are connected to the salva rei substantia 
requirement include the abuse of right and termination by permanent impossibility of 
exercise or enjoyment. The latter category consists of two subcategories, namely 
impossibility due to destruction and impossibility due to substantial change to the 
usufructuary property. 
 
2 4 2 2 Remedies 
The remedies available to the dominus in case of impairment of the substance of the 
usufructuary object and the strictness with which they are enforced to ensure the 
return of the usufructuary object salva rei substantia may be an indication of a strict 
approach towards the salva rei substantia requirement.  
The South African common law remedies315 may still include the actio negatoria 
in cases where the holder of the servitude does not respect the limits of the servitude 
and acts outside the right afforded to him.316 Lindenbergh notes that this action may 
                                                          
314 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 79 with reference to A Duyck Decisien en 
Resoluties van den Hove van Holland (1751) 74, 100 where a father who held the usufruct over a house, 
mortgaged it and transferred it to an official to be sold in a sale of execution in response to a court order. 
315 According to CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 543-544 the common law permitted the bare 
owner to use the following remedies against the usufructuary: the actio negatoria, an interdict, a 
declaratory order and a delictual claim for damages. He notes that the actio negatoria was replaced by 
the declaratory order accompanied by or without a prohibitory interdict and an action for damages. 
However, PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 
ed 2006) 263 does not rule out that this remedy may still be available. 
316 JC Sonnekus “Bewoningsreg (Habitatio) – Aard van die Regsobjek en die Effek Dáárvan op die 
Registrasie van die Reg” (2015) 26 Stell LR 63-85 63; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
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be one of the “oldest routes to prohibitory injunctions and have over the ages 
developed into a rather strong procedural position for the owner”.317 Although the 
Roman actio negatoria was not directly based on the right to property but could rather 
be perceived as an action to deny the existence of a servitude, it has especially 
through later development contributed to the content of the right to property.318 From 
initially being an actio de servitude in Roman law, the actio negatoria has developed 
into a general action available to the owner for any infringement except for the loss of 
possession. The right to property thus became a source of injunctive power.319 
The actio negatoria currently allows the owner to claim a prohibition on further 
infringement, damages, security against future infringement,320 removal of any 
unlawfully erected structures321 and a declaration of rights.322 Although certain South 
African writers assert that the actio negatoria was substituted by a declaratory order 
with or without an application for a prohibitory interdict and an action for damages,323 
                                                          
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 262 referring to Voet 8 5 5 and JH Wade 
v AM Paruk (1904) 25 NLR 219. 
317 SD Lindenbergh “Enforcing the Right to Property Properly” (2010) 17 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 48-
57 49. 
318 SD Lindenbergh “Enforcing the Right to Property Properly” (2010) 17 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 48-
57 49. For an extensive analysis of this development see PC van Es De Actio Negatoria: Een Studie 
naar de Rechtsvorderlijke Zijde van het Eigendomsrecht (2005). 
319 SD Lindenbergh “Enforcing the Right to Property Properly” (2010) 17 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 48-
57 49. 
320 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 543 citing Voet 7 6 1, 8 5 5 and Huber HR 2 44 16. 
321 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 262 citing D 8 5 14 pr and Voet 8 5 5. 
322 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 262 citing Voet 8 5 6. 
323 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 623; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 543 citing Wade v 
Paruk (1904) 25 NLR 219 223 and CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed 1973) 154 citing the same 
case as well as Van Leeuwen RHR 2 22 6. 
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Badenhorst et al submit that “the obsolescence of a remedy in favour of an alternative 
one must not lightly be inferred if it is to the prejudice of the claimant”.324 Van der 
Merwe and Pope also note that it still remains uncertain whether this action has been 
superseded by other remedies.325 Badenhorst et al explain the implications for the 
plaintiff, which in the case of a usufruct would be the bare owner, if it were to be the 
case that the actio legis Aquiliae should replace the actio negatoria where the recovery 
of damages is at issue. In the case of the actio legis Aquiliae the bare owner would 
have to prove fault, whereas this would not be a requirement to claim damages in the 
case of the actio negatoria.326  
In his assessment of the South African position, Van Es contends that the South 
African position as explained by Sonnekus and Neels seems to be more accurate than 
the description rendered by Van der Merwe.327 Van der Merwe asserts that during the 
reception of Roman law in Holland the actio negatoria evolved into a measure which 
could be used against any party factually disturbing ownership of an immovable.328 He 
bases this statement on texts by Voet329 and Huber.330 However, Van Es uses the 
                                                          
324 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 263. 
325 CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C Himonga, D Hutchison, 
K Lehmann, R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law (9 ed 2007) 469-556 541. 
326 JC Sonnekus “Ongegronde Verryking van Staatskas en Ontneming van Vermoënsregte” 2011 TSAR 
79-99 97; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 
ed 2006) 263; JC Sonnekus “Rei Vindicatio vir Vorderingsregte?: Regspraak” 2005 TSAR 410-427 412; 
JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2 ed 1994) 100. 
327 PC van Es De Actio Negatoria: Een Studie naar de Rechtsvorderlijke Zijde van het Eigendomsrecht 
(2005) 123. 
328 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 360. 
329 Voet 7 6 1; 7 6 3; 8 5 5. 
330 Huber 2 44 16. 
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same texts to show that this action remained an actio de servitude and had not 
developed to this extent in these texts.331 He prefers the statement of the law as 
rendered by Sonnekus332 since the later deduces that the actio negatoria can also be 
used against the servitude holder from the statement that the owner can use the action 
against a third party who exceeds the bounds of his servitude, without citing Voet or 
Huber as authority. Van Es also refers to an earlier version of Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property,333 but this source also mentions one of the 
contested Voet sources.334 The analysis by Van Es raises the question whether the 
wider interpretation of the Voet and Huber texts by South African writers was justified 
and whether the logical deduction by Sonnekus should therefore not be a preferred 
explanation. Van Es argues that the broader interpretation of the actio negatoria 
cannot be said to be evident in the texts of Roman Dutch authors.335 
The availability of this remedy seems to point to the importance of retaining the 
substance of the usufructuary object, as the actio negatoria compels the usufructuary 
to restore the status quo ante.336  
 
                                                          
331 PC van Es De Actio Negatoria: Een Studie naar de Rechtsvorderlijke Zijde van het Eigendomsrecht 
(2005) 123. 
332 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel (2 ed 1994) 475. 
333 See H Silberberg & J Schoeman The Law of Property (2 ed 1983). This most current version PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 262 
still cites Voet 8 5 5. 
334 Voet 8 5 5. 
335 PC van Es De actio negatoria: Een Studie naar de Rechtsvorderlijke Zijde van het Eigendomsrecht 
(2005) 120-122. 
336 CG van der Merwe “Ownership” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 27 (2 ed 2014) para 
241; JC Sonnekus “Sessie van die Rei Vindicatio Anderhalf Eeu ná Jhering” (2011) TSAR 302-325 303. 
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2 4 2 3 Termination 
South African legal scholars acknowledge that servitudes may be terminated in a 
number of ways.337 However, the only methods of extinction that are relevant to the 
salva rei substantia requirement are termination by permanent impossibility of exercise 
or enjoyment, that is, by destruction or substantial change of the object, and 
termination by misuse. However, the latter seems to be disputed.338 Moreover, the 
terminology used is not defined. For example, it is not entirely clear how disfigurement 
(skending)339 should be distinguished from abuse (misbruik). It seems that 
                                                          
337 CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed 1973) 175-176 discuss the termination of usufruct 
separately and lists the death of the usufructuary, expiry of the time for which the usufruct was granted 
or fulfilment or resolutive condition, dissolution if the usufructuary is a legal person or after the lapse of 
a 100 years, total destruction of the usufructuary property or a total change of its form, non-user for the 
period of prescription, merger, abandonment of the right, cession to the owner and fraudulent transfer 
by a father who is usufructuary over his children’s property by means of a joint will. CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 534 lists permanent impossibility of exercise or exercise or enjoyment of the 
servitude, expiry of the time for which the usufruct was granted or fulfilment or resolutive condition, 
merger, abandonment, prescription and the death of the usufructuary. To this list CG van der Merwe & 
A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C Himonga, D Hutchison, K 
Lehmann, R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 613-615 add the following: termination of the interest of the grantor in 
the servient land, termination by agreement, expropriation, registration of transfer of land free from 
usufruct on a sale of execution. The list by CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van 
der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 617 corresponds with the 
list in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C Himonga, D Hutchison, K Lehmann, R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, 
CG van der Merwe & D Visser Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 613-615. 
338 According to CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 540 and CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 
(3 ed 1973) 176 a usufructuary may not be deprived of his right of usufruct if he misuses the usufructuary 
property. The usufructuary can be interdicted and compelled to give security for the return of the object 
of the usufruct in a proper condition. However, CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van 
Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
141 cautiously does not rule out the possiblity. 
339 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 141. 
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disfigurement is a narrower concept denoting an action by the usufructuary to the 
physical detriment of the usufructuary object. I could not find reported case law 
pertaining to this issue. In his discussion of disfigurement and abuse Bezuidenhout 
does not mention any other illustration apart from the unreported case of CF Zietsman 
v KA Leeuwner NO.340 The term “abuse” might have a wider field of application. Abuse 
might refer to any action leading to the permanent depreciation in value of the 
usufructuary property and might also include the disposition of the usufructuary 
property.341 In this regard, a distinction drawn by Bell between disrepair triggering 
liability and fair wear and tear might be illuminating. His description of the former as 
“allied to injury or dilapidation, and arising from negligence or hard usage”342 is akin to 
one of the meanings inherent to abuse. It seems that the distinction between 
disfigurement and abuse drawn by Bezuidenhout is not applied by other academic 
writers such as Van der Merwe (who does distinguish between serious and “normal” 
abuse)343 and Hall and Kellaway.344  
The question whether abuse could amount to termination of usufruct was 
contentious in Roman Dutch law.345 In this regard Van der Merwe refers to the 
Institutes of Justinian and the commentary of the Roman Dutch authors Voet, 
                                                          
340 1986 K (Case 86/9797). 
341 See Heukelman v Heukelman NO 2012 JDR 1378 (GNP) for possible dissipation of the corpus of 
shares and cash subject to usufruct of the surviving spouse; Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C) for 
possible disposition of corporeal movables in the form of furniture subject to usufruct of the surviving 
spouse and Olivier v Venter 1933 EDL 206 for dissipation of capital and alienation or encumberance of 
a bond subject to a usufruct of the surviving spouse. 
342 R Caterina “A Comparative Overview of the Fair Wear and Tear Exception: the Duty of Holders of 
Temporary Interests to Preserve Property” (2002) 6 The Edinburgh LR 85-100 99 citing Bell Principles 
§ 1254. 
343 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 540. 
344 Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed 1973) 176. 
345 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 540. 
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Vinnius346 and Heineccius347 on Vinnius.348 According to the Institutes of Justinian 
usufruct terminates “by its improper exercise”.349 Voet350 qualifies this statement by 
asserting that it only applies when a definitive measure of use and enjoyment was 
specified during the establishment of the usufruct. Van der Linden351 denies that 
usufruct terminates when the usufructuary property is not used according to measure. 
He does, however, state that the stipulation whereby the usufructuary promised 
security to use and enjoy the property according to the discretion of a good man is 
activated and that, accordingly, an action may be brought at once instead of at the 
termination of the usufruct. Furthermore, he claims that the phrase “according to 
measure and time” must actually be understood to mean “according to the measure 
of time” which signifies that the usufruct is lost through non-user. Van der Linden 
justifies this reading with reference to a phrase added by Justinian, namely “all which 
things our ordinance has enacted”. This phrase apparently refers to C 3 33 16352 but 
this text does not mention non-user according to measure, only non-user according to 
the time. Voet353 also adds reasons of his own to indicate why usufruct is not 
terminated by misuse. He argues that if it were the case that usufruct could be 
terminated by abuse, it would not have been possible for the bare owner to demand 
                                                          
346 Vinnius ad I 2 4 3 par 2. 
347 Heineccius ad Vinnius ad I 2 4 3. 
348 540 n 626. 
349 I 2 4 3: “Finitur autem ususfructus […] non utendo per modum”. Although this phrase appears in the 
parallel Latin source text, it is not translated or commented upon by JAC Thomas The Institutes of 
Justinian Text, Translation and Commentary (1975) 88-89 but the English translation appears in JB 
Moyle The Institutes of Justinian Translated into English with an Index (5 ed 1913) 48. 
350 Voet 7 4 5. 
351 Van der Linden Supplementum ad Voet 7 4 5.  
352 See P Krueger (ed) Codex in Corpus Iuris Civilis (1899) Berolini: Weimannos 
353 Voet 7 4 5. 
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security from the usufructuary “that he will use and enjoy in the discretion of a good 
man” from time to time while the usufruct lasts.  
However, in contrast to Voet, other Roman Dutch authorities, namely 
Christinaeus,354 Antonius355 and Castillo Sotomayor356 are of the opinion that a 
usufructuary may be evicted since a lessee and a quitrenter can be evicted.357 Voet358 
disagrees. He distinguishes the position of the usufructuary from the position of the 
lessee and the quitrenter. In instances where the lessee and the quitrenter are evicted, 
they keep the quitrent or rent whilst the usufructuary keeps nothing. 
It therefore seems that this first measure of termination is heavily qualified. 
According to Roman Dutch law, transgression of a definitive measure of use indicated 
in the agreement that establishes the servitude terminates usufruct. According to 
certain South African authors, extreme abuse may terminate usufruct.359 Examples of 
serious abuse include instances when the usufructuary fraudulently sells the 
usufructuary property or attempts to destroy the substance of the usufructuary 
                                                          
354 Voet cites P Christinaeus In Leges Municipales eiusdem Civitatis ac Provinciae Commentaria ac 
Notae (in Leges Municipales Civium Mechliniensium Notae seu Commentationes) 15 4 11 and additions 
note 11. 
355 Voet cites A Faber Codex Fabrianus Definitionum Forensium et Rerum in Sacro Sabaudiae Senatu 
Tractatarum, Ad Ordinem Titulorum Codicis Justinianei, quantum fieri potuit ad usum forensem 
accomodatus. Et in novem Libros Distributus 3 23 2. 
356 Voet cites DJ del Castillo Sotomayor Quotidianarum Controversiarum Juris: S. Rotae Romanae 
Decisiones Recentissimae Opera omnia Amplectentes, Confirmantes, Laudantes Super Materiam De 
Usufructu chs 21, 23 & 24.  
357 Reference to Voet 7 4 5 unless stated otherwise. 
358 Voet 7 4 5. 
359 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 540; CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van 
Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
141. 
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property. 360 It is, however, not clear where the boundary between extreme and normal 
abuse lies. The contentious nature of this measure of termination makes it difficult to 
draw conclusions regarding the way it reflects the salva rei substantia requirement. It 
seems that the threshhold for termination in terms of misuse is very high and 
accordingly allows a relative wide discretion in terms of use. 
Secondly, total destruction of the usufructuary property will terminate the 
usufruct.361 Some authors362 base their position on Grotius363 and Voet.364 Grotius365 
mentions two examples, namely alteration of the character of the land by inundation 
and a house that is burnt down. What seems to be important is whether the object of 
the usufruct (in the latter example the building, according to Grotius) is destroyed and 
secondly whether it is totally lost or whether a portion remains. In the case a remnant 
of the usufructuary property survives, the usufruct may continue on the portion. Voet366 
agrees that a usufruct is inevitably terminated when the object of the usufruct is 
destroyed, but that usufruct may be retained if the object was only partially destroyed. 
He further adds that in the case of usufruct on a universality, the usufruct continues 
                                                          
360 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 540 n 626 cites Voet 7 4 4; Van Leeuwen CF 1 2 15 25. Cf 
Groenewegen ad Grotius 2 39 16; Van Leeuwen RHR 2 9 14. 
361 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 140; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 534CG Hall & 
EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed 1973) 176; AFS Maasdorp “Personal Servitudes; Usufruct, Usus and 
Habitatio” rev Hall CG in Hall CG (ed) Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law: Volume II The Law 
of Property (10 ed 1976) 196-197. 
362 Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes (3 ed 1973) 176; AFS Maasdorp “Personal Servitudes; Usufruct, 
Usus and Habitatio” rev Hall CG in Hall CG (ed) Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law: Volume II 
The Law of Property (10 ed 1976) 196-197. 
363 Grotius 2 39 14. 
364 Voet 7 4 8. 
365 Grotius 2 39 14. 
366 Voet 7 4 8. 
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on the remaining objects constituting the universality, save when the universality no 
longer constitutes one, for example when the numbers of a flock have to such an 
extent diminished that it can no longer be considered as a universality. According to 
Bezuidenhout, neither reconstruction nor restoration of the usufructuary property to its 
original form revives the usufruct.367  
In terms of the termination of the usufruct due to the total destruction of the 
usufructuary property, the Kidson case provides an example which has received 
ample academic attention recently.368 Although the case refers to the personal 
servitude of habitatio, the principles applicable to the problem are similar. Van der Walt 
assumes that Scott is correct when he argues that a servitude of habitation is 
terminated when the dwelling is destroyed.369 In the Kidson case, a strict application 
of the common law principle whereby the servitude is terminated ex lege in the event 
of destruction of the dwelling, would allow the bare owner to refuse rebuilding of the 
dwelling and consequently the continuation of the right of habitation.370 The Roman 
Dutch authorities do not provide a solution where considerations of equity and fairness 
would call for it and therefore Van der Walt agrees with Scott and Van der Merwe that 
                                                          
367 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 140. 
368 The most recent contribution is AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” 
(2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 which provides guidance on constitutional analysis of a dispute involving 
servitudes and critically reviews the articles by J Scott “Effect of the Destruction of a Dwelling on the 
Personal Servitude of Habitatio” (2011) 74 THRHR 155-169; CG van der Merwe “Extinction of Personal 
Servitude of Habitatio” (2010) 73 THRHR 657-665; JC Sonnekus, ‘Bewoningsreg (Habitatio)—Verval 
dit Weens Versteuring (Vernietiging) van die Bouwerk?’ 2009 TSAR 450-469. Recently, JC Sonnekus 
“Bewoningsreg (Habitatio) – Aard van die Regsobjek en die Effek Dáárvan op die Registrasie van die 
Reg” (2015) 26 Stell LR 63-85 made another contribution to this debate. 
369 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 732. 
370 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 746. 
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development of the common law is required.371 Furthermore, this outcome is at odds 
with the right of access to adequate housing enshrined in section 26(1) and requires 
analysis to decide whether the limitation of section 26(1) can be justified or rectified 
by weighing up the right of access to adequate housing of the servitude holder and 
the property rights of the bare owner.372 By analogy, the termination of usufruct due to 
the breach of the salva rei substantia requirement may therefore also compromise the 
constitutional right of access to housing. Should a constitutional analysis of a similar 
set of facts pertaining to usufruct reveal that development of the common law is 
necessary, a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement may be required 
on constitutional grounds. In chapter 5 I consider the constitutional implications of the 
extinction of usufruct due to the salva rei substantia requirement in detail. Again, this 
measure of termination, similar to the case of abuse, reveals a high threshold. Usufruct 
may still continue where a part of the usufructuary property or the universality remains. 
This also reveals a rather flexible approach to the consequences of termination 
through destruction. 
Thirdly, in Roman Dutch law usufruct was terminated in cases where the object 
of the usufruct was substantially transformed, “just as though it had perished”.373 
Examples of such substantial transformation include the erection of a building on land 
given in usufruct, the creation of agricultural fields through the reclamation of lakes, 
the melting of gold or silver objects with the purpose of casting it in bars, the felling of 
all trees given in usufruct to clear land that could generate income, and the 
transformation of a house into a bathhouse or a workshop into a dining room. The 
                                                          
371 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 732. 
372 746. 
373 Voet 7 4 9. 
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South African common law position still holds that the usufruct is extinguished when 
the object of the usufruct is fundamentally changed,374 but not when it undergoes 
partial change.375 An example of the latter would be the case of Philps v Cradock 
Municipality.376 Just as in the case of total and partial destruction, it is not clear where 
the boundary between substantial change in form and partial change lies. This 
measure of termination directly represents the salva rei substantia requirement. 
Finally, Voet377 addresses an interesting question, namely how far a usufruct 
revives when the usufructuary property is re-established or reverts to its old form. Voet 
suggests that a distinction should be made between reinstatement of the property “not 
the same in number but merely as a like property with a like form” and property “the 
same in number as that which has been destroyed”, “reawakened after destruction”. 
In the first case, for example if a house was demolished, the presence of a new house 
would not revive the usufruct, since the reinstated property is not the same as the 
property over which the usufruct was granted.378 In the second case, the usufruct 
revives, for example if the usufruct on a site ceased due to the erecting of a house, it 
may revive if the house is destroyed because the object of the usufruct is the same.379 
Perhaps this question of revival as it is addressed in the Roman Dutch sources is a 
particularly revealing one: it indicates a rigid interpretation of the salva rei substantia 
                                                          
374 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 621 citing D 7 4 2 pr; Grotius Inleiding 2 37 5; Voet Commentarius 
8 6 4 and Wiener v Van der Byl (1904) 21 SC 92 95. 
375 Voet 7 4 9. 
376 1937 EDL 389. 
377 Voet 7 4 10. 
378 Voet 7 4 10 refers to D 7 1 36; 7 4 10 1; Annaeus Robertus Res Judicatae Bk 4 ch 8 (the title should 
probably be Rerum Judicatarum); Johannes Paponius, Bk 14 tit 2 arrest 4.  
379 Voet 7 4 10. 
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requirement, since the usufruct may only revive if the object of the usufruct exactly 
corresponds to the original usufructuary property. Revival is, however, highly unlikely 
in South African law. According to Van der Merwe a servitude would only lapse 
permanently if it becomes perpetually impossible to exercise.380 However, since 
personal servitudes are not perpetual in nature, it is not readily accepted that the 
usufruct would revive where the servient property is restored in the previous 
condition.381 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the South African common law position 
regarding the salva rei substantia requirement within the context of personal 
servitudes, and specifically usufruct as the most comprehensive and prevalent 
personal servitude. The salva rei substantia requirement is still an element of the 
definition of usufruct. Furthermore, it is related to the civiliter principle that is applicable 
to all servitudes, but the former fulfils a specialised regulatory function. This distinction 
is related to the differences between praedial and personal servitudes. The civiliter 
principle, together with the salva rei substantia requirement, determines the duties of 
the usufructuary and regulates the relationship between the usufructuary and the bare 
owner by restricting the use and enjoyment of the usufructuary.  
                                                          
380 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 535; CG van der Merwe CG & A Pope “Servitudes and Other 
Real Rights” in Du Bois F (ed), Bradfield G, Himonga C, Hutchison D, Lehmann K, Le Roux R, Paleker 
M, Pope A, Van der Merwe CG & Visser D Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 
615 refer to D 7 4 2 pr; Grotius 2 37 5; Voet 8 6 4; Wiener v Van der Byl (1904) 21 SC 92 at 95. 
381 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 535 refers to Voet 7 4 10; Huber HR 2 40 14. Cf D 7 4 23, 24; 
Grotius 2 39 14; Van der Keessel Praelectiones on Grotius 2 39 14. 
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In terms of the rights allocated to the usufructuary, the use right of the 
usufructuary allows for administration and control. A measure of flexibility is evident 
from decisions taking into account contextual factors such as the locality, established 
practice in the area, the nature of the object of the usufruct and circumstances relevant 
to its enjoyment. However, these factors are still subject to both the destination and 
the bonus paterfamilias criteria. Furthermore, it is not clear which juristic acts 
amounting to control and administration of the usufructuary property are compatible 
with the salva rei substantia requirement. Given that case law particularly discussing 
the entitlements of administration and control is scarce, it is therefore difficult to answer 
the question whether these entitlements might in any way reflect a flexible approach 
to the salva rei substantia requirement. Nevertheless, it appears clear that they do not 
accommodate acts of disposition pertaining to the usufructuary property such as 
mortgage, pledge and sale. In this regard South Africa lacks the detailed discourse 
evident in comparative jurisdictions.  
Decisions relating to the duties of the usufructuary generally still show evidence 
of a somewhat rigid approach. This observation must, however, be qualified. Firstly, 
since case law on the salva rei substantia requirement is sparse, mostly dates from 
the preconstitutional era, and is predominantly restricted to provincial courts, it is 
difficult to gauge whether the previously established doctrinal positions will still be 
upheld by courts. Secondly, case law still does not reflect deference to the 
Constitution. These factors must lead to a circumspect assessment of the available 
material.  
The duties to frame inventory and to provide security are still in theory open to 
enforcement by severe measures such as the possibility to refuse delivery of the 
usufructuary property and ejectment. However, these sanctions have not been subject 
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to constitutional scrutiny. It is doubtful whether such severe penalties will be upheld in 
the current constitutional dispensation in cases where they compromise constitutional 
provisions by for example infringing the right to equality and non-discrimination or the 
right of access to housing. A few cases indicate that courts are using the discretion 
allotted to them to reach equitable outcomes, particularly where the usufructuary is 
vulnerable or subjected to unreasonableness.  
The importance of maintenance is highlighted by the courts’ response to 
situations where the lack of repairs and maintenance poses a threat to the usufruct 
and might lead to a breach of the salva rei substantia requirement. Although the 
usufruct is not transferable or heritable due to its highly personal nature and the 
usufructuary may accordingly neither alienate nor burden the object of the usufruct nor 
his real right to the object, judgements allowing mortgage to finance maintenance and 
repairs but not improvements point to strict adherence to the salva rei substantia 
requirement. Furthermore, overreaching by means of improvements, as contrasted to 
maintenance repairs, is met with restraint since the usufructuary who does what the 
law does not permit him to do by effecting improvements does so at his own risk and 
is not entitled to compensation. Improvements may not generally be claimed, except 
where they also indicate a propensity to enable the usufructuary to comply with the 
salva rei substantia requirement. That is, where the improvement is of a permanent 
nature and has as its object the permanent preservation of the usufructuary property, 
compensation may be claimed. This concession reveals a slightly more teleological 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. 
The availability of the actio negatoria as a remedy which enables the bare owner 
to insist on the restoration of the status quo ante might also be an indication of a rigid 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. Case law might eventually establish 
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that this remedy has been superseded by the declaration of rights, coupled with either 
a mandatory or a prohibitory interdict and, where applicable, a claim for damages.  
The grounds for termination of the usufruct also indicate that the salva rei 
substantia requirement is important, although the threshold for termination seems to 
be high – impairment to the usufructuary object has to be fundamental. Abuse of right 
by the usufructuary does not generally attract the same sanction as it did in Roman 
Dutch law, which might indicate a slightly less strict approach to the salva rei 
substantia requirement as far as grounds for termination is concerned. The abuse of 
right can still meet with the penalty of an interdict and the demand for security. As 
stated above, the law as it stands, namely that usufruct terminates due to impossibility, 
still has to be subjected to constitutional scrutiny and might, as Van der Walt has 
argued, require constitutional development. This question will be addressed in chapter 
5. This ground for termination still exist in South African law and might theoretically 
still indicate a rigid approach the salva rei substantia requirement.  
Therefore, it seems that doctrinally at least, taking into account the qualifications 
mentioned above, the salva rei substantia requirement is still approached in a 
somewhat rigid way, although there seems to be indications that an equitable outcome 
would be favoured where a usufructuary is vulnerable and subject to unreasonable 
treatment.
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CHAPTER 3:  
COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
3 1 Introduction 
Developments in foreign civil-law and mixed jurisdictions indicate that there has to an 
extent been a shift from a rigid to a flexible approach concerning the salva rei 
substantia requirement.1 This move is more pronounced in jurisdictions where the shift 
was formalised in recent versions of the civil codes.2 A second group of jurisdictions 
achieved the same result by focusing on the economic destination of the object of the 
usufruct.3 By foregrounding this teleological denotation of the salva rei substantia 
requirement, scope is created for a flexible approach to the application of the 
requirement. Thirdly, in other jurisdictions revision of the law of usufruct indicates that 
the balance between the usufructuary and the owner has shifted and that the 
                                                          
1 See A Verbeke, B Verdickt & D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in C van der Merwe & A 
Verbeke (eds) Time-Limited Interests in Land (2012) 33-56 47: “We may conclude that the modern 
approach as to both control and income offers substantially more leeway to the donor-usufructuary”. CJ 
van Zeben, JW du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek 
Boek 3 Vermogensrecht in het Algemeen (1981) 642 (with reference to footnote 1) mention that the 
Spanish Civil Code (in art 467) was the first to acknowledge the possibility of broadening the 
competencies of the usufructuary. The Spanish example was followed in various South American civil 
codes. One of the most explicit developments occurred in the Dutch Civil Code of 1992. CJ van Zeben, 
JW du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 3 
Vermogensrecht in het Algemeen (1981) 641 note that the salva rei substantia requirement previously 
embodied in article 803 was dropped from the new Dutch Civil Code.  
2 See for example the BW 201. 
3 See for example BGB § 1041. CJ van Zeben, JW du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire Geschiedenis 
van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 3 Vermogensrecht in het Algemeen (1981) 642 (with reference 
to footnote 1) also mention the Italian Civil Code, art 981. 
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usufructuary is endowed with an increasing competence to dispose of the object of the 
usufruct.4 This revision has implications for the application of the salva rei substantia 
requirement. Fourthly, in jurisdictions where the salva rei substantia requirement is still 
retained in the civil code, the interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement in 
case law reveals a preference for a less rigid approach.5 
This chapter considers the shift in the application of the salva rei substantia 
requirement in French, Belgian, Dutch, German and Louisiana state law. As civilian or 
partly civilian jurisdictions they share the Roman heritage of the law of usufruct, but 
each jurisdiction has developed different strategies to cope with the inherent limitations 
of the salva rei substantia requirement. 
The law of usufruct in Belgium, the Netherlands and the state Louisiana is 
historically and in certain cases doctrinally related to the French law of usufruct. A 
discussion of Belgian law would hardly be possible without referring to French law. 
With the exception of amendments, Belgian property law is still largely based on the 
French Civil Code (CC). Moreover, French law has exerted significant influence on 
Belgian scholars and case law.6 The Dutch Civil Code (BW) has been influenced by 
both German and French Law7 and the BW dating from 1838 was premised on the 
                                                          
4 See for example AN Matasar “The Usufruct Revisions: the Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables Now 
Expressly Includes Alienation, Lease and Encumbrance; Has the Louisiana Legislature Fundamentally 
Altered the Nature of Usufruct?” (2012) 86 Tul L Rev 787-822 821 and EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op 
Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 185. 
5 L Aynès “Property Law” in GA Bermann & E Picard (eds) Introduction to French Law (2008) 164. 
6 V Sagaert “The Fragmented System of Land Burdens in French and Belgian Law” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Towards a Unified System of Land Burdens? (2006) 31-52 32. 
7 B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law (2008) 9. B Akkermans, 
V Sagaert & W Swadling “Introduction: Essential Directions on Using the Casebook” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law (2012) 1-36 35 note that Dutch law 
occupies an intermediate position between French and German law”. 
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CC.8 In 1992 the BW was transformed under the influence of German law.9 Akkermans 
remarks that Dutch law takes the middle ground between French and German law but 
is at the same time complicated by traditional choices embodied in the 1992 Dutch 
Civil Code.10 The Louisiana Civil Code (La CC) is also based on the CC and Louisiana 
scholars rely extensively on the writings of French legal scholars for their doctrinal 
discussions.11 
The Dutch law on usufruct articulated in the 1992 BW may be the most 
compelling example of a shift in the approach to the salva rei substantia requirement.12 
                                                          
8 B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law (2008) 10. AN 
Yiannopoulos Civil Law System Louisiana and Comparative Law: A Coursebook: Texts, Cases and 
Materials (2 ed 1999) 52 remarks that the BW of 1838 “preserved much of the spirit, content and 
legislative technique” of the CC. 
9 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “Introduction: Essential Directions on Using the Casebook” in 
Van Erp S & Akkermans B (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law (2012) Oxford & Portland: 
Hart Publishing 1-36 35. 
10 B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus in European Property Law (2008) 10-11. See also 
B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “Introduction: Essential Directions on Using the Casebook” in 
Van Erp S & Akkermans B (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law (2012) Oxford & Portland: 
Hart Publishing 1-36 35. 
11 JD Smith “Foreword” in M Planiol & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) 
(translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 
(1959)) iii-v iii. See also MG Algero “The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative 
and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation” (2005) 65 La L Rev 775-822 777, 
780 and 798 and AN Yiannopoulos Civil Law System Louisiana and Comparative Law a Coursebook: 
Texts, Cases and Materials (2 ed 1999) 52. I am not negating the Spanish influence on Louisiana Law. 
On the Spanish influence see for example RA Pascal “Of the Civil Code and Us” (1998) 59 La L Rev 
301- 324 302-303. 
12 JPM Stubbé, TJ Mellema-Kranenburg, CA Kraan & IJFA Van Vijfeijken Vruchtgebruik Preadvies 
Koninklijke Notariële Beroepsorganisatie (1999) 11 note that usufruct generated a lot of interest 
because of the broader application possibilities opened up by the BW of 1992. In the context of the 
revised law of succession the institution of usufruct takes on new significance: the surviving spouse can 
be compelled to transfer property to the heirs, but with the retention of usufruct. 
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By eliminating the requirement from the definition13 of usufruct14 in article 3: 201 and 
removing the obligation to maintain the object of the usufruct,15 Dutch law reshapes 
usufruct as an institution. 
The transformation of the Dutch law regarding usufruct indicates a radical 
doctrinal shift in the position of the usufructuary. From a comparative perspective this 
departure provides flexibility, compared to French and Belgian law. Apart from omitting 
the salva rei substantia requirement, the removal of the distinction between 
consumables and traditional objects16 of usufruct thus redefines the duties, rights and 
position of the usufructuary. An investigation into the repercussions of the legislative 
change in Dutch law and the policy considerations underlying the transformation might 
stimulate South African discourse on the need for a flexible approach to the salva rei 
substantia requirement. 
The recent revision of the Louisiana state law on usufruct17 provides an 
interesting point of departure for reassessing the treatment of the salva rei substantia 
obligation in civil law jurisdictions in general. 
                                                          
13 As HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 510 notes the description in art 
3: 201 cannot be termed a definition since it only notes the entitlements of the usufructuary. 
14 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 319. 
15 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 319; MS van 
Gaalen Vruchtgebruik (2001) 23.  
16 CJ van Zeben, JW du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek Boek 3 Vermogensrecht in het Algemeen (1981) 239. 
17 M Nathan “2010 Revision of the Law of Usufruct” (2011) 57 Loy L Rev 227-236 227 refers to Act No 
881 of the 2010 Legislative Session of Louisiana which adopted revisions as a result of the 
recommendations from a four year study on the laws of usufruct and bare ownership done in the light 
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
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A preliminary comparative overview of the five foreign jurisdictions indicates a 
range of responses to the inherent limitations of the salva rei substantia requirement. 
In a few of these jurisdictions a significant shift from a rigid to a flexible approach 
occurred due to pragmatic reasons, socio-economic changes or legal developments. 
Approaches range from eliminating the preservation requirement, increasing the 
disposition capacity of the usufructuary to creative interpretations of the destination 
and substance concepts. An analysis of foreign usufruct law serves to identify 
alternative approaches to the limitations of the salva rei substantia requirement with 
the aim of subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny. 
 
3 2 Usufruct in Dutch law 
3 2 1 Introduction 
The new Burgerlijke Wetboek of 1992 already stimulated debate about the changed 
nature of usufruct in the Netherlands. Furthermore, relatively recent changes in the 
law of succession took place in 2003.18 The new law of succession of 1 January 2003 
stipulated a system of legal partition whereby the surviving spouse became the heir of 
the complete estate by law, while each of the children as heirs has a monetary claim 
against the spouse which can in principle be claimed on the death of the surviving 
spouse. Usufruct can play a role when the children use their voluntary right (wilsrecht) 
                                                          
18 In comparison to other jurisdictions there has been a marked resistance against using usufruct as a 
mechanism to provide for the surviving spouse in the intestate law of succession. HJ Snijders & EB 
Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511 note that the Design of Book 4 (Ontwerp Boek 4) 
originally stated that the surviving spouse would become the intestate usufructuary of the estate of the 
deceased. However, this became a contentious issue between the legislator (het departement) and 
notaries. 
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to claim transfer of the goods.19 This transfer then takes place under retention of 
usufruct. If a testamentary disposition (uiterste wilsbeschikking) by the testator causes 
a deviation from the intestate law of succession (versterf-erfrecht) in the sense that 
the spouse is not the only heir of the house with the contents (inboedel) he may claim 
the usufruct.20 Furthermore, a spouse who can prove that her income and patrimonial 
position are inadequate to provide for her living expenses may claim the usufruct of 
other goods than the house and contents. The heirs are obliged to cooperate to 
establish the usufruct.21 These legislative changes have prompted renewed interest in 
the law of usufruct and resulted in a few detailed studies on the nature of usufruct.22 
Accordingly, the question of the approach to the preservation requirement has also 
been addressed in these studies. 
                                                          
19 BW 4: 19; BW 4: 21; HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 512. A voluntary 
right can be defined as the competence to unilaterally create a new legal position (rechtstoestand) or 
subjective right irrespective of whether it is accompanied by a legal decision or not. See WHM Reehuis, 
AHT Heisterkamp, GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Goederenrecht (13 ed 2012) 70 para 102 and HJ 
Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 24 para 30. In terms of this right, children 
may claim their voluntary right when the surviving spouse decides to marry again. If they claim this right, 
they become bare owners of property to the value of their claim, but the surviving parent enjoys the 
usufruct on this property. See <http://www.erfwijzer.nl/wilsrechten.html> (accessed 18-08-2015). 
20 BW 4: 29; HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 512. 
21 BW 4: 30; HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 512. 
22 See for example EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht 
en Vennootschapsrecht (2005); MS van Gaalen Vruchtgebruik (2001); BWM Nieskens-Isphording 
“Praktijkgerichte Evaluatie van het Vruchtgebruik Leidt tot Vraag naar Meer ‘Maatwerk’” 1999 WPNR 
617-621; BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” 
(1993) 124 WPNR 890-893; WM Kleijn Monografieën Nieuw BW Vruchtgebruik (1990). 
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Bos describes usufruct as the “most complicated limited right” in Dutch property 
law,23 a view to which other scholars also subscribe.24 Factors that contribute to the 
intricate nature of Dutch usufruct include the fact that usufruct may be established on 
all types of property.25 Furthermore, not a lot of boundaries exist to delineate the 
division of competencies between the bare owner and the usufructuary. This is for 
example evident from the fact that the usufructuary may be permitted to consume the 
usufructuary property. Indeed, the usufructuary can to an extraordinary extent exercise 
disposition powers usually assigned to the owner, should the right to dispose of and 
to consume the usufructuary property be granted. As a result of these far-reaching 
disposition powers, the position of the bare owner is weakened. Although it is usually 
argued that the bare owner creates this situation by assigning these powers of 
disposition to the usufructuary, and therefore weakens his own position, Bos argues 
that this is not always the case in practice. An example would be where the usufruct 
is established due to the operation of the law of succession. In this case the conditions 
for the acquisition and establishment of the usufruct are determined by a testament or 
by means of the rules governing the law of intestate succession.26 
It therefore appears that both as consequence of legislative changes and due to 
the intricate nature of the right, particularly since the changes brought about by the 
                                                          
23 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 39. 
24 See for example the description by JW Zwemmer “Fiscale Aspecten van Vruchtgebruik” (1999) 6368 
WPNR 624-629 624 who vividly portrays usufruct as “een veelzijdig monster dat zich tooide met een 
dubbele Januskop. De ene kop vertoonde om beurten de trekken van vermogen en inkomen en de 
andere kop die van verzorgingsbehoefte en manipulatie-instrument”. 
25 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 39. 
26 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 39. 
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BW of 1992, the right of usufruct in the Netherlands presents an intriguing example of 
legal innovation. This is also the case where the preservation requirement is 
concerned. 
 
3 2 2 Changed nature of usufruct 
Article 803 of the 1838 BW defined usufruct as a real right to enjoy the fruits of the 
property belonging to another, as if one were the owner, provided that the object of 
the usufruct was preserved.27 The equivalent of this provision in the 1992 BW was 
changed substantially: the preservation requirement was omitted.28 Instead, BW 3: 8: 
201 only refers to the rights of the usufructuary, namely the right to use the objects 
belonging to another and to enjoy the fruits of the object.29 The new provision 
introduced fundamental changes to the law of usufruct,30 doing away with the 
reference to the salva rei substantia principle and broadening the scope of the 
usufructuary’s entitlements.31 Instead of formulating the salva rerum substantia 
                                                          
27 I Jansen (ed) Burgerlijk Wetboek (1985) 461 article 803 states “Vruchtgebruik is een zakelijk regt om 
van eens anders goed de vruchten te trekken, als of men zelf eigenaar daarvan was, mits zorgende dat 
de zaak zelve in stand blijve”. 
28 WM Kleijn Monografieën Nieuw BW Vruchtgebruik (1990) 1 claims that the removal of this 
requirement was motivated by the changed views regarding the use of object of the usufruct. This 
departure from the age old tradition concerning usufruct was already anticipated in the legislative design 
of Mejiers, see JC van Oven “Een Kort Begrip van Ons Toekomstig Vermogensrecht” (1955) 86 WPNR 
369-372 371; JC van Oven “Het Vruchtgebruik in het Ontwerp Nieuw BW” (1959) 90 WPNR 361-363 
361-362. 
29 JH Nieuwenhuis, CJJM Stolker & WL Valk (eds) Burgerlijk Wetboek Tekst & Commentaar De Tekst 
van de Boeken 3,5 en 6 Voorzien van Commentaar (1994) 165 state “Vruchtgebruik geeft het recht om 
goederen die aan een ander toebehoren, te gebruiken en daarvan de vruchten te genieten”. 
30 MS van Gaalen Vruchtgebruik (2001) 1.  
31 MS van Gaalen Vruchtgebruik (2001) 2. See also B Akkermans The Principle of Numerus Clausus 
in European Property Law (2008) 275; TJ Mellema-Kranenburg “Vruchtgebruik” in CJH Brunner, WM 
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requirement as part of a definition of usufruct, the usufructuary is obliged not to change 
the substance of the usufruct.32  
Furthermore, the distinction between the use of consumables and usufruct that 
was encoded in article 804 of the 1838 BW was not included in the 1992 BW.33 
Berenschot views the fundamental change brought about by title 3.8 of the current BW 
as exemplary of the accomplishments of a modernising legislator.34 Changes break 
with ancient tradition, resulting in fundamental changes to and revolutionary 
transformation of “archaic provisions”,35 particularly with regard to the powers of the 
usufructuary.36  
In the old BW the definition of usufruct was modelled on article 578 of the French 
CC.37 The French definition referred to the last part of the Roman definition of usufruct, 
which stipulates that the objects subject to the usufruct should be maintained without 
impairment of the substance, with the words “mits zorgende dat de zaak zelve in stand 
blijve”. The usufructuary was therefore required to care for the object of the usufruct 
                                                          
Kleijn, ALM Soons & YG Brie Weissmann (eds) Vermogensrecht (Suppl 23 1997) title 8 article 201–1-
201–2.  
32 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511. 
33 JH Nieuwenhuis, CJJM Stolker & WL Valk (eds) Burgerlijk Wetboek Tekst & Commentaar De Tekst 
van de Boeken 3,5 en 6 Voorzien van Commentaar (1994) 166. 
34 EB Berenschot “Enige Aspecten van de Plaats van het Vruchtgebruik in het Vermogensrechtelijk 
Systeem” (1983) 5730 WPNR 170-179 170. 
35 EB Berenschot “Enige Aspecten van de Plaats van het Vruchtgebruik in het Vermogensrechtelijk 
Systeem” (1983) 5730 WPNR 170-179 170 refers to JC van Oven “Een Kort Begrip van Ons 
Toekomstig Vermogensrecht” WPNR 4411 371; “Het Vruchtgebruik in het Ontwerp NBW” (1959) 4595 
WPNR 361; G de Grooth Preadvies Broederschap der Notarissen (1955) 66. 
36 EB Berenschot “Enige Aspecten van de Plaats van het Vruchtgebruik in het Vermogensrechtelijk 
Systeem” (1983) 5730 WPNR 170-179 170. 
37 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 319. 
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in such a way as to preserve it. However, this requirement was not included in the 
current article 201. Instead, the article stipulates the competencies of the 
usufructuary.38 The right of usufruct allows the usufructuary to use the things 
(goederen) of another and to enjoy the fruits thereof. Therefore, usufruct can be 
applicable to both things (zaken) and rights.  
Van Mijnssen, Van Velten and Bartels motivate this new formulation by stating 
that the usufructuary sometimes is competent to use fungible things (verbruikbare 
zaken). Furthermore, the requirement would not be valid where things lose their value 
due to normal use. Apart from these considerations, the formulation also reflects the 
different role that usufruct plays in the modern Dutch society. In the past, the protection 
of the family patrimony was important.39 It mainly consisted of immovables40 and the 
protection of these assets for the use of the family of the grantor of the usufruct was 
paramount.41 Although the emphasis was on the maintenance and protection of the 
patrimony, the institution of usufruct allowed adequate provision for the usufructuary. 
This was particularly the case in the testate law of succession, where one beneficiary 
was typically appointed heir and the other as usufructuary. Spouses could provide for 
each other in this way, leaving the bare ownership to their children.  
                                                          
38 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 510.  
39 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511; EM Meijers Ontwerp voor een 
Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek:Toelichting Eerste Gedeelte Boek 1-4 (1954) 264. 
40 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & 
SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 
Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 320. FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels 
Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: 
Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 320 mention that the comprehensive arrangements regarding 
“kaphout, hoopopgaand geboomte and fruit trees” in articles 813 to 818 of the old BW are examples 
illustrating the emphasis on immovables.  
41 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511. 
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Eventually the substance of patrimony changed.42 It now consists mainly of 
movables and investments in the form of securities and consequently the need to use 
these objects of the usufruct has arisen.43 Article 803 of the old BW complicated 
matters for the usufructuary by restricting his competence to deal with securities.44 The 
nature of usufruct has therefore changed to accommodate the different content of 
patrimony in general and the needs of the usufructuary. In particular, the usufruct of 
consumables has received more attention and the usufructuary has received more 
competencies than in the past. Old Dutch law only allowed the usufructuary to enjoy 
the fruits without the right of use while the object of the usufruct had to remain intact.45 
In the modern law of usufruct the usufructuary has the right of use, and the requirement 
to maintain the object of the usufruct has lapsed. All things are subject to usufruct:  the 
distinction between usufruct and quasi-usufruct has thus lapsed. 
 
3 2 3 Rights of the usufructuary 
The usufructuary has the right to enjoy the fruits of the usufructuary property, to use 
the object subject to the usufruct, and to control and dispose of it.46 According to BW 
3: 216 all the fruits that can be collected or harvested during the usufruct belongs to 
                                                          
42 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 2. 
43 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 320; HJ Snijders 
& EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511; JC van Oven Leerboek van Romeinsch 
Privaatrecht (1948) 162. 
44 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 320. 
45 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511. 
46 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 15. 
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the usufructuary. These fruits include civil and natural fruits as stated in BW 3: 9: 1 
and 2. This classification is dependent on the public opinion. 
The competence to use or consume the objects subject to the usufruct is afforded 
by BW 3: 207: 1.47 Use or consumption of the object is governed by the rules agreed 
upon by the parties at the commencement of the usufruct or by taking into account the 
nature of the property and local custom regarding the use or consumption of the 
property. According to Bos it is unclear from the literature how the nature of the 
usufructuary property and local custom should be determined. Bos sides with Kleijn in 
asserting that “normal use and consumption” should be determined by objective 
criteria.48 The Dutch Civil Code of 1992 allows the usufructuary to consume the 
usufructuary property.49 In this way, the preservation requirement 
(instandhoudingsverplichting) that was still part of the old Dutch Civil Code was done 
away with. Although the 1992 Dutch Civil Code does not define consumption, Bos 
asserts that generally it must be interpreted as destruction through first time or more 
frequent use, but not to include alienation.50 The competence to consume or destroy 
should be delineated with reference to BW 3: 212 and BW 3: 215. 
According to BW 3: 207 the usufructuary is competent to execute acts that would 
constitute acts of good control. The concept “control” is not defined in the article but 
Bos describes it as “daily acts that cannot be postponed and would serve the normal 
exploitation of the usufructuary property”. The direct competence to dispose of the 
usufructuary object is given in BW 3: 207: 2 which necessitates that the usufructuary 
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may dispose of the property to comply with the requirement of good control.51 The 
reason for the wide scope of the acts in BW 3: 207 is related to the protection of third 
parties. If a third party would clearly interpret an act as good control, he must be able 
to assume that the usufructuary is competent to act in this way; this might include acts 
of disposition. The rules of control compel the usufructuary to take care of the 
usufructuary property and enable third parties to judge whether the usufructuary is 
competent to execute certain acts concerning the usufructuary property.52 
The usufructuary has the competence to alienate and mortgage the property.53 
The competence to dispose of the usufructuary property is determined by the nature 
of the object of the usufruct. Firstly, the usufructuary may dispose of his right of 
usufruct as stated in BW 3: 223. Where property other than rights is subject to usufruct, 
the usufructuary may be competent to dispose in three cases. Firstly, he may be 
competent if the destination provides for disposition as is evident from BW 3: 212: 1. 
Secondly and thirdly, disposition may be possible with reference to BW 3: 212 and BW 
3: 215. 
According to Bos the wording of BW 3: 212: 1 leaves scope for the changing 
views of society in terms of whether the destination allows for disposition. Bos views 
the subjectivity of the destination criterium (the destination which the grantor had in 
mind) as a counter measure for the objectivity of the nature of the usufructuary 
                                                          
51 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 890-893. 
52 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 21-22. 
53 23. 
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property. If the bare owner earmarks certain objects of the usufructuary property as 
suitable for alienation, the usufructuary also has the competence to alienate them.54 
The disposition powers of the usufructuary can be increased to full disposition 
powers by the grantor or bare owner according to BW 3: 212: 2 giving him discretion 
to decide on the composition of the usufructuary property.55 He may even change the 
destination of the object of the usufruct according to BW 3: 208: 2 and can therefore 
alienate original objects of the usufruct and substitute them for objects which bear 
more fruit. The usufructuary can also receive more disposition power on the grounds 
of BW 3: 212: 3 when the bare owner or judge (kantonrechter) grants consent. When 
the judge has to make the decision he has to weigh the different interests and 
according to section 3 he may only authorise more disposition power if the interest of 
the usufructuary or the bare owner is served by the alienation or burdening of the 
property and it is not to the detriment of the interest of the other party.  
Apart from the limited and full disposition powers which may be granted through 
BW 3: 212, BW 3: 215 provides that the bare owner may grant the usufructuary a very 
extensive right of disposition to alienate but also to consume the proceeds of the 
alienation.56 Consumption can in this case be described as disposition over the 
                                                          
54 23-24. 
55 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 24; Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511; BCM 
Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 124 
WPNR 890-893 890. 
56 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 24-25 uses the phrase “een bijna alomvattend recht tot beschikking” to 
describe the describe the powers of dispostition that the bare owner may grant the usufructuary. See 
also BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” 
(1993) 124 WPNR 890-893 890. 
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proceeds of the alienation with the aim of appropriating it.57 The bare owner may 
request delivery of the burdened property to the extent that the usufructuary or his 
heirs do not prove that the property has been consumed or accidentally perished. BW 
3: 215 can therefore be interpreted as relief from the obligation to reinvest as stated in 
BW 3: 214: 1. 
 
3 2 4 Duties of the usufructuary 
The usufructuary has to comply with two duties before he can exercise the usufruct: 
he has to frame inventory and provide security. According to BW 3: 205: 1 the 
usufructuary is obliged to frame an inventory (boedelbeschrijving)58 at the 
                                                          
57 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 25. 
58 JH Lichtenbelt Enkele Opmerkingen over het Vruchtgebruik (1879) discussed the question whether 
the words staat and beschrijving have the same meaning. According to Lichtenbelt some writers were 
of the opinion that they differ substantially: staat pertaining to a summary of immovables and 
beschrijving to a formal notarial description according to article 681. The difference ought to be sought 
in the words and in the origin of this article as taken over from of the Code Napoleon In the Code 
Napoleon article 600 the word inventaire was used. This was taken over as boedelbeschrijving in article 
28 of the Act of 28 February 1825 containing the 9th title of the 2nd Book of the BW. Eventually the word 
was changed by the law of 19 March 1833 to beschrijving. From this then ought to follow that the 
legislature had intended the same as with the word boedelbeschriving, but had only taken over the word 
beschrijving because usufruct seldom pertains to a complete estate. This would also have been the 
case with article 221 of the BW. Lichtenbelt viewed this construction of the intention of the legislature 
as arbitrary. He proposed that the legislature perceived that the same formalities need not be taken into 
account with the framing of a beschrijving in comparison to a boedelbeschrijving. According to 
Lichtenbelt a beschrijving is nothing else than an enumeration of the goods with certain characteristics. 
The value of the goods is not taken into account because when the usufructuary property is returned 
they should be returned in the condition in which they were after use and not their value. No estimation 
is therefore needed. However, in the case of consumables the value is a main component and should 
be added, but without the need for estimators. The law itself does not demand estimation as is evident 
from article 804. Staat and beschrijving are used as synonyms with the first pertaining to immovables 
and the second to movables. 
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commencement of the usufruct, unless there is already a record due to the usufruct 
being placed under administration (onderbewindstelling).59 Although the inventory is 
usually framed in a notarial deed, the usufructuary may with the collaboration of the 
bare owner use a non-notarial document (onderhandse akte). According to section 2 
of the same article the possibility exists of including details pertaining to the legal 
relationship between the bare owner and the usufructuary in the deed. 
The duty to provide security for the fulfilment of his obligations toward the bare 
owner is encoded in BW 3:206. Bos notes that the article does not provide guidelines 
as to how security should be provided. However, according to Waaijer security can be 
personal as well as patrimonial according to BW 831 and BW 6: 51: 1.60 According to 
Bos a judge may be approached if there is a deadlock in terms of consensus.61 
The duty to act like a good usufructuary62 is not only the main duty but the other 
duties of the usufructuary stem from this source obligation.63 It ought to be seen in 
relation to the concepts of reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billijkheid) and 
forms the framework of the remaining duties and the way in which the usufructuary 
exercises his powers of disposition. 64 If he does not act as a good usufructuary he will 
                                                          
59 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 27. 
60 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 892. 
61 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 27. 
62 BW 3: 207(3). 
63 WHM Reehuis, AHT Heisterkamp, GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Goederenrecht (13 ed 2012) 506; 
EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 26.  
64 26-27. 
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be liable for the damage resulting from his failure to comply with this duty.65 Bos 
asserts that it not clear whether the usufructuary should always take into account the 
interests of the bare owner, for example when the usufructuary has to use his voting 
rights pertaining to shares. 
The bare owner should be informed of the condition, scope, substitutions made 
and benefits received concerning the usufructuary property by means of an annual 
statement, as stated in BW 3: 205: 4. Bos argues that the duty to ensure the 
usufructuary property could rather be categorised as a subset of the obligation to act 
as a good usufructuary according to BW 3: 207.66 However, the Civil Code specifically 
refers to this duty in BW 3: 209. The usufructuary only has to ensure the usufructuary 
property against risks that would normally form the subject of insurance. When money 
forms the object of the usufruct, the usufructuary should invest it in consultation with 
the bare owner. If other usufructuary property should be derived from this investment, 
it is assimilated in the usufructuary property by means of substitution and forms part 
of the patrimony of the bare owner. 
If the usufructuary should fail to fulfil his duties, to the extent that it can be 
categorised as a serious failure (ernstig tekortschieten),67 the bare owner may, in 
accordance with BW 3: 221, approach a court to grant control of the usufructuary 
                                                          
65 27. 
66 28. 
67 On the strength of HR 9 December 1994 NJ 1995 224 (Van Opstal/Van Miert) r o 3 3, EC Bos 
Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en Vennootschapsrecht 
(2005) 28 n 146 argues that the term “tekortschieten” does not reach far enough as the court in this 
instance decided that grave failures in the past can also be grounds for administration in order to prevent 
grave failures in the future. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
122 
 
property or to place the usufruct under administration (onder bewind te stellen).68 This 
type of administration, which even the bare owner may manage, has a penal function 
(strafbewind) and must be distinguished from the administration that can be arranged 
from the commencement of the usufruct according to BW 3: 204. The latter type of 
administration often protects both the bare owner and the usufructuary in the context 
of a legacy. In both types of administration the usufructuary loses control of the 
usufructuary property but may still dispose of his right of usufruct. 
 
3 2 5 Protection mechanisms supplementing the preservation requirement 
 Other protection mechanisms exist apart from the obligation to maintain the 
substance. The principles of substitution and reinvestment protect the patrimony.69 
The usufructuary also has the duty to act with the necessary care towards the object 
of the usufruct and to provide security. Furthermore, the principles of reasonableness 
and fairness (billikheid) play a role. Finally, in cases where the usufructuary property 
is at risk, the institution of administration (bewind) can also be utilised. 
Waaijer notes that BW 3: 207 obliges the usufructuary to act with the necessary 
care towards the property subject to the usufruct and the control that he has over it.70 
This standard of care does not permit limitless disposition or consumption. However, 
BW 3: 215: 3 allows for small customary gifts. Apart from the standard of care, BW 6: 
248 read together with BW 216 determines that the principles of reasonableness and 
                                                          
68 EC Bos Vruchtgebruik op Aandelen: Over de Grenzen van Goederenrecht, Erfrecht en 
Vennootschapsrecht (2005) 28. 
69 HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot Goederenrecht (5 ed 2012) 511. 
70 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 890. 
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fairness also guide other disposition powers not covered by this article. Waaijer also 
points out that where the grantor grants more than the usual disposition powers to the 
usufructuary, its effect is limited to the lifetime of the usufructuary as BW 3: 223 
indicates.71 Waaijer asks whether this article in combination with BW 3: 226 is not an 
indication that the extra competencies should be used exclusively for the usufructuary 
and his family.72 
If the usufructuary breaches the norm of good care stipulated in BW 3: 207, he 
incurs an obligation to pay damages on termination of the usufruct. Furthermore, 
breach of the good care standard may, if a judge intervenes, lead to transfer of control 
of the usufructuary object to the bare owner or to administration (onderbewindstelling). 
However, these measures only allow the bare owner to protect his property after the 
breach has occurred. 
Another protection mechanism is substitution. In the case of substitution the 
object that replaces the original usufructuary object due to a valid act of disposition on 
the part of the usufructuary belongs to the bare owner and is also subject to usufruct. 
When claims subject to usufruct are recovered they are subject to usufruct. 
Remuneration received for usufructuary objects sold is also subject to usufruct. 
According to BW 3: 213: 1 claims regarding loss of value of the usufructuary object 
(waardevermindering) are also included. Both a right of bare dominium and a right of 
usufruct are vested in the substitutionary goods. However, there is one exception to 
this rule: usufructuary objects on an inventory (register). If the usufructuary validly 
disposes of a usufructuary object on the inventory or a right in his name, and uses the 
                                                          
71 890-891. 
72 891. 
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substitutionary gain to buy other inventory objects (registergoed), the usufructuary 
becomes the only holder of a right. This can be explained in terms of the publicity 
principle.73 To safeguard the position of the bare owner, Waaijer suggests that the 
disposition competence of the usufructuary should be connected to the condition that 
he would only be allowed to dispose of the inventory objects and rights 
(registergoederen en rechten) if he uses the gains from the disposition to acquire 
goods that are both in the name of the bare owner and the usufructuary.74 This should 
happen on the same day as the disposition. The restrictive condition should be noted 
in the deed that establishes the usufruct. 
In cases of invalid disposition there can be no substitution.75 Therefore, no 
automatic substitution takes place and a third party can become the owner of the 
objects subject to the usufruct, if the rules of third party protection are applicable.76 
The bare owner has recourse to damages. Another alternative would be that the bare 
owner consents to the disposition or that the judges authorises the act. The invalid act 
of disposition then becomes enforceable on the supposition that the interested parties 
have affirmed the disposition. Usually it is argued that the bare owner would be 
burdened with objects in which he has no interest, and that he would presumably 
rather receive damages. However, Waaijer77 points out that this argument against 
automatic substitution has its limits. In cases where the usufructuary disappears and 
                                                          
73 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 891 refers to BW 1: 97: 1 third sentence, WM Kleijn Monografie Nieuw BW: 
Vruchtgebruik (1990) ch 6. 
74 891. 
75 BW 3: 213: 1; BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden 
Beschermd?” (1993) 124 WPNR 890-893 891. 
76 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 891. 
77 891. 
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no damages are available or where authorisation is not an option (where the 
usufructuary was aware of the invalidity of his act of disposition and only informed the 
interested parties after a third party acquired the goods in good faith), the bare owner 
is not protected. Automatic substitution would have allowed the bare owner to acquire 
goods but with the possibility of receiving damages due to the obsolescence of the 
relevant goods (vanwege de incourantheid van het goed daarenboven). Another 
disadvantage of only having damages as remedy is that the claim for damages is only 
based on the value of the goods when the claim for damages was instituted.78 A 
considerable loss of value could have taken place.79 
Another safeguard for the bare owner lies in the obligation of the usufructuary to 
provide security for the fulfilment of his duties as stipulated in BW 3: 206 which was 
also found in the old BW in articles 831 and 832.80 However, the usufructuary can be 
released from this obligation and also does not have to comply when administration 
(onderbewindstelling) is instituted.  
Acording to BW 832: 2 there formerly was a release of the duty to provide security 
in the case where usufruct was established by transfer with the reservation of usufruct, 
but this is no longer the case in title 3.8. Therefore, such a release must be arranged 
by agreement.  
It is in the interest of the bare owner that security should be given at the 
commencement of the usufruct. According to Waaijer the bare owner would be able 
to suspend the delivery of the objects subject to usufruct on the basis of BW 6: 52 read 
                                                          
78 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 891 refers to HR 16 januari 1959, NJ 1959, 355, Swieringa. 
79 891. 
80 892. 
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together with BW 6: 55 until security is arranged.81 However, in certain instances 
delivery is not necessary as in the case where usufruct is acquired through the division 
of a parental estate (krachtens ouderlijke boedelverdeling).82 A device that Waaijer 
suggests as protection mechanism is the stipulation of security as suspensive 
condition before division of the parental estate.83 
Another protection mechanism to ensure the provision of security that may be 
utilised would be stipulating that the usufructuary is not entitled to the fruits of the 
usufruct in the period before security is provided. According to BW 835 the 
usufructuary would normally have a claim to fruits in this period but Waaijer classifies 
this claim as within the law of obligations if the commencement of usufruct was 
suspended only due to the duty to provide security. Therefore a stipulation denying 
entitlement until security is provided would be acceptable. 
Waaijer discusses some uncertainties regarding the scope of the security 
required. The scope of the security required depends on the duties of the usufructuary 
which are in turn dependent on the usufruct that was instituted. A particular example 
he probes is that of the usufructuary who has the competence to alienate, burden 
orconsume the object of the usufruct. If the usufructuary should alienate or consume 
                                                          
81 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 892 refers to article 3: 205: 3 which states that bare owner may suspend the 
delivery of the usufructuary goods if the the usufructuary does not frame an inventory at the same time. 
Waaijer mentions that this article is a development or elaboration (uitwerking) of article 6: 52 according 
to Parl Gesch Book 6 204. 
82 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 892 refers to WG Huijgen & WM Kleijn “Verdeling, Vruchtgebruik en het Nieuwe 
BW” (1992) 45 JBN 45. 
83 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 892. 
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all the goods which he is in principle allowed to do if he proves it according to BW 3: 
215: 1, security poses a question. Waaijer contends that he should provide security 
for the value of the object of the usufruct minus the value of the usufruct. This could 
be too much because the competence to consume places a heavy hypothec on the 
value of the main right, or too little if the value of the object subject to the usufruct rises 
or if the life expectancy of the usufructuary decreases sharply. 
Waaijer views the required concretization of the value of the duties of the usufruct 
in the case of hypothec84 and surety as evidence of the real nature of the difficulty of 
quantifying the worth of these obligations.85  
In cases where the usufructuary does not have property apart from his usufruct 
and if he cannot obtain personal security, the patrimonial (goederrechtelijke) security 
rests on his right of usufruct. Waaijer questions whether this type of security is enough. 
A usufructuary to whom the grantor granted more than the usual disposition powers 
can cause more damage than his usufruct is worth. The person who acquires the 
usufruct after execution (executie) does not acquire the larger powers of disposition 
granted to the original usufructuary according to BW 3: 223. Due to these dangers, 
Waaijers views the inability to provide security as a instance that seriously falls short 
as indicated in BW 3: 221. Therefore, he argues that the judge should be able to grant 
control to the bare owner or to put the usufruct under administration (bewind). 
                                                          
84 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 892 refers to article 3:260 which states that the deed should state the amount for 
which the hypothec was granted or the maximum amount that can be claimed if the amount has not 
been established yet. The usufructuary may be forced to provide additional security according to article 
6: 51.  
85 892. 
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A final mechanism Waaijers discusses is administration (bewind). Administration 
can be instituted by the intervention of a judge according to BW 3: 221. In this case 
the usufructuary should have seriously fallen short in the fulfilment of his duties. 
However, the bare owner can only act once problems have occurred. Administration 
can however also be instituted according to BW 3: 204 by a testator or by an 
agreement between the bare owner and the usufructuary at the establishment of the 
usufruct. Administration according to BW 3: 204 can protect both the bare owner and 
the usufructuary and should with this aim in mind be established on the objects of the 
usufruct.  
If the sole aim is the protection of the bare owner against the usufructuary, the 
right of usufruct should be placed under administration. The administrator 
(bewindvoerder) has the same competencies as the usufructuary would have had 
regarding control and disposition.86 According to BW 1: 438: 1 the administrator 
controls the objects subject to the usufruct. Waaijer notes that BW 3: 204: 2 is not 
applicable and that is not clear why this is the case. He tries to interpret this with 
reference to the parliamentary commentary (toelichting) BW 3: 168: 2 and concludes 
that the legislator intended that the usufructuary should be able to dispose of his right 
of usufruct without intervention by die administrator.87 However, Waaijer indicates that 
it is not clear whether the usufructuary can dispose over the objects subject to the 
usufruct if the content of the right of usufruct allows this. Waaijer is of the opinion that 
                                                          
86 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 893 refers to the Par Gesch Book 3 (Inv 3, 5 and 6) 1314. 
87 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 893 refers to WM Kleijn Monografie NBW B10 Vruchtgebruik (1990) 67. 
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this would not be the case as it would give too little protection to the bare owner.88 
Waaijer ascribes the ambiguity and uncertainty to the fact that the words “de onder 
(het) bewind staande goederen” in BW 1: 438 are not interpreted in the same way in 
BW 3: 204. BW 1: 438: 1 indicates that the goods should be controlled by the 
administrator. Section 2 would relate to the usufruct placed under administration. 
Furthermore BW 3: 215: 2 also indicates that if the usufruct is placed under bewind, 
alienation and consumption can only take place with the collaboration of the 
administrator. This article ensures the bare owner that the administrator will be 
involved. However, BW 3: 215 is only applicable where the usufructuary was granted 
the competence to alienate or consume the objects subject to the usufruct. 
The efficiency of the administration is related to the administrator publicising the 
administration in the public registers for register goods. BW 1: 439 read with BW 3: 
204 protects other parties against legal acts or acts of disposition which are not valid 
due to the administration (onderbewindstelling). 
 
3 2 6 Termination and remedies 
The usufruct can be terminated if ownership of the usufructuary property is 
extinguished.89 Therefore, in cases where the usufructuary property is destroyed, for 
example if it is consumed, the usufruct terminates.90 However, the usufruct may not 
                                                          
88 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 893 also refers to article 3: 206: 1. 
89 BW 3: 81: 2 sub a; MS van Gaalen Vruchtgebruik (2001) 187. 
90 See also WHM Reehuis, AHT Heisterkamp, GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Goederenrecht (13 ed 
2012) 446 para 601 and 511 para 701. 
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be terminated when the usufructuary seriously defaults on his duties.91 The legislature 
expressly stepped away from the option of abrogation (vervallenverklaring) that was 
contained in the old BW, since the possibility of placing the usufruct under 
management allocated by the court safeguards the interests of the bare owner.92 
 
3 3 Nießbrauch in German Law 
3 3 1 Introduction 
In German law usufruct or Nießbrauch is practically though not dogmatically viewed 
as an independent institution due to its scope.93 It affords wide-ranging powers to the 
usufructuary in comparison to other real rights. Furthermore, usufruct can have other 
functions apart from the traditional role it plays in family law and law of succession.94 
In this case the purpose of the usufruct is determined by the intention of the parties.95 
                                                          
91 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s Handleiding to de Beoefening van het 
Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht vol 5 Zakenrecht: Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten (2008) 342. 
92 342. 
93 C Ahrens Dingliche Nutzungsrechte (2007) 42. 
94 C Ahrens Dingliche Nutziungsrechte (2007) 42. J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 767-768 also 
mentions donation with the reservation of usufruct, tax benefits and provision for families as 
applications. 
95 C Ahrens Dingliche Nutziungsrechte (2007) 42. 
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Usufruct is defined as the right to take the emoluments of a thing.96 However, 
this definition can be criticised since a right can also be the object of a usufruct.97 
Furthermore, usufruct can be established on the patrimony of a person but it attaches 
to the individual objects that form part of the patrimony.98 Therefore, Wilhelm 
reformulates the definition: “Nießbrauch is die Belastung (eines Gegenstands) derart, 
dass der Begünstigte berechtigt ist, die Nutzungen (des Gegenstands) zu ziehen”.99 
He defines the burdening (Belastung) as the splitting off (Abspaltung) of competencies 
(Befugnissen) from the right of origin or mother right (Quellrecht) and accordingly 
describes the usufruct of things as a usufruct burdening property and the usufruct of 
rights as the usufruct that burdens other rights.100 It is clear that German law excludes 
the salva rei substantia requirement from the definition. However, it is included in other 
provisions of the BGB.101 The emphasis is on the economic destination of the object. 
The foregrounding of the economic destination may be an important point to consider 
in South African law.  
                                                          
96 BGB § 1030 I states: “Eine Sache kann in der Weise belastet werden, dass derjenige, zu dessen 
Gunsten die Belastung erfolgt, berechtigt ist, die Nutzungen der Sache zu ziehen”. BGB § 100 defines  
“Nutzungen” as “die Früchte einer Sache oder eines Rechts sowie die Vorteile, welche der Gebrauch 
der Sache oder des Rechts gewährt”. The official translation of BGB § 1030 reads: “A thing can be 
encumbered in such a way that the person for whose benefit the encumbrance is made is entitled to 
take the emoluments of the thing”. See <www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-bgb/englisch-
bgb.html#p4032> (accessed 19-08-2015). See also J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 766. The term 
“emoluments” seems unusual and is for example not utilised by B Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of 
Property Rights – Immovables and Movables (Goods)” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, 
Materials and Text on Property Law (2012) 211-364 254 in their translation of BGB § 1030. 
97 BGB § 1068; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 766. 
98 BGB § 1085; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 766-767. 
99 J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 767. 
100 J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 767. 
101 Compare for example BGB §§ 1036 II, 1037 II and 1041. 




3 3 2 Rights of the usufructuary 
The usufructuary has the right to extensive use of the thing subject to the usufruct.102 
Limitations of this right are only permitted regarding individual uses,103 and not to the 
extent that it is detrimental to the character of usufruct as a comprehensive use right.104 
The usufructuary aquires all fruits, both natural and civil, inclusive of the surplus 
fruits.105 The usufructuary may also use the fruits and rights which are connected to 
the thing through the property.106  
The right of possession is also allocated to the usufructuary.107 This allows him 
to use the property. The grantor becomes the indirect possessor and the usufructuary 
normally the direct possessor.108 However, if the usufructuary leases the object of the 
usufruct, he becomes an indirect possessor of the first degree.109  
                                                          
102 BGB § 1030; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 770; KH Schwab & FL Lent Sachenrecht: Ein 
Studienbuch von Dr Hanns Prütting (33 ed 2008) 361. 
103 BGB § 1030 II; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 770. 
104 See for a detailed discussion W Schön Der Nießbrauch an Sachen: Gesetzliche Struktur und 
Rechtsgeschäftliche Gestaltung (1992) 296-308. R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im Zivil-und 
Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 32. See also S Wolf Besteuerung der Bodenschatzverwertung (2011) 202; L 
Pahlow Lizenz und Lizenzvertrag im Recht des Geistigen Eigentums (2006) 362. 
105 BGB §§ 954, 1039 I 1; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 770. 
106 KH Schwab & FL Lent Sachenrecht: Ein Studienbuch von Dr Hanns Prütting (33 ed 2008) 362. 
107 BGB § 1036 I; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 770; R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im 
Zivil-und Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 41; KH Schwab & FL Lent Sachenrecht: Ein Studienbuch von Dr 
Hanns Prütting (33 ed 2008) 361. 
108 BGB § 868; R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im Zivil-und Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 41; KH 
Schwab & FL Lent Sachenrecht: Ein Studienbuch von Dr Hanns Prütting (33 ed 2008) 361. 
109 KH Schwab & FL Lent Sachenrecht: Ein Studienbuch von Dr Hanns Prütting (33 ed 2008) 361. 
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The usufructuary may not consume the usufructuary property, either by selling it 
or mortgaging it, even if § 92110 declares things destined for consumption according to 
destiny.111 Only use that preserves the possession of the thing or the actual possibility 
to use the thing is acceptable according to § 100.112 Although the usufructuary in 
principle does not have the right to dispose of the usufructuary property,113 he has the 
right to dispose of the individual items of stock if land together with stock is given in 
usufruct.114 He may do so within the boundaries of proper management. However, he 
may not dispose of the property.115  
The usufructuary may lease the object of the usufruct or give it in leasehold. If 
he has done so beyond the term of the usufruct, the lessee or the leaseholder is 
protected.116 On termination of the usufruct the owner becomes party to the 
obligation.117 
The entitlement to use the usufructuary property is limited by the duty to respect 
the economic destination of the property and to act according to the rules of orderly 
                                                          
110 BGB § 92 defines consumables in the following way: 
“Verbrauchbare Sachen im Sinne des Gesetzes sind bewegliche Sachen, deren 
bestimmungsmäßiger Gebrauch in dem Verbrauch oder in der Veräußerung besteht. Als 
verbrauchbar gelten auch bewegliche Sachen, die zu einem Warenlager oder zu einem 
sonstigen Sachinbegriff gehören, dessen bestimmungsmäßiger Gebrauch in 
der Veräußerung der einzelnen Sachen besteht”.  
111 P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken 
Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 120. 
112 120. 
113 R Wörlen & K Metzler-Müller Sachenrecht: Lehrbuch Strukturen Übersichten (6 ed 2005) 211. 
114 BGB §1048. 
115 J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 770. 
116 §§ 1056 and 566; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 771. 
117 KH Schwab & FL Lent Sachenrecht: Ein Studienbuch von Dr Hanns Prütting (33 ed 2008) 362. 
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management.118 He is not entitled to reshape/remodel/redesign/transform 
(umzugestalten) the object of the usufruct or to substantially change it.119 Furthermore, 
the provision permits the usufructuary of land to build new plants (Anlagen) for the 
mining (Gewinnung) of stone, gravel, sand, loam, clay, shell-marl (“mergel”), peat and 
other soil elements (Bodenbestandteilen) as long as the economic destination of the 
land is not substantially changed.120 Commentary underlines the complementary 
                                                          
118 BGB §§ 1036 II; 1037, 1038; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of 
Use (5 ed 2011) 295; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 771; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis 
zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht 
(1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 181. 
119 BGB § 1037; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 181. P Pohlmann “Titel 2: Nießbrauch: § 1037" in 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (6 ed 2013) Rn 2 discusses examples where 
the requirement of § 1037 I will either necessitate permission, where alterations will be permissible and 
when it would not be sanctioned. Permission would be required when a usufructuary wants to convert 
one residence into three smaller ones and where the alteration would significantly impair the substance. 
If the change is of lesser scope and serves the economic destination of the usufructuary object, 
permission is not required. Examples of such measures would include installing a sewerage system, 
applying new plaster or putting up a new roof covering. Changes that would not be sanctioned by BGB 
§ 1037 I would include fundamental building alterations, new buildings, measures that would initially 
lead to the deterioration of the usufructuary object such as the building up of a building and flooded 
gravel pits remaining after the mining of pebbles unless it only relates to a small piece of the land. 
Measures dictated by public law for example to provide protection against noise or to save energy, will 
be permissible if it is not detrimental to the interest of the bare owner. In cases where the usufructuary 
has a usufruct on an agricultural enterprise, he may abandon a few business branches for maintenance 
purposes of the enterprise. The dominant view is that the usufructuary of land is not allowed to build on 
the land in terms of § 1037 I and II (by implication). However, cases where the building would be in line 
with the economic destination, for example where additional stables are erected, would not amount to 
a substantial change. Contrary to the view of the Kammergericht the right to erect a building can in the 
view of the supported derogation of BGB § 1037 I be made the content of a usufruct. The permission 
to erect the building must however be entered into the Land Register for it to be an action in rem. This 
building does not become a substantial part of the land according to BGB § 95 I. 
120 According to BGB § 1037. P Pohlmann “Titel 2: Nießbrauch: § 1037" in Münchener Kommentar zum 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (6 ed 2013) Rn 3 states that the dominant view is that the right to erect 
facilities (Anlagen) functions as an exception to BGB § 1037 I. In this case, according to the 
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nature of the prohibition on altering the substance and the obligation on the 
usufructuary to respect the economic destination of the usufructuary object. These two 
legislative requirements delineate the competences of the usufructuary and the bare 
owner. Within these prescriptive boundaries, subsection two functions as an exception 
allowing the raising of facilities for the mining of soil elements on the condition that the 
economic destination of the land is not substantially altered.121 
There is a general obligation to use the object of the usufruct within the 
boundaries of the economic destination122 and to provide for the maintenance of the 
usufructuary property in terms of normal repairs and renovations.123 The principle 
underlying § 1036 was laid down by Johow in the preliminary draft for the substantively 
similar § 294. Since the usufruct is only a temporary interruption of the use of the 
owner, the owner may not be forced against his will to accept the changes of the 
destination undertaken by the usufructuary, if these were not already forseen. The will 
of the owner determines the economic destination. According to an opposite view that 
exclusively focuses on the objective realities, consent must be denied. It fails to 
recognise the character of BGB § 1036 that together with the remaining paragraphs 
of the legal obligation relationship ensures the protection of the owner. The objective 
                                                          
understanding of BGB § 1037 I whereby it is not permissible to substantially transform the usufructuary 
object, BGB § 1037 II must be understood as a concretisation of BGB § 1037 I. There is no assumption 
in BGB § 1037 II that the land is destined for the mining of soil elements. What is decisive however, is 
whether the mining changes the economic destination substantially. This is determined according to 
the criterion of BGB § 1036 II half sentence 1. Apart from mining the soil elements which the section 
makes provision for, the use of a source must also be considered. New plants/facilities are those which 
are completely renewed as well as those that replace old ones. See also J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 
2010) 771. 
121 §1037 BGB. P Pohlmann “Titel 2: Nießbrauch: § 1037" in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (6 ed 2013) Rn 1. 
122 BGB § 1036 II; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 771. 
123 BGB § 1041; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 771. 
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condition of the land is only determined in BGB § 1037 II, according to which 
objectively possible use always will be unlawful when it substantially changes the 
economic destination determined by the ower. 124 The relation between BGB §§ 1036 
and 1037 seems to be contested. On the one hand, it is presumed that BGB § 1037 I 
delineates the competencies of the usufructuary independently from BGB § 1036. On 
the other hand, it is also proposed that BGB § 1037 I functions as a concretisation of 
BGB § 1036. In this case the permissibility of substantial transformation depends on 
whether the economic destination is maintained or whether it is substantially impaired 
and if the changes are compatible with the rules of a properly constituted economy.125 
This would for example leave scope for changing a factory to a different kind of factory 
without altering the destination of the factory as an industrial establishment.126 Material 
change of the substance is proscribed even when a material change would not amount 
to an alteration of the destination. Examples would include extensive remodelling or 
raising of a floor, erecting buildings on vacant losts, converting orchards into arable 
lands. Woodlands, mines and quarries are subject to special rules. 
The minority view that the economic destination should be the primary 
consideration in relation to the maintenance of the substance holds that BGB § 1037 
II is applicable to a specific change to the substance. Furthermore, the permissibility 
of the transformation is dependent on the condition that the economic destination of 
                                                          
124 P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken 
Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 183. 
125 Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (6 ed 2013) Rn 2. 
126 See AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 295 with 
a systematic comparative perspective with refererence to German law. 
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the land must not be changed substantially. How substantial the transformation is, can 
only be defined in relation to the economic destination.127 
The dominant view of BGB § 1037 I holds that the prohibition against substantial 
impairment of the substance of the usufructuary object is not subject to disposition by 
the parties. Therefore, when parties agree to conditions that deviate from this 
provision, it cannot be entered into the land register. According to another more correct 
view, the usufructuary may freely change and transform the usufructuary object, since 
he is still bound by BGB § 1036 II and therefore any change would not be permissible. 
Personal obligations are in any case permissible. The prohibition on altering the 
usufructuary object has always been important: both in Roman and the common law 
the jurists acknowledged the obligation.128 Today certain alterations are allowed if they 
are sensible according to the assessment of both the interests of the owner and the 
usufructuary.129 Exceptions to the prohibition to remodeling are described in BGB § 
1037 II.130 The interaction between BGB § 1036 II and BGB § 1037 II probably entails 
that the economic destination of the usufructuary object is still maintained when the 
land is only used for mining temporarily in such a way that the owner is not at a later 
stage frustrated in his use preferences. The usufructuary may defy the will of the owner 
in terms of a contrary use as long as it is possible to place the usufructuary object that 
                                                          
127 Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (6 ed 2013) Rn 2. 
128 P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken 
Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 184. 
129 184. 
130 BGB § 1037 II; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverh\tnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) 
im Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 184. 
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enables the owner to exercise his preferred use back in a suitable condition before 
returning the usufructuary object. 
The BGB uses the standard of “orderly management”.131 The rules of orderly 
management are not determined by the views of the owner since otherwise the 
usufructuary could in that case be obliged to use inefficient or uneconomical methods 
if either the owner himself did not use optimal methods, or changed them during the 
course of time.132 General principles concerning the content of orderly management 
can currently scarely be determined, since the usufructuary object can come from 
diverse economic sectors for which own rules have been developed.133 Usufructuaries 
should guard against excessive wear and tear. Any fruits produced as result of 
“wasteful methods of exploitation must either be returned to the owner or the value 
thereof should be restored. 
The rights of the usufructuary in German law are therefore limited in general by 
the duty to be a proper manager. However, he is not allocated the power of disposition. 
The rights of the usufructuary do therefore not generally afford him more flexibility in 
terms of the salva rei substantia requirement. 
 
                                                          
131 BGB § 1036 II; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 
2011) 286. 
132 P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken 
Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 183. 
133 183. 
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3 3 3 Duties of the usufructuary and the preservation requirement 
The authoritative obligation of the usufructuary is to maintain the economic destination 
of the usufructuary property.134 Therefore, if needs be he should do repairs or 
restoration work,135 insure the property,136 take responsibility for the public charges137 
and as far as his conduct causes a significant infringement of the rights of the owner 
provide security if the owner requires it.138 
German law affords both the usufructuary and the bare owner the opportunity to 
demand determination of the condition of the movable or immovable usufructuary 
property by experts, at the cost of the party instituting the determination.139 The 
usufructuary has the obligation to tolerate the determination of the condition of the 
usufructuary property, if the owner demands it.140 Should the usufruct pertain to a 
universality of things, both parties may demand an inventory.141 Both the owner and 
the usufructuary should cooperate in the process.142 The formal requirements include 
                                                          
134 R Wörlen & K Metzler-Müller Sachenrecht: Lehrbuch Strukturen Übersichten (6 ed 2005) 212. 
135 BGB § 1036; R Wörlen & K Metzler-Müller Sachenrecht: Lehrbuch Strukturen Übersichten (6 ed 
2005) 212. 
136 BGB § 1045; R Wörlen & K Metzler-Müller Sachenrecht: Lehrbuch Strukturen Übersichten (6 ed 
2005) 212. 
137 BGB § 1047; R Wörlen & K Metzler-Müller Sachenrecht: Lehrbuch Strukturen Übersichten (6 ed 
2005) 212. 
138 BGB § 1051; R Wörlen & K Metzler-Müller Sachenrecht: Lehrbuch Strukturen Übersichten (6 ed 
2005) 212. 
139 BGB § 1034; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
260. 
140 BGB § 1035; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität. 
141 BGB §§ 1034 and 1035; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use 
(5 ed 2011) 260-261. 
142 BGB § 1035. 
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that the inventory should include the date of entry and the signature of both parties.143 
Furthermore, a party may require notarial certification of the signatures and demand 
that the inventory be made by a competent authority or official or notary.144 The party 
who requests the certification must bear the cost. In contrast to the law of Louisiana, 
the BGB does not mention estimation. However, Yiannopoulos is of the opinion that 
an interested party may pay experts to determine the value of the usufructuary 
property.145 
In cases where the conduct of the usufructuary is a cause for concern and the 
risk of material injury to the rights of the owner exists, the owner may require 
security.146 This duty originated in the Roman cautio usufructuaria but does not 
constitute a general obligation prior to entry into the usufruct, since it has been 
restricted to cases where there is a risk that the usufructuary will infringe the rights of 
the bare owner.147 
The usufructuary has the duty to maintain the usufructuary property. This means 
that he has to repair and restore the object of the usufruct. However, he also has to 
take maintenance measures that become necessary to restore damage due to his 
                                                          
143 BGB § 1035. 
144 BGB § 1035. 
145 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 262. 
146 BGB § 1051; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 772; R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im 
Zivil-und Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 69; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und 
Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished 
doctoral dissertation Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 244. 
147 P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken 
Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 244. 
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unlawful and culpable actions.148 Outside this range, § 1041 states that the 
usufructuary is primarily responsible to keep the usufructuary property in good order 
by taking care of the maintenance. More specifically, he has to maintain the property 
according to its economic destination. In addition he must also see to the usual repairs 
and restoration. These maintenance measures are those that become unavoidable 
and would be done normally and at shorter periodic intervals. However, accidental 
damage and damage caused by third parties are not excluded. The usufructuary is 
however not obligated to repair the usufructuary property that ages and becomes worn 
out despite continual maintenance.149 Extraordinary repairs are not the responsibility 
of either the usufructuary or the bare owner. However, the usufructuary should inform 
the bare owner that these repairs are necessary.150 The usufructuary may 
nevertheless undertake these extraordinary repairs, and if land is the object of the 
usufruct he may use components of the usufructuary property to accomplish this. 151 
However, he must nevertheless use it directly for this purpose. If the usufructuary 
makes expenditures to the usufructuary property that benefit it when he is not 
obligated to do so, he can, according to the rules about management or agency without 
                                                          
148 BGB § 823; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 172. 
149 BGB § 1050; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 172. 
150 BGB § 1042; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 177. 
151 BGB § 1043; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 173. 
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authorisation,152 claim reimbursement (Verwendungsersatz) from the owner.153 On 
termination of the usufruct, these claims can be the grounds for a retention right.154 If 
the usufructuary does not undertake these repairs or if he omitted doing normal 
maintenance, the owner may initiate the work.155 The usufructuary’s right to do the 
work nevertheless takes precedence and the owner should allow him reasonable time 
to do so.156 If the owner has done so and proceeds with the maintenance, he will be 
entitled to the fruits and accessories (components of the land subject to the usufruct.157 
Certain duties may prevent or defend against the breach of the salva rei 
substantia requirement by other parties. These include the duty to inform the bare 
owner of encroachment on his immovable property or other violations of his rights158 
to prevent accrual of prescription. The latter obliges the usufructuary of a claim not 
producing interest to collect payment on time and in the case of a claim producing 
interest, to cooperate with the bare owner so that the claim may be collected timely.159 
The usufructuary is liable where a predial servitude is lost due to non-use or where he 
                                                          
152 BGB § 677. 
153 BGB § 1049; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 771; BGB § 273; P Deichmann Das 
Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken Römischen Recht und im 
Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Universität 173; 174 
154 BGB § 273; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 173. 
155 BGB § 1044. 
156 Analogous to BGB § 326 I. 
157 BGB §§ 1044, 1043; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher 
(ENV) im Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 173. 
158 BGB § 1042. 
159 BGB § 1042. 
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allows acquisition of a servitude on the property.160 His responsibility does not, 
however, include bringing an action against a party about to complete acquisitive 
prescription, but only to provide information to the owner. 
In German law, it is argued that the usufructuary should insure the usufructuary 
property against casualty or loss in the event that orderly management would require 
it.161 The usufructuary takes out an insurance policy in his own name and nominates 
the bare owner as the beneficiary. In instances where the usufructuary property is 
already insured, the usufructuary continues the payments that correspond to his 
obligation to insure.162 
On termination of the usufruct, the usufructuary must return the usufructuary 
property to the owner.163 If he allowed a third party to exercise the usufruct or has 
somehow lost the property, he must place the owner in possession.164 If he rented out 
                                                          
160 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 289. 
161 BGB § 1045; J Wilhelm Sachenrecht (4 ed 2010) 771; BGB § 273; P Deichmann Das 
Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken Römischen Recht und im 
Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Universität 771-772; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher 
(ENV) im Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 181. See also AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: 
Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 290. 
162 BGB §§ 1045 and 1046; R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im Zivil-und Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 
68. See also AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
290. 
163 BGB § 1055; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 187. 
164 BGB § 1059; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im 
Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 187. 
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or pledged the property he must give indirect possession to the owner.165 The owner 
becomes the substitute of the usufructuary in the agreement with the third party.166 
To summarise, the duties of the usufructuary according to German law is still 
subject to the pervasive requirement to respect the economic destination of the 
usufructuary property. However, there seems to be differing opinions about the 
flexibility that this specific wording allows, some more conservative than others. In 
terms of specific duties it is interesting to note that the burden of framing inventory is 
conceptualised as a right and that the liability for payment is accorded to the party who 
requests the inventory. Furthermore, the security duty is qualified in the sense that the 
bare owner may only demand it where the risk of impairment of the substance exists. 
On the other hand, the duty to ensure differentiates the German law from other 
jurisdictions and places a more onerous burden on the usufructuary, but in a sense 
explains the rather limited scope of the security duty. In this sense, the duty to ensure 
would probably be a better solution than demanding security. It is therefore difficult to 
make an unqualified statement about the extent to which the salva rei substantia 
requirement is flexible in German law. The general limitation of good management 
does not distinguish the German law from other jurisdictions, but the emphasis on the 
economic destination might to a certain extent – although writers are divided on this 
point. 
 
                                                          
165 P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher (ENV) im Antiken 
Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation Rheinischen 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 187. 
166 BGB § 1056 I; 571 I; P Deichmann Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen Eigentümer und Nießbraucher 
(ENV) im Antiken Römischen Recht und im Heutigen Zivilrecht (1998) unpublished doctoral dissertation 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 187-188. 
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3 3 4 Termination and remedies 
The usufruct ends when the property is totally destroyed.167 However, if a house is 
burnt down the usufruct on the land does not end, but continues on the rebuilt 
house.168 Usufruct can only be terminated if the usufructuary property is disposed of 
and the person who aquires it was in good faith.169 In cases of real subrogation the 
usufruct continues on the substitute of the usufructuary property.170 
 
3 4 Usufruct in Belgian law 
3 4 1 Introduction 
In Belgium the changes to usufruct were earlier than in the Netherlands. Usufruct, 
quitrent and building rights are old concepts of law that were infrequently used until 
the 1960s.171 Usufruct was particularly made more popular as a legal institution due 
to the Act of 14 May 1981 that amended the Belgian law of succession pertaining to 
the surviving spouse.172 Since usufruct originated in a time when there were few 
provisions of mandatory law (“dwingend recht”) it is flexible and therefore deviations 
                                                          
167 R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im Zivil-und Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 73; HJ Wieling 
Sachenrecht Sachen, Besitz und Rechte an Beweglichen Sachen (2 ed 2006) 681. 
168 BGH DNotZ 1965, 165; R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im Zivil-und Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 
73; H Prütting, F Lent & KH Schwab Sachenrecht Ein Studienbuch (33 ed 2008) 365 Rn 915. 
169 BGB §§ 936 & 892;R Jansen & M Jansen Der Nießbrauch im Zivil-und Steuerrecht (8 ed 2009) 73 
170 BGB §§ 1046 & 1075. 
171 D Michiels “Actuele Ontwikkelingen inzake Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal” (2006) 7 Not Fisc M 
191-209 191. 
172 D Michiels “Actuele Ontwikkelingen inzake Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal” (2006) 7 Not Fisc M 
191-209 191; G Poppe “Hoe Veilig Zijn Vruchtgebruikoperaties?” 1999 T Not 293-303 293. See also P 
Carlier & K Verheyden Vruchtgebruik (1998) 15 no 10. 
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from most legislative provisions that regulate them are possible – this frequently 
happens in practice.173 
In contrast to Dutch law, the definition of usufruct in the Belgian civil code still 
retains the maintenance obligation. BBW 578 describes usufruct as: 
“Het recht om van een zaak waarvan een ander de eigendom heeft, het 
genot te hebben, zoals de eigenaar zelf, maar onder verplichting om de 
zaak zelf in stand te houden”. 
This definition should be qualified since the obligation to preserve the substance of the 
usufructuary object is not applicable to all usufructs.174 Furthermore, the reference to 
enjoyment like the owner can be misleading, since although the usufructuary has the 
right to use the usufructuary object and to enjoy the fruits, he does not have the right 
to dispose of the property.175 The usufructuary is restricted in his use and enjoyment 
of the object by the limits set by the destination allocated by the owner at the 
commencement of the usufruct.176 Moreover, the standard of the bonus paterfamilias 
                                                          
173 D Michiels “Actuele Ontwikkelingen inzake Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal” (2006) 7 Not Fisc M 
191-209 191. 
174 BBW 587 deals with quasi-usufruct (oneigenlijk vruchtgebruik); P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: 
Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 11. 
175 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 1-2; R Jansen & K Swinnen “De 
Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in 
V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 
51; P Carlier & K Verheyden Vruchtgebruik (1998) 9; A Kluyskens Zakenrecht: Beginselen van 
Burgerlijk Recht (1940) 162 no 143. 
176 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 1-2. 
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also delineates his use and enjoyment.177 Carette and Del Corral therefore rather 
endorse the definition of Herbots, who describes usufruct as a real and temporary right 
to use the property of another in accordance with its destination and to enjoy the 
usufructuary object as a bonus paterfamilias.178 Recently, the gendered concept of the 
bonus paterfamilias has also been challenged in French law and the question remains 
whether Belgian law will follow suit.179 
Verbeke and Vanhove view the duty to return the usufructuary property 
(teruggaveplicht) embodied in article 578 BBW as a pivotal concept of usufruct and 
accordingly all rights and obligations of the usufructuary should be fleshed out with 
reference to it.180 In the following sections these rights and duties which specifically 
reflect the salva rei substantia requirement will be discussed. 
                                                          
177 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 1-2. For further criticism see R 
Derine, F van Neste & H Vandenberghe Zakenrecht Deel II A (1984) 331 no 840. 
178 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 1-2. See also P Vits 
“Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal 
(1998) 11-36 11 citing Cass 3 July 1879 Pas 1879 I 342 and H Vandenberghe “Actuele Problemen van 
het Vruchtgebruik” (1983) TPR 53-88. 
179 I want to thank Professor Vincent Sagaert for pointing this change out to me. The French Assembly 
amended legislation resulting in the replacement of the concept of the bonus paterfamilias by the terms 
‘raisonnable’ or ‘raisonnablement’. Acording to article 26 of Law 2014-873 issued on 4 August 2014 the 
term “bon père de famille” must be substituted in nine articles of the CC and one article of Code de 
Consommation, the Code Rural et de la Pêche, the Code de l’Urbanisme and the Code de la 
Construction et de l’Habitation. The rationale for this substitution is the real equality between men and 
women. See L Waelkens “Geen Goede Huisvaders meer in het Franse Recht” (2014) 8 RW 282; JM 
Smits “Adieu Bon Père de Famille” (2014) 145 WPNR 303-304. 
180 A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 77. 
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Recent academic writing on the law of usufruct in Belgium provides a useful 
starting point for rethinking the doctrinal and practical impact of usufruct in a modern 
context. Contributions on the Belgian law of usufruct were prompted by the need for 
clarity articulated by practitioners and the aspiration to optimize the boundaries of 
usufruct both fiscally and in terms of civil law.181 Creative ways are for instance sought 
to optimize usufruct within the context of the law of succession for the benefit of the 
testator and the heir, while minimizing loss of control and income.182 Belgian law 
emphasises the destination of the object rather than its material identity to enable 
certain acts of disposition; allows for alteration of the destination where socio-
economic transformation in society is evident; and utilizes a strategic construction of 
the object of the usufruct. These mechanisms allow for a flexible approach to the salva 
rei substantia requirement.  
 
3 4 2 Rights of the usufructuary 
The usufructuary has the right to use the property subject to the usufruct and to enjoy 
its fruits.183 The right to enjoy the fruits does not present problems in relation to the 
duty to maintain the usufructuary property, since the fruits become the property of the 
usufructuary. 
Regarding the right to use the property subject to the usufruct, on the other hand, 
the question might be whether an entitlement to use could conflict with the duty to 
                                                          
181 See V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 
dust cover; A Verbeke “Inleiding” in A Verbeke Creatief met Vruchtgebruik M & D Seminars (2001) 3-7 
3-4. 
182 A Verbeke “Inleiding” in A Verbeke Creatief met Vruchtgebruik M & D Seminars (2001) 3-7 4. 
183 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 405, 412-413. 
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maintain the usufructuary property and in this sense impact the salva rei substantia 
requirement. Use refers to material acts184 that preserve the capital value185 of the 
usufructuary property and to acts of control,186 that is, juristic acts which do not modify 
the proprietary deed (zakerechtelijke statuut) of the property given in usufruct. Jansen 
and Swinnen set out the content of the right to use in more detail.187 They categorise 
the competencies into acts of control, acts of preliminary (voorlopige) control and acts 
of maintenance, the right to build on the immovable property, the right to grant praedial 
servitudes on immovables which are the object of the usufruct, the right to grant a 
building right (opstalrecht), the right to grant a usufruct, the right to grant a long lease 
and the right to grant personal rights of enjoyment.188  
Acts of control must be in harmony with the bonus paterfamilias standard.189 Acts 
of preliminary control serve the purpose of protecting the goods or the fruit produced 
against sudden disadvantages or events or to prevent the loss of sudden or temporary 
                                                          
184 According to R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 52 material acts refer to the normal use rights 
and the usufructuary may make use of all material and juristic accessories of the property given in 
usufruct as well as the objects which become part of the property during usufruct. V Sagaert 
“Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 188 notes that material acts might for 
example include access to the relevant premises or the use of a house. 
185 According to V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 188 
preserving the capital value would allow for fair wear and tear, but not for additional damage to the 
usufructuary property. 
186 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 188. 
187 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 52-57. 
188 52-57. 
189 52. 
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benefits.190 Acts of maintenance serve to safeguard the capital value of a usufructuary 
object, the existence, scope or the effectiveness of a right. The right to build on the 
immovable property subject to the usufruct may only be utilised in accordance with the 
destination of the usufructuary object and conditions in the deed.191  
The right to dispose of the usufructuary object does in principle not form part of 
the competencies inherent to the right to use the object of the usufruct,192 nor can the 
usufructuary grant a pledge or a hypothec on the usufructuary property.193 Certain 
rights of disposition, namely certain juristic acts granting real rights, may under certain 
conditions be granted to the usufructuary.194 These rights are delineated by the 
destination of the usufructuary object and the nemo plus rule. 
In cases where the usufructuary has full enjoyment over immovables given in 
usufruct, he may grant praedial servitudes on them.195 Since he has full enjoyment, he 
may also have lesser enjoyment due to the burdening of his right of enjoyment by a 
praedial servitude. However, the duration of such a praedial servitude is restricted to 
the duration of the usufruct unless the bare owner collaborated with the usufructuary 
at the granting of the usufruct and the former granted the usufruct without any 
reservation concerning the duration. In this case the praedial servitudes might 
potentially be perpetual and survive the duration of the usufruct. 
Jansen and Swinnen do not see the granting of a building right (opstalrecht) as 
problematic on the condition that the content of the right specifies that the facilities will 
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not alter the destination of the immovable goods given in usufruct.196 The granted 
building right will also be restricted to the duration of the usufruct. In cases where the 
usufructuary grants a usufruct, the second usufructuary may not receive more rights 
than the first. 197 The obligation to respect the destination of the property subject to the 
usufruct also rests on the second usufructuary. However, in the case of a long lease, 
the same obligation does not rest on the lessee. The granting of a long lease by a 
usufructuary will also result in a more onerous burden on the lessee in relation to the 
bare owner. Jansen and Swinnen question whether this long lease still qualifies as a 
long lease and whether it should not rather be viewed as a usufruct.198  
The usufructuary does not have the power to grant real security rights on 
usufructuary property.199 This right would be in conflict with the right to use the 
usufructuary property as a bonus paterfamilias and the requirement to return the 
property subject to the usufruct on termination of the usufruct. Furthermore, article 73 
of the Hypotheek Wet stipulates that the mortgagor should have the capacity to 
alienate the immovable property. This is also true of the pledgor. Security rights 
granted by the usufructuary will not stand in relation to the bare owner either.  
According to BBW 595, the usufructuary may grant personal rights of 
enjoyment.200 BBW 1165 states that these rights will not hold against the bare owner 
on termination of the usufruct either, based on the relativity of agreements. An 
                                                          
196 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
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important exception is the granting of leases for periods longer than nine years. In this 
case the bare owner should tolerate the lease agreement until the termination of the 
nine year period during which the usufruct comes to an end.  
The entitlement to use the usufructuary property is restricted by the destination 
of the property and by the obligation to use it as a bonus paterfamilias.201 The 
obligation to act as a bonus paterfamilias also follows from BBW 578 and is even 
applicable where the owner did not take care of his property and or misused it (that is 
the owner did not respect the destination of the usufructuary property).202 
Although the content of the entitlement of control is to certain extent specified 
and there exists safeguards where control might be interpreted as the competence to 
dispose, Jansen and Swinnen note two instances where the content of the 
usufructary’s entitlements are not so clear. In the first place the content of the right of 
use and enjoyment is not always clearly delineated.203 Secondly, cases where the 
usufructuary is allowed to dispose of the usufructuary property under particular 
conditions also present a challenge, since there is not consensus about this 
entitlement and the boundaries of the entitlement to dispose need to be clarified.204 
Jansen and Swinnen focus on contemporary examples of usufructuary property 
presenting problems.205 An example more relevant to this study is the question 
                                                          
201 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 406. 
202 407. 
203 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 62. 
204 62; 68. 
205 Examples from Belgian law noted by R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de 
Gebruiks- en Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 62-64 but not considered here 
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whether the bare owner or the usufructuary should be able to collect debt claims.206 
The majority opinion seems to be that the usufructuary has the right of collection since 
the normal use of a debt would involve the collection of it, the destination of the claim 
will be collection and the patrimonial value of the usufructuary property would be 
maintained through collection. Arguments against allowing the usufructuary to collect 
the claim include that the usufruct changes its structure through collection, since the 
usufruct would henceforth be on a consumable. The usufructuary therefore becomes 
a quasi-usufructuary and becomes the owner of the payment received. This result has 
both practical and juridical disadvantages.207 In terms of the practical outcome the bare 
owner becomes responsible for the risk of insolvency. Juridically, the usufructuary 
acquires property through his own actions and the claim amounts to an act of 
disposition. Advocates208 of this position propose that the usufructuary and the bare 
owner should collect the debt together to avoid the transformation of usufruct into 
quasi-usufruct. Proponents209 of the view that the bare owner is the only viable 
collector of the debt argue that a consequence of the right to collect the interest on the 
debt would be that the collection of the debt itself would not be possible. Jansen and 
Swinnen try to reconcile the opposing positions by suggesting that the usufructuary 
collects the debt by transferring the claimable amount to an account opened especially 
                                                          
since they fall outside the scope of the study are the use and enjoyment on a partnership share and the 
delineation of voting rights in the general meeting of co-owners. 
206 64. 
207 65. 
208 See H de Page & R Dekkers Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil Belge VI (1953) 252-254 paras 323; 
R Dekkers & Dirix Handboek Burgerlijk Recht II (2005) 212-213 paras 533-534; V Sagaert Zakelijke 
Subrogatie (2003) 127-129 para 146.  
209 See Brussel 8 March 1988 RW 1988-89 650; E van Arensbergh Traité de l’Usufruit (1936) para 
1029. 
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for this purpose.210 The usufruct then remains on a debt claim against the credit 
institution while the usufructuary has collected the debt. 
The second problematic entitlement concerns the question of the extent to which 
a usufructuary is allowed to dispose of the usufructuary property. The usufructuary 
has the power to dispose of the object of the usufruct when it amounts to an act of 
control, for example when a usufruct is granted on a universality and when 
consumables form the object of the usufruct and his right to use will amount to an act 
of disposition. In the first case, usufruct on a business concern and usufruct on a 
portfolio of shares (effectenportefeuille) would be examples,211 but the latter fall 
outside the scope of this study. In these examples the usufructuary may dispose of 
the things constituting the universality, without having the power to dispose of the 
universality as a whole, since he has to maintain the latter. Since the usufructuary has 
the right to exploit the business concern, he may sell the stock and buy new stock with 
the proceeds. Equipment must also be replaced if it becomes worn out. The 
usufructuary’s acts of disposition flow from his position as controller of the usufructuary 
property. 
The disposition powers of the usufructuary are restricted by the requirement that 
the acts must be necessary for good control according to an objective standard.212 A 
high risk of loss of value should prompt the granting of these disposition powers. 
                                                          
210 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 65. 
211 66. 
212 68. 
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The usufructuary also has disposition powers if his right pertains to consumables. 
This results from the fact that the use of consumables amounts to an act of disposition 
extinguishing the usufructuary property. However, this example also falls outside the 
scope of this study.  
Both Jansen and Swinnen and Sagaert213 caution that the entitlement to 
dispose214 must be carefully delineated and approached with care. There has been a 
tendency to grant “functional disposition powers” to the usufructuary in the sense that 
he only has to respect the destination of the usufructuary property.215 This 
development is motivated by the Dutch construct of usufruct with the entitlement to 
“alienate and spend” (interingsbevoegdheid).216 Jansen and Swinnen are of the 
opinion that this “disposition power” is dictated by the destination of the usufructuary 
property that allows the usufructuary to dispose as an act of control. In these cases it 
must be necessary, objectively speaking, to dispose of the usufructuary property to 
avert the concrete risk of value loss.217 According to Sagaert the underlying principle 
of the nemo plus rule cannot be avoided and consequently the entitlements granted 
                                                          
213 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 416. 
214 For literature in favour of a wider interpretation of disposition see A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Spelen 
met het voorwerp van vruchtgebruik” (2004) in Lecocq P, Tilleman B & Verbeke A Zakenrecht 173-216; 
A Verbeke 1999 “Creatief met Vruchtgebruik” T Not 530-579 547 paras 54-55; A Apers & A Verbeke 
“Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 TSAR 117-129 and A Verbeke, B Verdickt and 
D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in CG Van der Merwe & A Verbeke (eds) Time-Limited 
Interests in Land (2012) 33-56 43-44.  
215 415-416. 
216 The Civil Code of the Netherlands (H Warendorf, R Thomas & I Curry-Sumner transl) (2009) art 215. 
217 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 68. 
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to the usufructuary resemble disposition powers but cannot be equated to it.218 
Furthermore, the decisions of the courts are not unanimous in this regard.219 It 
therefore seems that although the entitlement to control might create circumstances 
where the power to dispose seems to be granted to the usufructuary, this entitlement 
flows from the obligation to respect the destination of the usufructuary property. 
Therefore, it seems that at least doctrinally, the salva rei substantia requirement is still 
recognised and safeguarded. However, as Sagaert indicated there are indications that 
functional disposition powers are granted to the usufructuary.220 
 
3 4 3 Duties of the usufructuary and the preservation requirement 
Despite the formulation in BBW 578 that states that the usufructuary may enjoy the 
usufructuary property like the owner (“zoals de eigenaar zelf”), his powers are still 
restricted.221 These restrictions are evident from the obligations resting on the 
usufructuary. Authors agree on the duties prior to entry, namely the obligation to frame 
inventory and to provide security or surety222 Furthermore, there is consensus on the 
                                                          
218 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 416. This concerns 
cases where the usufruct is for example established on universalities and debts. In these cases the 
value of the usufructuary property is more important than the substance of the property.  
219 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 416 refers to Cass 21 
February 2006, Arr Cass  2006 417 RABG 2006 951 note B Meganck and T Not 2007 294, note M 
Muylle; Cass 8 April 2008 Pas 2008 845 TROS 2008 264. 
220  V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 415. 
221 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 58.  
222 A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 77-78; N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht 
van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in 
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duty to pay rates and taxes.223 However, as far as the other obligations are concerned, 
there appears to be a confluence of obligations and divergent approaches. The 
obligation to maintain the usufructuary property, to respect the destination of the 
property and to use and control it as a bonus paterfamilias are either treated as 
separate duties224 or conflated.225 Finally, the term maintenance may refer to 
“instandhouding” in which case authors tend to discuss the duty in abstracto without 
referring to repairs per se,226 or “onderhoud” in which case the duty of the usufructuary 
to effect repairs in order to maintain the usufructuary property is discussed. These 
duties are to a large extent interwoven.227 
                                                          
V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 
18; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401-403. 
223 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 23; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” 
in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 422. 
224 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 58.  
225 A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 78. 
226 A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 78 states “De verplichting om de zaak in stand te houden is 
derhalve een verplichting om de bestemming van die zaak te bewaren en te vrijwaren”. R Jansen & K 
Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de 
Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en 
Innovaties (2012) 51-90 58-59 notes that traditionally this duty refers to the maintenance of the 
substance of the usufructuary property but that for some types of usufruct such as a usufruct on debts 
or a universality maintainance would refer to the value of the usufructuary property. 
227 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 61. 
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The usufructuary must firstly frame an inventory (inventaris of 
boedelbeschrijving)228 concerning movables and a statement (staat)229 pertaining to 
immovables subject to the usufruct.230 However, the creation of a right of usufruct is 
not dependent on the framing of an inventory or a statement.231 These two documents 
can be used firstly to determine the scope of the usufruct.232 Secondly, on termination 
of the usufruct, they can be used to determine which usufructuary property needs to 
be returned233 and thirdly, whether the usufructuary has complied with his duty to 
return the usufructuary property salva rei substantia.234 In the case of loss of value, it 
is useful to determine how much damages are owed to the bare owner.235 The 
                                                          
228 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 17 describes an inventory as a “summary and description of the movables which 
form the object of the usufruct”. 
229 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 17 describes a statement as a “summary and a description of the immovables 
which are the object of the usufruct”. 
230 BBW 600; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401; V 
Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 335; P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D 
Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 17. 
231 V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 335. 
232 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 17. 
233 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401. 
234 A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 77. 
235 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401; V Sagaert, B 
Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 335; P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D 
Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 17. V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in 
Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401 n 84 suggests that an estimation report might be a 
useful addition to the statement and the inventory to establish the loss of value on termination of the 
usufruct. This comment seems to suggest that indications of value in these documents is not a 
necessary attribute. 
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descriptions in these documents portray the condition of the usufructuary property at 
commencement of the usufruct.236 Another function of the inventory or statement, 
namely to allow the usufructuary to request the delivery of all the property given in 
usufruct, can be deduced.237  
The duty to frame an inventory and a statement is applicable both in the case of 
a reserved usufruct and where a usufruct is granted, but in terms of a usufruct to the 
surviving spouse he or she may be relieved where he or she obtained possession of 
the property by operation of law.238 In this instance the bare owners may claim an 
inventory.239 If the usufructuary does not frame an inventory or prepare a statement, 
the bare owner may refuse delivery of the usufructuary property, except if he waived 
the right to an inventory or a statement contractually, 240 or if the usufructuary has the 
saisine of the usufructuary property.241 Vits is of the opinion that the usufructuary who 
does not comply with the duty to provide an inventory or a statement cannot enter into 
enjoyment of the usufructuary property.242 He cannot use the object of the usufruct or 
collect the fruits, although the bare owner must account for the fruits that he held back 
                                                          
236 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 17. 
237 See P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht 
en Opstal (1998) 11-36 18 citing Cass 16 June 1989 Arr Cass 1988-89 1242 and RW 1989-90 402. 
238 V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 335. 
239 BBW 745ter; V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en 
Bijzondere Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 335. 
240 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401 refers to Cass 16 
June 1989 Arr Cass 1988-89 1242 RW 1989-90 402; V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke 
Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 335. 
241 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401. 
242 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 18 citing Cass 14 November 1958 Pas 1959 269 and RW 1958-59 888. 
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during the period of noncompliance.243 It would be possible for the bare owner to claim 
an inventory or statement at a later stage even though an initial agreement relieved 
the usufructuary of the obligation, but the bare owner must then carry the costs 
involved.244 This is the case since the oligation to frame inventory is a question of 
public policy (openbare orde)245 or at least mandatory law (dwingend recht), while the 
liability of costs is a question of supplementary law (aanvullende recht).246 In fact, the 
obligation to frame inventory and provide a statement is applicable to almost every 
type of usufruct, even where a reserved usufruct is concerned, except where a 
hereditary usufruct is at issue and the surviving spouse obtained possession of the 
usufructuary property by operation of law.247 In this case the bare owners may require 
a statement and inventory but may not restrain the usufructuary (the surviving spouse) 
from obtaining possession of the usufructuary property.248 The usufructuary is 
responsible for the costs related to the framing of the inventory and the statement, 
                                                          
243 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 18. 
244 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402; P Vits 
“Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal 
(1998) 11-36 18 
245 Contra N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 19 citing Rb Doornik 12 October 
1988 JLMB 1990 635 636 and Rb Ghent 10 June 2003 T Not 2003 622 629. According to the latter 
case an obligation that is one of public policy would be one that concerns the “essential interests” of the 
State and the collective or belongs to the fundamental juridical principles underlying the economic and 
moral regulation of society. 
246 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402 n 88 notes that there 
seems to be a growing tendency to view this obligation as mandatory law. 
247 401. 
248 Art 745ter BBW; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401 
cites Liège 9 December 2003 TBBR 2006 135. 
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since he is the debtor in terms of the legal obligation.249 Both parties should be pressed 
to be present when the inventory or statement is drawn up.250 If a party does not 
comply he does not have the right to challenge the document.251 If the usufructuary 
and the bare owner cannot agree, the usufructuary may turn to the court of first 
instance for a detailed legal report (gerechtelijke plaatsbeschrijving).252 There are no 
formal requirements regarding the documents; although notarial documents may be 
used, non-notarial (onderhandse) documents are sufficient.253 The usufructuary may 
even make a declaration that he received the usufructuary property in good condition 
without significant defects and where a hereditary usufruct is concerned the 
notification of the inheritance will also qualify.254 If no inventory or statement was 
drawn up the assumption is that the usufructuary property is returned in the same 
condition that in which it was received.255 It is then up to the bare owner to prove the 
                                                          
249 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401; V Sagaert, B 
Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
250 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401; P Vits 
“Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal 
(1998) 11-36 18 merely notes this as a recommendation to avoid problems connected with contested 
documents at a later stage. 
251 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401; V Sagaert, B 
Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
252 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401. 
253 V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336; P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D 
Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 17. 
254 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 401-402. 
255 V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
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condition and value of the usufructuary property at inception of the usufruct with all 
legal evidence (“met alle bewysmiddelen rechtens”).256 
The mandatory character of the inventory in Belgian law seems to be preferable 
to the legal position in South Africa, where inventory only has to be provided on request 
of the bare owner, at least to the extent that it would minimise evidentiary 
complications during litigation regarding the maintenance requirement. Requiring the 
presence of both the bare owner and the usufructuary during the framing of the 
inventory also seems like a practical guideline that might be strongly advised in the 
South African context, where litigants seem uncertain as to the nature and purpose of 
the inventory.257 Furthermore, shifting the costs of framing inventory during a later 
stage to the bare owner where he initially relieved the usufructuary of the duty by 
means of contract, also seems to be preferable to the South African position where 
the inventory can probably be required at any point but where it is not clear who bears 
the costs. Moreover, placing the burden of proof concerning the initial condition of the 
usufructuary property on the bare owner if no inventory was framed also encourages 
the framing of inventory at the initial stage. As a peremptory legal provision, the 
obligation to frame inventory confirms the importance of compliance with the salva rei 
substantia requirement. However, the exception to the sanction of refusing possession 
in the case of the surviving spouse in a hereditary usufruct points to an important 
aspect of public policy balancing the requirement, namely to provide for the 
                                                          
256 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402 cites Brussel 3 April 
1957 Pas 1957 II 253 Rev Prat Not B 1960 157; V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht 
in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
257 See 2 4 1 1. 
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maintenance of the beneficiary,258 who in most cases would be the surviving 
spouse.259 In fact, the hereditary usufruct is the most prevalent type of legal 
usufruct.260 The alimentary function is further bolstered by the possibility of converting 
the usufruct into ownership.261  
Another duty that should also be complied with prior to entering into usufruct is 
the duty to provide security or surety.262 The usufructuary must provide security or 
surety (borg te stellen) at the commencement of the usufruct that he will enjoy his right 
of usufruct like a prudent administrator (goede huisvader)263 and return the 
usufructuary property in a condition that can be expected after long term use by a 
conscientious and prudent person.264 The duty to provide surety or security is aimed 
at ensuring that the liability for not complying with the restitution obligation can be 
                                                          
258 Compare V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 377; P Carlier 
& K Verheyden Vruchtgebruik (1998) 10, 11. 
259 P Carlier & K Verheyden Vruchtgebruik (1998) 11. 
260 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 398. 
261 398. 
262 Article 601 BBW only provides for surety (borgstelling). However, according to V Sagaert 
“Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402 security (zekerheid) may be 
provided in different forms such as surety, mortgage, bank guarantee, pledges on movables or debts, 
consignation of caution money, or depositing of caution money in a trust client bank account. See also 
A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 78. I therefore refer to both terms here. 
263 BBW 601; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402; V 
Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336; P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D 
Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 18. 
264 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in Meulemans D (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 19. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
164 
 
met265 and insures the bare owner against possible insolvency of the usufructuary.266 
Surety or security should not be viewed as consideration for the use and enjoyment.267 
Should the usufructuary default on this obligation, the bare owner may refuse to deliver 
the usufructuary property safe where exceptions are concerned.268 Furthermore, the 
bare owner may also insist on security not only at the commencement of the usufruct 
but during the usufruct.269 Security can be provided in various ways.270 The value of 
surety or security must be equal to the amount of the damage the usufructuary would 
cause if he does not take care of the usufructuary property like a prudent 
administrator.271  
                                                          
265 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402; V Sagaert, B 
Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
266 A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 78; P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D 
Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 18. 
267 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en 
Opstal (1998) 11-36 19. 
268 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 403. 
269 403. 
270 See n 262. V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402; V 
Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in 
Meulemans D (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 19 also mentions a pledge and cites 
article 2041 of the BBW. However, he states that these options are only available when a surety cannot 
be found. According to arts 2018-2019 BBW and V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch 
Privaatrecht (2014) 402 should surety be the means of securing the usufructuary property, the surety 
should be financially able to meet the obligation and his house should be within the jurisdiction of the 
court. In the case of a kosteloze borgtocht arts 2043bis would be applicable. 
271 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 402; V Sagaert, B 
Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336; Liège 26 July 1893 Pas. II 392; Rb Brussel 25 February 1992 
TBBR 1992 438. 
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Certain usufructuaries are exempt from providing security, namely parents 
acquiring legal usufruct on the property of their children and a party reserving 
usufruct.272 The purpose of these exemptions is to prevent tension in family 
relationships due to the obligation.273 However, it is notable that the surviving spouse 
is not exempted from the duty to provide security.274 The bare owner may also exempt 
the usufructuary from the duty,275 except where the usufruct is established on property 
identified as the reserved part of heirs.276 The possibility of exemption exists since, 
contrary to the duty to frame inventory, the obligation to provide security is 
supplementary law.277 If this exemption takes place, it is in principle irrevocable.278 
                                                          
272 BBW 601; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 403; V 
Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
273 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 403; V Sagaert, B 
Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336 
274 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 403 cites Liège 9 
December 2003 TBBR 2006 135. 
275 According to N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 20 and V Sagaert 
“Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 403 this exemption may be express or 
tacit since it is supplementary law; V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: 
Goederen- en Bijzondere Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
276 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 20; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” 
in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 403. 
277 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 20. 
278 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 403; V Sagaert, B 
Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336 
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However, if the usufructuary abuses his right, the bare owner can claim security 
instead of abrogration (vervallenverklaring).279 Furthermore, the court may also order 
that security be given in cases of abuse, or even revoke an exemption, since the court 
has the power to institute conservatory measures to safeguard the interests of the 
bare owner during the usufruct. An order for security might be a less drastic measure 
than the other option open to the court, namely abrogation.280 
In comparison to the South African position the obligation to provide security, 
unless exemption or contractual exemption applies, provides more legal certainty. 
Furthermore, the exceptions to the duty to provide security are more limited than in 
the case of South African law. It therefore seems that the entry level duties of the 
usufructuary are approached in a more rigid way. 
The temporary nature of usufruct compels the usufructuary to maintain the 
usufructuary property since he has to return the object of the usufruct on termination 
of the usufruct.281 Maintenance encompasses both the material, form and character of 
the object of the usufruct.282 This traditional approach to the content of the 
maintenance obligation was developed in relation to usufruct on corporeals, but seems 
ill-suited to certain forms of usufruct such as usufruct on consumables, usufruct on 
debts (schuldvorderingen) and usufruct on a universality of things (algemeenheid van 
                                                          
279 V Sagaert, B Tillemans & A Verbeke Vermogensrecht in Kort Bestek: Goederen- en Bijzondere 
Overeenkomstenrecht (2 ed 2010) 336. 
280 N Carette & J del Corral “De Kwalificatie van het Recht van Vruchtgebruik: Contractuele 
Mogelijkheden en Afbakening tegenover Opstal, Erfpacht en Huur” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) 
Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 1-50 21. 
281 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 58. 
282 59. 
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goederen). In the case of a universality, the composition varies and identification of 
the universality is therefore problematic. Consequently, the value of the universality is 
subject to maintenance. The usufructuary must therefore meet the requirement of 
returning the object of the usufruct by ensuring that the value of the universality at the 
termination of the usufruct is identical to the value of it at the commencement.  
According to Jansen and Swinnen the traditional interpretation of the obligation 
to respect the destination of the usufruct indicated that the usufructuary may not use 
the usufructuary property in a different way than the owner.283 The particular habits 
and uses of the bare owner pertaining to the property must be emulated. This would 
enable the bare owner to resume his use after termination of the usufruct. Jansen and 
Swinnen distinguish the obligation to respect the destination of the usufructuary object 
from the maintenance obligation.284 The former dictates that the usufructuary makes 
identical use of the usufructuary property in comparison to the owner, and the latter 
that the usufructuary may not let the usufructuary property perish even if the bare 
owner may do so. 
Recently, calls have been made for a more flexible interpretation of the content 
of this obligation,285 taking into account the reason why the object of the usufruct is of 
                                                          
283 60. 
284 60. 
285 R Jansen & K Swinnen “De Contractuele Modulering van de Gebruiks- en 
Beschikkingsbevoegdheden van de Vruchtgebruiker” in V Sagaert & A Verbeke (eds) Vruchtgebruik: 
Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en Innovaties (2012) 51-90 60. V Sagaert “Oude Zakenrechtelijke Figuren 
met Nut voor een Moderne Familiale Vermogensplanning” in XXXe Postuniversitaire Cyclus Willy Delva 
2003-04 Familiale Vermogensplanning (2004) 205-274 231 refers to A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia 
Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 78; 
A Verbeke 1999 “Creatief met Vruchtgebruik” T Not 530-579 547 para 54 and E Dockes “Essai sur la 
Notion d’Usufruit” 1995 Rev Trim Dr Civ 479-507 487-494.  
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importance. In instances where the patrimonial value of the object is more important 
than its material value, a flexible interpretation would allow for the sale of the 
usufructuary object and reinvestment in things of a similar nature. The locus of the 
destination is therefore the value of the object. What must be maintained is the 
financial value and the potential to realise the usufructuary object. The duty to maintain 
is also an obligation to respect and reserve the destination of the usufructuary object. 
This reciprocity underlines the fact that the boundary between the duty to maintain and 
the duty to respect the destination may blur in certain instances.286 Jansen and 
Swinnen note that the flexible approach is not a justification for allowing the 
usufructuary to dispose of the usufructuary property.287 
The usufructuary acts as a bonus paterfamilias when he respects the 
destination.288 He must therefore act in such a way that the financial value of the 
usufructuary object is not less at the termination of the usufruct than it was at the 
commencement of the usufruct. The requirement to respect the destination of the 
object of the usufruct raises questions when the owner used the property in an abusive 
way. The usufructuary should then be allowed to choose another way of use which 
corresponds to the way of use a “normal, reasonable and cautious” bonus 
paterfamilias would select. This would also be a prudent option when the bare owner 
has not designated a destination for the usufructuary property.289 
Based on the duties to maintain the object, to respect the destination of the 
usufructuary property and to act as a bonus paterfamilias, the usufructuary must effect 
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repairs where it is necessary to maintain the property, regardless of whether the 
repairs were caused by a reason beyond his control. The scope of these repairs290 
excludes extraordinary repairs (grove herstellingen),291 except when these were 
caused by the lack of maintenance since commencement of the usufruct292 or were 
necessary at the commencement of the usufruct.293 Although article 606 BBW 
describes extraordinary repairs that mainly concern walls and roofs, it is only 
applicable to buildings for daily use foreseen by the legislature in 1804. It excludes 
movables and certain immovables. In cases where article 606 is not applicable, large 
renovations and building work to ensure the stability and maintenance of the entire 
building and which would be exceptional and would be a capital expense, qualify as 
serious repairs.294 
Finally, the usufructuary is also obligated to pay the normal or annual rates and 
taxes, while extraordinary rates and taxes should be paid by the bare owner. This duty 
is also supplementary law and therefore the parties may deviate from this obligation 
contractually.295 
 
                                                          
290 See the examples given by the Ruling Commission which include paint work (not including initial 
paint work), varnishing, cleaning wells, repairing  floors, ceiliings, stairs, roofs, cleaning and repairing 
chimneys, maintainance and repairs of lifts and water pumps, replastering, new carpeting. 
291 BBW 605-606; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 419. 
292 A Verbeke & K Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in 
Zakenrecht Themis no 16 (2002) 73-102 80. 
293 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 420. 
294 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 420; A Verbeke & K 
Vanhove “Actualia Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden” in Zakenrecht Themis no 
16 (2002) 73-102 80 citing Cass 22 Januari 1970 RCJB 1971 470 note J Hansenne and Liège 7 July 
1998 TBBR 2001 107. 
295 V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 422. 
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3 4 4 Termination and remedies 
If the usufructuary property is destroyed either materially or juridically, the usufruct is 
terminated.296 The destruction must be of a permanent nature and be caused by an 
accident or force majeure.Temporary impossibility due to for instance a flood, does 
not result in termination of the usufruct. In Belgian law usufruct may be terminated due 
to the abuse of the usufructuary property by the usufructuary.297 Abuse might entail 
damaging or refraining from maintaining the property. The latter constitutes the most 
prevalent form of abuse. Normal wear and tear resulting from normal use according to 
the destination of the usufructuary property does not lead to liability.298 Furthermore, 
not respecting the destination of the property or not acting as a bonus paterfamilias or 
acts of disposition can be grounds for abrogation.299 However, the court should take 
into account all the relevant circumstances before giving an order of abrogation. The 
court has a discretion in this regard and may give an order for a partial abrogation, 
damages or additional security.300 On termination of the usufruct the property subject 
to the usufruct must be returned in natura.301 In cases where the usufructuary cannot 
return the usufructuary property, he is liable, except where he can prove that his 
noncompliance is due to force majeure. 
                                                          
296 617: 6 BBW; 296 P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) 
Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 31. 
297 Art 618; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 442; P Vits 
“Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans (ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal 
(1998) 11-36 32. 
298 Art 589 BBW; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 445. 
299 Rb Aarlen 19 October 1971 Jur Liège 1971-72 304; V Sagaert “Goederenrecht” in Beginselen van 
Belgisch Privaatrecht (2014) 442; P Vits “Vruchtgebruik: Burgerrechtelijke Aspecten” in D Meulemans 
(ed) Vruchtgebruik, Erfpacht en Opstal (1998) 11-36 32-33. 
300 443. 
301 445. 
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In contrast to South African law and German law the duties to frame inventory 
and provide security afford more legal certainty. The effect of these duties are also 
somewhat less severe on the usufructuary in the sense that an owner who does not 
demand inventory at an initial stage, but changes his mind must bear the costs himself. 
These duties before entry do not reflect a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement. In terms of the disposition powers of the usufructuary, there seems to be 
difference of opinion. Although some authors argue that flexibility regarding the salva 
rei substantia requirement may be possible due to the granting of functional disposition 
powers, it seems that the caution advocated by others might lead to the conclusion 
that the powers of the usufructuary might only prima facie appear more flexible, since 
it seems that in certain circumstances he has disposition powers, but that these 
powers actually just resemble the entitlement to dispose. Where powers resemble 
disposition powers, they are finally still subject to the destination of the usufructuary 
property and the bonus paterfamilias standard. The fact that usufruct may be 
terminated due to abuse, particularly due to an omission to maintain, confirms that the 
salva rei substantia requirement is still significant. 
 
3 5 Usufruct in Louisiana state law 
3 5 1 Changed nature of usufruct 
In Louisiana state law usufruct has always played an important role in the law of 
succession, but even in this jurisdiction changes were unavoidable and the legislator 
revised the law pertaining to usufruct in 1976.302 Changes were the result of the work 
                                                          
302 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) xix; AN 
Matasar “The Usufruct Revisions: The Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables Now Expressly Includes 
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of a committee consisting of experts who took into account the substance and form of 
the civilian tradition in Louisiana, possible solutions emerging from doctrine, 
jurisprudence, legislation from other civil law countries such as France, Germany and 
Greece, and contemporary conditions.303 These changes were necessary because the 
provisions pertaining to usufruct in the 1870 La CC were mainly drafted with 
conventional usufructs304 of immovables in mind and were out of step with a context 
where more than ninety percent of usufructs in Louisiana are legal usufructs305 and 
usufructuary property includes both movables and immovables.306 The redactors 
consequently formulated rules that were suitable for the objects of legal usufructs and 
particularly focused on the usufruct of the surviving spouse,307 the most prevalent 
usufruct.308 The prevalence of the usufruct of the surviving spouse must be seen in 
the context of the general tendency to increase the rights and particularly the 
succession status of the surviving spouse.309 Furthermore, where the provisions of the 
                                                          
Alienation, Lease and Encumbrance; Has the Louisiana Legislature Fundamentally Altered the Nature 
of Usufruct?” (2012) 86 Tul L Rev 787-822; D Tooley-Knoblett, JL Carriere & JR Trahan Yiannopoulos’ 
Civil Law Property Coursebook (9 ed 2009) 733-734; Committee on Significant Legislation, Real 
Property Division “Legislation Affecting Real Property” (1977) 12 Real Prop Prob & Tr J 1-48 8. 
303 D Tooley-Knoblett, JL Carriere & JR Trahan Yiannopoulos’ Civil Law Property Coursebook (9 ed 
2009) 733-734. 
304 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 12 notes that 
a conventional usufruct is a usufruct established by a juridical act. Conventional usufructs are 
categorised as either contractual or testamentary usufructs. 
305 According to JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 188 and AN Yiannopoulos 
Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 12 legal usufructs are established 
by operation of law.  
306 D Tooley-Knoblett, JL Carriere & JR Trahan Yiannopoulos’ Civil Law Property Coursebook (9 ed 
2009) 734. 
307 Article 890 La CC. 
308 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
309 DM Lloyd “New Hope for the Survivor: The Changes in the Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse” (1982) 
28 Loy L Rev 1095-1195 1097-1098. This movement is not restricted to the state of Louisiana – Lloyd 
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1870 code were aimed at expressing the intention of the contract parties or of the 
grantor, the new legislation had the purpose to balance the interests of the bare owner 
and the usufructuary. Taking into account that the most typical example of a 
usufructuary is a surviving spouse whereas the most prevalent bare owners would be 
children from the marriage of the deceased, the broadening of the rights of the 
usufructuary may be justifiable. Moreover, where a conventional usufruct still exists, 
the grantor may restrict the rights of the usufructuary through express provisions. 
Particularly, a shift in the composition of patrimony from predominantly 
immovable property to movables with an emphasis on securities, coupled with a shift 
in societal views concerning the protection of patrimony versus the preference 
regarding provision for the surviving spouse can be observed.The inflexibility of the 
obligations relating to the salva rei substantia requirement led to the codification of the 
usufructuary’s power and his right to dispose of nonconsumables in 1976. Recent 
revisions attempted to clarify the power of the usufructuary by stating that the power 
to dispose includes the right of alienation, lease (even beyond the length of the 
usufruct) and encumbrance of the property. Scholars are divided on the impact of the 
revision. Nathan concludes that the revision does not amount to a fundamental 
change, but that it does clarify the law and provides “more modern and flexible rules 
that account for societal and legal developments that have taken place since 1976”.310 
Matasar states that the change has “significantly broadened the codification of this 
                                                          
also mentions the example of Quebec. The trend relates to changes in the family structure and the 
diminishing importance of the biological relationships and of keeping family wealth secured by 
transmitting it to blood relations. Furthermore, marriage ties which in the past were of an economic 
nature, have acquired an emotional character and therefore provision for the surviving spouse has 
become an important factor in the law of succession. 
310 M Nathan “2010 Revision of the Law of Usufruct” (2011) 57 Loy L Rev 227-236 227.  
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freedom” as the usufructuary may now control the property in a way that will 
“potentially impact and obligate the bare owner long after the termination of the 
usufruct”.311 Louisiana also provides an example of a jurisdiction where innovations in 
the law of usufruct were implemented during the twentieth century, having 
unanticipated consequences which resulted in practical and theoretical problems. 
Similar to the BW and the BGB, the La CC definition does not contain the salva rei 
substantia requirement but acknowledges that the nature of the object plays a pivotal 
role in the determination of its characteristics.  
Matasar remarks that the balance between the usufructuary and the owner has 
shifted with each revision312 and that the 2010 La CC revision “reflects a continuing 
trend whereby the usufructuary is granted increasing authority”. Exploring whether the 
balance between the usufructuary and the owner has shifted in South African law and 
whether it should shift could prove to be an interesting question. Another point to 
ponder would be if the current balance is warranted, considering constitutional 
objectives. The implications of the 2010 revision might also indicate whether more 
flexible interpretations of the salva rei substantia requirement indeed do provide the 
answer. 
The definition of usufruct as worded in the 1976 Revision and incorporated in La 
CC 535 does not refer to the salva rei substantia requirement: 
                                                          
311 AN Matasar “The Usufruct Revisions: The Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables Now Expressly 
Includes Alienation, Lease and Encumbrance; Has the Louisiana Legislature Fundamentally Altered 
the Nature of Usufruct?” (2012) 86 Tul L Rev 787-822 795-796. 
312 788. 
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“Usufruct is a real right of limited duration on the property of another. The features 
of the right vary with the nature of things subject to it as consumables or 
nonconsumables”.313 
In contrast, the 1870 La CC 534 distinguished between perfect and imperfect or quasi 
usufruct.314 Perfect usufruct was applicable to nonconsumables which could be 
enjoyed without altering their substance, taking into account that the substance could 
nevertheless diminish or deteriorate as a result of time or due to use.315 Imperfect 
usufruct applied to consumables which would only be of use to the usufructuary if 
consumption, expending or altering the substance was possible.  
Although on the surface it seems as if the institution of imperfect usufruct was 
done away with, the fact that different rules still apply in effect still maintains the 
distinction. Instead, the Louisiana classification of the usufructuary object determines 
the characteristics of the usufruct.316 The inherent features and objective criteria are 
used to classify usufructuary objects. The features of consumables stipulated by article 
536 include use which would inevitably amount to consumption or expending or 
altering the substance. Examples of consumables are “money, harvested agricultural 
products, stocks of mechandise, foodstuffs, and beverages”.317 The second paragraph 
of the source provision of the 1870 La CC 534, was interpreted by case law to refer to 
                                                          
313 La CC 535; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
2-3. 
314 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 2. 
315 3-4. 
316 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 4. 
317 La CC 536; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
4.  
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money, 318 promissory notes,319 certificates of deposit,320 negotiable instruments to the 
bearer,321 bales of cotton322 and stocks of merchandise.323  
Nonconsumables can be enjoyed without changing their substance, allowing for 
deterioration or diminishing as result of time passing or by use.324 Examples are “lands, 
houses, shares of stock, animals, furniture, and vehicles”.325 Case law related to the 
first paragraph of the source provision held that shares of stock were 
nonconsumables.326 
Yiannopoulos notes that it is also possible to treat specific nonconsumables as 
consumables in the service of contractual freedom. 
                                                          
318 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 4 n 14 cites 
Mariana v Eureka Homestead Soc 181 La 125 158 So 642 (1935); Gryder v Gryder 37 La Ann 638 
(1885); Succession of Bickham 197 So 924 (La Ct App 1st Cir 1940); Danna v Danna 161 So 348 (La 
Ct App1st Cir 1935) and Johnson v Bolt 146 So 375 (La Ct App 2d Cir 1933).  
319 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 4 note 15 
cites Succession of Block 137 La 302 68 So 618 (1915); Miguez v Delcambre 125 La 176 51 So 108 
(1910); Kahn v Becnel 108 La 296 32 So 444 (1902). 
320 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 5 note 16 
cites Vivian State Bank v Thomason-Lewis Lumber Co 162 La 660 111 So 51 (1926). 
321 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 5 note 17 
cites Taylor v Taylor 189 La 1084 181 So 543 (1938) and Johnson v Bolt 146 So 375 (Lt Ct App 2d Cir 
1933). 
322 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 5 note 18 
cites Succession of Hayes 33 La Ann 1143 (1881). 
323 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 5 note 19 
cites Succession of Trouilly 26 So 851 (La 1899) and Succession of Blancand 19 So 683 (La 1896).  
324 La CC 537; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
5. 
325 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 5. 
326 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 5 note 22 
cites Leury v Mayer 122 La 486 47 So 839 (1908); Succession of Heckert 160 So 2d 375 (La Ct App 
4th Cir 1964); Milton v Mulla 526 F 2d 968 (5th Cir 1976). 
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The rights of the usufructuary also flow from the classification of the object of the 
usufruct as either consumables or nonconsumables. The usufructuary may in the case 
of nonconsumables possess the usufructuary property and enjoy the “utility, profits and 
advantages” thereof, but remains under the obligation to preserve the substance of the 
usufructuary object.327 However, the usufructuary may be relieved from the obligation 
to preserve the substance by the grantor.328 An example would be where the grantor 
gives the usufructuary the power to sell the thing. The usufruct of nonconsumables 
may in this instance be converted into a usufruct of consumables, and the right of 
enjoyment consequently attaches to the proceeds of the sale. Another example would 
be where a usufructuary sells the assets of a succession to meet obligations toward 
creditors and the usufruct attaches to the residual cash after payment of debts.329 A 
third example would be when nonconsumables are converted to money after an 
expropriation in the interest of public utility. Liquidation instituted without any act of the 
usufructuary will also convert the usufruct to one of consumables based on the 
principle of real subrogation.330 
However, the conversion of nonconsumables into consumables must be 
authorised, otherwise, the Louisiana Supreme court held, based on the 1870 La CC, 
the usufruct does not become imperfect.331 Yiannopoulos interprets the decision to 
mean that the usufructuary does not become the owner of the proceeds and that he 
would still be liable to the bare owner for not preserving the substance of the thing. He 
                                                          
327 La CC 539; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
5 states that article 539 was based on the 1870 La CC 533. 
328 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 6. 
329 8. 
330 8-9. 
331 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 9 citing 
Wainer v Wainer 210 La 324 26 So 2d 829 (1946). 
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would, in other words, not be able to only return the value of the thing at the time of 
conversion supplemented by the interest from the date of the termination of the 
usufruct, since alienation of nonconsumables would violate his obligation of preserving 
the substance of the usufructuary object. A further consequence may be that his 
usufruct terminates according to La CC 623 and that he will then be liable for losses 
due to his “fraud, default or neglect”. 
Yiannopoulos underlines the difference between a usufruct of consumables and 
a usufruct of nonconsumables. In the case of the former, the usufructuary becomes 
the owner of the thing and the bare owner a general creditor. The usufructuary bears 
the risk of deterioration or loss of the thing and as an owner he is also entitled to capital 
appreciation as result of investment. 
Apart from these doctrinal changes to usufruct, it is also worth noting that 
proposals have been made to use usufruct in a novel way as an alternative to 
condemnation.332 In the wake of hurricane Katrina New Orleans had to be rebuilt. The 
reconceptualization of usufruct would have allowed the city to obtain an interest in 
private properties that were “blighted and uninhabitable”.333 The city could rehabilitate 
and control the properties while the owners retained title. After rehabilitation the city 
would have assumed the mortgage notes to the properties and rented it out to 
“essential city employees”. The owner would have had the option of returning to his 
home after a certain period of time on the condition that he reimbursed the city for 
repairs. Should the owner have decided not to move into his renovated home, he could 
have shared in the profits of a sale of the property. Had this proposal been successful, 
                                                          
332 M Johnson “Addressing Housing Needs in the Post Katrina Gulf Coast” (2006) 31 T Marshall L Rev 
327-351 337-341. 
333 338. 
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it woud have repositioned usufruct as a tool of social upliftment and an institution of 
significant public interest.334 
3 5 2 Rights of the usufructuary 
Since usufruct can be established on both consumables and nonconsumables,335 the 
usufructuary has different rights regarding both categories. In terms of the former, he 
is the owner of the consumables and has the entitlement to destroy it by either 
consumption or transfer. He may further grant real rights less than full ownership on 
the usufructuary property. On the other hand, when nonconsumables are concerned, 
he may in principle not dispose of them.336 However, there are two exceptions. A 
usufruct created by a juridical act and whereby the grantor clearly gave the 
usufructuary the right of disposal, would be the first.337 The second is that corporeal 
movables which are prone to wear and tear are subject to the usufruct may be 
disposed of subject to the standard of prudent administration.338 The right to use 
entails possession, and enjoying the utility of the usufructuary property.339 
                                                          
334 Compare S Viljoen “Temporary Expropriation of a Use Right as Interim Measure in the South African 
Housing Context (Part 1)” 2014 TSAR 359-376; “Temporary Expropriation of a Use Right as Interim 
Measure in the South African Housing Context (Part 2)” 2014 TSAR 520-535 and J Strydom & S Viljoen 
“Unlawful Occupation of Inner-City Buildings: A Constitutional Analysis of the Rights and Obligations 
Involved” (2014) 17 PER 1207-1261 1239-1240 for temporary expropriations of a use right in the South 
African context. 
335 JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 190. 
336 La CC 568; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012); AN Matasar “The Usufruct 
Revisions: the Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables Now Expressly Includes Alienation, Lease, and 
Encumbrance; Has the Louisiana Legislature Fundamentally Altered the Nature of Usufruct?” (2011-
2012) 86 Tul L Rev 787-822 79. 
337 La CC 568; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 190. 
338 JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 190. 
339 191. 
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The theory of destination applied to the 1870 La CC 552 (mines and quarries), 
568 and 569 (buildings).340 Yiannopoulos therefore argues that apart from mines, 
quarries and buildings the usufructuary was allowed to improve other usufructuary 
objects without being restricted to the way that previous owners used the property if 
he did not cause injury to the estate or alter its condition.341 As examples, 
Yiannopoulos proposes that acts such as crop rotation, contour plowing and cattle 
raising on lands no longer suitable for cultivation should be permitted. However, land 
could not be put to its most profitable use if the grantor did not consent and the original 
destination could be maintained. Furthermore, the substance could not be 
substantially changed. 
The theory of destination was abolished in La CC 558342 the 1976 Revision. The 
usufructuary was henceforth allowed to improve and change the usufructuary property 
at his cost if the court approved. These improvements and alterations would have to 
correspond with the behaviour of a prudent administrator. The destination could 
therefore be changed on condition that the substance was not altered. 
La CC 539 places the duty on the usufructuary to use the usufructuary property 
“as a prudent administrator”.343 This provision is complemented by La CC 576, which 
                                                          
340 292-293. 
341 293. 
342 La CC 558 states: “The usufructuary may make improvements and alterations on the property 
subject to the usufruct at his cost and with the written consent of the naked owner. If the naked owner 
fails or refuses to give his consent, the usufructuary may, after notice to the naked owner and with the 
approval of the court, make at his cost those improvements and alterations that a prudent administrator 
would make.” 
343 285. 
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indicates that the usufructuary is liable for “losses resulting from his fraud, default or 
neglect”. 
According to Yiannopoulos the prudent administrator should maintain a certain 
standard of care and comply with the related duties.344 In terms of the standard of care, 
the usufructuary should act as diligently as “an attentive and careful man […] in the 
management of his own affairs”. This equates to “slight fault”, which is defined as “that 
want of care which a prudent man usually takes of his business” in the 1870 La CC 
3506(13). The test can be equated to the Roman culpa levis in abstracto and in case 
of loss or deterioration caused by the usufructuary the bare owner would be entitled 
to recover the value the property would have had at termination of the usufruct.345 
 
3 5 3 Duties of the usufructuary and the preservation requirement 
The usufructuary is compelled to frame an inventory.346 A “detailed descriptive list” is 
also allowed as a substitute for the inventory.347 The inventory and the determination 
of the condition of the property on commencement of the usufruct serve as evidence 
on termination of the usufruct during the settlement of accounts between the parties.348 
Furthermore, they may also be used to determine the restoration duty of the 
usufructuary and serve to indemnify the owner against loss or deterioration of the 
property. Inventories and descriptions of condition may therefore function as another 
                                                          
344 286. 
345 286-287. 
346 La CC 570(1). 
347 La CC 570(2) and article 3136 of the Louisiana Civil Procedure Act; AN Yiannopoulos Personal 
Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 260. 
348 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 261. 
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protection mechanism for the benefit of the bare owner. The estimated value of both 
movable and immovable usufructuary property must be stated in the inventory.349 An 
appraiser must specifically state the fair market value of the usufructuary property.350 
In general, security should be furnished to guarantee the fulfilment of the 
usufructuary’s duties towards the bare owner. In case of default, the bare owner may 
enforce his security right and accordingly receive monetary compensation.351 Certain 
usufructuaries are exempted from the duty to provide security,352 for example the legal 
usufructuary (except where the bare owner is a forced heir or not the child of the 
usufructuary) and the usufructuary reserving a usufruct for himself while transferring 
the bare ownership. The means of providing security are flexible: the usufructuary 
usually either renders surety in the form of a bond or by a special mortgage on his 
other property.353 The amount of security must be equal to the value of the 
usufructuary property but may be reduced or increased by a court “on proper showing”. 
A major obligation of the usufructuary entails preserving the substance of things. 
The usufructuary may use and enjoy the usufructuary property but must meet the 
obligation of preserving its substance.354 The 1870 La CC 533 and the 1825 La CC 
525 also included this obligation.355 The 1808 La CC was similar to the French CC 
                                                          
349 La CC 570(2); AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 
2011) 261. 
350 Art 3133(4) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: 
Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 261. 
351 JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 194. 
352 La CC 573; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 194. 
353 La CC 572; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 194. 
354 La CC 539; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
291. 
355 291. 
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because it included the phrase “as the owner himself could do”.356 The redactors of 
the 1825 La CC rightfully recommended that these words be struck out since the owner 
may do various things without changing the substance of the usufructuary property but 
which the usufructuary may not do. The 1825 La CC also phrases the obligation 
differently than the French CC: The La CC utilises the phrase “without altering its 
substance” while the French CC reads “to preserve the substance” (à la charge d’en 
conserver la substance):357 La CC 558 seems to be in conflict with this obligation since 
it permits the usufructuary to improve and alter the property at his own cost and on 
condition that the owner provides written consent. However, if the bare owner does 
not give his consent the usufructuary may notify the bare owner and obtain court 
approval to improve and alter the property in the way a prudent administrator would 
do. The usufructuary may of course remove the improvements if he restores the 
property to its former condition. 
Apart from La CC 558, La CC 568 and 569 of the 1870 La CC, unique to the La 
CC and not incorporated in either the French CC or German BGB, also pertained to 
the duty of the usufructuary to preserve the substance of things.358 There seems to 
have been a distinction between the preservation duty regarding buildings and the 
preservation duty pertaining to other objects of the usufruct. In the case of the latter, 
the rules seemed to be less strict. Article 1870 La CC 568(1) presumably applied to 
the latter and provided that the usufructuary could make useful and necessary repairs 
and could even make improvements and repairs for the sake of convenience, on the 
condition that the estate is not injured or changed. Where buildings were concerned, 
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the 1870 La CC 568 placed the duty on the usufructuary to preserve the buildings 
already erected on the land in the condition in which they were received at the 
commencement of the usufruct, without altering their “form, distribution or destination”, 
unless he had the consent of the bare owner. However, the usufructuary was allowed 
to create openings for windows or doors if he lived in a house given to him in usufruct. 
The usufructuary could not finish buildings left unfinished by the owner or build new 
buildings, except in cases of decay or accident,359 nor could the usufructuary destroy 
or demolish buildings erected by him or remove materials.360 These facilities had to be 
handed over to the bare owner on termination of the usufruct and the usufructuary did 
not receive any compensation.361 Nevertheless, provisions to the contrary in the act or 
agreement creating the usufruct could change these obligations.  
Yiannopoulos lists the duties that are connected with the obligation to act as a 
prudent administrator. Firstly, the usufructuary should preserve the substance of 
nonconsumables.362 Secondly, he should make repairs that are necessary and thirdly, 
he should pay the annual charges. Fourthly, he should prevent excessive wear and 
tear; fifthly he should inform the bare owner if third parties encroach on the estate; in 
the sixth place he should prevent liberative or acquisitive prescription to the detriment 
of the bare owner and finally, he should insure the usufructuary property against 
casualty or loss. 
                                                          
359 1870 La CC 569; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 
2011) 292. 
360 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 292. 
361 292. 
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The fourth duty entails that the usufructuary should prevent excessive wear and 
tear and from causing “exhaustive or uneconomic exploitation”.363 Fruits that are the 
result of “wasteful methods of exploitation” must either be restored or the equivalent 
value be returned to the bare owner. Furthermore, the usufruct may be terminated. 
However, the usufructuary is not liable for normal deterioration of usufructuary 
property which by its nature is subject to war or decay. 
The fifth duty of the usufructuary is expressed in La CC 598. The usufructuary 
must inform the bare owner if a third party “encroaches on the immovable property or 
violates in any other way the rights of the naked owner”. Failing to notify the bare 
owner may lead to liability for the damages suffered by the bare owner.364 
A sixth duty of the usufructuary entails that he prevents accrual of liberative or 
acquisitive prescription.365 For instance, if a usufruct of a credit is granted, the 
usufructuary should collect payment before liberative prescription in favor of the 
debtor. In cases where a predial servitude is lost by non-use or where the usufructuary 
allows acquisition of a servitude on a property by prescription, he is liable to the bare 
owner, according to La CC 597. According to Yiannopoulos it is possible to argue that 
the usufructuary has an obligation to bring a possessory action preventing the 
acquisition of servitudes by third parties who rely on the rules of acquisitive 
prescription on the grounds of La CC 597 and the 1870 La CC 590.366 
Yiannopoulos is of the opinion that La CC 539 and 576, read together with La 
CC 617, should be interpreted to entail the duty of the usufructuary to insure the 
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property against casualty and loss based on at least one court decision interpreting 
the corresponding provisions in the French civil code. 
The usufructuary as a prudent administrator should keep the usufructuary 
property in good order by taking responsibility for maintenance and repairs.367 Rules 
governing the task allocation between the usufructuary and the bare owner prescribe 
that the bare owner should take care of extraordinary repairs, while the usufructuary 
has the duty to provide ordinary maintenance and repairs.368 The usufructuary only 
becomes liable for extraordinary repairs if he causes damage through his fault or 
neglect.369 The usufructuary is not held liable for fair wear and tear; this risk is allocated 
to the bare owner. However, during his enjoyment he must see to maintenance and 
ordinary repairs.370  
The obligation to maintain the usufructuary property and to make repairs 
originates in the duty of the usufructuary to be a prudent administrator, but 
Yiannopoulos label them as “charges of the enjoyment”.371 The latter determines who 
takes responsibility for repairs necessitated at the commencement of the usufruct, 
whether the bare owner can force the usufructuary to do repairs during his enjoyment 
                                                          
367 La CC 539, 576, 577 & 581; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of 
Use (5 ed 2011) 296. 
368 La CC 577 & 581; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 
2011) 296. 
369 La CC 576 & 577; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 
2011) 296. 
370 La CC 569; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
296. 
371 La CC 582; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 
297. 
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and whether the usufructuary may relieve himself of his duties of maintenance and 
repairs if he abandons the usufruct.372 
 
3 5 4 Termination and remedies 
 Usufruct may terminate due to destruction of nonconsumables.373 This destruction 
must however be permanent, total and due to accident or age but not the fault of the 
third party.374 This termination is nevertheless relative, since the principles of real 
subrogation are applicable.375 The usufruct does not terminate due to transformation 
of the usufructuary property in the cases specified in La CC 615, but attach to the 
money or property resulting from the termination through real subrogation.376 
Furthermore, if the usufructuary property is sold on agreement between the owner and 
the usufructuary or when partition takes place, the usufruct falls on the proceeds 
generated by the sale.377 
In contrast to Dutch law, the usufruct can be extinguished when the usufructuary 
seriously defaults on his preservation duty regarding nonconsumables.378 The relevant 
range of default includes commiting waste, unlawfully alienating usufructuary property, 
neglecting to repair or abuse of enjoyment in any other way.379 These grounds do not 
amount to termination by operation of law, but require court intervention.380 When the 
                                                          
372 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 297. 
373 La CC 614, 617; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 199-200. 
374 La CC 613; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 199. 
375 La CC 613; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 199. 
376 La CC 615; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 200. 
377 La CC 616; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 201. 
378 La CC 623; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 201.  
379 La CC 623; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 201. 
380 JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 201. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
188 
 
usufructuary commits waste, it must amount to active neglect. Furthermore, the bare 
owner is not entitled to the right to have the usufruct terminated, but only the right to 
approach the court in this regard.381 The court may terminate the usufruct or may 
declare that the usufructuary property should be delivered to the bare owner, who must 
pay a “reasonably annuity” to the usufructuary until termination of the usufruct.382 
However, the usufructuary may avert the preceding two measures by providing 
security that he will correct his default before the deadline set by the court. 
 
3 6 Usufruct in French law 
3 6 1 Introduction 
The institution of usufruct has a wider scope in French law than the comparable 
German institution of Nießbrauch, since usufruct may not only be created by a legal 
transaction but may also originate in various other contexts based in family law and 
law of succession.383 According to article 578 CC usufruct is “‘the right to enjoy things, 
of which another has the ownership’, as the owner himself but subject to the charge 
of preserving the substance of things”.384 Article 581 CC states that usufruct can be 
established on all kinds of property. Therefore, according to the definition usufruct can 
be established on movable and immovable, corporeal and incorporeal property. 
However, Planiol and Ripert disagree and assert that there are certain things upon 
which usufruct cannot be established because use of these objects would amount to 
                                                          
381 La CC 624; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 201. 
382 La CC 624; JR Trahan Louisiana Law of Property: A Précis (2012) 201. 
383 M Ferid Das Französische Zivilrecht Zweiter Band (1971) 1099. 
384 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 630. 
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consumption or alienation and the “jus utendi is nothing without the ‘jus abutendi’”.385 
Due to this distinction between things which can be the object of usufruct and things 
which cannot, the institution of quasi-usufruct is necessary. This right permits the 
usufructuary to consume things on condition that he returns similar things on 
termination of the usufruct. Furthermore, the parties to the agreement giving rise to 
the usufruct can also, when they create a usufruct on non-consumables, choose to 
establish a quasi-usufruct rather than a “veritable usufruct”.386 
 
3 6 2 Rights of the usufructuary 
The usufructuary has the right to use usufructuary property, and to enjoy its fruits.387 
The use and enjoyment of the usufructuary property necessarily imply that the 
usufructuary must have certain powers of control or management.388 These acts may 
be categorised as either material acts or juridical acts.389 In terms of material acts, the 
usufructuary or his family390 may use the usufructuary property but he is restricted in 
his use.391 According to Carbonnier he has to conform to the habits of the owner that 
                                                          
385 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 631. 
386 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 631 citing Cass req 
March 30 1926 Gazette du Palais May 18 1926. 
387 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 107 no 72; J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les 
Biens (1973) 110 no 32; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) 
(translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 
(1959) 642 no 2775. 
388 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 112 no 74. 
389 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 116 no 33. 
390 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 107 no 72 
391 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 116 no 33. 
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used the thing before him and the development and destination given to the 
usufructuary property prior to the usufruct. Marty and Raynaud assert that the 
restriction lies in the general duty to act as a bonus paterfamilias (bon père de 
famille).392 Material acts that the usufructuary may not perform include material 
disposition, consumption, destruction or degradation of the usufructuary property.393 
The only exceptions are usufruct on property that are consumed upon the first use, in 
which case the usufructuary must restitute the equivalent of the usufructuary 
property,394 and property that deteriorates progressively through use which if it was 
subjected to normal use,395 can be returned in the condition it was in on termination of 
the usufruct.396 
Juridical acts are categorised as acts of administration and acts of disposition.397 
Administrative acts are acts of normal exploitation with the aim of developing the 
usufructuary property as a source of income, for example leasing.398 The usufructuary 
may perform widely diversified acts of administration.399 Juridical acts cannot in 
principle be acts of disposition since the usufructuary does not have the ius abtendi.400 
                                                          
392 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 107 no 72. 
393 Arts 591 CC, 598 CC para 1; J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 116 no 33. 
394 Art 587 CC. 
395 Art 589 CC. 
396 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 117 no 33 notes that this exception can be viewed as 
conferring a limited ius abutendi. 
397 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 117 no 33. 
398 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 117 no 33; L Aynès “Property Law” in GA Bermann & E 
Picard (eds) Introduction to French Law (2008) 164 states that the usufructuary may decide on the 
exploitation of the usufructuary property and may rent it to a third party. He may act alone without 
obtaining the consent of the bare owner, except when he wants to lease real estate. 
399 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (1980 2 ed) 112 no 74. 
400 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 380 no 2332 defines 
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The usufructuary does not have the right to dispose of the usufructuary property.401 
For example, he may not alienate the usufructuary object, donate it, or burden it with 
a mortgage or with a praedial servitude, since he cannot transfer entitlements which 
he does not possess.402 However, where alienation would be judged good 
administration and preservation, it is authorized on condition that proceeds are re-
used.403 Furthermore, the usufructuary may alienate the use of his usufruct by means 
of gift, sale or exchange, since he does not alienate a right in his patrimony.404 
 
3 6 3 Duties of the usufructuary and the preservation requirement 
The usufructuary must comply with two obligations before he enters into possession, 
namely firstly to draw up an inventory (inventaire) of movables or to record the 
condition of immovables in a statement (état)405 and secondly, to furnish security.406 
These obligations safeguard the bare owner against the possibility of the 
usufructuary’s insolvency or dishonesty.407 The framing of inventory is only applicable 
                                                          
abuti as consumption and not abuse of the property. The phrase ius abutendi originated with the 
Commentators. 
401 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 118 no 33. 
402 L Aynès “Property Law” in GA Bermann & E Picard (eds) Introduction to French Law (2008) 164; J 
Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 118 no 33. The term servitude is used in the French texts 
here, since personal servitudes are not classified as servitudes in French law. Since it only applies to 
praedial servitudes, I have used the latter term. 
403 L Aynès “Property Law” in GA Bermann & E Picard (eds) Introduction to French Law (2008) 164. 
404 L Aynès “Property Law” in GA Bermann & E Picard (eds) Introduction to French Law (2008) 164; J 
Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 118 no 33. 
405 Article 600 CC; J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119 no 34. Also see AN Yiannopoulos 
Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 261. 
406 Article 601 CC; J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119-120 no 34; M Planiol M & G Ripert 
Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on 
the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
407 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119 no 34. 
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to movables, since the existence of immovables is proved by titles.408 However, for 
immovables a statement is drawn up noting their physical condition on the 
commencement of possession by the usufructuary.  
The inventory serves as proof of the condition and nature of the movables.409 On 
termination of the usufruct the inventory, if properly framed, will be used to determine 
the duties as well as the scope of restitution to be made by the usufructuary or his 
heirs in case of damage or loss.410 Sometimes the inventory or statement contains 
indications of the value of the contents, but this is only a complementary measure to 
identify the usufructuary property and to determine its condition, since it is the 
usufructuary property itself or, if this is not possible, its value on termination of the 
usufruct which should be returned to the bare owner.411 In fact, the value indicated on 
the original estimation can be much less than the value on termination of the usufruct 
if the usufruct continued for a long time and the property was subject to serious 
economic or monetary fluctuations. 412 
There are only a few instances in which the inventory must state the estimated 
value of movables.413 If the usufruct is created by an inter vivos donation according to 
                                                          
408 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
409 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 102 no 68; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol 
Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil 
Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
410 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 261; M 
Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law 
Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
411 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 102 no 68 cites Trib civ de Périgueux 27 
July 1932 DH 1932 566. 
412 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 102 no 68. 
413 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 261. 
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article 948 CC, if the title of the usufruct states an obligation to frame an inventory with 
estimation of the value of the movables and if the usufructuary becomes owner for 
example with a usufruct of consumables, of a business enterprise or an estimation-
sale. Although the bare owner may demand determination of the value of any 
movables when the inventory is framed, or at a later stage, courts have the discretion 
to accept or reject his demand if he makes it at a later time.414 
The inventory or statement should be framed in the presence of the owner or 
after he has been summoned.415 This practical measure ensures that the owner is 
assured of the accuracy of the documents.416 Without this arrangement, documents 
drawn up by the usufructuary alone cannot be used against claims by the owner. It is 
not necessary for a notary to frame the inventory, although the inventory may be 
framed by one or he may assist in cases where it is necessary.417  
The usufructuary is liable for the costs of framing an inventory or a statement, 
since it is his duty to draw up the documents.418 According to Planiol and Ripert these 
costs may be extensive and it often happens that usufructuaries are poor.419 They 
therefore suggest that the impecunious usufructuary be relieved from the obligation to 
                                                          
414 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 261-262. 
415 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 102 no 68; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol 
Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil 
Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
416 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
417 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 102 no 68. 
418 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 102 68; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol 
Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil 
Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
419 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
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frame an inventory or a statement or alternatively, that “acts under private signature” 
be drawn up. Although the act constituting the usufruct often relieves the usufructuary 
of the duty to frame an inventory or a statement, this clause should only be understood 
as to relieve him from the responsibility of paying for these documents.420 In this case, 
the heir who eventually receives the property has the right to have the documents 
drawn up, but should then pay the related costs.421 The heir cannot be deprived of the 
only measure available to determine issues of restitution and which could act as 
“regular proof”.422 
The second option to solve the costs issue would be applicable when the title 
does prescribe conditions relating to the inventory. In this instance the usufructuary 
and the bare owner could agree to draw up an informal inventory or statement on 
condition that both parties are majors and capable.423 However, the general 
consensus, probably based on tradition, is that notarial documents cannot be avoided 
if a minor or an interdict is involved.424  
The provisions of article 1442 CC, which deprives the surviving spouse as 
usufructuary from her right of enjoyment when an inventory was not framed, qualifies 
as “an exceptional severity”, which should not be extended to other usufructuaries and 
                                                          
420 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 103 no. 68; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol 
Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil 
Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 639. 
421 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
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therefore, the failure to provide an inventory should not lead to the loss of the 
usufruct.425 
However, the owner may refuse to deliver the usufructuary property if inventory 
was not framed.426 Alternatively, restitution may be demanded on termination of the 
usufruct.427 In the absence of an inventory, the owner may prove his claim “by oral 
testimony, by presumptions, and even by common repute (la commune 
renommée)”.428 
The usufructuary also has the obligation to provide surety that he will use the 
property as a bonus paterfamilias before he enters into possession of the usufruct.429 
This amounts to finding a solvent person430 who is willing to assume an obligation with 
                                                          
425 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 640. 
426 Article 600 CC; G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 103 no 68; J Carbonnier 
Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil 
(1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-
3097 (1959) 640. 
427 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 640. 
428 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire 
de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 
2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 685 note that this kind of proof is exceptional since it is baded on hearsay, is 
prone to exaggeration and is only permitted by the law as a penalty according to articles 1415, 1442 
and 1504. 
429 Article 601 CC; J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol 
Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil 
Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 640. 
430 Articles 2040, 2018, 2019 CC; G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 103 no 69; 
M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law 
Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 640. 
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the usufructuary serving as security431 for the bare owner.432 The possibility exists that 
the usufructuary may at some point owe an excessive amount of money as a result of 
his abuse of enjoyment, or deterioration, loss or destruction for which he is 
accountable. In the case of consumables he might not be able to reimburse the bare 
owner for the value.433 According to Planiol and Ripert the motivation for this duty lies 
in the guarantee it provides against a situation where the usufructuary becomes 
insolvent and as result decide to abscond.434 
Finding a surety might prove to be a challenge, since the scope of the obligation 
is not ascertainable in advance.435 The law provides for situations where a delay in 
securing a surety occurs.436 In this case the fruits collected or received during the 
period should be reimbursed to the usufructuary.437 If the surety defaults, the court (le 
tribunal) has the power to order measures to conserve the usufructuary property in the 
interest of the bare owner.438 In cases where it is too difficult to find a surety, the 
usufructuary might comply with the duty by providing a pledge or other security.439 
                                                          
431 See article 2011 CC. 
432 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire 
de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 
2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 640. 
433 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 




437 Article 604 CC; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation 
Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 641. 
438 Articles 602 & 603 CC; J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 120. 
439 Article 2041 CC; G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 103 no 69; J Carbonnier 
Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 119-120; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil 
(1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-
3097 (1959) 641. 
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Examples would include depositing money or securities in a public depositary440 or by 
giving the bare owner a mortgage on his movables.441 Case law confirms that these 
facilities should be available to the usufructuary where the CC imposes the surety 
obligation.442  
Where the usufructuary is unable to either find a surety or to give equivalent 
security, the usufruct may be taken away.443 Such a situation serves as proof of the 
dire need of the usufructuary. Nevertheless, the owner should also not be subjected 
to an insolvent usufructuary for an undetermined period. Therefore, articles 602 and 
603 CC provide for measures aimed at protecting the interests of both the bare owner 
and the usufructuary. 
In the case of liquid cash or food that is sold, the money should be invested. If 
the owner requires that other movables that may possibly perish, be sold, the price 
should also be invested. However, the usufructuary may request the court to order 
delivery of movables that he needs for his personal use, on condition that he takes an 
oath to preserve the usufructuary property and to return them. Immovables may be 
cultivated or given to a sequestrator who acts as guardian managing the property and 
                                                          
440 Article 2041 CC. 
441 Article 2041 CC; G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 103 no. 69; M Planiol M & 
G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute 
Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 641. 
442 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 641 citing Cass Aug 7 
1882 D 83 1 220 and Angers July 13 1930 S 1931 2 12. 
443 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 641. 
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rendering an account of its revenue.444 The sequestrator receives a salary from the 
fruits of the usufructuary property.445 
Finally, certain parties may be relieved from the obligation to provide surety.446 
The grantor may dispense with the obligation in the title constituting the usufruct447 or 
relief might be tacit as indicated by case law.448 These clauses are most often 
associated with testaments.449 When the grantor retains usufruct and alienates the 
bare ownership, he is not required to provide surety. This relief from the obligation is 
based on an assumption based on the intent of the vendor or donor, namely that he 
meant to establish the arrangement for his own benefit. Parents are also exempt from 
the provision of surety due to their bond of natural affection with their children. When 
usufructuaries are exempted in this way, they may take possession of the usufructuary 
property in its existing condition without providing “exceptional guarantees”. However, 
the relief granted to these usufructuaries in terms of the obligation to provide surety is 
                                                          
444 Article1956 CC; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation 
Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 641. 
445 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 641. 
446 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 120; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire 
de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 
2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 642. 
447 Article 601 CC. 
448 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 642 citing Cass October 
28 1889 D 90 1 67. 
449 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 642. 
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not final.450 Judges may order measures to preserve the usufructuary property during 
the usufruct if it seems that the rights of the bare owner are threatened.451 
The definition of usufruct in article 578 of the CC includes the preservation of the 
substance requirement. The theory of destination delineates the scope of this 
preservation duty of the usufructuary pertaining to nonconsumables.452 According to 
Yiannopoulos, French courts and writers hold that the usufructuary is obliged to 
maintain the destination of the object of the usufruct and to employ the same methods 
of use and enjoyment used by previous owners.453 However, Marty and Raynaud 
assert that although this interpretation is evident in several usufruct cases, it must 
rather be viewed as a secondary way of delimiting the right of enjoyment of the 
usufructuary.454 Instead, the focus should be on the conservation of the usufructuary 
property, an obligation included in the broader duty to enjoy as a bon pere de famille. 
Where conflict for instance arises between the concrete standard of the use of the 
previous owner Planiol and Ripert mention that several writers trace the theory of 
destination to article 578 of the CC, stating that the substance of the usufructuary 
property should be preserved.455 The phrase “provided the substance of the thing be 
preserved” (“à la charge d’en conserver la substance”) originated from the Latin 
phrase salva rerum substantia.456 Although Planiol and Ripert acknowledge the 
                                                          
450 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 120. 
451 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 102 no 68; J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les 
Biens (1973) 120. 
452 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 293. 
453 293 
454 G Marty & P Raynaud Droit Civil: Les Biens (2 ed 1980) 120. 
455 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 293; M 
Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law 
Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 663. 
456 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 293. 
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possibility that the redactors of the code could have meant that the usufructuary should 
not change what is essential, that is the destination, by changing its purpose or use, 
they state that if this was the intention of the compilers, they did not use the correct 
translation of the Latin phrase.457 Planiol and Ripert 458 as well as Yiannopoulos459 are 
of the opinion that the compilers did not use the phrase to refer to destination. The 
Latin phrase points to the “extinction of the right as a result of the loss of the thing”.460 
However, Planiol and Ripert do not attach too much importance to the intended 
meaning of the redactors in the ambiguous phrase since the principles involved do not 
create uncertainty.461 
The theory of destination originated in Roman texts,462 was developed in 
medieval French law463 and is applied in some articles of the CC such as article 578, 
stating that the usufructuary may enjoy the property “like the owner himself” and 
several other articles on timberlands, mines and quarries prescribing that the 
                                                          
457 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 663. 
458 663. 
459 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 293. 
460 293. 
461 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 663. 
462 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 663 note that the 
Roman jurisconsults often spoke of the duty to respect the owner’s habits but did not consider it a 
distinct obligation. M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation 
Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 663 
illustrates this with reference to Ulpian. According to D 7 1 9 Ulpian for example said “sicut pater familias 
coedebat …, unde palo solebat pater familias uti”. 
463 See M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana 
State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 663.  
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usufructuary must continue the use or customs of the owners.464 In these articles the 
use made by or the custom of the owners is mentioned as a criterion whereby the 
usufructuary should regulate his conduct.465 
As a consequence of this theory and based on articles 578 and 590 to 598 CC it 
would not, according to French writers, be permissible to convert a house into a hotel, 
store or warehouse, except where the original destination cannot be maintained.466 
Leases seem to be possible on condition that the lessee also honours the destination. 
The mode of cultivation of lands may also not be changed, except where an accident 
destroys the cultivated areas. An exception seems to be uncultivated marshlands: 
cultivation would qualify as an improvement rather than a change of the substance. 
The exploitation of woodlands, mines and quarries is also subject to the theory of 
destination. 
Although the strict theory of destination is advocated in Roman and medieval 
texts, French writers have indicated that there is scope for a wider interpretation of 
provisions on the duty to preserve the usufructuary property.467 The general duty 
applicable to usufructs states that the substance of the usufructuary property must be 
preserved without indicating that the usufructuary is limited to using the property in the 
same way as the previous owner.468 According to Yiannopoulos, the usufructuary 
                                                          
464 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 293-294. M 
Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law 
Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 663 also mentions articles 
590, 591, 593, 597 and 598. 
465 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos. 1610-3097 (1959) 663. 
466 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 294.  
467 295. 
468 294-295. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
202 
 
should be allowed to make improvements and alterations which would keep the 
concern up to date, but on condition that the economic purpose of the usufructuary 
object is maintained.469  
The second main obligation stated in article 601 CC to which the usufructuary is 
bound within the context of French law, is the duty to enjoy the usufruct as a “‘prudent 
father of a family’” (bon père de famille).470 Planiol and Ripert note that the French 
expression has retained the meaning inherent in the Latin concept pater familias, 
namely to signify a good owner.471 Historically, the pater “absorbed in his person the 
personality of all those who were subject to his power” and seemed to be the single 
owner of all the family’s property. Therefore, the concept bonus pater familias implies 
that the usufructuary should enjoy the usufruct “as a careful and diligent owner”.472  
The French CC imposes the duty to act as prudent administrator in the same 
sentence in which it sets out the duty to give security.473 According to Yiannopoulos 
this causes the provision to be “obscure”.474 Planiol and Ripert explain this ambiguous 
                                                          
469 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 295. 
470 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 120; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire 
de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 
2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 660. This phrase has been struck from a number of laws since it discriminates 
on the grounds of gender. See JM Smits “Adieu Bon Père de Famille” (2014) 145 WPNR 303-304 and 
L Waelkens “Geen Goede Huisvaders meer in het Franse Recht” (2014) 8 RW 282. 
471 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 661. 
472 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 120; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire 
de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 
2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 661. 
473 Article 601 CC. 
474 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 286. 
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phrase as a result of the changed meaning of the Latin term “cautio”.475 The Latin term 
was incorporated in a formula meaning to “assume a personal engagement by means 
of a stipulation”. Article 601 can be traced back to the homo diligens et studiosus 
paterfamilias in Roman law, who had to commit to the obligation flowing from the 
cautiones and sponsiones required of usufructuaries by the Roman praetors.476 The 
obligation later became less formalised and was implied as part and parcel of usufruct 
law. However, in French the linguistically related phrase “donner caution” has the 
meaning of furnishing surety.477 In French law the duty not to cause undue wear and 
tear and to refrain from “exhaustive or uneconomic exploitation” of the usufructuary 
property exists as well. 
The duty to inform the bare owner of third parties encroaching on the immovable 
property or violating his rights is also found in article 614 of the CC.478 In terms of the 
duty to prevent accrual of prescription, the usufructuary must, in case of a usufruct on 
a credit, collect payment before accrual of liberative prescription benefitting the 
debtor.479 In the case of loss of a predial servitude by lack of use or acquisition of a 
servitude on the property, the usufructuary is liable.480 However, the duty to prevent 
accrual of prescription does not entail that the usufructuary bring an action against the 
                                                          
475 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 661. 
476 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 286. 
477 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 661. 
478 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 288. 
479 289. 
480 Article 614 CC; AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 
2011) 289. 
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person about to complete acquisitive prescription: the only requirement is to provide 
information to the owner.481 
According to the majority opinion in France, the duty to insure the property or 
continue insurance payments, is not an obligation on the usufructuary.482 It is rather 
viewed “as an act of extraordinary precaution not required of a prudent 
administrator”.483 However, at least one court in France has decided that a duty to 
insure the usufructuary property against casualty and loss should be placed on the 
usufructuary, arguing that the usufructuary’s position as a prudent administrator 
should be treated analogous to that of a tutor.484 Yiannopoulos refers to criticism of 
the civil code by Planiol and Ripert, who suggested that this “veritable lacuna in the 
French law” should be amended, since a prudent administrator ought to take out 
insurance where practices or the nature of the usufructuary property dictates it.485 
As a prudent administrator the usufructuary has the duty to keep the usufructuary 
property in good order, according to article 605(1) CC. Flowing from the obligation, the 
usufructuary should attend to ordinary maintenance and repairs.486 However, the 
usufructuary is not responsible for all repairs and rules govern the relationship 
between the usufructuary and the bare owner in this regard.487 Usually, the bare owner 




484 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 290 cites 
Besançon April 1st 1863 D 1863 2 93. 
485 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 291. 
486 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 120 citing article 618 paragraph 1; AN Yiannopoulos 
Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 296; M Ferid Das Französische 
Zivilrecht Zweiter Band (1971) 1105. 
487 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 296; M Ferid 
Das Französische Zivilrecht Zweiter Band (1971) 1105. 
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takes care of extraordinary repairs and the usufructuary of maintenance and ordinary 
repairs.488 If the usufructuary causes damage through his fault or neglect, he becomes 
responsible for extraordinary repairs.  
Where the object of the usufruct deteriorates due to normal wear and tear, the 
bare owner carries the risk.489 In this case the usufructuary does not have to replace 
usufructuary property, but he must take care of maintenance and ordinary repairs 
required during enjoyment. 
The obligation of maintenance and repairs flows from the obligation of the 
usufructuary to act as a prudent administrator.490 Furthermore, these duties must be 
viewed as “charges of the enjoyment”, an idea that assists in responding to questions 
such as determining the responsible party if repairs are needed at the commencement 
of the usufruct, whether the bare owner can force the usufructuary to make repairs 
during the usufruct and whether the usufructuary can relieve himself of these duties 
by abandonment of his usufruct.491  
                                                          
488 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 296; M Ferid 
Das Französische Zivilrecht Zweiter Band (1971) 1105. According to M Ferid Das Französische 
Zivilrecht Zweiter Band (1971) 1105 this does however not imply that the owner has an obligation 
towards the usufructuary to do the the main repairs. Whether such gross repairs are depends more on 
the person who bears the obligation to pay the costs internally (“der intern Kostentragungspflichtige”). 
M Ferid Das Französische Zivilrecht Zweiter Band (1971) 1105 states that article 607 is proof of this, 
but cautions that the idea expressed in this article is risky as it encourages wasteful possession of land 
(“Verluderung des Grundbesitzes”): If the usufructuary voluntarily completes a gross repair, he will have 
on termination of the usufruct a claim on the then existing addidtional value. M Ferid Das Französische 
Zivilrecht Zweiter Band (1971) 1105 proposes that the usufructuary should only bear the burden of 
gross repairs when it necessarily arises due to his inappropriate exercise of his usufruct, according to 
article 605(2). 
489 AN Yiannopoulos Personal Servitudes: Usufruct, Habitation, Rights of Use (5 ed 2011) 296. 
490 296-297. 
491 297. 




3 6 4 Termination and remedies 
Two of the grounds for termination specifically concern the salva rei substantia 
requirement, namely termination through total loss of the usufructuary property and 
forfeiture492 due to abuse of enjoyment.493 The usufruct is terminated when the 
usufructuary property is destroyed, since the object of the usufruct ceases to exist and 
the usufructuary is not entitled to the remains of the property.494 However, in the case 
of partial loss, the usufruct continues on the part of the usufructuary property that still 
remains.495  
Where forfeiture is concerned, the point of departure is that the usufructuary’s 
right is dependent on his compliance with his obligations.496 If he does not comply, his 
usufruct may be withdrawn from him and in this sense, usufruct is similar to a 
synallagmatic contract. Generally, forfeiture may occur in cases where the 
                                                          
492 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 681 no 2852 note that 
this cause for termination neither existed in Roman law, nor was it evident from the work of the 
seventeenth century jurist Domat. It only became prevalent in old cases where it was applied to 
dowagers. In the CC the provisions applicable to the dowager was applied to usufructuaries in general.  
493 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 677 no 2842. 
494 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 677 no 2842 note two 
examples in the CC namely the hides of dead animals (art 615, 616) and the soil and material that 
remain after a building collapsed or burned down. 
495 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 678 no 2843 mention 
the example in art 624 para 2 of a building forming part of a larger unit. When the building is partially 
destroyed, the usufructuary still enjoys the usufruct on the soil and the material. 
496 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 681 no 2852. 
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usufructuary defaults on his obligations and his noncompliance endangers the 
usufructuary property.497 More particularly, abuse justifying forfeiture occurs when the 
usufructuary damages the property subject to the usufruct or allows it to deteriorate 
due to a lack of maintenance.498 Since forfeiture only grants the bare owner the right 
to obtain a judgment of forfeiture if he provides evidence of abuse, the court’s 
intervention is necessary and forfeiture therefore cannot happen by operation of 
law.499 Moreover, the court should only use its discretion to grant an order of forfeiture 
where the abuse is very serious. Less drastic measures are available to avoid 
termination of the usufruct and to protect the interests of the bare owner. These include 
returning the usufructuary property to the owner but with the understanding that he 
pays the usufructuary an annual sum equal to the profit of the usufruct.500 Furthermore, 
the special measures in articles 602 and 603 CC may be used.501 In terms of these 
measures cash is invested, perishables sold and the return invested, immovables 
cultivated or handed over to a sequestrator. However, movables for personal use may 
be granted by the court on the basis of the usufructuary’s oath to maintain and return 
them. A usufructuary may also be allowed to retain the property if he merely protects 
                                                          
497 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 681 no 2853 cite Paris 
June 7 1926 Gazette du Palais July 8 and Cass req Jan 3 1934 Gazette du Palais Feb 18. 
498 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 681 no 2853. 
499 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 682 no 2854. 
500 Art 618 CC; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation 
Louisiana Stat e Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 682 
no 2855. 
501 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 682 no 2855 and 641 
no 2770. 
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the owner’s interests by providing surety, depositing securities or by means of a 
pledge.502 The owner’s interests may also be protected by the usufructuary’s creditors 
in the interest of preserving the usufructuary’s income as a probable source of 
payment. Creditors can offer to pay the damages caused by the usufructuary or 
provide guarantees.503 Whether the forfeiture is made an order of court or the usufruct 
allowed to continue, the usufructuary should repair damages caused at his own 
cost.504 
When the usufruct ends, the usufructuary or his heirs has the duty to restore the 
usufructuary property to the owners.505 However, a settlement of adjustment of 
account (règlement des comptes) can also be made between the parties. Restitution 
can also be made in money if the property has been valued at the time of the 
constitution of the usufruct.506 Money is also suitable when the property has been lost 
through fault of the usufructuary. By contrast, no restoration obligation exists if the loss 
occurred through force majeure.507 
 
                                                          
502 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 682 no 2855 and 682 
no 2856. 
503 Art 618 , par. 2 CC; M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation 
Louisiana State Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 682 no 
2855 and 682 no 2856. 
504 M Planiol M & G Ripert Planiol Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil (1939) (translation Louisiana State 
Law Institute Treatise on the Civil Law Volume 1, Part 2 Nos 1610-3097 (1959) 682 no 2855 and 682 
no 2856. 
505 J Carbonnier Droit Civil 3: Les Biens (1973) 120. 
506 Article 587 CC. 
507 Articles 607 & 1302 CC. 
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3 7 Reasons for a shift in the approach to usufruct 
Firstly, on a doctrinal level, it seems from the discussion of the various jurisdictions 
that the limitations on the right to use still seem to be prevalent in most of the countries: 
the duty to act as a bonus paterfamilias, bon père de famille, or prudent manager still 
demarcates the acceptable use of the usufructuary property. Furthermore, destination 
still seems to be a significant consideration. However, in terms of the latter, it seems 
that there is some divergence of views, for example in German and Belgian literature 
on destination. Writers who are in favour of a more flexible approach to the destination 
requirement seem to view the powers of the usufructuary in a wider sense, allowing 
for disposition subject to destination. They also promote the idea that the object of the 
usufruct must be interpreted widely to allow disposition as a normal act of control. On 
the other hand, other writers caution that these powers only seem similar to disposition 
powers but cannot be.  
Furthermore, by not including the salva rei substantia requirement in the 
definition of usufruct, some codes do seem to open up the possibility of a more flexible 
approach. This is related to the abolition of the strict distinction between usufruct and 
quasi-usufruct. By establishing that usufruct can be granted on both consumables and 
nonconsumbles, the inevitable outcome was that the salva rei substantia requirement 
could not be incorporated in the more inclusive description of usufruct. 
 In terms of the duties allocated to the usufructuary, it seems that some countries 
place more stringent requirements on the entry requirements such as the duty to frame 
inventory and provide security.508 This at least provides legal certainty and prevents 
                                                          
508 In French (600 CC), Belgian (), Dutch (3: 205 BW), it is mandatory to frame inventory while this is 
not a requirement but a choice in German law (§ 1034 BGB). In French (601 CC), Belgian (601 BBW) 
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unnecessary litigation. At the same time, it emphasises the salva rei substantia 
requirement. Interestingly enough, the duty to ensure has also became an obligation 
and in this sense supports the contention that the requirement is still of importance. 
This seems to account for shifts pertaining to the prominence of the duty to provide 
security. Furthermore, usufructuary has maintenance obligations.509 It seems 
therefore, that apart from the Netherlands, all other jurisdictions still value the salva rei 
substantia requirement, although there are arguments for a more flexible approach to 
it, particularly where it concerns the limitation on the disposition powers of the 
usufructuary. However, general conclusions in this regard should be approached in a 
nuanced way. 
Secondly, in terms of societal changes, it seems that usufruct as an ancient 
property institution has experienced a revival due to legislative changes pertaining to 
the law of succession in different jurisdictions. These changes are not only linked to 
doctrinal flexibility concerns. They also reflect shifts in moral and societal views in 
terms of the growing importance given to provision for the surviving spouse, compared 
to maintaining patrimony within the traditional family structure. Moreover, changes 
signal a shift in the composition of patrimony from predominantly immovable property 
to movables, with an emphasis on securities. Legislative changes were in part 
responses to these changes.  
Pragmatic arguments have been made in for instance Louisiana, where 
legislative revisions have been made in the service of practical considerations, 
                                                          
Dutch (3:206 BW), German (§ 1051) and Louisiana state law (571 La CC) the usufructuary is generally, 
subject to certain exceptions, required to furnish security.  
509 In French (605-606 CC), Belgian (605-606 BBW), Dutch (3: 220 BW), German (§§ 1045, 1047, 1048 
II BGB) and Louisiana state law (571 La CC) law the usufructuary is responsible for the costs of ordinary 
maintenance and repairs. 
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adjusting the rights of usufruct. Particularly, the 1976 and 2010 revisions have aimed 
to expand the rights of the usufructuary to “‘balance the interests of the usufructuary 
and of the bare owner and to reach desirable solutions’”.510 Since the traditional 
requirements of usufruct were inflexible, the Legislature codified the usufructuary’ s 
power to dispose of nonconsumables, for example vehicles and other property subject 
to usufruct that are gradually and to a large extent impaired by use.511 Moreover the 
testator could grant the power to dispose of nonconsumables to the usufructuary. In 
2010 the power to dispose was clarified by the Legislature by stating that the power to 
dispose includes the right to alienate and encumber the property and even to lease it 
beyond the duration of the usufruct.  
Finally, it might be considered whether protecting the bare owner through 
alternative measures, without strictly adhering to the preservation requirement, would 
be effective.512 
It therefore seems that there are reasons for a shift towards a more flexible 
approach to the preservation requirement in comparative law. However, there remains 
a tension between measures increasing flexibility and measures tending towards 
rigidity in all systems. The relevant question would finally be whether these reasons 
provide persuasive arguments for a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement in South African law. 
                                                          
510 AN Matasar “The Usufruct Revisions: the Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables Now Expressly 
Includes Alienation, Lease, and Encumbrance; Has the Louisiana Legislature Fundamentally Altered 
the Nature of Usufruct?” (2011-2012) 86 Tul L Rev 787-822 792. 
511 794-795. 
512 BCM Waaijer “Hoe Kan de Hoofdgerechtigde Tegen de Vructgebruiker Worden Beschermd?” (1993) 
124 WPNR 890-893 891. 




3 8 Questions for consideration in South African law 
In South African law the legislator has not utilised usufruct as a legal concept within 
the law of intestate succession to provide for the surviving spouse. In this regard the 
South African Law Commission came to the conclusion in 1985 that it seldom happens 
that the surviving spouse is left destitute and that usufruct is not so commonly used in 
testaments as to be prescribed as a norm in intestate succession and as a measure 
to provide for the surviving spouse. 513 However, usufruct still plays a role in the testate 
law of succession to provide for the surviving spouse. Thirty years have passed since 
the report by the South African Law Commission. One could ask whether, in a context 
where blended families are becoming more prevalent, a reconsideration of usufruct 
within the context of providing for the surviving should not be investigated. 
Secondly, one could ask whether the changing nature of patrimony might be an 
argument for a more flexible approach to usufruct. It is still open to question whether 
the nature of patrimony in South Africa has changed in a way comparable to the 
change that took place in other jurisdictions. Although the usufruct of securities has 
received and is receiving attention in some of these jurisdictions, only one article on 
the subject was published in South Africa in 2006.514 With the institution of the new 
Companies Act515 reconsideration of the subject might be warranted. 
                                                          
513 South African Law Commission Verslag oor die Hersiening van die Erfreg: Intestate Erfreg (1985) 
19. 
514 E Leos “Quasi-usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 126-146. 
515 The Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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Thirdly, it remains to be seen if the distinction between usufruct and quasi-
usufruct will be abolished in South African law. This certainly can lead to a flexible 
approach to usufruct as is evident from the Dutch approach.  
Finally, pragmatic considerations might, like in other jurisdictions, prompt new 
applications of usufruct to address societal concerns. Proposals regarding the use of 
usufruct in Louisiana might provide a point of departure in this regard. Taking into 
consideration the dire need for housing, arguments have been made for expropriating 
a use right of inner-city buildings.516 
 A comparative perspective might be point of departure for the reconsideration of 
usufruct as a legal concept in South Africa and particularly whether the preservation 
requirement can be approached in a flexible way.
                                                          
516 S Viljoen “Temporary Expropriation of a Use Right as Interim Measure in the South African Housing 
Context (Part 1)” 2014 TSAR 359-376; “Temporary Expropriation of a Use Right as Interim Measure in 
the South African Housing Context (Part 2)” 2014 TSAR 520-535 and J Strydom & S Viljoen “Unlawful 
Occupation of Inner-City Buildings: A Constitutional Analysis of the Rights and Obligations Involved” 
(2014) 17 PER 1207-1261. 




POLICY AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
4 1 Introduction: Approach to theory and policy 
The question addressed in this chapter is whether persuasive policy and theoretical 
arguments exist for a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. More 
specifically: How do we deal with use conflicts and the rules governing them in a 
usufruct situation more flexibly in terms of changing circumstances and other social 
considerations? I will briefly illustrate the problem underlying this question by means 
of two cases dealing with use conflicts and the salva rei substantia requirement 
governing them. These two cases demonstrate different approaches of the court to 
use conflicts. But more importantly, they also illustrate the constraints of a legal system 
biased towards the interests of the owner and ill-disposed to accommodation of the 
interests of a non-owner in terms of solving a use conflict triggered by the salva rei 
substantia requirement.  
Olivier v Venter1 dealt with an interdict against a usufructuary exceeding his 
rights. The applicant had obtained an interdict pending action against his mother. This 
interdict restrained her as usufructuary from diminishing the capital of a sum of money 
or alienating or encumbering a bond. Both the capital and the bond were the property 
of the applicant. The applicant had proof that the respondent had drawn approximately 
one-third of the capital. He sought orders that would direct the respondent to furnish 
security for the payment of the money and the delivery of the bond and to extend the 
interim interdict until security was given. Furthermore, he sought an order to the effect 
                                                          
1 1933 EDL 206. 
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that should the security not be given within one month, the capital should be invested 
in his name instead of the respondent’s name, subject to payment of interest being 
paid to the respondent for the duration of her usufruct. Finally, he sought orders for 
the attachment of the accrued and accruing interest on the capital to pay the costs of 
the interdict proceedings and the application. The application was granted. 
The applicant alleged that the respondent had made the withdrawal despite his 
objection and that she had expressed the intention of drawing further sums. In this 
case the respondent had breached the salva rei substantia requirement by not 
maintaining the usufructuary property and by not providing security for its return. 
Although the case provides indications that there was probably an attempt on the side 
of the usufructuary to communicate her intentions and needs to the bare owner, the 
latter had the power to veto her request to dispose of the usufructuary object. The 
court did not display reluctance to extend the temporary interdict. The interdict 
effectively curtailed further impairment of the substance of the usufructuary property 
until the obligation of the provision of security was met. There is no indication whether 
there was consideration of the question of use and needs of the parties that had an 
interest in the dispute and specifically the financial position and the ability of the 
usufructuary to provide security. One might ponder whether consideration of these 
issues could have resulted in a more nuanced interdict. 
In Klopper v Van Rensburg2 the applicant initially obtained a rule nisi operating 
as a temporary interdict to restrain the respondent from selling stock and movable 
property. The applicant had an interest in the usufructuary property. The respondent 
had advertised the property for sale. The sale was scheduled for a date after the rule 
                                                          
2 1920 EDL 239.  
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nisi was obtained. At the hearing for the temporary interdict counsel for the applicant 
did not object to the tender of security as a condition to meet the case. This security, 
along with an inventory, was tendered before the sale date. It was held that although 
the applicant had grounds for his original application, he was bound to accept security 
as an offer of compromise. It was also held that the rule nisi should be discharged and 
not made absolute.  
In his judgment Gane AJ exhibits a rather sympathetic stance towards the 
usufructuary. He notes that the usufructuary had documents signed by the applicant 
indicating consent for the donation of furniture and an erf to the usufructuary’s second 
wife but that one of the claims by the applicant was for the setting aside of these 
documents as bad in law and as void on the ground of failure of consideration. This 
claim amounts to the treatment of a prima facie valid agreement as an attempt by the 
usufructuary to exercise an act of disposal which would be to the detriment of himself 
as well as the other heirs. Another point the judge takes note of is that the respondent’s 
attorneys sent a “very reasonable letter” stating that he had let the farm property in the 
joint estate and did not therefore have capacity to graze the stock, that he was old and 
had relinquished farming and hence did not have use for the farm implements and 
could not look after the stock. Furthermore, he did not intend to appropriate the money 
for his own use but intended to invest it. This letter received no reply. 
Even the court to which the original application was made, indicated that “it was 
a pity to interrupt the sale at such a propitious time as the present”3 and therefore 
suggested the tender of security to safeguard the interests of the applicant and to void 
the need for an interdict. However, this offer of security was not accepted by the 
                                                          
3 Klopper v Van Rensburg 1920 EDL 239 241. 
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applicant, resulting in further costs. In refusing the security, Gane AJ asserts, the 
applicant “recklessly incurred costs and cannot be heard to say that he was obliged to 
seek redress by way of an interdict”.4  
Gane AJ asserts that it was foolish of the applicant to object to the sale, 
especially as it was a handsome one and indeed not out of keeping with practices to 
rather secure the value of the stock instead of the stock itself. The applicant was 
nevertheless, as Gane AJ admits, within his rights in doing so.5  
It is clear from the judgment that the court, although it was bound to acknowledge 
the legal rights of the applicant, exhibited a nuanced approach to the question of 
granting an interdict and the necessity of doing so. Gane AJ highlights the behaviour 
of the respondent as reasonable, points to his needs and circumstances – including 
his age, the letting of the farm and the lack of use for the farming implements which 
renders the usufructuary property an impediment – and does not in the process negate 
the legitimate interests of the applicant. However, there is a marked disapproval of the 
applicant’s behaviour as bordering on the unreasonable and as a misuse of his 
disposition power in relation to the respondent. This case exhibits a nuanced approach 
to the remedies applicable to a salva rei substantia dispute, but nevertheless illustrates 
the constraints of a legal system prejudicial to the interests of non-owners. In order to 
deal with these constraints, use conflicts and the salva rei substantia requirement that 
governs them, we need to consider both policy and theoretical arguments for a more 
flexible approach. 
                                                          
4 242-243. 
5 241. 
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Policy analysis plays a role in the development of servitude law.6 This is evident 
from decisions such as Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another7 (Van 
der Heever) and Linvestment CC v Hammersley8 (Linvestment). In the Van der Heever 
case9 Van der Byl AJ examined the common law and concluded that the court could 
use its discretion to exempt the usufructuary from a duty originating in the salva rei 
substantia requirement. On the policy ground of fairness Van der Byl AJ exempted the 
impecunious usufructuary from the duty to provide security.  
In the Linvestment case the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right 
of way was justified by comparative, historical and policy arguments. However, both 
the comparative and historical arguments advanced in the case were problematic. In 
terms of comparative law, predominantly secondary sources were relied on, without 
providing contextual evidence justifying why and demonstrating how a flexible 
approach is utilised in foreign jurisdictions.10 The historical argument is insubstantial 
due to misplaced reliance on a draft Dutch civil code that never formed part of Roman 
Dutch law, and the dismissal of the applicable authority of Voet as well as established 
precedent in the relevant case law.11 On the other hand, Kiewitz argues with reference 
to the Linvestment decision that policy considerations provide relatively convincing 
arguments for allowing the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of 
                                                          
6 AJ van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (forthcoming 2016) ch 1 44. 
7 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T). 
8 2008 3 SA 283 (SCA). 
9 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T). 
10 L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 2, 34. 
11 2, 33. 
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way.12 In fact, as Van der Walt remarks, the Linvestment decision is in the end justified 
by policy reasons.13  
Although policy analysis plays a role in the development of servitude law, it must 
be approached with caution and at least in some instances it cannot be the only basis 
for development.14 Van der Walt points out two problems related to both economic 
analysis15 and doctrinal analysis as justification for legal development on policy 
grounds.16 Firstly, the underlying premise of both economic and doctrinal analysis is 
that the initial (or current) land distribution is just. Taking into account the history of 
unequal land distribution and unequal access to natural resources, this premise and 
consequently the suitability of economic analysis may be questioned, at least in the 
South African context.17 Secondly, neither economic analysis nor doctrinal analysis 
adequately takes account of the intricate social policy issues that may be at stake in 
servitude cases. Van der Walt points out that servitudes encompass the distribution of 
land-use rights and are linked to other attendant social issues of access to land, 
markets and capital. Furthermore, economic analysis might not offer a sufficient 
explanation for the shift from an agrarian to a mainly urban, technology-dependent 
society. Most importantly, economic analysis does not engage with the constitutional 
or democratic considerations that are pressing and inevitable in property law. Apart 
from the challenges mentioned above, a discussion of policy considerations is also 
                                                          
12 AJ van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (forthcoming 2016) ch 1 44. 
13 44. 
14 Caution against the use of policy as justification for an argument is not a new idea. Burrough J for 
example already encouraged prudence relating to this practice in 1824. See Richardson v Mellish 1824 
2 Bing 229 130 ER 294. 
15 Economic analysis is a significant form of policy inquiry. 
16 AJ van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (forthcoming 2016) ch 1 48. 
17 Ch 1 49. 
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impeded by the conceptual elusiveness of the term policy; the relatively scant material 
on policy considerations in relation to personal servitudes; the divergent perspectives 
on the proper use of policy in legal decision-making and scholarly work; and 
methodological considerations. 
Taking into consideration these inadequacies of policy analysis, this chapter 
nevertheless considers policy justifications for both a rigid and a flexible approach to 
the salva rei substantia requirement. Van Aswegen reiterates the truism that law as a 
social institution must adapt to changing circumstances, values and perceptions if it 
purports to stay valid, legitimate and effective.18 Policy plays a role in the development, 
extension and adaptation of the law and must therefore be considered.19 The core 
question addressed in this chapter is whether it would be justifiable for South African 
courts to interpret the salva rei substantia requirement flexibly on the basis of policy 
and theoretical considerations. Therefore, considering both the value and the 
problems associated with policy analysis, the discussion of policy in this chapter is 
qualified by considering the challenges that it poses. I argue that policy as a concept 
is not defined in a way that makes it useful and relevant as a research tool. In the face 
of scant material, identifying clear and strong policy arguments in favour of a flexible 
approach might prove challenging. Therefore, I utilise theory, since it underpins 
policy.20 Consequently, the larger part of this chapter explores theoretical 
considerations that might bolster an argument in favour of a flexible approach. The 
theories drawn on in this chapter generally present two fundamentally different schools 
of thought. However, as has been pointed out within the context of policy theory, there 
                                                          
18 A van Aswegen “Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict” (1993) 56 THRHR 171-195 172. 
19 173. 
20 Compare PA Sabatier “The Need for Better Theories” in PA (ed) Theories of the Policy Process 
(2007) 3-17 4-6. 
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are advantages to using multiple theories. It actively resists the assumption that a 
certain theory is the only valid option, it displays the comparative advantages of 
diverse theories in different contexts and sensitises the researcher to the “implicit 
assumptions” underlying a preferred theory.21 By drawing on explanations from both 
information and progressive theorists22 a unidimensional answer is resisted. 
Furthermore, the strengths of each school of thought might be applied to explain 
different approaches to the salva rei substantia requirement. By juxtaposing the 
different schools of thought their underlying assumptions are also exposed. 
After the initial excursion into policy considerations, I firstly examine arguments 
in favour of flexibility by proponents of information theory. In particular, I enquire 
whether Law and Economics theory with its focus on efficiency provides support for a 
more flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. As a starting point, I 
outline the Coase theorem. Subsequently, the extension of his work by Calabresi and 
Melamed in terms of their property and liability rules model is considered. A further 
development of this model by Bell and Parchomovsky concerned pliability rules. The 
question is whether especially pliability rules can provide theoretical support for a 
flexible interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement. The picture would not be 
                                                          
21 P Cairney “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: How Do We Combine the Insights of Multiple 
Theories in Public Policy Studies?” (2013) 41 The Policy Studies Journal 1-21 9, citing P Sabatier 
“Fostering the Development of Policy Theory” in P Sabatier (ed) Theories of the Policy Process (2 ed 
2007) 321-336 330. According to PA Sabatier “The Need for Better Theories” in PA (ed) Theories of 
the Policy Process (2007) 3-17 6 the consideration of different theories might ultimately prompt 
clarification of distinctive assumptions instead of implicitly harbouring a specific set,  foster the 
generation of “competing hypotheses that should lead ideally to ‘strong inference’” or to mounting 
evidence favouring certain perspectives and eventually make clear under which conditions a particular 
theory would be more useful than another. 
22 JB Baron “The Contested Commitments of Property” (2010) 61 Hastings LJ 917-968 explains and 
elaborates on this distinction by utilising the metaphors of a machine and a conversation to represent 
the contested commitments of the information theorists and progressive theorists respectively. 
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complete without recognising that the tenets of Law and Economics only 
accommodate a flexible approach to the requirement to a limited extent. Drawing on 
the work of Parisi regarding fragmentation of property rights and Mackaay on 
opportunism, I consider how these theories conversely reinforce a more rigid approach 
to the salva rei substantia requirement. 
Moving to the proponents of Progressive Property theory, I reflect on the work of 
Alexander regarding governance property and Dyal-Chand on sharing in property. In 
contrast to the information theorists, both point out that the traditional dominant 
paradigm of ownership with its focus on exclusion in property law results in a 
perception that sharing is a peripheral phenomenon in property law. Actually, as their 
examples show, sharing is prevalent in property institutions. The question is how the 
theories of these Progressive theorists can be applied to usufruct, particularly if their 
work provides arguments in favour of a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement. 
It needs to be reiterated that policy and theoretical considerations cannot serve 
as a standalone justification for either a rigid or a flexible approach to the salva rei 
substantia requirement in a constitutional dispensation like South Africa. Therefore, 
the arguments in this chapter cannot be considered in isolation or be seen as 
conclusive evidence that irrefutably justifies either point of view. 
 
4 2 Challenges in relying on policy considerations 
4 2 1 Introduction 
In a comment on Dworkin’s distinction between arguments of principle and arguments 
of policy, Neil MacCormick asserted: “‘Policy’ has become a hideously inexact word in 
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legal discourse”.23 This point of criticism is probably also true of South African legal 
discourse.24 Therefore, this chapter on theoretical and policy considerations should be 
introduced with a demarcation of the concept of policy as it pertains to private law. The 
conceptual elusiveness of the term “policy” is intensified because it is not readily seen 
as a dominant consideration in all fields of law.25 Accordingly, the conceptual grafting 
of policy analysis onto areas of law that are not usually integrated in policy discourse 
proves to be challenging. Within the context of property law, usufruct as an example 
of a personal servitude is not often the topic of policy-related discussions. 
Furthermore, the salva rei substantia requirement is susceptible to a similar diagnosis: 
it is not usually associated with public policy analysis.26 Therefore, defining public 
policy for purposes of investigating policy considerations relevant to the salva rei 
substantia requirement presents a challenge.  
Case law in fields of law other than property reveals broad and sweeping 
definitions of policy that attempt to pin down the concept and courts admit the difficulty 
of definition.27 Affirming this, Hoexter in an article on judicial policy in the South African 
                                                          
23 N MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 263. 
24 See in this regard A van Aswegen “Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict” (1993) 56 THRHR 
171-195 173; C Hoexter “Judicial Policy in South Africa” (1986) 103 SALJ 436-449 441. 
25 See for example MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 
26 Quinnipiac Prob LJ 125-155 125, who highlights constitutional law as a field where policy is 
examined, but notes that  the converse is true for estate planning. A van Aswegen “Policy 
Considerations in the Law of Delict” (1993) 56 THRHR 171-195 171, 172 points out the important role 
of policy in the law of delict. 
26 Two articles that do touch on policy considerations are GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” 
(1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 and CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-
20. 
27 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 145, citing Tunstall v Wells 50 Cal Rptr 3d 468 (Cal Ct App 2006) 474 (internal citations 
omitted): “In sum, ‘it is generally agreed that ‘public policy’ as a concept is notoriously resistant to 
precise definition”. See also AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 303. 
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context typifies policy as “a very slippery concept” with a shifting and context-
dependent meaning.28 Furthermore, academics point to the uncertain and changing 
nature of public policy.29 This unstable character of policy can be ascribed to evolving 
“economic needs, social customs, and moral aspirations”.30  
Taking into account the unstable and slippery nature of policy, the two South 
African authors Hoexter31 and Van Aswegen32 revert to a definition by Bell, who 
defines policy as “substantive justifications to which judges appeal when the standards 
and rules of the legal system do not provide a clear resolution of a dispute”.33 These 
justifications are contrasted with “authoritative reasons for a decision, which are the 
clear legal rules and principles established by statute or precedent”.34 Bell also 
                                                          
28 C Hoexter “Judicial Policy in South Africa” (1986) 103 SALJ 436-449 441.  
29 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 136 provides an example, citing a definition from Grant v Butt 17 S E 2d 689 (S C 
1941) 693, quoting Weeks v New York Life Ins Co 122 S E 586 S C 1924. GN Williams “Importance of 
Public Policy Considerations in Judicial Decision-Making” (2000) 25 International Legal Practitioner 
134-139 134 (with reference to Australian law) quotes Jordan CJ in Re Jacob Morris (deceased) (1943) 
S R NSW 352 355: “Public policy is not, however, fixed and stable. From generation to generation ideas 
change as to what is necessary or injurious, so that ‘public policy’ is a variable thing. It must fluctuate 
with the circumstance of the time … New heads of policy come into being, and old heads undergo 
modification”. 
30 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 136, citing definitions from Grant v Butt 17 S E 2d 689 S C 1941 693, quoting Weeks 
v New York Life Ins Co 122 S E 586 S C 1924; Girard Trust Co v Schmitz 20 A 2d 21 N J Ch 1941 29 
(internal citation omitted), quoting State v Bowman 170 S W 700 (Mo Ct App 1914) 701. 
31 C Hoexter “Judicial Policy in South Africa” (1986) 103 SALJ 436-449 441. 
32 A van Aswegen “Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict” (1993) 56 THRHR 171-195 173. 
33 J Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983) 22-23. The definition of AB Handler “Judging 
Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 303, 307 broadly corresponds to that of Bell since Handler 
includes utilitarian and moral considerations. He asserts that policy cannot be avoided where legal 
precepts, rules of law and principles cannot lead to the resolution of cases. Where precedent and 
authority do not provide answers, public policy will mirror the social priorities of daily life. 
34 A van Aswegen “Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict” (1993) 56 THRHR 171-195 173. 
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categorises policy considerations according to substance: they can be either ethical, 
“conforming to an ethical standard such as fairness or justice” and “may be 
consequentialist in nature” or goal-based, “advancing some social goal”.  Van 
Aswegen describes this social goal as a goal of “collective welfare, such as effective 
loss spreading or free economic competition”.35 Van Aswegen consolidates the 
highlighted traits into a working definition of policy in accordance with the general view 
in South Africa:  
“Policy considerations are substantive reasons for judgments reflecting values 
accepted by society. They consist in moral or ethical values, valuable in 
themselves, or in desirable goals of collective societal welfare, but there is no 
reason why these two types of policy consideration cannot overlap. A decision 
determined by such considerations – a policy decision – comprises a balancing of 
the various values, and is thus a value judgment by the decision-maker.”36 
This definition seems useful and compatible with the main tenets of other definitions.37 
It also emphasises that the distinction between different types of policy does not have 
                                                          
35 A van Aswegen “Policy Considerations in the Law of Delict” (1993) 56 THRHR 171-195 173-174. 
36 174. 
37 Some other definitions seem to foreground the social, collective or community dimension of policy. 
See R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 90, who defines policies as propositions describing 
goals, and arguments of policy as arguments aimed at establishing a collective goal. Policies are 
contrasted with principles which are propositions describing rights. Arguments of principle are aimed at 
establishing an individual right. N MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 262-264 
criticises Dworkin’s definition and takes as a starting point the more commonly accepted dictionary 
definition of the concept as an advantageous or expedient course of action. He defines policy “as 
denoting those courses of action adopted by courts as securing or tending to secure states of affairs 
conceived to be desirable”. Following from this definition, a policy argument “shows that to decide the 
case in this way will tend to secure a desirable state of affairs”. In contrast to Dworkin, MacCormick 
does not juxtapose policy and principle artificially. The question whether a certain policy is desirable is 
entwined with the question of principle. To prescribe a goal to be secured, is to articulate a principle or 
a judgment depending on some unstated but presupposed principle. Furthermore, for MacCormick, the 
postulated goal to be achieved by the course of action cannot per se be equated to the policy as Dworkin 
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to be clear-cut. Furthermore, it indicates a methodological approach to policy 
considerations. However, it does have certain limitations. Firstly, it was developed 
within the framework of the law of delict and not specifically with reference to property 
law. Secondly, it does not cover policy considerations gleaned from property theory, 
which does play a significant role in this chapter where theoretical, comparative and 
analogous arguments have to augment sparse case law references to policy.  
Scholars hold divergent perspectives on the proper use of policy in legal 
decision-making.38 Hence, a discussion on the use of policy in private law should 
secondly be embedded in an overview of the different positions culminating in a choice 
for either an instrumentalist or formalist view or a via media between the two 
                                                          
postulates. A Robertson “Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH 
Wu (eds) The Goals of Private Law (2009) 261-280 262-263 defines policy considerations as 
“justifications (for or against a legal rule or outcome in a particular case) that are concerned with 
community interests not related to the form of law”. Robertson qualifies his definition of policy as 
community oriented justifications relating to legal rules or outcomes in four ways. Firstly, he asserts that 
policy considerations may be either consequentialist or deontological. (Therefore he does not exclude 
the ethical dimension, but highlights the community aspect.) Secondly, the formal legal considerations 
(certainty, consistency and coherence) should be excluded from discussions of broader social or 
economic considerations. Thirdly, where policy considerations relate to community interests they must 
be distinguished from considerations of justice and fairness pertaining to litigants in a particular dispute. 
Fourthly, policy considerations do not equate to justifications for legal rules because they do not always 
operate as justifications for rules, nor are they the only justification for rules. MD Begleiter “Taming the 
‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac Prob LJ 125-155 136-141 
attempts to demarcate the boundaries of public policy under the common law with reference to the 
sources of public policy, namely the Constitution, statutes, judicial decisions and the “customs and 
connections of the people … their clear consciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently 
just and right between man and man”. He focuses on the latter: the prevalent conceptions of the 
community, as it appears in the Restatement (Second) of Trust. Begleiter prefers it to the conception of 
public policy in the Restatement (Third) of Trust. 
38 These views can be classified as formalist or instrumentalist. See n 27 for definitions. 
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perspectives.39 A related issue is that a significant proportion of the material is 
generated by writers with a formalist stance or who rely on sources written by 
formalists, which leads to a theoretical bias.40 A further distinction should be drawn 
between perspectives on the use of policy arguments in legal decision-making and the 
role of policy arguments in scholarly arguments. Most of the literature on policy 
analysis in private law pertains to legal decision-making and not to scholarly analysis 
per se.41  
Thirdly, a discussion on policy should also be set within a framework of 
methodological considerations. Here methodological considerations pertaining to 
judicial decision-making should also be distinguished from methodological issues 
regarding scholarly work. 
Robertson42 notes that the question whether policy should play a role in private 
law scholarship relates to whether a formalist or an instrumentalist view is held. 
Formalists do not believe that private law can have goals and therefore there is no 
                                                          
39 A formalist view would not endorse the use of policy considerations whereas an instrumentalist view 
would subscribe to the use of private law as a tool of public policy. See A Robertson “Constraints on 
Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds) The Goals of Private Law 
(2009) 261-280 261, who proposes that a via media between formalist and instrumentalist perspectives 
is acceptable. 
40 See for example A Robertson “Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson 
& TH Wu (eds) The Goals of Private Law (2009) 261-280 and N MacCormick Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Theory (1978) 259-264. Robertson, although advocating a via media between instrumentalist and 
formalist approaches, frequently refers to the work of Weinrib, an academic with a strong formalist bias, 
judging from his work. See for example EJ Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (1995) with its strong 
pronouncements against functionalism. 
41 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 and AJ 
van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (forthcoming 2016) ch 1 44-50 might be starting points for a 
discussion on the proper use of policy argument in scholarly literature regarding servitude law. 
42 A Robertson “Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds) 
The Goals of Private Law (2009) 261-280 261-268. 
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legitimate role for policy considerations in court decisions or the development of rules. 
Conversely, instrumentalists deem private law a tool in the service of public policy. 
However, from both perspectives policy considerations guiding judgements are used 
without constraint. Judges utilising public policy take on the role of legislators in 
choosing between various legal answers to particular problems. The unfettered use of 
policy is embraced by instrumentalists, while formalists reject it. Against this 
background, Robertson attempts to demarcate the constraints on the utilisation of 
policy considerations and to trace the contours of a via media between the two 
theoretical approaches.43 
Therefore, the function of courts is not to declare policy but to decide whether a 
statute articulates policy and to determine the content of the policy accordingly.44 
However, this is done cautiously in order to avoid inferring broad policy where the 
statute does not justify such an interpretation. In the absence of statutes, the courts 
may develop policy more liberally, but courts should do so “with great care and due 
deference to the judgment of the legislative branch”.45 Policy does not focus on “the 
litigants’ purely personal or proprietary interests” or turn on “a particular court’s sense 
of fairness”, but pertains to “society at large”.46 Begleiter not only cautions courts to 
consider whether the policy is based on the “substantial belief in the community” but 
                                                          
43 A Robertson “Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds) 
The Goals of Private Law (2009) 261-280 261. 
44 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 143. 
45 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 145, citing Tunstall v Wells 50 Cal Rptr 3d 468 (Cal Ct App 2006) 474 (internal citations 
omitted). 
46 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 145, citing Tunstall v Wells 50 Cal Rptr 3d 468 (Cal Ct App 2006) 474 (internal citations 
omitted). 
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also suggests documenting factors that justify the latter assumption.47 What should be 
avoided, is “the temptation to substitute the judge’s own beliefs for the settled beliefs 
of the community”.48 
Policy particularly needs to be considered when more than the interests of the 
litigants are at stake.49 When the collective interests of the community necessitate the 
preservation of litigants’ rights, policy considerations must be taken into account. The 
remedy protecting these interests must not only vindicate the parties’ rights but also 
be a way to reach a societal goal.50 
The discussion above emphasises certain aspects that have to be taken into 
account when considering policy. Firstly, there are divergent perspectives regarding 
the nature of private law as either having no goal in itself or as a tool in the service of 
policy. This is an important consideration, since it determines whether policy is in any 
way relevant in adjudication and the development of law. Secondly, there seems to be 
different opinions as to the nature of policy. Does it denote goals, courses of action or 
justifications? In this dissertation policy will mainly refer to justifications, particularly 
because it accords with South African definitions of policy. However, Robertson’s 
qualification that policy considerations are not always the justification for legal rules, 
or the only justification for legal rules, is important. Thirdly, an indispensable element 
seems to be the concern with community interests. Fourthly, categorisation seems to 
indicate that consequentialist or utilitarian considerations can be distinguished from 
                                                          
47 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 148. 
48 MD Begleiter “Taming the ‘Unruly Horse’ of Public Policy in Wills and Trusts” (2012) 26 Quinnipiac 
Prob LJ 125-155 148. 
49 AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 307. 
50 303. 
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deontological or moral considerations. Finally, a hierarchy of sources can be 
discerned, starting with statutes as the primary source but not negating community 
conceptions as a significant contributor.  
 
4 2 2 Role and use of policy 
Public policy has in the past been hailed as “the secret root from which the law draws 
all the juices of life” and the source of “[e]very important principle which is developed 
by litigation”. 51 These quotations suggest that policy plays or should play a dominant 
role in legal development.52 Conversely, legal theorists caution against the use of 
                                                          
51 AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 304, citing OW Holmes The 
Common Law (1881) 35-36. For a more recent expression of a similar sentiment, see GN Williams 
“Importance of Public Policy Considerations in Judicial Decision-Making” (2000) 25 International Legal 
Practitioner 134-139 139: “[T]he notion of public policy is the backbone of the common law, it provides 
its strength and its mobility”. 
52 Apart from OW Holmes, mentioned by Handler and Roederer, the latter also mentions B Cardozo as 
defending the view that judges may legislate “within the gaps of the law” by referring to policy. See CJ 
Roederer “Third Path Theorists: Between Positivism and Natural Law, Fuller and Dworkin” in CJ 
Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 84-116 99 and fn 58. K Greenawalt “Policy, 
Rights and Judicial Decision” (1977) 11 Georgia LR 991-1053 991 mentions the analytical positivist 
Hart along with the legal realists and writers within the tradition of sociological jurisprudence as 
exponents of the assumption that judges may exercise “‘legislative discretion’” where the law as it exists 
does not provide answers to legal questions. Greenawalt associates with this stream through his 
criticism of Dworkin’s stance against judges relying on policy arguments.  
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public policy as the dominant consideration in judicial decision-making 53 or discourage 
the use of policy entirely.54 
In a recent South African article by Van der Walt referring to the role of policy in 
the development of the common law, it is suggested that policy, along with other 
considerations, only comes into play when “traditional historical or doctrinal analysis 
does not provide satisfactory answers”.55 Along with the use of comparative sources, 
“economic and other policy considerations” may suggest “alternative possibilities”. 
Van der Walt does not discuss policy as a source “of authority or inspiration” but 
cautions firstly, that policy considerations, as is the case for “historical authorities, 
foreign law […] and normative principles” will only justify the development of the 
common law where proper and thorough analysis has been conducted subject “to its 
own requirements and traditions”. The article does not elaborate on the requirements 
and traditions associated with policy analysis in South African legal writing. Even 
                                                          
53 In Richardson v Mellish 1824 2 Bing 229; 130 ER 294 Burrough J cautioned against leaning too 
strongly on policy in argument when he made the well-known pronouncement: “[Policy] is a very unruly 
horse, and once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the 
sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail”. For a cautionary approach in post-
constitutional South African law see AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” 
(2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 736; AJ van der Walt The Law of Servitudes (forthcoming) ch 1 48-50. 
54 AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 304 refers to Ronald Dworkin. 
According to CJ Roederer “Third Path Theorists: Between Positivism and Natural Law, Fuller and 
Dworkin” in CJ Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 84-116 98 Dworkin ties the 
integrity of the law to the similar treatment of like cases based on principle and not on “whim, policy, or 
expediency”. K Greenawalt “Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision” (1977) 11 Georgia LR 991-1053 992 
notes Dworkin’s insistence that existing legal materials are sufficient to provide answers to legal 
questions and that even hard cases should be approached in terms of principle. A Robertson 
“Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds) The Goals of 
Private Law (2009) 261-280 261 also mentions other proponents questioning the justification of 
decisions based on policy considerations, including “scholars advocating a strict corrective justice or 
rights-based approach” for example EJ Weinrib, A Beever, R Stevens within the context of tort law. 
55 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 736. 
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assuming that policy analysis has been done properly, “such analysis (and hence the 
grounds that we put forward for a particular development of the common law) will often 
remain controversial”. Only rarely can this analysis result in a “simple, uncontroversial 
solution […] to any given dispute”. This caveat against using policy analysis as 
justification for common law development should be duly noted. Fairly recent 
academic theses on servitude law, including those of Kiewitz56 and Raphulu,57 relied 
on arguments partly based on policy analysis but not as the first and only 
consideration. 
Whereas Van der Walt endorses the use of policy as a guide to “alternative 
possibilities”, Dworkin argues that “well-established legal rules” should be the 
foundation for decisions, followed by principle, but does not subscribe to the use of 
policy.58 Principles (contrary to rules) refer to general (often implicit) standards which 
underpin the various legal rules. They provide “weight or gravitational pull” and can 
thus compete because they do not apply in an “all-or-nothing way” but may be 
balanced and given precedence in specific contexts.59 Principles are prompted by the 
“requirements of justice, fairness, or some other dimension of morality” and give rise 
to the rights of litigants.60 Dworkin views policy as the prerogative of the legislator and 
defines it as “‘that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an 
                                                          
56 See L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 109-150. Law and Economics analysis forms a substantial part of Kiewitz’s 
chapter on policy analysis. 
57 See NT Raphulu Right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis (2013) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University § 3 3 79-84 and § 3 4 92-98 who distinguishes between “public policy” and “law 
and economics” considerations.  
58 AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 304. 
59 CJ Roederer “Third Path Theorists: Between Positivism and Natural Law, Fuller and Dworkin” in CJ 
Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 84-116 96-97. 
60 100. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
233 
 
improvement in some economic, political or social feature of the community’”. The use 
of policy is discouraged because it is viewed as “utilitarian-like calculation pitting the 
damage to some litigant’s financial position against the gains to society generally”.61 
This aversion to utilitarian considerations and policy as justification for judicial 
decisions reveal a reductionist view of policy, which conceptually eludes demarcation 
and is often characterized broadly.62 
 
4 2 3 Methodological considerations 
According to Handler, courts are faced with a challenge because they must safeguard 
a sufficient and fully informed basis for the incorporation of policy.63 This requires an 
identification and explanation of the application of public policy. He also points out that 
knowledge must be used responsibly, in a trustworthy and understandable manner. 
Handler breaks down the policy analysis process into normative steps. Firstly, 
courts must use appropriate means to determine public policy.64 Competing policies 
must be rationally compared and weighed. Therefore courts must determine the 
acceptable level of certainty needed before information that buttresses policies may 
be incorporated in its jurisprudence. When faced with an information shortfall, where 
even knowledgeable experts cannot meet the need, courts must ensure that the 
demand is dealt with. The level of certainty may then even be adjusted, taking into 
consideration “the consequences in failing to recognize and accept apparent, though 
                                                          
61 AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 304. 
62 For a similar view of the role of policy by a South African author, see the discussion of Fagan’s 
inaugural lecture in AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 92-97. 
63 AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 308. 
64 308. 
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accepted, levels of knowledge, thereby denying redress for a perceived harm and […] 
the drawbacks inherent in resorting to less certain knowledge, thereby imposing 
liability and responsibility for the harm on a potentially or theoretically innocent party”.65 
The individual and social consequences of each alternative are context-dependent 
and variable. The issues that have to be determined influence the different standards 
of acceptable knowledge as basis for the justification of a decision. The acceptable 
level of reliable knowledge mirrors the demarcation of legal issues, the legal questions 
and the court’s interpretation as well as the understanding of public policy. Secondly, 
courts should also have “comprehensive, straightforward and understandable” 
explanations so that the decision is not treated in a dismissive manner but is regarded 
as strong and valid.66 MacCormick’s levels of argument over issues of policy may 
inform the process of weighing and comparing that Handler refers to. According to 
MacCormick, arguments for and against a particular policy can be conducted on 
different levels:  
“[M]eans-effectiveness arguments – will doing x in this context actually achieve 
y?, means-desirability arguments – regardless of efficacity is it on other grounds 
undesirable to do x, or undesirable to use x as a means to y, and goal-desirability 
arguments – is it desirable to procure y by any means?” 67 
In contrast to Handler, Robertson does not so much provide a normative framework 
for the use of policy in judicial decisions, but discusses constraints on the use of policy. 
Firstly, the use of policy in case law is constrained by broader institutional 
                                                          
65 AB Handler “Judging Public Policy” (2000) 31 Rutgers LJ 301-324 308. 
66 309. 
67 N MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 262. 
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considerations.68 Secondly, conventional techniques of legal reasoning such as the 
doctrine of precedent also act as constraints. Thirdly, the formal legal aim of 
“consistency between related principles and related bodies of law” also constrains 
courts in their decision-making. Fourthly, the use of policy is constrained by the need 
to do justice to the parties to litigation. Every plaintiff’s entitlement corresponds to an 
obligation or liability of the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff can only receive a 
remedy if liability is attributed to the defendant, and the latter can only be relieved from 
liability if the plaintiff is denied. This bipolar structure of private law constrains the use 
of policy in private law. Robertson notes that the strength of the “bipolarity constraint” 
must be determined: 
“How are judges constrained in private law decision-making by the correlativity 
between right and obligation, and the consequent need to reconcile the pursuit of 
public goals with the need to do justice to individual plaintiffs and defendants?” 69 
The level of constraint depends on whether an instrumentalist or a formalist stance is 
taken. Instrumentalists do not consider the need to do justice to both parties, but focus 
on the “goal of producing socially desirable outcomes”.70 Formalists argue that 
                                                          
68 A Robertson “Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds) 
The Goals of Private Law (2009) 261-280 268-269 explains that reasons for judgments must be 
disclosed publicly and therefore are open to peer scrutiny. Where unorthodox justifications can hence 
be challenged and a judge’s reputation is open to criticism, self-constraint is enforced. Furthermore, as 
A Robertson “Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds) 
The Goals of Private Law (2009) 261-280 269 citing Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey 1970 125 CLR (High 
Court of Australia) 396 notes, appellate courts develop legal principles through collective judicial input 
and are influenced by “‘analogies in other courts […] persuasive precedents as well as authoritative 
pronouncements’”. Policing by textbooks and scholarly literature concerning consistency, coherence 
and doctrinal stability as well as scrutiny and criticism of assumptions regarding the “potential social 
and economic consequences of particular legal rules” also contribute to institutional constraints. 
69 272. 
70 272-273. 
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reasons for a right and a corresponding liability should be found in the interactions 
between the litigants and accordingly the reasons for the defendant’s obligation should 
correlate with the reasons for the plaintiff’s entitlement. Between these two extremes, 
Robertson notes, a middle ground exists. Robertson refers to the work of Dagan:71 For 
Dagan the fact that it is “socially desirable for a class of people that includes the 
defendant to bear a responsibility to a class of people that includes the plaintiff” is not 
sufficient.72 The constraint of the bipolar structure lies in “the requirement of reconciling 
the promotion of community interests with the need to do justice as between individual 
parties”. Robertson characterises the bipolarity constraint in terms of three questions: 
“First, can an obligation be imposed on a defendant purely on the basis of 
community welfare concerns? Secondly, can the extent of the defendant’s 
secondary or remedial obligation be determined exclusively by community welfare 
concerns? Thirdly, can a right that might otherwise be recognised be denied solely 
on the basis of community welfare concerns?” 
This section highlights the challenges inherent in a discussion on policy considerations 
and in adjudication involving policy arguments. Courts need to assess their 
methodology for incorporating policy as argument in a responsible manner. Apart from 
developing a normative framework for decisions, certain constraints also need to be 
taken into account, namely broader institutional considerations, conventional 
techniques of legal reasoning, consistency and justice considerations.  
 
                                                          
71 See H Dagan “The Limited Autonomy of Private Law” (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 809-833 813-818. 
72 A Robertson “Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law” in A Robertson & TH Wu (eds) 
The Goals of Private Law (2009) 261-280 273-274. 
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4 3 Theoretical arguments 
4 3 1 Introduction 
Explicit and detailed reference to policy in case law concerning the salva rei substantia 
requirement is scarce. What could be gathered from chapter two and three is that the 
alimentary function of usufruct, the changed content of patrimony and the 
considerations of heirs, especially the best interests of minors, seem to be important 
policy considerations. Of these the alimentary function, the changed content of 
patrimony and in very limited circumstances the best interest of minors can be 
construed as policy arguments in favour of flexibility. However, taking into account the 
dearth of material, it needs to be supplemented and supported by a discussion of 
theoretical arguments in favour of flexibility that underpin policy. 
Theoretical arguments in favour of a flexible approach can be constructed from 
two very different current schools of property theory. In the following sections I follow 
the recent distinction between information theorists and Progressive Property 
theorists. The former work within the efficiency paradigm of Law and Economics and 
focus on exclusion, while the latter argue against exclusion as the main tenet of 
property law. Instead, Progressive Property theorists argue that sharing is a much 
more prevalent form of property than is often recognised and that consequently, 
governance and enforcement mechanisms need to reflect and accommodate this 
reality by not merely prioritising the interests of owners but also considering the 
interests of non-owners. 
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4 3 2 Information theorists: Law and Economics 
According to Schäfer and Ott a society meets the efficiency standard when “under the 
given endowments it is no longer possible to improve the welfare of any individual and 
at the same time no individual has been made worse off”.73 To achieve an efficient 
allocation of resources, the creation and protection of rights that encourage exchange 
and investment is necessary.74 The allocation of resources may be affected by the 
rules that exist for enforcing property rights.75 The rules determine how property rights 
can be transferred and indicate the remedies for infringements. According to Mackaay, 
Law and Economics theory provides a tool to assess legal rules in relation to their 
“expected social effects as opposed to their justice or fairness qualities”.76 It is 
important to evaluate legal rules because they affect the costs and benefits involved 
in particular courses of action and therefore have an impact on whether certain actions 
are considered more attractive and viable than others. Law and Economics analysis 
can be conducted on three levels. Firstly, Law and Economics clearly expresses the 
main foreseeable consequences that a change in legal rules might have, specifically 
relating to how people may adapt their behaviour as a response to the change. 
Secondly, economic analysis of law sets out the rationale for existing rules. Finally, it 
acts as a normative agent because it probes which rules “we ought to have” and 
gauges “whether existing rules are desirable or wise”.  
This section addresses the selection of an appropriate rule from a Law and 
Economics point of view that will result in an efficient outcome for both the bare owner 
                                                          
73 H Schäfer & C Ott The Economic Analysis of Civil Law 3-13 8. 
74 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 at 246. 
75 TJ Miceli The Economic Approach to Law (2004) 176. 
76 E Mackaay Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems (2013) 6. 
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and the usufructuary when the salva rei substantia requirement is applied. Building on 
the work of Coase, I consider how the property and liability rule paradigm developed 
by Calabresi and Melamed can be applied to the requirement. Subsequently, I rely on 
Bell and Parchomovsky’s pliability rules paradigm,77 which argues for even more 
flexibility by expanding on the work done by Calabresi and Melamed. I propose that 
these Law and Economics models, considered progressively, allow for a more flexible 
approach to property to enhance efficiency and that this argument supports a flexible 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. 
 
4 3 2 1 Coase Theorem 
Coase considered efficiency in situations involving conflicting property rights.78 He 
argued that parties will bargain to change the initial allocation of property rights.79 An 
efficient outcome will result irrespective of which party originally acquired the property 
                                                          
77 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79. 
78 RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44 1-2, 27, 42-43 specifically dealt 
with the problem in the context of actions inducing harmful effects and the question of which parties 
should bear the costs. He argued that the problem had a reciprocal nature and that the object of such 
an inquiry should be to “avoid the most serious harm”. His article was a response to the work of AC 
Pigou The Economics of Welfare (4 ed 1932) and his exponents who argued that the liability should 
only be allocated to the harm-inducing agent and therefore the focus is on measures of restraint. Coase 
argued for a change in approach in the sense that the focus should not be on removing harm (“particular 
deficiencies”) from the system, but on reducing the cost of the harm. In this sense Coase already 
proposes a more flexible approach than Pigou.  
79 See RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44 15 “It is always possible to 
modify by transactions on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights.”  
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right, on condition that the transaction costs80 associated with bargaining are zero.81 
However, when transaction costs play a role, rearrangement of the initial allocation of 
rights will only take place if such a rearrangement would result in an increase in the 
value of production that exceeds the costs involved in attaining the rearrangement.82 
Should the increase in value production be less than the costs involved, a possible or 
actual injunction or the liability to pay damages may cause the relevant party to not 
initiate or disconitinue an activity which would have taken place in a situation where 
transactions costs are zero. Consequently, where transaction costs are taken into 
account, the initial allocation of legal rights matter, since it affects the efficiency with 
which the economic system operates. A specific allocation of rights by the legal system 
may bar the option of reaching an efficient or optimal result since the costs of reaching 
the result through the modification and combination of rights by means of the market 
would be too high.  
Where usufruct is concerned, the two bargaining parties would be the 
usufructuary and the bare owner. When transaction costs are zero, they might bargain 
for a more flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement to reach an optimal 
                                                          
80 RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44 15 explained transaction costs in 
the following way: “In order to carry out a market  transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that 
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to 
make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often 
extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out 
in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost”. However as Coase acknowledged, 
transaction costs are seldom zero. 
81 See RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44 10: “With costless market 
transactions, the decision of the courts concerning liability for damage would be without effect on the 
allocation of resources” and 15: “[I]f such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of 
rights will always take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production”. 
82 15-16. 
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arrangement of rights, or more accurately an optimal distribution of the entitlements to 
dispose, control and manage the usufructuary property. However, where market 
transactions are not costless, this optimal arrangement might not occur where the 
usufructuary is faced with a threatened injunction or liability for damages. Coase 
argues that the availability of “an alternative form of economic organisation” that is 
geared to obtain an optimal result at less cost83 than would be the case if the market 
is involved, could act as a measure to raise the value of production. Another alternative 
might be government regulation by administrative decisions, but this solution might not 
necessarily be less expensive or effective and has been assessed overoptimistically 
by economists and policy-makers. Coase is therefore in favour of curtailing 
government regulation.84 Since both these alternatives may not have an optimal 
outcome, it is important that the courts must understand the economic repercussions 
of the initial allocation of property rights and take into account the consequences in 
their decisions. In this way they can reduce the need for market transactions to change 
the allocation of rights and the associated transaction costs. Courts do seem to 
acknowledge the economic problems involved in conflicting property rights when they 
refer to criteria of reasonableness or accepted use.85 Within the context of usufruct, 
the criteria that Coase mentions as evidence that a court is taking into account the 
economic consequences of the allocation of rights, are already integrated into the 
principles governing the relationship between the usufructuary and the bare owner. In 
this sense the common law may already to a limited extent pre-empt considerations 
                                                          
83 RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44 16-17 states that less costs can 
be achieved by substituting a market transaction for an administrative decision, although administrative 
costs may not necessarily be less than the costs of a market transaction. 
84 17-18. 
85 22. 
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of economic consequences in legal disputes. However, this statement would have to 
be qualified since these principles and their specific applications in for example the 
salva rei substantia requirement do not only embody economic considerations. Given 
the alternatives which Coase mentions, one could ask which options are open to the 
bare owner and the usufructuary in a situation where transaction costs have to be 
taken into account and an optimal arrangement would not result from applying the 
property rules as they currently stand. Government regulation might be an option, but 
given the highly context-sensitive nature of the problem of flexibility, this would not 
necessarily result in an optimal arrangement. The onus would most likely fall on courts. 
They have to take into account whether their decisions bring about the optimal 
allocation of entitlements. Of course courts are currently restrained in the solutions 
they can provide, as was evident from the case law discussed in the introduction to 
this chapter and as will be evident from the discussion of remedies in Dyal-Chand’s 
work below. The Coase theorem opens up the possibility of allocating costs not only 
to the harm-inducing agent but to the party to whom it would cause the least costs, 
since a property conflict is seen as reciprocal. Furthermore, his theory opens up the 
possibility of factoring in costs rather than merely applying property rules mechanically 
and in this sense does to a limited extent argue for flexibility in the service of economic 
efficiency.  
Bell and Parchomovsky point out the gaps in Coase’s theorem and show how 
they were addressed by Calabresi and Melamed.86 Although Coase was in favour of 
the courts assigning property rights in such a way that efficiency was maximised, he 
                                                          
86 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79 5 10-11. See further JA 
Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 9-11. 
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did not give guidelines to the courts in this regard. These guidelines are especially 
necessary to curb the court’s discretion. Furthermore, his analysis did not clearly 
indicate the function of legal norms in promoting efficiency or signal how entitlements 
should be protected by the legal system once they were allocated. These questions 
were subsequently addressed by Calabresi and Melamed. 
 
4 3 2 2 Calabresi and Melamed’s property and liability rule paradigm 
Micelli asserts that, apart from the Coase theorem,87 Calabresi and Melamed’s 
proposition88 building on the work of Coase89 and guiding the choice between property 
and liability rules, established “the core of the economic theory of property law”.90 
Lovett91 summarises the importance of their contribution by referring to the way it firstly 
enabled legal scholars to schematise “‘a pattern of entitlement enforcement’” 
vindicating the prevailing party in a property dispute by either a property or a liability 
rule. This pattern applies irrespective of who wins and reveals a “‘bilateral symmetry’”. 
Calabresi and Melamed’s work also led to a normative inquiry into the selection of 
property or liability rules, along with their benefits and risks, by courts and policy 
makers.  
                                                          
87 RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44. 
88 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128. 
89 RH Coase “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 J L & Econ 1-44. See s 3 3 2 1 above. 
90 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 249. 
91 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 9. 
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Calabresi and Melamed investigate the rules that govern both the voluntary and 
involuntary transfer of rights.92  Apart from inalienabililty rules, which are not discussed 
here,93 they identified two types of rules for the protection of legal entitlements or 
rights, namely property and liability rules.94 Right holders may use property rules to 
protect their entitlements or rights by enjoining attempts to obtain the right or 
entitlement on unacceptable terms. They may also use liability rules by demanding 
monetary compensation when their rights or entitlements are seized. Consent 
distinguishes the two types of rules: transfer according to a property rule takes place 
when consent is required, whereas transfer by means of a liability rule takes place 
without consent.95 Although consent assures mutually beneficial and therefore efficient 
exchanges, the transaction costs of obtaining consent might be so high that otherwise 
efficient exchanges may not be completed.96 Therefore property rules might be the 
most appropriate when transaction costs are low.97 This might imply that liability rules 
should be the preferred choice when transaction costs are high, because these rules 
                                                          
92 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 1092; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar 
Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 249. 
93 See G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 1092-1093. 
94 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 1092; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar 
Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 249. 
95 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 1092, 1105-1106; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus 
(ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 249. 
96 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 1092, 1106; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The 
Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 249. 
97 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 249. 
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enable the courts to coerce exchanges when bargaining is out of the question.98 
However, the choice for liability rules in the context of high transaction costs must be 
qualified.99 Courts may not usually take account of subjective values and accordingly 
inefficient transfers may take place. Therefore, “the cost of potentially inefficient 
exchanges under liability rules needs to be weighed against the cost of forgone 
transactions under property rules”.100 
To concretise their paradigm, Calabresi and Melamed refer to a nuisance case 
where a homeowner complains about the pollution caused by a nearby cement 
factory.101 The dispute can be resolved by applying either two alternative property 
rules or two alternative liability rules. Rule one is applied when the homeowner has 
the initial entitlement to be free of pollution and as result the court enjoins the activity 
causing the emissions. A property rule is also used when rule three is applied. In this 
case the assumption is that the factory owner has the entitlement to pollute and the 
court therefore allows the continuation of the emissions, ruling that no nuisance exists. 
Conversely, liability rules may also be applied. Rule two is applied when the court 
protects the homeowner’s initial entitlement to be free from pollution by a damage 
award that compensates him for damage inflicted upon his entitlement. A rarely used 
                                                          
98 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 1092, 1110; TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The 
Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-260 249. 
99 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 249. 
100 TJ Miceli “Property” in JG Backhaus (ed) The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2005) 246-
260 249. 
101 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 1092, 1115-1116 draws this example from the work of FI 
Michelman “Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi’s Costs” (1971) 80 Yale LJ 
647-686 670; JA Lovett JA “A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 10. 
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liability rule, rule four, is utilised when the assumed entitlement to pollute can be 
bought by the homeowner “at some measure of just compensation”. 
The property and liability rules theory developed by Calabresi and Melamed has 
been applied to property law issues in the South African context with regard to 
encroachment cases102 and praedial servitudes.103 Within the context of servitude law, 
Calabresi and Melamed’s property and liability paradigm has been used as a 
framework for a deliberation on the relocation of servitudes. However, it has not been 
applied within the context of personal servitudes and specifically with reference to 
usufruct and the salva rei substantia requirement. 
The salva rei substantia requirement can be represented as a property rule that 
entitles the bare owner of the usufructuary property to receive the object of the usufruct 
without impairment of the substance on termination of the usufruct.104 According to the 
traditional common law principle, the entitlement of the bare owner will be protected 
through an interdict (a property rule correlating with rule one of Calabresi and 
Melamed’s paradigm) because failure to return the usufructuary property salva rei 
substantia or to fulfil the duties ascribed to the usufructuary originating in this 
requirement, will be an unlawful interference with the rights of the bare owner. The 
usufructuary may only deviate from this requirement by for example disposing of the 
                                                          
102 AJ van der Walt “Replacing Property Rules with Liability Rules: Encroachment by Building” (2008) 
125 SALJ 592-628. 
103 L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 108. 
104 In developing the argument regarding the salva rei substantia requirement as a property rule I rely 
on the analogous arguments in L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) 
unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 123 and JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road: Easement 
Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Conn L Rev 
1-77 24-25. 
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object of the usufruct with the consent of the bare owner. If economic efficiency is the 
object of this servitude agreement, and if the cost of bargaining with the bare owner 
and the transaction costs involved are low, it could be argued that the strict application 
of the property rule would be efficient. However, transaction costs may not be low. As 
Van der Walt argues in relation to the application of rule 1 to encroachment cases, the 
bargaining situation might not always be governed by rational negotiations.105 The 
bare owner might decide to act strategically and withhold consent for an act of 
disposition or for acts that will result in transformation unless an exorbitant price is 
paid. A point analogous to Van der Walt’s assertion about the primacy of the affected 
landowner can be made regarding the affected bare owner in a usufruct case. He is 
given the crucial choice, while the usufructuary has the option of exercising his 
usufruct in accordance with the original destination of the usufructuary property and 
with a less than efficient result, or alternatively to alienate his usufructuary interest, 
which would not be a very attractive option to buyers as it is still tied to the person of 
the usufructuary and may hence be terminated unexpectedly if the usufructuary for 
example dies. To expound this argument, the other theoretical alternatives posited by 
Calabresi and Melamed should also be developed. 
If the second rule formulated by Calabresi and Melamed is applied, the court 
finds that the salva rei substantia requirement has not been met, and applies a liability 
rule instead of insisting on the property rule. The usufructuary exceeding his 
usufructuary entitlements remains in possession of the usufructuary property but must 
pay compensation to the bare owner in accordance with an amount prescribed by the 
court or restore the substance if that is a more viable option. In this case it is significant 
                                                          
105 AJ van der Walt “Replacing Property Rules with Liability Rules: Encroachment by Building” (2008) 
125 SALJ 592-628 618-620. 
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that the usufructuary is given a choice and that the affected bare owner does not have 
the option of negotiating an alternative outcome because the compensation is set 
down by the court.  
In terms of Calabresi and Melamed’s third rule, the court is likely to find that the 
salva rei substantia requirement was not breached and that compensation is therefore 
not necessary. Similar to encroachment cases, this option should only be possible 
when the usufructuary’s “breach” is “either illusory or really insignificant”.106 This 
property rule will leave open the option of negotiating an alternative outcome, where 
the bare owner would probably buy out the usufructuary in order to prevent further 
infringement. 
If Calabresi and Melamed’s fourth rule is applied, the court would allow the 
usufructuary to continue impairing the substance of the usufructuary property. A 
liability rule acts as protection and would allow the bare owner to terminate the 
impairing of the substance by paying compensation to the usufructuary. The affected 
bare owner may choose to act, depending on whether he deems termination of the 
impairment of the substance worth the prescribed amount of damages. As Van der 
Walt remarks with reference to encroachments this might be a viable option if the bare 
owner deems the usufructuary property of a high personal value and the usufructuary 
attaches a lower value to impairing the substance.107 
                                                          
106 AJ van der Walt “Replacing Property Rules with Liability Rules: Encroachment by Building” (2008) 
125 SALJ 592-628 619. 
107 619-620. 
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Bell and Parchomovsky noted that Calabresi and Melamed’s model does not 
adequately explain the protection of legal rights in the system.108 They propose that 
contrary to the static property and liability rules Calabresi and Melamed advocated, 
dynamic pliability rules can better serve to protect property rights over time. 
 
4 3 2 3 Bell and Parchomovsky’s pliability rules 
Lovett points out a deficiency in Calabresi and Melamed’s model and in those of 
scholars rethinking their paradigm.109 According to Lovett none of the models 
acknowledges that: 
“[W]hen a person chooses to buy or acquire an easement or servitude, although 
the law often describes the right in absolute terms, the choice in some sense 
initiates a long-term relationship that is itself bounded and limited. In other words, 
by selecting a property interest that gives him less than full fee simple ownership, 
but instead the limited and quasi-possessory rights of an easement or servitude 
holder, the creator or acquirer of such an interest is not just getting a ‘thing’, but 
instead is voluntarily entering into a long-term relationship that necessarily will 
entail a degree of mutual neighborly accommodation and liability rule 
regulation”.110 
                                                          
108 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79 4-5; JA Lovett “A Bend in 
the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” 
(2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 5. 
109 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 refers to I Ayres & E Talley “Solomonic Bargaining: 
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade” (1995) 104 Yale LJ 1027-1118 1031-1033, 
1041; CM Rose “The Shadow of the Cathedral” (1999) 106 Yale LJ 2175-2200 2179 and L Kaplow & S 
Shavell “Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis” (1996) 109 Harv L Rev 713-790 
715-723. 
110 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 11-12. 
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Bell and Parchomovsky endeavour to address these relational implications in their 
pliability rules model. The relationship between the usufructuary and the bare owner 
also has the potential to be a long-term relationship that requires that the bare owner 
accommodates the usufructuary’s exercise of his powers of enjoyment and use. 
Therefore, the pliability rules model might also provide a theoretical point of departure 
to conceptualise the relational implications of the relationship between the usufructuary 
and the bare owner. 
In contrast to Calabresi and Melamed, Bell and Parchomovsky deny that decision 
makers are only presented with the option of a choice between property rules and 
liability rules.111 Instead, they propose that property and liability rules are combined in 
certain legal structures into what they term “pliability rules”, dynamic and contingent 
means of protecting entitlements. These rules initially provide for either a property or 
liability rule but the initial rule is altered when a relevant condition changes and the 
circumstances prescribes a different rule. 
A related shortcoming of Calabresi and Melamed’s paradigm is that it reduces 
the choice of a remedy to a one-time decision which cannot be reconsidered over time 
or as circumstances between the parties change.112 Bell and Parchomovsky seek to 
address changed circumstances with their pliabililty rule model.113 According to Bell 
                                                          
111 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79 4-5; JA Lovett “A Bend in 
the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” 
(2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 5. 
112 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79 7; R Dyal-Chand “Sharing 
the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Conn LR 647-723 664. 
113 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Conn L Rev 647-723 664. 
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and Parchomovsky, pliability rules can be understood as amalgamated rules 
combining property and liability rules in various combinations.114 
Lovett states that Bell and Parchomovsky justify their model by asserting that 
pliability rules enable rule makers to deal with changed circumstances and to absorb 
them into a legal rule by pinpointing the change as the trigger-shifting protection 
modes.115 In effect, Bell and Parchomovsky’s model creates what Dyal-Chand terms a 
“glider switch” allowing for transitions from injunctions to damages or vice versa.116 In 
this way policy makers sidestep the snares of static property or liability rule regimes.117 
Property rules tend to lead to anti-competitive holdout situations and liability rules 
discourage investment and planning. In contrast, pliability rules might function as an 
incentive to entitlement holders to evade the unwanted change in circumstances. 
Changed circumstances may end in the switch to a different entitlement protection 
phase in cases where the triggering event can be impacted by the behaviour of the 
original entitlement holder. In comparison with a model of inflexible property and 
liability rules, pliability rules can provide an alternative to policy makers attempting to 
balance efficiency and justice. 
                                                          
114 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79 26. 
115 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 18. 
116 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Conn L Rev 647-723 665. Bell and Parchomovsky 
were not the sole creators of “glider-switches” as Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Conn 
L Rev 647-723 665 (particularly footnote 94) notes. See I Ayres & E Talley “Solomonic Bargaining: 
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade” (1995) 104 Yale LJ 1027-1118 for an example 
of another “glider switch”, namely temporal division of property.  
117 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 18-19. 
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Conceptually, the triggering event is preceded and followed on either side by a 
liabililty or a property rule that provides protection.118 Triggering devices can be brought 
about by the passage of time, changed circumstances, scale or nature of use, or a 
combination of these aspects. Time triggers mark a period of specific protection 
followed by a change of the protection regime. Where changed circumstances act as 
trigger, market power, carelessness and the emergence of a higher value use may be 
considered. In instances where magnitude of use determines the trigger, ordinary 
protection can be set aside if low magnitudes are involved. Nature of use, or to put it 
differently, the behaviour of the initial entitlement holder, may also be correlated with 
trigger events. Pliability rules may incentivise the entitlement holder to practice self-
regulation or to act according to socially desirable standards. 
Bell and Parchomovsky also suggest the circumstances in which their model 
would be beneficial.119 The conditions they state are contexts where policy makers 
foresee circumstances that might change to a large extent; situations where 
contending interests need to be accommodated in one rule; and cases where the 
inherent limitations of property and liability rules should be surmounted. In these 
conditions the application of a pliability rule enables planning by the entitlement holder 
and bargaining with potential acquirers. 
A change in circumstances may require a modification of the initial protection 
mechanism so that the legal rule corresponds to reality.120 Since pliability rules are 
flexible they may enable policy makers to accommodate changed circumstances and 
                                                          
118 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79 65-68. 
119 66. 
120 References to A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability Rules” (2002) 101 Mich L Rev 1-79 67-69 unless 
stated otherwise. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
253 
 
absorb them into the legal rule by pinpointing change as the trigger-shifting protection 
modes. In contrast, neither property nor liability rule protection can adjust to changed 
circumstances. In the case of uniform property rule protection, the owner’s right to 
exclude and to withhold consent regarding acts of disposition is preserved. Although 
uniform liability rules facilitate non-consensual uses, they undermine the owner’s 
incentive to develop his property. Consequently, changed circumstances lead to 
efficiency loss where parties may only resort to property and liability rule protection. 
Pliability rules are able to preserve the efficiency advantages related to both rules even 
in changed circumstances. Furthermore, pliability rules also facilitate the balancing of 
incompatible interests, for example efficiency and justice. Finally, pliability rules may 
overcome the inherent limitations of property or liability rule protection. Where property 
rules may grant exclusion, they may allow owners to invest optimally in their property. 
At the same time, inefficiencies may result when property rule protection resulting in 
monopolies encourages underproduction, supra-competitive pricing and a deadweight 
loss.  
Within the context of servitude law, these conditions for the application of pliability 
rules also exist.121 The point of departure in the law of usufruct is that the bare owner 
is protected by the salva rei substantia requirement. The usufructuary must return the 
usufructuary property without impairment of the substance. However, changed 
circumstances may well indicate that a bare owner, protected by the salva rei 
substantia requirement, ought to allow the usufructuary to exercise his usufruct outside 
the bounds of the destination set apart for the usufructuary property. There might also 
be a need for balancing of the efficiency arguments for allowing a new use of the 
                                                          
121 See for example JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 5-6. 
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usufructuary object and the concerns of justice relating to the bare owner and his 
legitimate expectations about the exercise of the usufruct as stipulated by the common 
law. Pliability rules might also overcome the inherent limitations of applying only 
property or liability protection by incentivising both parties with the possibility of a 
changed property rule protection regime. 
Lovett endeavours to apply Bell and Parchomovsky’s pliability paradigm within 
the context of servitudes, particularly to the problem of the unilateral relocation of a 
specified servitude of right of way.122  Classic pliability rules apply when the protection 
awarded to an entitlement changes from property rule protection to liability rule 
protection. Classic pliability rules can accommodate situations where default property 
rule protection becomes inefficient or unfair. The baseline protection in terms of classic 
pliability rules involves property rules. The property rules promote efficient allocation 
of resources. They facilitate the creation of in rem rights in assets and thereby allow 
owners to invest optimally in the item’s use. This in rem protection involves low costs 
where the extrinsic costs are low, since the object will still be acquired by the highest 
value user. Property rights also bring down transaction costs and enable exchange by 
lowering the cost of defining ownership and usage rights. Moreover, the benefit of 
baseline property rule protection is maintained because the triggering event for 
transforming property into liability rules is demarcated by classic property rules. They 
                                                          
122 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 5-6 typifies the flexible approach to the unilateral 
relocation of a specified servitude of right of way as a classic pliability rule. Due to the length of this 
chapter and the specific relevance of the classic pliability rules, the other five pliability rule types are not 
discussed here. They are zero order pliability rules, simultaneous pliability rules, loperty rules, title 
shifting pliability rules and multiple stage pliability rules. See L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified 
Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 132 n 198. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
255 
 
also provide the flexibility to adapt to changes. The baseline property rule delineates a 
triggering event signalling the shift from property rules to liability rules. 
The flexible interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement can probably 
also be typified as a classic property rule.123 The relevant entitlement protected by a 
property rule is the right of the owner to receive the usufructuary property without 
impairment of the substance on termination of the usufruct. This right is protected by 
the salva rei substantia requirement that functions as a property rule. If a triggering 
event such as changed circumstances or even a passage of time occurs and the rule 
is interpreted flexibly, the classic property rule protection in the form of a declaratory 
order attended by an interdict may be suspended. The property rule may accordingly 
be substituted by liability rule protection. Other variations of this shift can be achieved 
by not mandating compliance with the duties of the usufructuary originating in the salva 
rei substantia requirement. In effect, this shift can lead to a more flexible 
reconceptualization of servitudes, and specifically usufruct, as changing relationships 
between the usufructuary and the bare owner who exercise concurrent rights in the 
usufructuary property. From the development of this example it seems that application 
of the pliability rules paradigm concerns more than one property rule layer preceding 
the triggering event, namely the salva rei substantia requirement and the declaratory 
order accompanied by the interdict. The liability rule protection would entail the 
payment of compensation for impairment of the substance after the triggering event. 
A significant aspect of Bell and Parchomovsky’s model and of “glider switches” in 
general is that they accomplish sharing without the apparent aim of doing so.124 
                                                          
123 Developed according to the example of L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of 
Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 133. 
124 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Conn L Rev 647-723 665. 
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However, Dyal-Chand asserts that the sharing that they accomplish is limited. Hence, 
it is necessary to look at a model that foregrounds this justification for a more flexible 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement, specifically by investigating a more 
creative approach to remedies that might be applied in this regard. This model was 
developed by Dyal-Chand within the context of Progressive Property theory and will 
accordingly be discussed in the relevant section. 
 
4 3 2 4 Limitations to flexibility argument: fragmentation and opportunism 
Although the theoretical arguments of the proponents of Law and Economics theory 
can be applied to construct an argument in favour of a flexible approach, they only do 
so up to a point. It is therefore necessary to demarcate the flexibility argument by 
considering to what extent Law and Economics theory does not support measures of 
flexibility and consequently in which circumstances it would rather support a rigid 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. There are mainly two instances 
where this would be the case, namely to curb fragmentation and opportunism.  
According to Depoorter and Parisi servitudes can be viewed as a partitioning of 
property rights, since the use rights are divided between the owner and the servitude 
holder.125 This can be conceptualised as either a legal or an economic division. 
Partitioning may result in different forms of fragmentation, namely spatial, functional 
and atypical forms. Usufruct can be construed as a “non-conforming property 
arrangement”126 resulting from partitioning. As such it is an example where the “closely 
                                                          
125 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of Property Rights: a Functional Interpretation of the Law 
of Servitudes” (2003) 3 Glob Jurist Front 1535-1654. 
126 F Parisi “Entropy and the Asymmetric Coase Theorem” in D Porrini & GB Ramello (eds) Property 
Rights Dynamics: A Law and Economics Perspective (2012) 67. 
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complementary attributes” of ownership have been dismembered between the bare 
owner and the usufructuary.127 Although this explanation works within legal systems 
which subscribe to the bundle of rights metaphor, it would not be a correct doctrinal 
conceptualisation in South African law.128 In the South African legal system the 
principle of elasticity, whereby the owner consents to the suspension of his ownership 
entitlements until the termination of a restriction, is accepted. On termination of the 
restriction, for example on extinction of the usufruct, the owner may again exercise all 
his entitlements. Nevertheless, the arguments that Parisi formulates regarding the 
disadvantages resulting from fragmentation and the legal mechanisms for countering 
them are also valid in regard to usufruct and explain the function of the salva rei 
substantia requirement and a rigid approach to it. Therefore, I briefly discuss the 
disadvantages resulting from dismemberment. 
Fragmentation may lead to inefficient use unless the property division costs are 
less than the externalites resulting from concentrated use.129 Dismemberment results 
in welfare losses and a discrepancy between the complementary rights of use and 
exclusion, for example uncoordinated decision rights in terms of reunification. When 
these decision rights are not coordinated it leads to suboptimal reunification since 
every owner of a fragment will attempt to maximise his total revenue in a joint venture 
                                                          
127 E Mackaay Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems 257 .F Parisi “Entropy and the Asymmetric 
Coase Theorem” in D Porrini & GB Ramello (eds) Property Rights Dynamics: A Law and Economics 
Perspective (2012) 67 discusses usufruct as an example of a dismembered right where a scarce 
resource is utilised through property forms giving rights to several persons at once. In the case of 
usufruct the usufructuary and the bare owner share the ownership rights in a complementary manner 
with the bare owner only retaining abusus for the period of the usufruct. 
128 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 174. 
129 F Parisi “Entropy and the Asymmetric Coase Theorem” in D Porrini & GB Ramello (eds) Property 
Rights Dynamics: A Law and Economics Perspective (2007) 69-93 71-72. 
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without consideration of the effect on others. This might lead to under-exploitation of 
the joint investment. Furthermore, every owner of a fragment may veto a unanimous 
decision with the effect that no-one can use the full benefits and costs of his control 
over the resource. Consequently the resource may remain idle. Under-exploitation 
may generate externalities such as a decrease or even elimination of the value of the 
fragmented right of the other owner. Productive resources may also be withheld. 
These disadvantages are also relevant to limited real rights and to usufruct as 
an institution. Firstly, they involve noncomformity between complementary 
entitlements and may lead to conflict in terms of decisions and friction regarding the 
reallocation of resources. In the case of limited real rights it is possible to assign some 
entitlements to other individuals than the owner so that ownership is not marked by 
the permanent or simultaneous presence of all entitlements.130 Functionally, the 
entitlements may be viewed as “fragmented”, even more so when the entitlement of 
disposition is involved. The usufructuary may neither alienate nor encumber the 
usufructuary property or the real right of usufruct.131 Conversely, the bare owner may 
alienate, pledge and grant other real rights regarding the usufructuary property.132 
However, the owner may not prejudice the usufructuary’s rights by preventing, 
hindering or diminishing the right of use and enjoyment.133 Consequently, the bare 
                                                          
130 H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The Principles of the 
Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 92. 
131 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 340. 
132 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (1989 2 ed) 515; AJ van der Walt “Saaklike Regte en Persoonlike 
Serwitute” (1987) 50 THRHR 343-352 351. 
133 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 592. 
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owner may only grant a servitude with the consent of the usufructuary.134 The bare 
owner also needs the consent and cooperation of the usufructuary to deal with the 
nude property, for example to sell and mortgage it.135 In fact, dealings are always 
subject to the usufruct. These examples show that both the usufructuary and the bare 
owner are jointly involved in certain decisions to dispose. Moreover, consent is needed 
from both parties to overreach the traditional restrictions on disposition. One of the 
consequences of shared disposition is that a decision to dispose may inevitably be 
vetoed by one of the parties.136 In this case, both the usufructuary and the bare owner 
who have to consent to a joint venture would probably be interested in maximising 
their own interests in terms of the usufructuary property. If a party does not view the 
joint venture as personally advantageous, he may veto decisions in this regard and 
consequently no act of disposition is possible. This may result in under-exploitation of 
the property. Accordingly, the value of one party’s interest may decrease and 
productive resources are withheld. 
Although both the usufructuary and the bare owner can be disadvantaged by this 
veto power, there are limited options available to the usufructuary to circumvent such 
a deadlock. His limited power of disposal is to a certain extent countered by the 
possibility to convey the usufructuary interest by means of sale, pledge, mortgage, 
rent, lease or loan.137 This power of disposal, in effect temporarily circumventing the 
restrictive implications of the salva rei substantia principle for the decision-making 
                                                          
134 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (1989 2 ed) 515; Voet 7 1 20. 
135 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 592. 
136 See for example Klopper v Van Rensburg 1920 EDL 239. 
137 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 591. 
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powers of the usufructuary, is curbed by the same principle at the death of the 
usufructuary. A third party loses the interest gained during the usufruct at the death of 
the usufructuary because the usufruct is terminated. The usufructuary interest is still 
subject to the limited real right, which is in itself inalienable.138 The power to dispose 
of the usufructuary interest is a device to temporarily circumvent functional unity and 
the numerus clausus principle. In effect, it renders the usufructuary able to exercise 
wider and atypical powers of disposal than the rules of usufruct and the salva rei 
substantia principle allow. However, it does not provide typical property-type protection 
to third parties. 
 Parisi has also pointed out the difficulty concerned “when two or more individuals 
jointly hold decision rights”.139 This problem has historically been addressed by 
adopting rules facilitating the reunification of use and by giving exclusion rights to a 
single individual.140 The salva rei substantia requirement acts as a reunification device 
since it compels the usufructuary to return the property subject to the usufruct on 
termination of the right. Therefore, the salva rei substantia requirement acts as an anti-
fragmentation device in terms of both legal and functional unity.  
The salva rei substantia requirement acts as an anti-fragmentation device in the 
sense that it compels the usufructuary to return the object of the usufruct to the bare 
                                                          
138 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 591, discussing Durban City Council v Woodhaven Ltd 1987 3 
SA 555 (A). 
139 F Parisi “The Fall and Rise of Functional Property” in D Porrini & GB Ramello (eds) Property Rights 
Dynamics: A Law and Economics Perspective (2007) 31-53 41. 
140 F Parisi “The Fall and Rise of Functional Property” in D Porrini & GB Ramello (eds) Property Rights 
Dynamics: A Law and Economics Perspective (2007) 31-53 41 discusses the example of joint tenancy. 
Although Parisi does not refer to limited real rights and specifically personal servitudes like usufruct in 
his discussion of different types of unity, personal servitudes present problems comparable to those 
inherent in joint ownership regarding the principle of absolute disposition.  
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owner without impairing the substance. Even if the usufructuary dies and is personally 
unable to restore the usufructuary object to the bare owner, the obligation to return the 
object salva rei substantia rests on his heirs.141 If the usufructuary disposes of the 
object of the usufruct, for example by selling it in order to be able to live from the 
interest on the capital returns, or because the use of usufructuary object has become 
obsolete or because the usufructuary object presents a risk of diminishing value,142 
the disposal would result in failure to comply with the salva rei substantia requirement. 
However, if the salva rei substantia requirement is met, the decision-making powers 
are no longer shared between the usufructuary and the bare owner. Accordingly, legal 
unity is restored.  
The usufructuary effectively controls the object but does not have title.143 He has 
to return the object at the end of the usufruct. Therefore, the usufructuary has the 
incentive to exploit the object of the usufruct to the maximum in order to acquire all it 
can produce. He will expend his energy and inventiveness on what will be of personal 
benefit, not on efforts benefitting the owner.144 Mackaay refers to this challenge as the 
“economic problem of agency”.145 This extensive exploitation can be to the detriment 
of the preservation of the capital belonging to the owner.146 The incentive structure 
can be improved by allowing the user “to keep all or a large share of the results of the 
use of the resource, even though the resource itself remains the property of the 
                                                          
141 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 126. 
142 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 126, citing Gibaud v Bagshaw 1918 CPD 202. 
143 E Mackaay Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems (2013) 260. 
144 258. 
145 E Mackaay Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems (2013) 258. 
146 260. 
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owner.147 Certain rules curtail this potential for opportunism.148 Apart from the limited 
duration of the usufruct, the salva rei substantia requirement, with all the related duties 
imposed on the usufructuary are designed to minimise opportunism. 
Firstly, the duty to make an inventory limits the possibility for opportunistic 
misappropriation of the property by the usufructuary. Secondly, there is a duty to 
provide security to ensure meeting of usufructuary obligations, good management and 
compensation at the end of the usufruct. If the usufructuary does not adhere to this 
obligation, the usufructuary object may be withdrawn from the usufructuary’s control. 
Although the usufructuary may utilise the natural and legal products of the property, 
sale or other forms of disposition of the property is prohibited, except in the case of 
consumable products. In this case opportunism is curtailed by the obligation to return 
similar items of equal quality and quantity.149 Where the usufruct pertains to items that 
deteriorate rapidly with use, the value must be returned at the termination of the 
usufruct.150  
Opportunism is also prevented in terms of the reimbursement that is allowed for 
expenses related to maintenance of the usufructuary property.151 To curtail the risk of 
the bare owner being charged for expenditures mainly benefitting the usufructuary, 
only necessary expenses are reimbursable, but not improvements made or for the 
increase in usefulness or attractiveness of the property. The usufructuary is allowed 
to remove the improvements, provided that the property is returned in its original state. 
On a superficial level, Mackaay’s comments on the duties of the usufructuary explain 
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how the salva rei substantia requirement is designed to curb opportunism and provides 
limited incentive to the usufructuary to maintain the property.152 
Presenting the salva rei substantia requirement as a traditional property rule, 
within the context of Law and Economics analysis and specifically the property and 
liability rules paradigm, opens up the possibility of discussing formal arguments 
supporting traditional property rules as justification for the preservation requirement.153 
Kiewitz (with reference to Lovett)154 summarises the reasons for preferring property 
rules and includes a few formal policy considerations, namely simplicity, clarity, and 
reduction of uncertainty.155  
Lovett notes that property rules hold the advantage of defining the entitlements 
of the involved parties “‘crisply’”.156 In this sense he refers to the work of Sterk,157 who 
discusses the “geometric-box” allocation of rights which facilitates market exchange 
because it promotes certainty.158 It establishes a “definite framework for negotiation, 
thus increasing the chances for bargaining”.159 When rules promote certainty, all 
parties valuing a particular right will know who has the right to dispose of it.160 Crisp 
definition of rights thus enhances the efficiency of property rights. The simplicity of 
                                                          
152 260-261. 
153 See 3 3 2 2 1 above. 
154 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77. 
155 L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 124. 
156 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 12. 
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property rules also enables consensual bargaining, particularly because it tends to 
define right holders “clear or mechanistically”.161 
Property rules also reduce uncertainty by giving entitlement holders the 
guarantee of the ability to preserve their property interest.162 Entitlement holders do 
not have to fear the risk of their interest being appropriated by opportunists. Certainty 
also encourages investment and promotes planning and labour associated with the 
entitlement. Lovett also notes Smith’s argument about certainty.163 The need for 
owners to resort to expensive forms of self-help in order to protect their interests from 
opportunistic takers is eliminated by property rules.164 Certainty also discourages 
unnecessary litigation.165 
These formal policy considerations in favour of the traditional salva rei substantia 
requirement serve to constrain the broader and economic and social policy 
considerations. The salva rei substantia does provide certainty because it safeguards 
the interests of the bare owner by requiring that the usufructuary property should be 
returned without impairment of the substance. In this sense it curtails opportunism, 
discourages self-help and aims to minimise litigation.  
 
                                                          
161 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 13. 
162 12. 
163 JA Lovett “A Bend in the Road Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes” (2006) 38 Conn L Rev 1-77 13 refers to HE Smith “Property and Property 
Rules” NYU L Rev 1719-1798 1724-1726 and 1729-1730. HE Smith “Property and Property Rules” 
NYU L Rev 1719-1798 1727 argues that property rules provide a superior anser in comparison to liability 
rules as a response to uncertainty. He develops three arguments based on information costs to support 
his preference for property rules. 
164 12-13. 
165 20. 
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4 3 3 Progressive Property theorists 
4 3 3 1 Alexander: governance device 
In this section I argue that the concept of governance property provides a useful 
analytic tool for explaining the function of the salva rei substantia requirement as a 
governance mechanism. In this sense a flexible approach to the requirement would 
enhance governance, especially in use conflicts. 
The concept of governance property needs to be understood against the 
background of two current approaches to property, namely viewing it as exclusion 
property and conversely viewing it as governance property. The dominant perspective 
of property advocated by exclusion or Law and Economics theorists only takes 
account of the relationship between owners and non-owners and therefore neglects 
the internal relationships between property stakeholders.166 For the sake of argument, 
although he acknowledges that this is an oversimplification, Alexander differentiates 
between two types of property, namely exclusion property and governance property.167 
When one owner basically exercises all control over an object and his rights are in 
rem, the property can be classified as exclusion property. Governance property, on 
the other hand, refers to multiple-ownership property. This type of property 
necessitates governance norms to regulate ownership’s internal relations. 
Governance property differs from exclusion property because it involves the 
fragmentation of various concurrent rights relating to an object.168 These two types of 
                                                          
166 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1854-1856. 
167 1855-1856. 
168 Examples that GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1856 points 
out include “concurrent estates; marital and domestic partnership property; common interest 
communities including condominiums and housing cooperatives; certain forms of business 
organizations, including partnerships and close corporations; leaseholds; and trusts, including statutory 
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property are posited as theoretical concepts demarcating two ends of a spectrum 
where real property institutions occupy different positions between the two poles.169 
Furthermore, these two theoretical concepts can also be associated with two property 
theories in the property discourse, namely the exclusion theory and the human 
flourishing theory. 
Governance theory may take on different forms. The owners may be concurrent, 
sequential, or combined. Multiple owners may simultaneously own various portions of 
the property as a whole and other portions individually. This is a combination of 
governance and exclusion property. Another arrangement might entail some owners 
having non-beneficial interests while others have the contrary. In terms of its form, 
usufruct as an example of governance property can probably be described as both 
concurrent in the sense that the bare owner and the usufructuary simultaneously 
possess various entitlements over the usufructuary property and sequential in the 
sense that the use and enjoyment as well as the fruits of the usufructuary property will 
on termination of the usufruct become entitlements that the bare owner may exercise, 
rendering his position that of a full owner. Therefore, during the usufruct the 
usufructuary will have beneficial ownership in the sense that he is allowed to use and 
                                                          
trusts (e.g. pensions)”. It can probably be argued that usufruct may in certain respects, for purposes of 
the argument here, be likened to a trust. This comparison is more convincing in the phraseology of 
common law and other mixed systems. AJ Correro “Trusts – the Usufruct in Trust” (1963)24 La L Rev 
127-131 127 compared the Louisiana usufruct bare ownership to a trust containing both a principal and 
an income beneficiary, the usufructuary being analogous to the trust’s income beneficiary and the bare 
owner resembling the principal beneficiary. However, the administration of the property and its 
enjoyment is not wholly partitioned in the case of usufruct, where the usufructuary retains physical 
control. MJ de Waal “The Uniformity of Ownership, Numerus Clausus and the Reception of the Trust in 
South African Law” in JM Milo & JM Smits Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems (2001) 43-54 48 notes that 
under South African law the trustee is the owner of the trust assets whereas the trust beneficiary only 
has a personal right against the trustee. This construction avoids the problem related to split ownership. 
169 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1856. 
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enjoy the usufructuary property, while the bare owner may only dispose of the property 
and has therefore in many respects non-beneficial ownership. 
Apart from its form, governance property is further demarcated as a form of 
property in terms of the following attributes,170 namely the access it provides to the 
property, the agency it involves, horizontality as opposed to verticality and non-
currency of enjoyment.  Firstly, governance property excludes open-access resources 
but allow for limited access regimes.171 Secondly, governance property, especially with 
vertical power relationships, provides for agency.172 
Thirdly, in terms of horizontality compared to verticality, where the relationship 
among interest holders is “formally vertical”, certain interest holders have “exclusive 
or greater control” compared to others.173 Examples include the trust174 and the 
leasehold.175 In terms of the characterisation of the relationship between the parties, 
the usufructuary and the bare owner also to a certain extent have a vertical 
                                                          
170 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1857-1866 distinguishes 
governance property from commons in this regard. 
171 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1857. Certain limited 
access regimes have traits that are not necessarily part of the governance property regime, namely a 
horizontal relationship among the co-owners characterised by relative equality of legal rights, privileges 
and powers and concurrency of privileges of possession, use and enjoyment of the property 
172 1857. 
173 1865. 
174 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1865 notes that the trustee, 
being the legal titleholder, holds an interest that differs from the beneficiary. Their interests differ in 
terms of the control they hold over the trust assets: only the trustee controls the trust assets, although 
he must exercise this power for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiary. 
175 According to GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1865-1866 
the leasehold, where there is a vertical relationship between the landlord and the tenant because the 
tenant holds immediate control over the leased premises, but the landlord has more fundamental control 
as his reversion interest allows him to control the tenant’s use of the premises in various ways formally 
recognised by property doctrines such as the law of waste or the law of fixtures. 
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relationship. The bare owner holds the ultimate power of disposal. In cases where the 
usufructuary seeks to exercise acts of disposition the bare owner may veto decisions 
in this regard by the usufructuary.176 Furthermore, the usufructuary’s disposition 
powers are curtailed by the salva rei substantia requirement. 
Lastly, governance property involves non-currency of enjoyment.177 
Beneficiaries of governance property may have successive rights of enjoyment.178 
This attribute of governance property is important since it generates conflict of interest. 
Usufructuaries and bare owners enjoy non-currency of enjoyment since the former 
may use and enjoy the usufructuary property for the duration of the usufruct, while the 
bare owner is only entitled to the use and enjoyment once the usufruct terminates. The 
conflicts which Alexander discusses in relation to this non-currency of enjoyment 
provide a useful basis for the analysis of the conflicts inherent in usufruct. Non-
currency of enjoyment and potential conflicts between the usufructuary and the bare 
owner necessitate governance mechanisms (coordination norms and mechanisms) 
such as the salva rei substantia requirement. 179 
Alexander identifies three contexts in which potential conflicts among interest 
holders in governance property may arise, namely the consumption and enjoyment of 
                                                          
176 See for example Klopper v Van Rensburg 1920 EDL. 
177 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1866. 
178 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1866 notes the example 
of personal trusts where “the right to possess and use the trust property is divided sequentially between 
life beneficiaries and remainder beneficiaries”. There exists a temporal division of interest because the 
right of beneficiaries to possess the property is triggered when the preceding life estate is terminated, 
except when the trustee has been granted the power to “invade the trust principal for their benefit”. 
179 1866. 
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governance property assets, the investment and managerial control of the assets and 
the membership in the governance property institution.180  
In terms of consumption and enjoyment of governance property assets, in 
governance property institutions, where interest holders have simultaneous privileges 
to possess or enjoy the asset, the potential for overuse and underinvestment might 
arise.181 Where relations are not strictly horizontal, or where successive rights of 
possession or enjoyment exist, two types of conflict arise, namely opportunistic 
behaviour by the interest holders with the power to manage the asset and conflicting 
investment goals where interests holders have successive enjoyment rights.182 
Conflicting investment goals result from the division of beneficial ownership between 
beneficiaries with current possessory interests and those with future beneficiary 
interests. With the temporal division of possessory and enjoyment rights conflict arises 
regarding the proper investment objectives. Current possessory interest holders prefer 
investments that will maximise current yield at the expense of long-term capital growth, 
while future interest holders will have a preference for the opposite strategy. Therefore, 
some coordinating norms are necessary. These types of conflicts are also notable with 
regard to usufruct. The salva rei substantia requirement firstly addresses opportunistic 
behaviour in the sense that it places specific duties on the usufructuary to facilitate the 
return of the usufructuary property without impairment of the substance. This acts as 
a deterrent in situations where the usufructuary consumes and enjoys with only short 
                                                          
180 1867. 
181 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1867-1868 notes that in 
the case of co-tenancies, the impossibility of simultaneous occupation necessitates conflict resolution 
and questions of contributions for improvements and repairs might arise. 
182 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1868 discusses trusts as 
an example: the trustee holds the legal title and has the power to sell the assets and therefore the risk 
exists that he might use his position as trustee for personal gain and to harm the intended beneficiaries. 
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term returns in mind and in this sense may use the opportunity to dissipate the corpus. 
Secondly, the requirement also regulates situations where conflicting investment goals 
exist and the usufructuary would most likely like to maximise current yield at the 
expense of long-term capital growth, while the bare owner might have the opposite 
aim. In this sense the salva rei substantia requirement acts as a governance device to 
resolve conflicts of interest.183 
In terms of the preservation and managerial control of assets, Alexander does 
not work out his examples as clearly as he does with the previous source of conflict.184 
Management of governance property assets might not be a problem in vertical 
governance property institutions where the institution’s structure dictates who has the 
power to manage and invest assets. However, in horizontally structured institutions, 
authority to manage and liability for decisions made by one party might create 
conflict.185 The problem with usufruct is that it is to an extent a hybrid institution that is 
both horizontally and vertically structured. While only the bare owner has the power of 
disposition, he may only dispose of the property subject to the usufruct. The 
usufructuary, on the other hand, has the entitlements of possession, control and 
administration. In this sense he has wide managerial control, especially if acts that 
qualify as use and enjoyment conform to the destination of the usufructuary property 
and would objectively amount to conduct of a bonus paterfamilias. Accordingly, 
disagreements about acts of management might arise between the bare owner and 
                                                          
183 See 3 3 2. 
184 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1869 briefly refers to the 
examples of co-tenants and residents of common interest communities who might disagree on 
expenditures for repairs or improvements pertaining to co-owned structures and married couples who 
might have conflicts about capital investments in family residences. 
185 Here GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1869 mentions 
community property in marriages and other forms of co-ownership. 
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the usufructuary. For example, disagreements about repairs and improvements as 
managerial strategies do arise in the context of usufruct and because they concern 
the substance of the usufructuary property, the salva rei substantia requirement also 
acts as a managerial and preservation device to deal with conflicts.186  
Membership in governance property institutions might also present a source of 
conflict in terms of entry, exit and alienability.187 According to Alexander, exit might 
cause similar if not greater conflict.188 Membership conflicts might arise in terms of 
usufruct. However, not all membership conflicts are relevant to the salva rei substantia 
requirement.189 Two instances may be relevant. Firstly, when the usufructuary 
disposes of his entitlement to use and enjoy (he is not able to dispose of his 
usufruct)190 another party is entitled to use the usufructuary property until termination 
of the usufruct. Although in law this does strictly amount to a membership conflict, in 
practice it might have the same effect. This could be the case where the bare owner 
does not agree on the disposition of enjoyment or the party who acquires the 
                                                          
186 Case law concerning repairs and improvements are discussed in chapter two. 
187 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1869-1870 considers the 
example of controversial members who seek to join the institution but whose membership might create 
conflict and the coordination norms and enforcement mechanisms needed to resolve this. 
188 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1870 refers to co-tenants 
with irreconcilable differences wishing to terminate the arrangement and owner-residents in common 
interest communities who desire the freedom to transfer their property to whomever they choose but 
who are countered by homeowners associations restraining alienability of members’ interests. Trust 
beneficiaries and trust creators may also not agree on alienation. 
189 In terms of entry, the actio communi dividundo as a measure of creating usufruct may present 
membership conflicts. In this case, when the object of joint ownership cannot be divided between the 
joint owners, the court has the power to order by which bare ownership is allocated to one owner and 
the usufruct to the other. See in this regard CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 94. This may 
understandably escalate an existing conflict in terms of the parties not agreeing on the division. 
190 Steyn v Registrar of Deeds 1933 TPD 109. 
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enjoyment from the usufructuary. Secondly, the bare owner is allowed to dispose of 
the usufructuary property, but always subject to the usufruct. In such a case the 
successors in law to the bare owner would have to allow the usufructuary the use and 
enjoyment of the usufructuary property, but may not necessarily agree with his 
exercise of his entitlements. Here the entry of the successors may also present a 
membership conflict. In both these cases this membership conflict may be connected 
with conflicts around the permitted use of the usufructuary property and perhaps 
therefore the interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement. 
Inevitably, the three areas of conflict arising from the non-currency of enjoyment 
in terms of usufruct necessitate coordination norms and mechanisms of enforcement. 
As Alexander remarks, a significant part of property law consist of heterogeneous 
norms and doctrines that facilitate coordination among multiple interest holders of 
governance property assets.191 They include operative default rules underpinning 
social interactions and mandatory rules that resolve conflict in different ways by 
facilitating participation or permitting exit. The type of coordination device also 
depends on the nature of the relationships involved. Relationships may be personal, 
social or commercial. According to Dagan and Heller proximity to the social pole 
determines the emphasis a property institution places on participation in management, 
that is, whether it focuses on voice.192 A more social orientation also indicates more 
collective control on exit and entry and greater use of substantive equality norms. In 
this regard it might seem that a distinction might be considered between usufructuaries 
according to the relationship they have with the bare owner. One may ask whether 
                                                          
191 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1871. 
192 H Dagan & MA Heller “Conflicts in Property” in Property: Values and Institutions (2011) 229-244 
236-237. 
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proximity to the social pole in comparison to proximity to the commercial pole might 
not be an argument for greater “voice” and deliberation concerning the application of 
the salva rei substantia requirement. For example, where usufruct is bequeathed to 
the surviving spouse and bare ownership to her children, more deliberation should be 
possible than in the case of a usufruct for commercial purposes. This contextualisation 
with regard to the type of governance property could result in context-sensitive 
treatment of the mandatory salva rei substantia requirement. Such an approach can 
further be informed by fairness and equality norms. 
Alexander identifies two main types of legal norms regulating governance 
property institutions, namely fairness and equality.193 Fairness norms also consist of 
two kinds of norms. The first responds to horizontal consumption and use conflicts 
among multiple interest holders with either successive or concurrent legal interests, 
for example the duty against waste in landlord-tenant law. The second fairness norm 
deals with management and control conflicts of governance property assets, for 
example fiduciary duties of interest holders controlling governance property to manage 
the governance property assets in a manner consistent with the interests of 
beneficiaries.194 Fairness norms of the first kind also underlie the salva rei substantia 
requirement as an expression of the civiliter principle with its appeal to reasonableness 
and good management. Fairness norms of the second kind would especially come 
into play where a usufructuary has the management and control of the usufructuary 
                                                          
193 According to GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1871. Equality 
norms function in the context of consumption and exit where social type governance property is 
involved, for example in concurrent estates or as distributive norm upon divorce and are not particularly 
relevant here. 
194 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1871 notes the example 
of trust law where the duty to be impartial implies that trustees may not favour one group of beneficiaries 
above another when investing assets or allocating receipts between them. 
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property belonging to minors and has the duty to manage and control it in a way not 
detrimental to the interests of the vulnerable bare owners.195 
To summarise, the discussion indicates that usufruct shares the qualities 
attributed to governance property and can therefore be conceptualised in these terms. 
Consequently, the civiliter principle and the salva rei substantia requirement as 
measures regulating usufruct can be evaluated and conceptualised as coordination 
norms and mechanisms of enforcement developed for governance property. On face 
value it seems that the theory of governance property provides a basis for the 
justification of the salva rei substantia requirement. However, since it emphasises the 
constructive quality of the requirement as a governance device instead of merely a 
restrictive requirement (as would predominantly have been the case in a purely 
exclusion theory paradigm) and argues for different variables to be taken into account 
when considering coordination norms and mechanisms of enforcement such as the 
type of relationship involved, the nature of the rule and the norms of fairness and 
equality, it also provides support for a context-sensitive approach to the salva rei 
substantia requirement. This is particularly the case where this requirement may act 
as a governance device regulating governance conflicts.  
 
4 3 3 2 Dyal-Chand’s model of sharing 
Alexander is not the only Progressive Property theorist who recently confirmed that 
sharing in property is actually more prevalent than exclusion theorists would admit. 
With reference to the work of Calabresi and Melamed, Dyal-Chand argues that the 
work of Law and Economics theorists who focus on efficiency does not accommodate 
                                                          
195 GS Alexander “Governance Property” (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1854-1887 1871. 
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sharing, and discourages “the development of an outcome-focused mode of dispute 
resolution that incorporates sharing”.196 This view also contributes to the 
“impoverished outcomes in property law”197 which are also evident from court 
decisions in the face of disputes concerning sharing. Courts usually deal with sharing 
by creating exceptions to the owner’s right to exclude. Instead, they could 
accommodate sharing through rethinking remedies. Although courts may recognise 
rights of non-owners that limit the property rights of the owner, they are currently 
restricted in the remedies that they can provide because ownership remains the 
dominant consideration in terms of outcome. 
Within the context of increasingly scarce resources and inequality of distribution, 
Dyal-Chand emphasises that one of the implications of the view that the right to 
exclude lies at the core of property is that property rights must remain concentrated 
where information costs can be reduced.198 Therefore dismemberment is opposed in 
the interest of efficiency. She notes that “the blunt power of ‘keep out’ injunctions 
leaves decisions about resource use and allocation entirely in the hands of private 
owners”.199 In the context of usufruct, decisions about resource allocation and use may 
also be vetoed by private owners because their consent is required for acts that 
challenge the salva rei substantia requirements. Furthermore, injunctions as non-
negotiable property rules are at their disposal.  
Dyal-Chand envisions the potential of property outcomes to resolve “acute 
problems of fairness and distributive justice” and to “alleviate the harsh externalities 
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that result from ignoring the uses of property made by non-owners”.200 In particular, 
she aims to explore the potential of injunctions to achieve sharing and to develop “a 
model for enhancing property outcomes and, in particular, for promoting sharing as a 
preferred outcome”.201 According to Dyal-Chand, her model is applicable where 
legitimate interests regarding a disputed property exist on both sides of the dispute 
and enables the evaluation of the interests not to determine rights but to achieve an 
outcome that involves sharing. This sharing leads to “court-imposed or settled 
outcomes” that can be seen as compromises between the parties’ varying interests.202 
Since both parties’ interests and judgments would be relevant to determine whether 
sharing has in fact been achieved, certain types of sharing would represent the core 
of the model, for example simultaneous uses or uses necessitating continuous 
collaboration or coordination.203 However, her model also accommodates transfers of 
property and other forms of sharing over time and therefore covers sharing that does 
not necessitate a continuous relationship.204 The promotion of property sharing places 
Dyal-Chand’s model in the “middle space between exclusive ownership and a 
commons”, which it endeavours to expand.205 
The interest-outcome approach commences the dispute resolution process by 
recognising and defining the legitimate interests regarding the property on both sides 
of the dispute.206 Instead of starting with formal entitlements, Dyal-Chand notes that 
the concept of property entitlements can be expanded, firstly by referring to notions of 
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“social obligation, capabilities, personhood, democratic community, positive rights and 
interconnectedness”.207 Secondly, the court would consider outcomes that would best 
suit each party’s legitimate interests.208 Thirdly, the court would have to consider the 
extent to which formal title and more broadly defined entitlements are relevant to the 
dispute. 
Dyal-Chand is particularly interested in cases where uses overlap and which 
involves legitimate interests not based in entitlements.209 She proposes three sub-
questions about use that determines the legitimate interests of the parties. Firstly, it 
should be determined how both the owner and the non-owner parties to the dispute 
are using the property. Secondly, one should ask how the world perceives these uses. 
Thirdly, the intent of the parties regarding the property should be determined. Their 
intent refers to their intended uses and their intention concerning the other interests 
that form part of ownership. These three questions assist in determining possible 
outcomes, including sharing. In this regard, uses would be evaluated for compatibility, 
which could lead to “sharing along one or more dimensions or at least injunctions that 
would not exclude one or more parties completely”.210 To summarise, this model does 
not identify owners and assign outcomes accordingly, but urges judges to look for 
outcomes and then assign and define entitlements to match those outcomes.211 
The question that remains is how the insights gleaned from Dyal-Chand can be 
applied to answer questions about the preference of a rigid or flexible approach to the 
salva rei substantia requirement. Can the focus on use as a point of inquiry rather than 
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on ownership be relevant? Can foregrounding sharing as a value and an outcome 
prompt the investigation of other considerations where the rigid interpretation of the 
salva rei substantia requirement would dictate a remedy, impede the disposition 
powers of the usufructuary and diminish the potential for more distributive uses of the 
property?  
Personal servitudes and specifically the institution of usufruct traditionally allows 
for sharing in a limited sense. While the usufructuary is granted a limited real right in 
the form of usufruct, ownership is still vested in the bare owner.212 Disposition powers 
are to an extent shared between the bare owner and the usufructuary. In certain cases 
disposition may be vetoed by one of the parties.213 The usufructuary may neither 
alienate nor encumber the usufructuary property or the real right of usufruct.214 
Conversely, the bare owner may alienate, pledge and grant other real rights regarding 
the usufructuary property.215 However, the owner may not prejudice the usufructuary’s 
rights by preventing, hindering or diminishing the right of use and enjoyment.216 
Consequently, the bare owner may only grant a servitude with the consent of the 
usufructuary.217 The bare owner also needs the consent and cooperation of the 
                                                          
212 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 340; CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) 
unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 95; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 515. 
213 See for example Klopper v Van Rensburg 1920 EDL 239. 
214 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 340. 
215 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 515; AJ van der Walt “Saaklike Regte en Persoonlike 
Serwitute” (1987) 50 THRHR 343-352 351. 
216 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 592. 
217 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 515; Voet 7 1 20. 
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usufructuary to deal with the nude property for example to sell and mortgage it.218 In 
fact, dealings are always subject to the usufruct. Consent is needed from both parties 
to overreach the traditional restrictions on disposition. The common law distribution of 
entitlements and shared entitlements therefore indicates that usufruct as an institution 
is an example of sharing.  
Consequently, Dyal-Chand’s guidelines for approaching a dispute can be applied 
to enrich the judicial inquiry where a dispute involving the salva rei substantia 
requirement is at hand. In terms of the first question, taking into account that the non-
owner or usufructuary in this case is the party who uses the property, while the bare 
owner does not, might provide a useful starting point for reasoning that the 
usufructuary’s use is a significant factor in determining the outcome of the dispute. If 
the usufructuary for instance uses a house subject to the usufruct as a permanent 
residence, the case for a remedy requiring sharing would be more compelling than in 
the case of usufruct over a movable not necessary for sustenance. Furthermore, if the 
usufructuary property provides a livelihood to the usufructuary it would also invite 
serious consideration. If, on the other hand, the bare owner has a strong moral and 
personal connection with land given in usufruct and the usufructuary does not reveal 
such an interest and only sporadically uses the property, the ownership entitlement 
might bear more weight. Enabling the usufructuary to make optimal use of the 
usufructuary property could be an important consideration, but it need not be. 
Secondly, judging the use against public norms might indicate the acceptability and 
reasonableness of the practice. If the usufructuary uses his usufructuary property in a 
way that contributes to his community and regional economy or enhances 
                                                          
218 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 592. 
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development of the area, it would be a significant factor. Thirdly, an inquiry into the 
intended uses of the usufructuary property might also be useful since it balances the 
inquiry by also taking into account the intended future uses that the bare owner has in 
mind. Anticipating the use that a bare owner would make of the property in the future 
might guide decisions on use allocation. Furthermore, it might even be the case that 
the intended future use of the property might be compatible with the current use of the 
usufructuary. These examples219 indicate how these three questions can be used to 
assist in determining possible outcomes, which might include sharing. If the use of the 
usufructuary and the intended use of the bare owner are compatible, an outcome 
accommodating sharing or at least an interdict that would not entirely exclude the 
usufructuary could be in order. An important question would be how the current use of 
the property could be protected. Furthermore, to achieve sharing, combining remedies 
in innovative ways both in terms of division of time and in terms of the division of duties 
and rights, a nuanced and context-sensitive approach would be necessary. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I examine the policy and theoretical reasons for a flexible approach to 
the salva rei substantia requirement. Although arguments based on policy in favour of 
a flexible approach may be constructed, the material is scarce. Furthermore, as I 
indicate in 4 2 above, using policy involves various challenges in terms of constructing 
a working definition, methodological issues and more broadly, in terms of its role in the 
legal system. Consequently, I examine theoretical arguments in favour of a flexible 
                                                          
219 I draw on exampes discussed by R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Conn L Rev 647-
723 715-720 in different contexts. 
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approach to the requirement. These arguments can be grouped according to the 
general theoretical orientation ascribed to its proponents.  
The first group of arguments are based on the work of the information theorists 
or Law and Economics scholars. Starting from Coase, these writers formulated models 
progressively incorporating increased flexibility to enhance efficiency. Coase 
formulated the seminal theorem explaining how parties bargain in conflicting property 
use disputes. Although he indicates that courts should play a pivotal role in situations 
where transaction costs have an effect, he does not provide guidelines to courts to 
indicate how these entitlements should be protected. Calabresi and Melamed address 
the gaps in Coase’s theorem by developing guidelines for the protection of 
entitlements. In this regard they formulate the distinction between property and liability 
rules and indicate how and when these rules should be applied in the protection of 
property rights. However, as Bell and Parchomovsky argue, these rules do not account 
for all property protection mechanisms. Accordingly, they develop dynamic pliability 
rules that allow for a shift between property and liability rules based on the realisation 
of a changed condition. Their model takes account of protection afforded to property 
entitlements over time and is therefore less static. Based on these developments of 
property rules which allow for enhanced flexibility, I argue that the salva rei substantia 
requirement can also be interpreted flexibly. The flexible interpretation of the salva rei 
substantia requirement can probably be typified as a classic property rule. The relevant 
entitlement protected by a property rule is the right of the owner to receive the 
usufructuary property without impairment of the substance on termination of the 
usufruct. This right is protected by the salva rei substantia requirement that functions 
as a property rule. If a triggering event such as changed circumstances or even a 
passage of time occurs and the rule is interpreted flexibly, the classic property rule 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
282 
 
protection in the form of a declaratory order attended by an interdict may be 
suspended. The property rule may accordingly be substituted by liability rule 
protection. Other variations of this shift can be achieved by not mandating compliance 
with the duties of the usufructuary originating in the salva rei substantia requirement. 
In effect, this shift can lead to a more flexible reconceptualization of servitudes, and 
specifically usufruct, as changing relationships between the usufructuary and the bare 
owner who exercise concurrent rights in the usufructuary property. From the 
development of this example it seems that application of the pliability rules paradigm 
concerns more than one property rule layer preceding the triggering event, namely the 
salva rei substantia requirement and the declaratory order accompanied by the 
interdict. The liability rule protection would entail the payment of compensation for 
impairment of the substance after the triggering event. 
The second group of arguments concern the work of Progressive Property 
theorists. Applying the work of Alexander, I argue that usufruct can be construed as a 
form of governance property. Consequently it needs both coordination and 
enforcement mechanisms. The salva rei substantia requirement functions as such a 
device. Since the concept of governance property focuses on sharing, these devices 
are portrayed as mechanisms enhancing sharing and therefore less emphasis is given 
to the restrictive qualities they possess as would have been the case in an exclusion-
dominated paradigm. The salva rei substantia requirement is therefore construed as a 
constructive device facilitating sharing of governance property and in this regard an 
argument for a flexible approach that would enhance the use, management, 
investment and membership of usufruct as a governance institution could be made. 
Finally, I consider the work of Dyal-Chand. With her outcomes-based approach she 
argues for a dispute resolution process that takes into account the interests of both 
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owners and non-owners and which should not be constrained by rigid application of 
property remedies. In this regard I argue for a creative and flexible approach to 
remedies in disputes where the salva rei substantia requirement is concerned. Her 
emphasis on the prevalent nature of sharing is supported by an overview of the manner 
in which disposition in terms of usufruct is treated in other jurisdictions. In jurisdictions 
where this issue of limited disposition has been addressed, the empowerment of the 
usufructuary has received attention as it impedes efficient management of the 
usufructuary property.220 Empowerment of the usufructuary has been achieved by 
various mechanisms. The more conservative jurisdictions221 advocate creative use of 
usufruct and support devices such as foregrounding the destination of the usufructuary 
property as standard for demarcating the disposition powers of the usufructuary, the 
application of the rules of usufruct to a universality of goods rather than a single 
usufructuary asset, and contractual extension of quasi-usufruct to all types of 
usufructuary objects.222 Although this approach allows for some flexibility it still pivots 
on the disposition power of the full owner. 
In other jurisdictions a more radical approach is advocated. The central role of 
ownership was examined and the disposition powers shifted. In the Netherlands, this 
shift amounts to a removal of the salva rei substantia requirement from the description 
of usufruct. Since the introduction of the new BW in 1992 the control and income may 
                                                          
220 A Apers & A Verbeke “Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 TSAR 117-129 120 
citing A Verbeke, B Verdickt and D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in CG Van der Merwe & A 
Verbeke (eds) Time-Limited Interests in Land (2012) 33-56 54-55. For a discussion see chapter 3 of 
this thesis. 
221 Jurisdictions that maintain this approach include France and Belgium. See A Apers & A Verbeke 
“Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 TSAR 117-129 118. 
222 118-119. 
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be fully vested in the usufructuary.223 Furthermore, the usufructuary may in certain 
circumstances dispose of and consume the assets subject to the usufruct. These 
different approaches to the disposition power of the usufructuary in foreign jurisdictions 
are discussed in chapter 3. Some jurisdictions have addressed sharing in terms of 
widening the disposition powers of the usufructuary. 
 
                                                          
223 A Verbeke, B Verdickt and D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in CG Van der Merwe & A 
Verbeke (eds) Time-Limited Interests in Land (2012) 33-56 36. 






5 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the constitutional implications of various 
approaches to the salva rei substantia requirement. Constitutional analysis has hardly 
been used in property law and specifically in servitude law.1 According to Van der Walt, 
both property and some constitutional lawyers do not necessarily consider 
constitutional analysis of servitude law necessary.2 To them, the development of 
servitude law is not really contentious,3 and the impact of the Constitution on this 
development does not elevate this field to a problematic one. In fact, literature on the 
law of servitude reveals that property lawyers frequently resort to the “traditional logic 
of private-law doctrine” in order to develop the common law, sometimes merely with a 
nod in the direction of the Constitution, as was evident in a case note on Kidson v 
Jimspeed Enterprises CC4 by Scott.5 Even section 39(2) of the Constitution,6 which 
requires development of the common law where it does not reflect the spirit, purport 
                                                          
1 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 736-737. 
2 723. 
3 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Prop L Rev 3-35 29; AJ van der 
Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 723. 
4 2009 5 SA 246 (GNP). 
5 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 30; AJ 
van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 724; J Scott 
“Effect of the Destruction of a Dwelling on the Personal Servitude of Habitatio” (2010) 73 THRHR 155-
169 163-164. 
6 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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and objects of the Bill of Rights, does not persuade all academics of the prime 
importance of constitutional scrutiny of the common law.7  
Van der Walt asserts that one of the consequences of the constitutional 
dispensation is that constitutional law should play a pivotal role in justifying and 
structuring the development of the common law in contrast to doctrinal or historical 
arguments.8 Questions about the development of servitude law have an unavoidable 
constitutional dimension, implying that the point of departure for considering the 
interpretation and development of servitude law needs to be the supremacy of the 
Constitution9 and the “single-system-of-law principle”.10 As part of a single system of 
law, the law of servitudes, and in this case the law of usufruct, derives its force from 
the Constitution, is shaped and controlled by it, and by regulation giving effect to the 
Constitution.11 Consequently, one integrated process guided by constitutional 
                                                          
7 See A Fagan “The Secondary Role of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of the Bill of Rights in the 
Common Law’s Development” (2010) 127 SALJ 611-627; AJ van der Walt “Development of the 
Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 723 n 1 refers to the debate engendered by this 
article. 
8 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 735. 
9 F Michelman “The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution” in S Woolman et al 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed OS 2003) ch 11 35 distinguishes between constitutional 
supremacy as a value and as “a rule for the construction of a determinate, hierarchical relation among 
legal norms emanating from various, recognised sources of law in and for South Africa”. Section 2 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, establishes the supremacy of the Constitution 
and states that law inconsistent with it is invalid. Hence, should the common law of usufruct be 
inconsistent with the Constitution, it would be invalid. 
10 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 738; AJ 
van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 31. The 
“single-system-of-law” principle was unequivocally articulated in Ex Parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) 
para 44: “There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, 
and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to 
constitutional control”. 
11 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 32. 
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principles is necessary for the development of the system, as indicated by the 
Constitution and the Constitutional Court.12  
The analytic point of departure should, as in the case of any other legal dispute 
subject to South African law, be constitutional. This first step entails determining both 
“the relationship between and the relative authority of various sources of law” 
applicable to the servitude problem.13 The selection of the sources (including 
legislation, constitutional provisions and the common law) is a constitutional issue14 
and is guided by subsidiarity principles.15 The subsidiarity principles and a proviso as 
formulated by the Constitutional Court flow from the single-system-of-law principle.16 
According to the first principle formulated in South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence,17 litigants must turn to legislation enacted to give effect to a right 
in the Constitution and cannot rely on the constitutional provision pertaining to the right 
directly.18 This principle is qualified in the sense that it applies when an action is 
brought to protect a particular right against infringement, but not in a case where the 
constitutional validity of the legislation is questioned.19 The constitutional validity of the 
legislation may be challenged by a direct appeal to the relevant constitutional 
                                                          
12 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 739. 
13 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 32; AJ 
van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 738; AJ van 
der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 15. 
14 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 15. 
15 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756; AJ van 
der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 35.  
16 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 35. 
17 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52. 
18 AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-
128 100. 
19 100-101. 
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provision.20 The first subsidiarity principle is based on the democratic principle, that is, 
on acknowledgement of the duty of the legislature to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. If a litigant is allowed to appeal to the relevant 
constitutional provision and to ignore the legislation enacted to give effect to the 
constitutional provision, the basis for the principle would be negated.21 The 
qualification to the first principle is based on the norm that holds the majority 
accountable to and allows testing of legislation against the Constitution.  
The second subsidiarity principle prescribes that litigants may not turn directly to 
the common law to protect a right against infringement if that right is already protected 
by legislation enacted to give effect to it.22 Therefore, application or development of 
the common law is not an option once legislation has been enacted to protect the right. 
The common law may, however, still guide interpretation of the legislation to the extent 
that it accords with the Constitution, the relevant legislation and in so far as it is viable 
to augment the interpretation in line with section 39(2), that is, to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The second subsidiarity principle is also based 
on the single-system-of law-principle and aimed at the prevention of parallel systems 
of law and jurisprudence. The subsidiarity approach can therefore be summed up as 
a norm preventing litigants from relying directly on a constitutional provision or the 
common law if legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right. The 
constitutional provision may only be applied directly if the litigant wishes to attack the 
constitutional validity of the legislation. 
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Van der Walt argues that, flowing from the logic of the SANDU subsidiarity 
principle, in the absence of legislation protecting a constitutional right,23 a litigant must 
turn to the common law and may not directly rely on the relevant constitutional right, 
except when he challenges the constitutional validity of the common law.24 Section 
39(2)25 states the duty to develop the common law in line with the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.26 Should it not be possible to apply or develop the common 
law in accordance with the Constitution to give effect to the constitutional right, a 
litigant may turn directly to the constitutional provision to challenge a rule or institution 
of the common law that restricts or conflicts with the constitutional right or as basis for 
the creation of a special constitutional remedy.27 According to Van der Walt, the 
proviso to the second subsidiarity principle demarcates the space where the common 
law may be developed according to section 39(2) and may on the one hand be viewed 
as a “common-law development principle”.28 On the other hand, the first and second 
                                                          
23 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 36 clarifies this deduction by stating that it is 
applicable when legislation was not aimed at covering that aspect of law or where it does not cover it. 
24 AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-
128 115. 
25 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
26 AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-
128 115; AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 
723 notes that Fagan views the role of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights as secondary 
and as a tiebreaker indicating the preferred way of developing the common law when development is 
already justified by alternative reasons. Fagan’s view was criticised by both AJ van der Walt and Davis 
in further articles: for details see AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” 
(2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 723 n 1. 
27 AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-
128 115. 
28 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 37. 
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principles interact as an interpretive principle and the proviso to the first principle acts 
as a “constitutional review principle”.29  
If no relevant legislation is identified, the possibility emerges of relying on either 
a constitutional provision or the common law as the basis for litigation.30 Application of 
the common law must take into account relevant constitutional provisions, starting with 
section 173, which sanctions the high courts to develop the common law through their 
inherent power, and section 39(2), which provides the constitutional framework for 
development of the common law since it prescribes that courts should promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing the common law.31 It 
follows from these subsidiarity principles that in the case of servitude law, particularly 
usufruct, where there is no legislation to activate the second principle, a litigant must 
turn directly to either the common law or a relevant constitutional provision.32  
Once the appropriate sources of law have been identified, the first concern in a 
servitude case would be to work out the “implications that application, amendment or 
termination of any existing servitude arrangement (and the law that regulates it) might 
have for the shaping of democratic society foreseen in the Constitution”.33 The 
Constitution provides guidelines structuring this process which I consider in section 5 
2. This process involves determining the common law position by law by way of 
                                                          
29 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 37. 
30 AJ van der Walt “Normative Pluralism and Anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 Term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-
128 100. 
31 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common 
Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 738. 
32 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 740. 
33 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 32. 
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historical analysis.34 Once the position is determined, the next step would be to 
determine if the “outcome predicated on the common-law position is acceptable”.35 
Although persuasive non-constitutional reasons (for example policy and fairness 
considerations) may exist, constitutional evaluation of the outcome set by the common 
law is required. Assessment must determine whether the outcome dictated by the 
common law conflicts with “non-utilitarian, democratic constitutional provisions”.36 To 
determine whether the outcome based on the common law position is acceptable, a 
limitation analysis is necessary. This analysis determines whether a right in the Bill of 
Rights has been infringed by law of general application and whether this limitation is 
arbitrary or meets constitutional muster. Within the context of constitutional analysis in 
general, this is usually done by means of the “two-step approach” which I discuss in 
section 5 2 2 7. Within the context of property law, this analysis has been adapted in 
what is known as the FNB37 methodology,38 which I discuss in section 5 2 3 and 5 3 
1. The constitutional provisions that inform the present chapter necessitate that either 
                                                          
34 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 738; 
745. 
35 745. 
36 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 745. 
37 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
38 According to AJ Van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-
756 749-750 the FNB test involves seven questions: 
“(a) Is there a protected property interest involved? (b) If there was property, was there a 
deprivation of that property? (c) If there was a deprivation, was the deprivation arbitrary? 
(d) If the deprivation was arbitrary, can it be justified in terms of section 36(1)? (If the 
arbitrary deprivation cannot be justified, it is unconstitutional and that ends the 
constitutional inquiry.) (e) If the deprivation was not arbitrary or if it could be justified in 
terms of section 36(1), does it also constitute expropriation? (f) If the deprivation does 
constitute expropriation, does it comply with the requirements in section 25(2)? (f) If the 
expropriation does not comply with the section 25(2) requirements, can it be justified in 
terms of section 36(1)? If the expropriation does not comply and cannot be justified, it is 
unconstitutional.” 
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the generic “two-step approach” or its specification in the form of the FNB-
methodology is utilised to determine whether the consequences of the salva rei 
substantia requirement is acceptable in an open and democratic society based on 
equality, freedom and human dignity. 
The outcome of this inquiry determines whether “development of the common 
law is either constitutionally required or prohibited”.39 The decision to apply or develop 
the common law must be motivated by a constitutional argument (since “constitutional 
arguments for or against development of the common law would, in view of the 
supremacy of the Constitution, probably trump any utilitarian, non-constitutional 
considerations that might exist”)40 because a mere consideration of the logic and 
coherence of the common law doctrine or policy considerations would be 
inadequate.41 
In the previous chapters I have already investigated comparative,42 policy and 
theoretical considerations43 for a shift to a flexible position that might have persuasive 
force. This chapter presents, firstly, constitutional reasons that support a flexible 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement based on constitutional provisions 
aimed at securing democratic liberty.44 Therefore, the analysis will focus on the 
consequences of applying a rigid approach, that is, of the common law position as it 
currently stands. Noncompliance with the requirement, either wilfully or as a result of 
circumstances, results in termination of the usufruct where (a) the obligation to frame 
                                                          
39 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 745. 
40 745. 
41 741. 
42 See ch 3. 
43 See ch 4. 
44 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 32. 
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inventory and the obligation to provide security are not complied with in response to a 
court order, (b) the usufructuary property is subjected to disfigurement or serious 
abuse and (c) where the usufructuary property is destroyed or substantially changed. 
If constitutional provisions aimed at securing democratic liberty are compromised by 
the rigid approach the Constitution requires development of the common law and a 
shift to a flexible approach would be mandatory. Where the right to equality and non-
discrimination45 or the right of access to adequate housing46 is compromised, this 
would be the case. Moreover, where the right of access to housing is involved, it 
usually impacts on the right to dignity.47 If the usufructuary’s right of access to 
adequate housing is threatened in a case involving the deprivation of a usufruct right 
or where his property right in the form of a usufruct is terminated due to the 
disfigurement, misuse or substantial change in form or destruction of the usufructuary 
object, these provisions might be compromised. 
However, a discussion of constitutional considerations would not be complete 
without also reflecting on the consequences for the bare owner resulting from a shift 
to a flexible approach. Non-termination of the right of usufruct may impact the bare 
owner’s right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property.48 The question is, firstly, whether 
a deprivation of the bare owner’s right occurs and secondly, whether this deprivation 
provides a compelling reason for not adopting a flexible approach. 
                                                          
45 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9. 
46 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 26 
47 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 10. Section 10 of the Constitution entrenches 
the right to human dignity – a right that might be adversely impacted by the loss of the right of access 
to housing. See also R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the 
National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 60 n 3. 
48 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 25. 
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 In the constitutional analyses that follow, I follow the principles developed in Van 
der Walt’s articles on the continued relevance and the development of the common 
law to direct the inquiry.49  
 
5 2 Non-property constitutional provisions that require a flexible 
approach 
5 2 1 Introduction 
Van der Walt proposes that non-property constitutional provisions which “entrench and 
guarantee democratic liberty” should be considered first in any constitutional 
analysis.50 Relevant constitutional guarantees include the right to equality and the right 
of access to adequate housing. The right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property is 
also relevant, but Van der Walt argues that this right is economic rather than 
democratic and must therefore feature on a different level: 
“Normatively, consideration of the ‘higher’, democratic constitutional provisions 
has to take precedence over purely economic or efficiency interests because they 
concern higher, broader values that affect the overall wellbeing of the democratic 
society rather than just the economic utililty of one individual. Constitutionally, they 
have to be considered prior to economic interests because the Constitution is the 
highest law and because these guarantees enshrine the rights of all people in the 
country and affirm the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.”51 
                                                          
49 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756; AJ van 
der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35. 
50 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 32. 
51 33. 
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Based on this hierarchical differentiation argued by Van der Walt I therefore firstly 
investigate the section 9 and 26 implications of the salva rei substantia requirement 
and subsequently proceed with the section 25 analysis. The question as Van der Walt 
frames it is whether “these constitutional provisions explicitly prescribe, implicitly 
require, explicitly prohibit or implicitly preclude […] the enforcement, amendment or 
revocation of the legal rule or principle that regulates it”.52 The question is therefore 
whether any of these non-property constitutional provisions prescribes or requires 
development of the common law principles relating to the salva rei substantia 
requirement as it is currently understood and applied. 
 
5 2 2 Section 9 
The usufructuary has a duty to provide security where it is demanded by the bare 
owner. The duty to provide security ensures that the usufructuary complies with the 
salva rei substantia requirement. However, there are exceptions to these duties and 
in these cases the duty to provide security is not enforced. These exceptions have the 
effect of rendering compliance with the salva rei substantia requirement (providing 
security) unnecessary. They can therefore be seen as measures that promote 
flexibility.  
One of these exceptions relates to fathers who have the usufruct of usufructuary 
property of which their children are the owner. A father who has the usufruct of 
usufructuary property of which his child is the owner, does not have to furnish security 
to ensure that he will return the usufructuary salva rei substantia. This exception does 
not apply to mothers or stepparents. It is necessary to determine whether this 
                                                          
52 33. 
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exception which discriminates on the basis of gender, infringes the right to equality of 
the Constitution. 
 
5 2 2 1 The nature and content of section 9 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution53 states that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and 
has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”. Section 9(2) fleshes out the 
content of the right to equality: “Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all 
rights and freedoms”. Furthermore, section 9(3) states that discrimination on the 
grounds of “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth” is prohibited. Discrimination may not take place “directly or indirectly”, as 
described in section 9(4). The right is limited54 in cases “where it is established that 
discrimination is fair” but otherwise discrimination on the grounds listed in 9(3) is unfair. 
According to section 9(3) and (4), section 9 is applicable to the state and all persons. 
To actualise this right “legislative and other measures” may be taken in order to protect 
or advance parties “disadvantaged by unfair discrimination”. Moreover, section 9(4) 
compells “[n]ational legislation” to “be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination”. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
(PEPUDA)55 was enacted to fulfil this function.56 
                                                          
53 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9. 
54 See also The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 7(3) and s 36. 
55 Act 4 of 2000. 
56 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 244. 
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The right of equality is significant since it is underpinned by the democratic 
constitutional values of creating a society based on equality, dignity and freedom.57 
Notably, it is the first right listed in the Bill of Rights and protects the right to quality in 
the sense that it not only provides a constitutional guarantee of equal protection and 
benefit by the law but also prohibits unfair discrimination.58 In terms of the right to 
equality, parties who are in a similar position, should be treated in the same way where 
it is relevant.59 This would prompt the question what the content of similar treatment 
of people in a similar position should be and whether the outcome of similar treatment 
would give the parties access to the same opportunities, that is, to the “full and equal 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms” as stated in section 9(2).60  
Section 9 must be understood against the historical context of a preconstitutional 
political and legal system inextricably tied to inequality and discrimination and the 
ambitions of the Constitution to rectify this entrenched injustice.61 Particularly relevant 
here is the “long-embedded culture of patriarchy”.62 The listed grounds in section 9(3) 
recognise this legacy by prohibiting unfair discrimination based on gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status and sexual orientation. The Constitutional Court in Harksen 
v Lane NO63 reiterated that, among others, these grounds have previously been 
                                                          
57 See in this regard section 7(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: “This Bill of 
Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of people in our country 
and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom”. I Currie & J de Waal The 
Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 211. 
58 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 211. 
59 210. 
60 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9(2); I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (6 ed 2013) 211. 
61 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 211. 
62 212. 
63 1998 1 SA 300 CC para 49; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 227. 
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employed “to categorise, marginalise and often oppress persons who have had, or 
who have been associated with, these attributes or characteristics”. The Court pointed 
out that these grounds may “when manipulated” […] demean persons in their inherent 
humanity and dignity” and commented on the “complex relationship” between them. 
The Court also cautioned against forcing the grounds “into neatly self-contained 
categories”. This caveat is also important in this chapter where, for clarity of argument, 
the discussion of the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights is compartmentalised. 
With reference to section 8(2) of the interim Constitution the Court described the aim 
of the equality provision as a deterrent against discrimination “based on such criteria 
which may, amongst other things, result in the construction of patterns of disadvantage 
such as has occurred only too visibly in our history”. Furthermore, in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Hugo64 the Court noted that: 
“[e]ach case, therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the 
impact of the discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to 
determine whether its overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal 
of equality or not. A classification which is unfair in one context may not necessarily 
be unfair in a different context”. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the relevant ground of discrimination is gender.65 
Gender pertains to “ascribed social and cultural male and female roles”.66 In this case 
the exception from the duty to provide security granted to a father who enjoys the right 
                                                          
64 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 41; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 214. 
65 Gender needs to be differentiated from sex. The latter, according to I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of 
Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 227 refers to “biological and physical differences between men and 
women”. 
66 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 227. 
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of usufruct over property of which his child or children are the bare owner(s)67 requires 
scrutiny. Mothers or stepparents in a similar position are not exempted unless a 
testator grants them this exemption.68 Taking into account that usufructuaries may 
experience economic hardship, this exception grants fathers a particular advantage in 
the sense that they are not required to provide security on demand, whereas an 
impecunious mother or stepparents must take recourse to a court in terms of The 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA),69 which 
was enacted to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution. Furthermore, a court might 
use its discretion to intervene where an unreasonable demand in relation to security 
is made.70  
 
5 2 2 2 Legislation promulgated to give effect to section 9 
To give effect to section 9(4), PEPUDA71 was enacted. According to its preamble the 
act aims to eradicate “social and economic inequalities, especially those of a systemic 
nature, which were generated in our history by colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, 
and which brought pain and suffering to the great majority of our people”.72 In order to 
                                                          
67 Voet 7 9 7; Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 39 3; Carpzovius Definitiones Forenses 2 10 
9; Huber HR 2 39 23; Holl Cons 1 57 2; Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 3; Ex parte Wagenaar 1953 4 SA 435 
(C); Van Staden v Van Wyk 1958 2 SA 682 (O); CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 517. 
68 Voet 7 9 7; Schorer ad Grotius 2 39 3; Contra Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 39 3; Ex 
parte Newberry 1924; OPD 219 223-224; Ex parte Wagenaar 1953 4 SA 435 (C); Van Staden v Van 
Wyk 1958 2 SA 682 (O); Olivier v Venter 1933 EDL 206. 
69 Act 4 of 2000. 
70 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T); Van Rensburg v Mulder 
1998 JDR 0756 (T) 11. 
71 Áct 4 of 2000. 
72 References to The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and I 
Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 244-247 unless indicated otherwise. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
300 
 
fulfil this mandate it prohibits unfair discrimination, provides remedies for the victims 
of unfair discrimination and promotes the achievement of substantive equality. Unfair 
discrimination is generally prohibited by chapter 2.  
Since the Act has horizontal application, it binds the state and other parties. 
According to MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay,73 any equality challenge not 
challenging the Act itself should be brought in terms of the substantive and procedural 
provisions of PEPUDA. In accordance with subsidiarity principles, litigants may only 
base their cases on the right to equality if a provision of the Act itself or other litigation 
or conduct not falling in the scope of the Act is at issue. The assumption is that the Act 
is consistent with the Constitution. 
In comparison to litigation previously based on section 9, the Act places the 
burden of proof on the respondent once a prima facie case of discrimination is 
established by the complainant.74 In section 8 the Act lists different instances of unfair 
discrimination.75 The list includes discrimination based on gender. A respondent 
cannot argue that discrimination on one of the grounds can never amount to 
discrimination. Sections that might be relevant in a case brought on the grounds of the 
exemption of fathers from the duty to provide security might include section 8(d), which 
refers to “any practice […] that impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality 
between women and men”’, and section 8(d), which adds “any policy or conduct that 
unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources”. 
                                                          
73 2008 1 SA 474; Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 215, 245. 
74 246. 
75 247. 
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This Act was only enacted in 2000, brought partially in operation with effect from 
1 September 2000, with the remaining sections coming into effect from 16 June 2003. 
 
5 2 2 3 Application of section 9 and PEPUDA 
Prior to the enactment of PEPUDA,76 the approach to an infringement of the equality 
provision was set out in Harksen v Lane NO.77 Firstly, it had to be established whether 
the law differentiates between people or categories of people.78 Such a differentiation 
should have been rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose. If this was 
not the case, section 9(1) was infringed and the inquiry ended. However, a rational 
connection did not rule out discrimination. Secondly, the question was whether the 
differentiation came down to unfair discrimination. A “two-stage analysis” was then 
used in this inquiry. The first question was whether differentiation amounted to 
discrimination. If a ground specified in section 9 was involved, the differentiation 
amounted to discrimination. If the ground was not specified, it might have been based 
on “attributes and characteristics that have the potential to impair the fundamental 
human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably 
serious manner”. If the differentiation came down to discrimination, it had to be 
established whether it was unfair. In the case of a specified ground, unfairness was 
presumed, but in the case of an unspecified ground, the complainant needed to 
establish unfairness. The impact of the discrimination on the complainant and other 
parties in the same situation accordingly had to be determined. If the differentiation 
                                                          
76 Act 4 of 2000. 
77 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 53. 
78 References to I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 216-217 unless indicated 
otherwise. 
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was not unfair, there would have been no infringement of section 9(3) and (4). 
However, if the discrimination was unfair, the next question would have been if the 
provision could be justified by means of the limitation clause, section 36.  
In the case of the exemption from the duty to provide security, the challenged 
common law exception differentiates between fathers on the one hand and mothers 
or stepparents on the other who enjoy the usufruct of property of which their children 
are the bare owners.79 In terms of mothers the common law differentiates between 
                                                          
79 I only discuss discrimination based on gender here. The question is whether a discrimination 
argument can also be made regarding stepparents. The argument can probably be attempted on 
“analogous grounds”. A stepparent that has to provide for a child may suffer from the same financial 
hardship as a biological parent. In South Africa the structure of families has changed so that stepparents 
play a significant role in families and frequently support children. However, South African case law 
referring to stepparents focuses on the right of stepchildren and not specifically on the right of non-
discrimination where stepparents are concerned. See for example Heystek v Heystek 2002 2 SA 754 
(T) where it was held that a child also has a right to parental care from a stepparent. This decision is 
discussed by LN van Schalkwyk & A van der Linde “Onderhoudsplig van Stiefouer Heystek v Heystek 
2002 2 SA 754 (T)” (2003) 66 THRHR 301-312. See also J Heaton “Family Law and the Bill of Rights” 
in Y Makgoro & P Tlakula Bill of Rights Compendium (RS 34 2014) 1-86 para 3C46 who suggests that 
the term “parent” might be afforded a liberal interpretation in the future. Consequently, stepparents may 
be held responsible for certain duties of a parent or other family member in relation to the child. Heaton 
refers to Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 31 and Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population 
Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC) para 19. However, as Flynn v Farr No and Others 2009 1 SA 584 
(C) shows, proving discrimination on analogous grounds can be difficult, since it is difficult to prove that 
discrimination in terms of a de facto and de lege relationships (in casu between a de facto and de lege 
child of a stepfather based on s 1(4)(e) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987) impairs the dignity 
of a party. Furthermore, even if discrimination is established, the differentiation might be rationally 
connected to a legitimate government purpose. In MB v NB 2010 3 SA 220 (GSJ) para 25 Brassey AJ 
noted that certain passages in the Flynn decision “suggest that a de facto relationship should not be 
given legal recognition where, as here, nothing prevents the creation of its de jure equivalent”. In other 
words, if the reasoning of Brassey AJ is followed, when circumstances do not prevent the adoption of 
a child by a stepparent, the de facto relationship between the child and the stepparent should not be 
recognised. Consequently, the exception to the duty to provide security based on the parental 
relationship between the stepparent as usufructuary and the stepchild as bare owner cannot be applied 
to the stepparent. However, insistence on security where a usufruct is granted may ultimately be to the 
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mothers and fathers on the grounds of gender. Accordingly, a two-stage analysis had 
to be applied. Legitimate differentiation was distinguished from “constitutionally 
impermissible differentiation” by means of the criteria listed in section 9(3),80 and since 
gender is a listed ground it amounted to impermissible differentiation. Moreover, in 
modern society the differentiation did not seem to bear a rational connection to a 
legitimate government purpose. Although there seems to be a rational connection 
between the law that protects the interests of minors who are bare owners, that is, 
between the common law rule to give security and the protection of the bare owner, 
an exception to this rule can only be justified if it is in the interests of minors. However, 
differentiating between mothers and fathers in this regard in modern South African 
society does not bear a rational connection to protection of the interests of minors. The 
exception denies equal protection and benefit of the law of usufruct to mothers who 
are usufructuaries of property of which their children have the bare ownership. A 
mother who is a usufructuary may suffer the same hardship as a father in a similar 
position. Therefore, it seems that there is an infringement of section 9(1). The 
exception thus failed at the first stage of the inquiry and it was not necessary to 
proceed with the second stage of the constitutional inquiry or to do a section 36 
limitations analysis. Therefore, in terms of a section 9 analysis it seems a compelling 
reason existed for developing the common law position regarding the exceptions to 
the duty to provide security. 
                                                          
detriment of the child if the usufructuary needs access to the usufructuary property in order to provide 
for the child. Therefore, an argument based on s 28(2) concerning the primacy of the best interests of 
the child can probably also be constructed in favour of applying the exemption to stepparents.  
80 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 219. 
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However, since the enactment of PEPUDA,81 in terms of the subsidiarity 
principles litigation has to be brought in terms of the Act. The Act affirms the 
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court since it also separates the question of 
discrimination from the question whether the discrimination is unfair.82 The outcome 
of litigation on the exemption of fathers from the duty to provide security would 
probably also mirror the section 9 inquiry. Section 13(2)(a) of PEPUDA states that if 
discrimination takes place on a ground listed in paragraph (a) of the definition of 
‘prohibited grounds’ then it is unfair, unless the defendant proves the contrary. Gender 
is included in the prohibited grounds listed in paragraph (a) of the definition and since 
it would be unlikely that it can be proven that the discrimination is fair, a challenge to 
the common law exception will probably succeed. 
It is not clear what the remedy in such a case would be. The point of departure 
is that a law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid and must be declared 
so.83 It could be declared invalid to the extent that it is inconsistent with section 
172(1)(a) or rectified by a common law remedy similar to “reading in”.84 The exception 
could be upheld, but applied to all parents and stepparents since only applying it to 
mothers and fathers would still discriminate against stepparents and female same-sex 
parents. In any event the remedy would have to amount to a reading or development 
of the common law that brings it in line with the Constitution. In a way, this amounts to 
a flexible reading of the common law principles relating to the salva rei substantia 
                                                          
81 Act 4 of 2000. 
82 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 245. 
83 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 172; Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah 
Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) paras 81-87; Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 4 
SA 230 (CC) para 71; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 183. 
84 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 183-184.  
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requirement, resulting mandatorily from a non-property constitutional obligation. Such 
a development will deprive the bare owner of the right to be protected against 
impairment of the substance of the usufructuary property. However, this deprivation 
would not be arbitrary since compliance with the Constitution and the legislation giving 
effect to the right to equality mandates the development of the common law. 
 
5 2 3 Section 26 
5 2 3 1 Introduction 
Usufruct, like the other personal servitude of habitation, has the function of securing 
“personal residential or housing interests” in cases involving immovables.85 
Consequently, these servitudes reveal a public law dimension since they have the 
potential to trigger constitutional scrutiny where the right of access to adequate 
housing is concerned. Apart from enhancing economic liberty through its utilitarian 
purpose of securing housing interests, constitutional liberty is also bolstered by 
personal servitudes, since the rules governing their creation, amendment and 
termination help shape a free and democratic society.86 This civic or democratic 
function of servitude law implies that the Constitution as bulwark of a democratic 
society needs to be the point of departure for the examination and, if need be, the 
development of the law of servitude. Furthermore, as was argued in section 5 2, the 
investigation and development should be guided by constitutional guidelines 
prioritising the analysis of the impact of the common law on higher democratic 
constitutional provisions. This would include analysis of the impact of the law of 
                                                          
85 AJ van der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 30. 
86 31. 
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usufruct and particularly the salva rei substantia requirement on the operation of the 
housing clause. Does enforcement of the salva rei substantia requirement in certain 
instances exacerbate of the already prevalent housing problem in South Africa? 
Usufructuaries faced with the enforcement of the preservation requirement may, like 
those affected by the enforcement of mortgage bonds, be living in poverty, or 
experience a decrease in welfare.87 Whereas other areas of law, such as mortgage 
law, have already been shaped by developments to deal with homelessness,88 this is 
not the case for the common law of usufruct. The question is whether development is 
not required to address possible consequences of enforcement of the preservation 
requirement that may worsen homelessness. 
The usufructuary’s right of access to adequate housing is only threatened in 
limited circumstances, namely in a case involving the deprivation of a usufruct right 
due to noncompliance with the security and inventory duties where the usufructuary is 
“holding over”. The main question in this section of the chapter is whether and how the 
substantive law that governs usufruct should develop in response to the housing 
clause.89 More concretely, when and how should the law of usufruct allow for a 
usufructuary to be evicted? And furthermore, when is it unjustifiable to evict the 
usufructuary, for example, if less invasive measures exist to protect the bare owner, 
or if the result of the limitation of the right of usufruct is disproportionate? 
                                                          
87 Compare R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National 
Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 60; GF Wright “Die 
Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 58 THRHR 86-91 86. 
88 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 61. 
89 67. 
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In the following subsections I first discuss preconstitutional evictions to 
contextualise the discussion of the the housing clause. Secondly, I consider the nature 
and content of the clause to indicate how the substantive content of the right of access 
to housing has been fleshed out to a degree in which it could assist in an eviction 
inquiry pertaining to a usufructuary. Thirdly, I discuss the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE)90 as legislation promulgated to give 
effect to this right and consider whether and how this legislation would be applicable 
to former usufructuaries faced with eviction. 
 
5 2 3 2 Eviction of usufructuaries in the preconstitutional era 
In the preconstituitional era, according to the common law of usufruct, eviction orders 
could be obtained against the noncompliant usufructuary who did not comply with a 
court order mandating the framing of inventory or the provision of security.91 
Particularly in the preconstitutional era the rules and procedures in eviction 
proceedings gave precedence to the right of ownership.92 The plaintiff, which would 
be the bare owner, could merely prove that he was the owner of the property and that 
the defendant, which would be the usufructuary, was in occupation. The onus was 
then on the usufructuary to establish a right to continue occupation. If the usufructuary 
pleaded lawful occupation in terms of usufruct, the bare owner had to answer this plea. 
If the bare owner conceded the existence of a usufruct, he was burdened with proving 
                                                          
90 19 of 1998. 
91 Schoeman v Schoeman and Another 1953 2 SA 441 (T); Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C). 
92 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 587. 
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lawful termination of the usufructuary’s right to occupy the property in terms of the 
usufruct.  
In regard to a usufructuary faced with the threat of eviction in reaction to his 
failure to provide security mandated by a court order, the preconstitutional case of 
Schoeman v Schoeman93 could serve as an illustration of the manner in which the 
courts approached the eviction of a usufructuary prior to the Constitution. In this case 
Roper J considered whether the bare owner was entitled to an order of ejectment 
against a noncompliant usufructuary and holder of a servitude of habitation of the 
usufructuary property.94 With reference to Voet,95 he concluded that the applicant was 
entitled to an order of ejectment if the usufructuary did not comply with an order of 
court for inventory and security to be supplied within one month from the date of the 
order.96 In the particular case the applicant was the registered owner of immovable 
property subject to usufruct, in respect of one-half thereof, in favour of the first 
respondent.97 Furthermore, the usufructuary was entitled to reside in a house on one 
of the pieces of land until his death. The second respondent was in occupation of the 
house or of a portion thereof98 as lessee from the first respondent99 and the order was 
also applicable to him.100 The case does not mention the personal circumstances of 
the usufructuary or of the second respondent. The question arises whether the 
                                                          
93 1953 2 SA 441 (T). 
94 Schoeman v Schoeman and Another 1953 2 SA 441 (T) 442. 
95 Voet 7 9 2; 7 9 9; 7 9 11.  
96 Schoeman v Schoeman and Another 1953 2 SA 441 (T) 391. 
97 390. 
98 It is unclear whether the other portion was occupied by the usufructuary, but the possibility cannot be 
ruled out. By implication the usufructuary may also have been denied access to adequate housing as 
result of the court order for eviction. 
99 Schoeman v Schoeman and Another 1953 2 SA 441 (T) 390. 
100 391. 
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conclusion reached in this decision (that a bare owner would be entitled to an order of 
ejectment should a usufructuary fail to frame an inventory and provide security in 
response to a court order), based solely on passages from Voet, without considering 
the circumstances of the respondents, would pass in a constitutional dispensation. Not 
only the usufructuary but the occupier would be affected since the landlord would only 
have a limited real right to the property, which would be terminated.101 Rigid application 
of the inventory and security obligations tied to the salva rei substantia requirement 
would result in the usufructuary and the second respondent as occupiers being 
deprived of their right to occupy the premises. This outcome would be at odds with 
section 26 of the Constitution because both the usufructuary and the second 
respondent would probably be deprived of their right of access to adequate housing 
by being ejected.102 
The common law concerning eviction would not have given effect to the 
requirements of section 26(3) of the Constitution.103 Hence, the legislature 
promulgated legislation aimed at preventing homelessness by protecting occupiers 
from inequitable eviction.104 Within the context of the law of usufruct, PIE prevents 
default evictions and requires the relevant circumstances to be considered before an 
                                                          
101 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 
2006) 433 and n 51. 
102 Compare AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-
756 743. G Muller The Impact of Section 26 of the Constitution on the Eviction of Squatters in South 
African Law (2011) unpublished LD dissertation Stellenbosch University 92 remarks that courts have 
not considered that “evictions more often than not lead to homelessness, which undermines the right 
of access to adequate housing”. 
103 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 587. 
104 588. 
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eviction order can be granted. It furthermore gives the court a broad discretion to 
decline an eviction order where justice and equity would require it to do so. 
 
5 2 3 3 The nature of section 26 
Section 26(1) of the Constitution105 states: “[e]veryone has the right to have access to 
adequate housing”. Furthermore, subsection 3 prescribes that “[n]o one may be 
evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit 
arbitrary evictions”. These provisions of the Bill of Rights protect the right of access to 
adequate housing and provide for procedural fairness where a party who has access 
to adequate housing is faced with eviction. The right of access to adequate housing is 
categorised as a socio-economic right.106  
Socio-economic rights embody the transformative impetus of the Constitution.107 
As such, they create the opportunity to live a “life of dignity, freedom and equality”.108 
                                                          
105 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 26(1) 
106 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 565; R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure 
under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 62 particularly n 8. 
107 S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-economic Rights to Private Law” 2008 TSAR 464-480 464; 
I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 564. 
108 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 564. In contrast to the first-generation 
rights which are premised on the notion that government interference in individual liberty should be 
curbed, and which are conceptualised as negative rights restraining the power of government, socio-
economic rights are categorised as second-generation rights. Second-generation rights are 
predominantly conceptualised as positive rights imposing duties on the government based on the 
interconnection between human rights and basic social living conditions. They may however entail both 
positive and negative duties. R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing 
and the National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 62 states that 
socio-economic rights are mainly associated with public law, but not limited to this field. As S Liebenberg 
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Liebenberg emphasises that judicial review in terms of these constitutional rights and 
values functions to create the possibility to disengage the entrenched power and 
privileged position of those who already have access to socio-economic resources and 
works against the “exclusion and marginalisation of those who currently lack the 
means to participate meaningfully in the social and economic institutions of society”.109 
The right of access to adequate housing has the purpose of alleviating 
homelessness and to prevent its unjustified escalation.110 In this regard, the first two 
subsections are aimed at the alleviation of homelessness. The first subsection may 
also be viewed as preventing existing housing being lost, along with subsection three, 
which regulates evictions.111 Within the context of eviction of unlawful usufructuaries, 
only section 26(1) and (3) would be relevant to the discussion. 
 
5 2 3 4 The content of section 26(1) 
According to section 26(1), everyone has the right of access to adequate housing. 
Although this right places the duty on the state to provide access to adequate housing, 
it does not entail an unqualified obligation. The duty is not only imposed on the state 
but is also binding on private parties, as was indicated in Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom,112 where it was held that section 26(1) entails “at the 
                                                          
“The Application of Socio-economic Rights to Private Law” 2008 TSAR 464-480 464 and I Currie & J 
de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 565 note, this is the case since common-law rules 
(including the law of usufruct) “structure access to socio-economic resources” in property law. 
109 S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-economic Rights to Private Law” 2008 TSAR 464-480 465. 
110 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 62. 
111 62-63. 
112 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
312 
 
very least, a negative obligation upon the State and all other entities and persons to 
desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate housing”.113 In 
Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stolz114 the content of this negative duty was 
fleshed out. The Court decided that “any measure which permits a person to be 
deprived of existing access to adequate housing, limits the rights protected in section 
26(1)”.115 As Liebenberg notes, this finding indicates that private law rules which allow 
parties to be deprived of existing access to socio-economic rights such as the right of 
access to adequate housing are inconsistent with section 26(1).116 
 
5 2 3 5 The content of section 26(3) 
When a usufruct is terminated as result of noncompliance with a court order to frame 
inventory or provide security, a usufructuary may lose his home and his right of access 
to adequate housing may be threatened or compromised. According to the common 
law the bare owner therefore has the right to evict the usufructuary, since the latter 
qualifies as an unlawful occupier after termination of the right of usufruct.  
Subsection 26(3), entails procedural and substantive requirements safeguarding 
parties against arbitrary eviction.117 In terms of the procedural requirements, literature 
points to a gradual “proceduralisation to give ‘remedial bite’ to the right”.118 Procedural 
principles, particularly those relating to joinder of municipalities, the obligation to report 
and meaningful engagement are used “to move towards establishing the substantive 
                                                          
113 S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-economic Rights to Private Law” 2008 TSAR 464-480 467. 
114 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
115 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 34. 
116 S Liebenberg “The Application of Socio-economic Rights to Private Law” 2008 TSAR 464-480 468. 
117 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 589. 
118 589. 
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content of the section 26 housing right”.119 However, the substantive requirements of 
the subsection are not developed to the same extent.120 Brits notes that section 26(1) 
informs the content of section 26 as a whole.121 The section aims to provide and 
protect access to adequate housing.122 Therefore, the judicial oversight and discretion 
mandated by section 26(3) is aimed at ensuring that all the relevant circumstances are 
taken into account when the right to access to adequate housing is limited. In the 
application of PIE, the principal piece of legislation promulgated to give effect to 
section 26, consideration of the relevant circumstances is of significance.  
Upon termination of usufruct the owner may evict the usufructuary by means of 
PIE. It is therefore necessary to determine the relevant circumstances that need to be 
taken into account in deciding whether the usufructuary should be evicted. However, 
determining what these circumstances encompass is a challenging and individualised 
exercise. Section 26(3) does not provide guidance as to the scope of relevant 
circumstances.123 Pienaar and Mostert note that a numerus clausus of relevant 
circumstances does not exist.124 They do however attempt to draw conclusions from 
case law in this regard.125 Firstly, the identity of the applicant is significant. In cases 
                                                          
119 589. 
120 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 590; R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure 
under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 65. 
121 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 65-66. 
122 66. 
123 R Brits & AJ van der Walt “Application of the Housing Clause during Mortgage Foreclosure: a 
Subsidiarity Approach to the Role of the National Credit Act (Part 1)” 2014 TSAR 288-305 291. 
124 JM Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: die Verhouding tussen 
Artikel 25(1), Artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (Deel 1)” 2006 TSAR 522-536 527. 
125 Although JM Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: die Verhouding 
tussen Artikel 25(1), Artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (Deel 1)” 2006 TSAR 522-536 533-534 discuss 
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where the state is the applicant more stringent requirements and additional duties are 
involved.126 In a usufruct case where a bare owner is the applicant in eviction 
proceedings the requirements would therefore probably be less strict. Secondly, the 
vulnerability, indigence, and exigence of the defendants would also be serious 
considerations where an eviction order is at issue.127 In the case of an impecunious 
usufructuary the court would have to consider the dire need and vulnerability of the 
defendant, as was amply illustrated in Van den Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and 
Another.128 Thirdly, the social responsibility of the owner of the property might be a 
consideration.129 If the latter can or does not want to use the property at issue for better 
social objectives it might count in favour of the defendant. In the context of eviction 
cases concerning usufructuaries, this might imply that the bare owner set on evicting 
a usufructuary might have to bring evidence of a worthy use for the property which 
would probably not outweigh the usufructuary’s need to housing. Fourthly, 
considerations of equity and fairness are paramount – but need not per se imply that 
the occupier’s interests will trump those of the applicant.130 In terms of this factor, in 
cases where owners of private property seek eviction, courts have started to develop 
the content of subsection 26(3) by giving meaning to the “just and equitable” 
requirement mandated in the legislation enacted to give effect to the housing right, 
                                                          
other considerations such as land grabs, queue-jumping and commercial property (these are not 
applicable to eviction disputes involving usufructuaries and I do not discuss them here). 
126 JM Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: die Verhouding tussen 
Artikel 25(1), Artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (Deel 1)” (2006) TSAR 522-536 528. 
127 JM Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: die Verhouding tussen 
Artikel 25(1), Artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (Deel 1)” (2006) TSAR 522-536 531. 
128 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T). 
129 JM Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: die Verhouding tussen 
Artikel 25(1), Artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (Deel 1)” (2006) TSAR 522-536 533. 
130 534. 
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namely PIE.131 In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd132 Van der Westhuizen J established that the court should take 
an “open list of factors” into consideration when determining whether the eviction 
would be just and equitable.133 These factors could include the duration of occupation, 
previous lawfulness and potential homelessness of either of the two litigating parties. 
In City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd,134 the Court held that the right 
of property owners is not absolute, which would imply that there are cases where an 
eviction order in favour of a private landowner would not be just and equitable. Private 
owners should even, in cases where it would be just and equitable to grant an eviction 
order, exercise patience where needed to fulfil the requirements of PIE and to prevent 
temporary homelessness.135  
Furthermore, in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika136 the court held 
that the personal circumstances of occupiers are relevant circumstances.137 As Muller 
observes, the obligation to consider all relevant circumstances marks a significant shift 
from the common law position where eviction was treated as “an abstract or absolute 
                                                          
131 19 of 1998. 
132 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 39. 
133 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 
104 (CC) para 39; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 590. 
134 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) n 22. 
135 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 
104 (CC) paras 40; 100; Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2011 ZACC 36 paras 11, 13; City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 
294 (SCA) para 25. 
136 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA). 
137 G Muller The Impact of Section 26 of the Constitution on the Eviction of Squatters in South African 
Law (2011) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 101. 
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remedy for a private land owner without regard for the personal circumstances of the 
occupiers”.138  
The factors above may also be considered in disputes where a usufructuary as 
unlawful occupier is faced with eviction. A usufructuary will be an unlawful occupier 
when his right of usufruct is terminated and he still occupies the usufructuary property. 
According to PIE the court is mandated to consider all relevant factors when deciding 
whether an unlawful occupier should be evicted. Although Troksie and Another v 
Liquidator of RSD Construction CC Wilbecar Liquidators CC t/a Bureau Trust Gauteng 
RSD Construction CC and Others139 dealt with an unregistered usufruct, it not only 
gives an indication of relevant factors the court might consider in a usufruct case, but 
also how unlawful occupiers in an eviction case should take responsibility for providing 
sufficient supporting evidence that the court can take into consideration when 
determining whether an eviction would be just and equitable.140 Furthermore, the court 
also distinguished between unlawful occupiers who may be categorised as poor and 
vulnerable, those whose “protection was obviously foremost in the Legislature’s mind 
when it enacted PIE”141 and those who do not belong to this class.142 Factors 
considered in the decision include the age of the holder of the personal right, the 
                                                          
138 99. 
139 Case no 71322/2010 [2015] ZAGPPHC 321. 
140 Paras 70-71. 
141 Van der Berg AJ in Troksie and Another v Liquidator of RSD Construction CC Wilbecar Liquidators 
CC t/a Bureau Trust Gauteng RSD Construction CC and Others (71322/2010) [2015] ZAGPPHC 321 
referred to Wormald NO v Kambule 2006 3 SA 569 571E-F para 20. In paras 25-26 of the latter case it 
was assumed without deciding that according to customary law the widow “enjoys a type of personal 
servitude of usus or habitatio” of the residence she was permitted occupy. However, the court found 
her occupation to be unlawful and had to decide whether her eviction would be just and equitable. She 
was likened to an affluent tenant holding over and consequently not “in dire need for accommodation”. 
Therefore the court concluded that an eviction would be equitable and fair. 
142 Para 72. 
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duration of occupation of the premises, whether the property was used to generate an 
income and whether another source of income was available, whether alternative 
accommodation was available, the health of the holder of the personal right, the 
urgency of the party bringing the application for an eviction order.143 In casu the parties 
were elderly people who had lived on the property for 37 years, and the first applicant 
had acute heart problems. However they did not reveal their financial position. Van 
der Berg AJ ruled that they did not belong to the class of persons PIE was enacted to 
protect from eviction and did not disclose their. Consequently, the eviction order was 
granted. It seems that an open list of factors is taken into account as relevant 
circumstances to determine whether an eviction would be just and equitable. Although 
these factors might prima facie indicate that an eviction might not be just and equitable, 
certain factors such as the financial position of the unlawful occupier might weigh more 
than other indicators of vulnerability. 
 
5 2 3 6 Legislation promulgated to give effect to section 26(3) 
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act144 (PIE) 
repealed the old Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act145 and was enacted with the aim 
of protecting constitutional housing and property rights where evictions are 
concerned.146 PIE is applicable to the eviction of unlawful occupiers of all land in South 
                                                          
143 Paras 69; 73. 
144 19 of 1998. 
145 52 of 1951. 
146 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 270 
n 11. 
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Africa.147 As such, it gives effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. It is not the only 
legislation relevant in an evictions context.148 Evictions may also be subject to The 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act149 (ESTA) or other legislation aimed at protecting 
security of tenure such as the Informal Protection of Land Rights Act.150 For the most 
part, evictions are either regulated by PIE or ESTA. Since ESTA151 defines an occupier 
as a party residing on the land of another with consent or another right in law, it would 
not be applicable in instances where the usufructuary is an unlawful occupier. In that 
case the relevant legislation to apply in the event of imminent eviction proceedings 
would therefore be PIE152.  
In City of Cape Town v Rudolph153 the court found that the provisions of PIE 
replace the rei vindicatio if this action would result in eviction.154 The pivotal question 
here would be whether a usufructuary subject to an eviction order due to the 
noncompliance with the security or inventory requirement, would qualify as an unlawful 
occupier. Section 1 of PIE defines the latter as someone who either does not have 
                                                          
147 ZT Boggenpoel “Does Method Really Matter? Reconsidering the Role of Common-Law Remedies 
in the Eviction Paradigm (2014) 25 Stell LR 72-98 72; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 271. 
148 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 270 
n 11. 
149 62 of 1997. 
150 31 of 1996. 
151 62 of 1997. 
152 19 of 1998. 
153 2004 5 SA 39 (C) 61 E & 59 I. 
154 JM Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet: die Verhouding tussen 
Artikel 25(1), Artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (Deel 1)” (2006) TSAR 277-299  292. 
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“express or tacit consent of the owner or person in charge, or without any other right 
in law to occupy such land”.155 
In Schoeman v Schoeman and Another156 the Court established that a 
usufructuary and holder of the right of habitation would not “be entitled to the use and 
enjoyment of the property” until an inventory and security have been provided on the 
bare owner’s insistence.157 Roper J relied on Voet, who emphatically states that wilful 
noncompliance with the security requirement will deprive the usufructuary “of all the 
benefit of the usufruct” for the period of his noncompliance.158 Furthermore, the bare 
owner is entitled to claim the property by means of vindicatio. For the duration of his 
noncompliance the usufructuary therefore does not have a right in law to the 
usufructuary property.159 The definition of an unlawful occupier would therefore be 
applicable to the usufructuary who does not provide security on the insistence of the 
bare owner in response to a court order.  
Furthermore, in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika160 the Court elaborated on the 
definition of an unlawful occupier by including parties who previously were lawful 
occupiers but who later became unlawful. These cases are referred to as cases of 
“holding over”. Therefore, PIE also applies to occupiers who refuse to vacate the 
property after a lease termination or a sale of execution resulting from the calling up 
                                                          
155 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 271-
272. 
156 1953 2 SA 441 (T). 
157 Schoeman v Schoeman and Another 1953 2 SA 441 (T) 391. 
158 391. 
159 Thanks to Regard Brits for a conversation on this point. 
160 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA). 
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of a mortgage bond.161 Although the term “holding over” was generally reserved for 
these instances, the court in Vorster v Van Niekerk, Van Niekerk en Enige Ander 
Onregmatige Okkupeerders Welke Gevind Mag Word op Eiendom Bekend as 
Saffierstraat 6, Jordania,162 with reference to Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v 
Jika,163 interpreted the facts as an example of “holding over” where PIE was 
applicable.164 In casu the first respondent averred that the respondents (the applicant’s 
maternal grandfather and his wife) had acquired a life right (lewensreg)165.166 
Therefore, based on case law expanding the scope of the definition of an unlawful 
occupier, it would seem plausible that PIE could also be applicable to usufructuaries 
who are “holding over”.  
Having established that PIE would be applicable in situations where the 
usufructuary qualifies as an unlawful occupier faced with eviction, the relevant 
circumstances that need to be considered in an eviction application should be 
investigated. In section 5 2 3 5 I discuss the scope of these circumstances with 
reference to factors identified by Pienaar and Mostert as a starting point for such an 
inquiry in eviction disputes. I also indicated that the consideration of personal 
circumstances falls in this category. 
 
                                                          
161 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 272 
n 20. 
162 Case no 6723/2008 (OFSPD) decided 2009-02-05. 
163 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA). 
164 Case no 6723/2008 (OFSPD) decided 2009-02-05 para 9. 
165 W du Plessis, J Pienaar & N Olivier “Land Matters and Rural Development: 2009 (2)” (2009) 24 
SAPR/PL 599 translates the term “lewensreg” as “usufruct. In Ex parte Van Zijl and Bilse 1946 OPD 46 
the term used in a will was interpreted to encompass the notion of habitatio. 
166 Case no 6723/2008 (OFSPD) decided 2009-02-05 para 5. 
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5 2 3 7 Eviction of usufructuaries in the constitutional era 
Section 34 governs the right of access to courts and mandates judicial oversight in the 
settling of private disputes.167 Brits views section 26(3) as an embodiment of this 
constitutional value in eviction law, since it underlines that an eviction may only be 
effected where a court has taken all the relevant circumstances into account.168 It 
therefore combines a procedural and substantive safeguard. Furthermore, as Van der 
Walt points out, Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others169 
established that court procedures and particularly those facilitating “‘normal’ 
commercial processes may not be abused “to exploit or exacerbate the economic and 
social weakness and marginality of the poor, especially when doing so has a negative 
impact on state efforts to alleviate homelessness”.170 It is therefore imperative that 
eviction proceedings, in what would traditionally be seen as private law disputes, take 
place within this constitutional framework. Evictions can no longer be based on 
administrative decisions only, but require the authority of court order granted after all 
the relevant circumstances have been taken into account.171 A relevant question would 
subsequently be how the courts should approach this inquiry where a potential eviction 
may infringe the right to adequate housing. 
                                                          
167 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 92. 
168 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 92. 
169 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
170 AJ van der Walt “Property, Social Justice and Citizenship: Property Law in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa” (2008) 3 Stell LR 325-346 331-332; R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: 
Property, Housing and the National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 76. 
171 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 587. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
322 
 
Case law pertaining to an eviction order issued to a usufructuary who fails to 
provide security on the insistence of the bare owner is scarce both prior to and during 
the constitutional dispensation. Schoeman v Schoeman and Another172 typifies the 
common law response during the preconstitutional era. One notable case after the 
enactment of the Constitution illustrates the consideration of relevant circumstances 
pertaining to the usufructuary where an eviction order was demanded. However, this 
case neither refers to the Constitution, nor revises the common law position on the 
requirement to provide security as stated in Schoeman v Schoeman, although it marks 
the exercise of judicial discretion regarding the enforcement of the security obligation.  
In Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another173 the usufructuary 
was clearly impecunious.174 Van der Byl AJ mentions that she only possessed an old 
vehicle and no other assets. Furthermore, she was dependent on the monthly rental 
income received from letting the house. Accordingly, the court found that she was not 
able to provide the security that was demanded of her.175 In the absence of relevant 
case law, the Court referred to an article of Wright on the impecunious usufructuary.176 
Wright discusses the common law authorities and comes to the conclusion that the 
viewpoint taken by Voet, namely that the judge should exercise his discretion where 
an impecunious usufructuary is involved, is the most equitable.177 Following this 
                                                          
172 1953 2 SA 441 (T). 




177 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 12-13. The viewpoint of 
Voet is also supported by Van der Linden and is the predominant approach of textbook writers. Van der 
Keessel however advocates a stricter approach not allowing for a lenient approach towards the 
impecunious usufructuary. 
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approach would also give effect to the intention of the deceased testator to benefit the 
usufructuary.178 According to Van der Byl AJ equity was an important consideration in 
casu.179 The Court applied its common law discretion and relieved the usufructuary of 
the obligation to provide security.180  
The approach advocated by Van der Byl AJ not only aligns with the dominant 
viewpoint of Roman Dutch writers,181 but would also be in accordance with section 
26(3) of the Constitution, which prescribes consideration of all the relevant 
circumstances. It therefore seems to be possible to approach cases where an eviction 
order is demanded on noncompliance with the security requirement, in a way that 
takes cognisance of the relevant circumstances, although it was clearly mandated by 
the position of the respondent as an impecunious usufructuary. In the absence of 
further relevant case law on this point dating from the constitutional dispensation, it is 
unclear whether the Court would in every instance consider the relevant 
circumstances.  
 
5 2 3 Assessment 
From the discussion of the non-property constitutional provisions above, it is evident 
that sections 9 and 26 provide mandatory reasons for development of the common 
law regarding the salva rei substantia requirement. Firstly, exemption from certain 
obligations under the requirement may not establish unjust discrimination. In particular 
                                                          
178 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 13. 
179 Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) 13. 
180 13. 
181 See discussion of Voet and Van der Linden in GF Wright “Die Onvermoënde Vruggebruiker” (1995) 
58 THRHR 86-91. 
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exemption from the obligation to furnish security may not result in unjustified 
discrimination against mothers182 Therefore, the common law will have to be 
developed to treat mothers and fathers the same. 
Secondly, enforcement of the salva rei substantia requirement that ends in 
termination of the usufruct will have to comply with the PIE requirements for eviction 
when applicable. In some instances it might require development of the common law 
to avoid eviction. 
Since it is within the power of the courts to develop the common law, and they 
are constitutionally mandated to do so, they have no discretion to avoid development. 
Mandatory development of the common law required by the equality clause and the 
housing clause will have to be considered before property issues are even addressed. 
 
5 3 Section 25 reasons for a flexible approach 
5 3 1 Introduction 
Reasons for developing the common law relating to the salva rei substantia 
requirement in view of mandatory non-property constitutional provisions have been 
established in section 5 2. The next question is whether section 25 also requires a 
flexible approach to or development of the common law, seeing that it protects the 
usufructuary’s right. 
 
                                                          
182 If the exemption establishes unjustified discrimination against stepparents on the basis of analogous 
grounds it would also be unconstitutional. I have not developed this argument here. See further 5 2 2 
3. 
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5 3 2 The nature and content of section 25 
The property clause does not aim to protect private property but constitutional 
property.183 Therefore, it does not act as a shield or guarantee for existing property 
rights against all infringements. It is rather aimed at establishing and maintaining a 
balance between “individually vested rights” and “the public interest in the regulation 
of property”.184 Since the rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute, individual property 
interests may also be limited and in general, these limitations do not warrant 
compensation. 
In line with this balancing aim, the property clause is structured into “two 
seemingly contradictory parts that exhibit “structural tension”.185 The first part focuses 
on the protection of property interests, the second on reform.186 These two parts can 
also be related to the historical context of the Constitution and its purpose of 
transformation.187 
                                                          
183 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 295. 
184 295. 
185 295-296. 
186 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 16; R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under 
the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 295-296. 
187 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) refers to Sachs J’s historical and contextual 
approach in terms of a “broad constitutional matrix” in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 14 ff as example. R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: 
Property, Housing and the National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University 296. 
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According to section 25(1) no one may be deprived of property except in terms 
of law of general application. Woolman and Botha conceptualised a “four-pronged 
test”188 for law of general application: 
“[T]he authorising law must be generally and equally applicable and ensure parity 
of treatment; non-arbitrary in the sense that the law is applied according to a 
discernible standard; precise enough so that people can arrange their conduct to 
meet its standards; and accessible in the sense that the law has been publicly 
promulgated and is available to the public at large”.189 
In terms of this test, the principles of the common law would qualify as law of general 
application.190 Since the phrase “law of general application” in section 25(1) is inclusive 
of the common law, a regulatory deprivation of property can also be sanctioned by a 
common law rule. 191 As law of general application the common law may also not 
authorise arbitrary deprivations of property. Accordingly, the law of usufruct and the 
salva rei substantia requirement would by implication also meet the requirements for 
law of general application. The requirement for law of general application is a formal 
minimum requirement.192 Therefore, the court should determine if the law in question 
is authority for the deprivation in the sense that it foresaw and authorised it. Should 
                                                          
188 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 232; 233. 
189 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 232 refers to S Woolman & H Botha 
“Limitations” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 2 (2 ed OS 
2006) chapter 34 48-49. 
190 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 233 refers to S Woolman & H Botha 
“Limitations” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 2 (2 ed OS 
2006) chapter 34 51-53. 
191 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 234. 
192 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 297. 
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the deprivation be unauthorised, it would not meet constitutional muster and the inquiry 
would end without the need to apply the arbitrariness test. 
The law may not allow arbitrary deprivation of property, which indicates that a 
deprivation should be authorised by law that makes provision for and results in 
regulation.193 This implies that the specific law allowing the deprivation and not the 
deprivation itself must be challenged. A law authorising arbitrary deprivation of 
property would either be unconstitutional or would be read down so that it would not 
allow arbitrary deprivations.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, only section 25(1) would be relevant, since 
the expropriation clause and the clauses dealing with land reform are not applicable 
to common law disputes.194 These clauses are exclusively related to legislation and 
direct state involvement. I therefore limit the discussion of both the content and the 
application of section 25 to section 25(1), otherwise known as the deprivation clause. 
 
5 3 3 Application of section 25 
In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Services (FNB)195 the “two-stage approach” was modified and applied to decide a 
section 25 property dispute.196 The FNB test involves seven questions: 
                                                          
193 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 297. 
194 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 235 n 131. 
195 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
196 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 301; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law (3 ed 2011) 75. 
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“(a) Is there a protected property interest involved? (b) If there was property, was 
there a deprivation of that property? (c) If there was a deprivation, was the 
deprivation arbitrary? (d) If the deprivation was arbitrary, can it be justified in terms 
of section 36(1)? (If the arbitrary deprivation cannot be justified, it is 
unconstitutional and that ends the constitutional inquiry.) (e) If the deprivation was 
not arbitrary or if it could be justified in terms of section 36(1), does it also constitute 
expropriation? (f) If the deprivation does constitute expropriation, does it comply 
with the requirements in section 25(2)? (f) If the expropriation does not comply with 
the section 25(2) requirements, can it be justified in terms of section 36(1)? If the 
expropriation does not comply and cannot be justified, it is unconstitutional.”197 
Ackermann J forged the FNB methodology from the two-stage approach and the initial 
questions from the first stage were reworked into questions (a) to (c), while question 
(d) marks the commencement of the stage two inquiry.198  
Section 25(1) states: “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”.199 
Therefore, it should be determined whether the interest involved does indeed qualify 
for protection as property under specifically sections 25(1) and (2).200 Furthermore, 
section 25 requires that the constitutional analysis be framed in terms of the question 
whether an interference with the property interest has occurred and whether this 
interference conflicts with the property clause.201 Consequently, in the FNB case 
                                                          
197 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 749-
750. 
198 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (6 ed 2013) 163-164. 
199 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
200 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 
(2 ed OS 2003) 46; L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished 
LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 78. AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 112. 
201 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 749. 
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Ackermann approached the constitutional inquiry by first addressing whether in the 
particular dispute a property interest is involved.202  
From the outset, constitutional cases have shied away from adopting a universal 
definition of property,203 endorsing a wide definition accommodating “all rights and 
interests that have to be protected according to international standards”.204 The FNB 
decision confirmed the pragmatic difficulty of providing a comprehensive definition but 
gave guidance in its preference for a “dynamic public law view of property” as 
advocated by Van der Walt.205 Regardless of the academic debates about the scope 
of property for purposes of section 25, there is authority for the proposition that a 
limited real right, and particularly a servitude, qualifies.206 
If usufruct is terminated either due to noncompliance with a court order for 
security or inventory or as consequence of the disfigurement, destruction or 
substantial transformation of the usufructuary property, the usufructuary is deprived of 
all his entitlements to enjoy and use the object of the usufruct under the limited real 
right granted in the property of the bare owner. Since the limited real right at issue 
                                                          
202 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 749. 
203 See Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 70-75; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law (3 ed 2011) 112 referring to para 72 of the FNB decision. 
204 L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 78. 
205 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 
51-52; AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 112. 
206 See Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 2 SA 136 (C); National Stadium South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 2 SA 157 (SCA) and AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law (3 ed 2011) 139-140. 
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(usufruct) is recognised as property in terms of section 25 of the Constitution,207 the 
answer to the first question of the FNB methodology is that property is involved.  
Having dealt with the property question in general, I consider the deprivation 
question, followed by the arbitrariness test drawn from the FNB methodology. I will not 
consider the other steps of the methodology, since they would not apply to the analysis 
of usufruct disputes. I restrict the analysis to examples where enforcement of the salva 
rei substantia requirement prescribes the termination of a usufruct by way of a judicial 
order or ex lege through the lapsing of the right. The analysis will entail discussion of 
the termination of usufruct in instances where the obligations on the usufructuary to 
frame inventory and provide security are not complied with in response to a court 
order, as well as terminations of usufruct that flow from the violation of or impossibility 
to comply with the salva rei substantia requirement with regard to the condition of the 
usufructuary property, due to disfigurement or serious abuse, substantial change or 
destruction of the object of the usufruct.  
In the FNB decision, the term “deprivation” was demarcated broadly as “any 
interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property”.208 This 
definition was complicated and qualified209 by subsequent decisions,210 but it is 
                                                          
207 L Kiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University 81. 
208 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Comissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57; L Kiewitz 
Relocation of a Specified Servitude of Right of Way (2010) unpublished LLM thesis Stellenbosch 
University 82; AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 203. 
209 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 204. 
210 See Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 32; Reflect-All 1025 CC and 
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nevertheless clear that any termination of a usufruct resulting from enforcement of the 
salva rei substantia requirement will establish a deprivation for purposes of section 
25(1). 
Brits notes that the pivotal question in a constitutional property inquiry amounts 
to whether the interference with the relevant property right can be characterised as a 
non-arbitrary deprivation of property.211 In the FNB decision a deprivation is defined 
as arbitrary “when the ‘law’ referred to in section 25(1) does not provide sufficient 
reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair”.212 Drawing 
from this definition, the two criteria for an arbitrary deprivation seem to be lack of 
sufficient reason (substantive aribitrariness)213 and procedural unfairness.214 Although 
the FNB decision elaborated on the substantive arbitrariness test, it did not dwell on 
the concept of procedural unfairness.215  
The substantive arbitrariness inquiry involves the consideration of the connection 
“between ‘a complexity of relations’ […] including the relationship between the 
means employed and the ends sought to be achieved; the relationship between 
the purpose of the deprivation and the person whose property is affected; and the 
                                                          
2009 6 SA 391 (CC); Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2011 1 SA 293 (CC); National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC). 
211 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 303. 
212 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
213 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 245. 
214 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 304 
215 According to AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 245, 269 procedural 
arbitrariness would mainly be applicable in cases where a deprivation results from legislation. Since 
this would probably rule out application in cases where the common law is the source of law, I therefore 
focus on the substantive arbitrariness test. 
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relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the property and 
the extent of the deprivation.”216 
The Court also indicated that the purpose of the deprivation would have to be more 
significant where ownership is affected and where all incidents of ownership were 
impacted by the deprivation.217 Van der Walt adds examples of other factors which 
could benefit the analysis such as “personal autonomy and the sanctity of the home”.218 
Furthermore, it could be argued that a limitation could be more acceptable in cases 
where the property interest is located further from the personal sphere and home of 
the party subject to the deprivation and vice versa. 
Depending on the context, the arbitrariness inquiry might vary from a thin 
rationality test to a thick proportionality test closer to the section 36(1) analysis.219 In 
the application of this test the court has a wide discretion and should resist a formulaic 
approach entailing mere employment of the factors identified in the FNB decision.220 
Overall, the arbitrariness test seems to involve both a broader and a narrower 
question.221 In terms of the implicit broader inquiry, it has to be determined if the 
deprivation is connected with a valid and legitimate public purpose. In contrast, the 
narrower question concerns the details of the case and probes whether the deprivation 
might result in an unjustifiable outcome pertaining to the rights of the litigants involved 
                                                          
216 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 245. 
217 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 245 refers to First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
218 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 245-246 n 165. 
219 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 245-246. 
220 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (3 ed 2011) 247. 
221 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 305. 
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in the specific case.222 In terms of this approach to the arbitrariness test the 
expressions of the salva rei substantia requirement can be investigated on both a 
broader and a narrower level. Prior to a discussion of the broader inquiry I will in each 
case state the common law position which triggers the constitutional inquiry. Since the 
narrower inquiry involves case specific details and such an inquiry would always be 
context sensitive, a general discussion is challenging and speculative in nature. I 
nevertheless draw on the factual matrixes of existing case law as illustrative material.  
Should a deprivation be found to be arbitrary, the FNB-test allows for the limitation 
to be justified in terms of section 36(1). As Van der Walt indicates, it is not clear whether 
the FNB-methodology “leaves any room for” the section 36 analysis.223 Although the 
court in FNB assumed that section 36 analysis was an option Van der Walt questions 
whether “it will analytically and logically be possible to justify, in terms of the 
requirements set out in section 36(1) a deprivation that failed the section 25(1) test 
because it was arbitrary or procedurally unfair”.224 Uncertainty about the relationship 
between sections 25 and 36 remains,225 and I therefore only consider aspects of the 
arbitrariness test in section 25(1). 
The FNB test can firstly be applied to the common law position providing that a 
usufruct terminates in the event of noncompliance with a court order to frame inventory 
or to provide security. Although the common law position relating to the noncompliance 
with the security duty is clear, this does not seem to be the case in terms of the duty 
to frame inventory. In terms of this question, case law is even more of a rarity than is 
                                                          
222 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act 
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the case with security and decisions do not address the issue of termination as a result 
of noncompliance with a court order to frame security in isolation but in tandem with 
the security obligation. The only case specifically highlighting the possibility of 
terminating usufruct as result of noncompliance with an order to frame inventory is the 
preconstitutional case of Stain and Another v Hiebner.226 This somewhat problematic 
decision is discussed in chapter 2. Assuming that the law as it stands is reflected in 
Stain v Hiebner,227 failure to frame inventory after the commencement of the usufruct 
in response to a court order may result in the loss of the usufruct. In terms of the 
termination of the right of usufruct in response to noncompliance with a court order to 
provide security, the common law position was established in Schoeman v 
Schoeman,228 namely that the usufruct may terminate.  
A judicial order for the termination of a usufruct in response to noncompliance 
with an order of court to provide an inventory or to provide security will result in a 
deprivation of the usufructuary’s property.  
The third question of the FNB test concerning arbitrariness of the deprivation 
concerned can be rephrased: Is there sufficient reason, judging on the basis of the 
constitutional provisions involved, the historical and social context and all other 
circumstances to deprive the usufructuary of the usufruct? On a broader level the 
arbitrariness question would be whether the termination of the right of usufruct as 
consequence of noncompliance with a court order to frame inventory or to provide 
security serves a valid and legitimate public purpose.  
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In Roman law, there was no obligation on the usufructuary to frame an inventory 
although the practice was encouraged.229 It seems to have originated from a 
suggestion made by Ulpian.230 Voet is in favour of the measure of framing inventory 
and observes that it has “passed by slow degrees into permanent observance” to the 
point where in Roman Dutch law inventory could be compelled “just as much as to 
give security” where inventory was requested.231 According to Bezuidenhout there was 
no general obligation on the usufructuary in Roman Dutch law to frame an inventory. 
However, where an inventory was requested, he was compelled to provide one.232 
Bezuidenhout does not specifically discuss the purpose of inventory in relation to 
either Roman or Roman Dutch law, but states the purpose of the duties of the 
usufructuary in general in his conclusion.233 In South African law of usufruct, 
usufructuaries are not compelled to frame inventories or provide security either, but 
encouraged to do so.234 Where a demand is made by the bare owner, the usufructuary 
is compelled to frame inventory and to provide security. Although Bezuidenhout 
mentions the general purpose of an inventory, namely to inform the usufructuary as to 
the scope and nature of usufructuary property he needs to return on termination of the 
usufruct, and mentions the consequences should the usufructuary disregard a court 
                                                          
229 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 27 refers to D 7 19 14 which is incorrect: it should be D 7 9 1 4. 
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order demanding inventory, he does not discuss the public purpose for the termination 
of the usufruct in such a case.235  
The purpose for terminating the usufruct where a usufructuary does not frame 
an inventory, or provide security in response to a court order, would be to safeguard 
the remaining property subject to the usufruct, since the bare owner would have no 
way of ascertaining how much of the corpus has been damaged, diminished or 
disposed of. The framing of inventory is closely connected to the obligation to provide 
security, since it makes it possible to determine “over what, what kind of and what 
amount of property”236 the usufruct has been established. This determination is 
important so that it may be clear if the usufructuary has fulfilled the salva rei substantia 
requirement and if or to what extent he has worsened the property subject to the 
usufruct. Furthermore, it indicates the extent to which the sureties are bound. Security 
provision protects the bare owner so that he “may not be landed in loss through the ill-
will or poverty of the usufructuary”.237 According to Voet:  
“[…] usufructuary security on the contrary is primarily for the sake of the heir. That 
is because the testator’s decision has already realized its effect when the heir by 
entering upon the estate has acquired proprietorship of the properties of which the 
usufruct has been bequeathed to another. The aim of such usufructuary security 
is thus not the acquisition of something to be afforded under the testator’s will, as 
is the case with the security given on account of legacies. It is rather that the 
proprietorship already acquired in accord with the testator’s disposition shall 
thenceforward be secured to the heir. It cannot be doubted that that is an especial 
favour to the heir and not to the testator. Favour to the latter is not concerned with 
the legatees’ keeping legacies which have once accrued to them, or on the other 
hand with their alienating or losing them, if a burden of fideicommissum has not 
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been attached to them. In like manner it is no favour to him that an heir who has 
once and for all by adiation obtained proprietorship under his will should thereafter 
have it kept safe and sound for himself through the medium of security.”238 
Voet’s argument in favour of security, namely that it benefits the heir, was followed in 
Ex parte Pistorius.239 Furthermore, in this case De Villiers JP referred to the Court of 
Holland, which stated that “it was a matter of jus publicum which nobody could 
renounce”.240 In his judgment, Mason J noted that the object of security is to “secure 
the minors during the long period when their estate is under the control of the surviving 
parent” and agreed that this obligation cannot be dispensed with “by the terms of a will 
purporting to release the survivor from the obligation to give security”.241 In this case, 
the interest of the heir was noted as a reason why security cannot be remitted. It 
therefore seems that the common law provides for a public purpose, namely the 
protection of the heirs, particularly minors, as a legitimate reason to compel the 
usufructuary to give security. To terminate the usufruct and to return the usufructuary 
property to the bare owners where an inventory is not provided in response to a court 
order would aid this purpose and is invariably connected with it. Therefore, in terms of 
the broader inquiry of the substantive arbitrariness test, a legitimate and valid public 
purpose exists for the termination of the usufruct on noncompliance with a court order 
to frame inventory and to provide security and deprivations in these cases would 
probably not be arbitrary. 
The second level of the non-arbitrariness inquiry revolves around the details of 
the case. The question is whether the termination of the usufruct on noncompliance 
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with a court order to frame inventory or provide security would have an unjustifiable 
effect on the usufructuary in the circumstances of a particular case. In terms of the 
narrower question, the complexity of relationships need to be considered. It might be 
useful to reiterate the factors singled out by Ackermann J in the FNB case, namely: 
“the relationship between the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved; 
the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the person whose property 
is affected; and the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of 
the property and the extent of the deprivation”.242 
In the first place, the relationship between the means, namely the termination of 
the usufruct in response to noncompliance with a court order to frame an inventory or 
to provide security, and the ends of protecting the usufructuary property for the sake 
of the bare owner burdened by the usufruct must be considered. There is a connection 
between the termination of the usufruct in response to noncompliance with a court 
order for inventory and the protection of the usufructuary property which approximates 
the connection between the termination of usufruct in response to noncompliance with 
a court order for security. Where the usufructuary property is returned to the bare 
owner upon termination of the usufruct, the bare owner may ascertain the condition of 
the property and if and to what extent the property has been diminished by the 
usufructuary, which corresponds to the purpose of inventory in general. Furthermore, 
the usufructuary property is then protected against abuse or disposal by the 
usufructuary. An example would be where the bare owner does not have the means 
to ascertain the continued existence of the property subject to the usufruct and 
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furthermore has reason to believe that a corpus of movables, for instance furniture, is 
being dissipated due to loss or alienation.243 
Secondly, the relationship between the affected property holder and the property 
needs to be considered. The usufructuary as affected property holder is often 
dependent on the property (namely the usufruct of the movables) to support him and 
to provide an income. If the usufruct is terminated due to the noncompliance with a 
court order to frame inventory or to provide security, the usufructuary is deprived of 
this property right. In cases where the usufruct is established on a residence, the 
usufructuary may even be deprived of a home. 
Thirdly, the relationship between the affected property holder (usufructuary) and 
the reason for the deprivation (extinction of the usufruct due to noncompliance with a 
court order to frame inventory or to provide security with the aim of preserving the 
corpus) needs to be taken into account. The reasons for the deprivation is twofold. 
Firstly, the termination takes place due to the noncompliance of the usufructuary. 
Whereas inability to provide security would not necessarily be the fault of the 
usufructuary (for example if he is impecunious), failure to frame inventory can probably 
more readily be ascribed to the usufructuary. Therefore, there is a direct relationship 
between this reason for the deprivation and the affected property holder. Secondly, 
the reason for the deprivation involves a policy consideration, namely the preservation 
of the property in the interest of the heirs. This reason is also related to the affected 
usufructuary, since his omission resulted in the need for this preservation measure. 
Finally, the nature of the property (the usufruct) and the extent of the deprivation must 
be taken into account. In terms of the nature of the usufruct, it is a limited real right of 
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limited duration. The usufruct usually continues until a relevant condition is fulfilled or 
a particular time limit of the usufruct is reached or the death of the usufructuary. The 
usufruct is therefore limited in time and amounts to a limited restriction on the bare 
owner’s rights. The extent of the deprivation of the usufruct, on the other hand, is 
severe, unless the usufructuary frames an inventory or provides security. The 
usufructuary is deprived of his usufruct and all the entitlements associated with it. He 
may no longer use and enjoy the property and collect its fruits. If the usufruct has 
mainly an alimentary function, the effect of this deprivation is worse. 
If these relationships are considered in the context of all relevant circumstances, 
the conclusion would probably be that the deprivation is justified by the reasons for 
terminating the usufruct (preserving the corpus in the interests of heirs) and that it is 
therefore not arbitrary, especially if the requirement is applied in a flexible manner, 
with the court judging a termination to be justified based on the circumstances of a 
specific case. Since a judicial decision is involved entailing discretion that allows the 
court to consider all the relevant circumstances, the resulting deprivation would not be 
arbitrary. Since there is no arbitrary deprivation and the FNB questions regarding 
expropriation are irrelevant,244 the inquiry ends here. 
According to Van der Merwe, Roman Dutch writers did not agree on the question 
whether a usufruct may be terminated through abuse.245 Abuse is incompatible with 
the obligation on the usufructuary to use the usufructuary property in a reasonable 
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manner.246 Normal abuse presumably does not terminate usufruct since the owner is 
protected by the security provided by the usufructuary.247 Since some South African 
authors248 recognise serious abuse as a cause of termination, I develop the 
constitutional argument in this regard. The point of departure is that in the case of 
serious abuse, for instance when the usufructuary fraudulently sells the usufructuary 
property or attempts to destroy the substance of the usufructuary property, it is 
assumed that the usufruct lapses.249  
In terms of a section 25 analysis it is difficult to determine the legal nature of the 
lapsing of a usufruct: there is no South African case law on the point and it is uncertain 
whether there is a court order involved. Claassen250 states that the term “lapse” has 
the consequence that the claimholder ceases to hold the claim and that the claim vests 
in the Government.251 In Pietermaritzburg Corporation v Union Government252 the 
word “lapse”253 is defined as “com[ing] to an end altogether” or “ceas[ing] to exist”.254 
In Darlington v Union and Rhodesian Wholesale Ltd (in liquidation)255 it was held 
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consequent to a forfeiture clause in a contract, lapsing occurs “‘at the option of the 
party agrieved’”.256 Analogous to these examples, the usufructuary ceases to hold the 
right if it lapses. It vests in the bare owner and therefore constitutes a forced transfer 
of the right to the bare owner. This process can be construed as a compulsory 
unilateral ex lege termination of the right of usufruct – one of the examples of forced 
transfers Van der Walt notes in his article on the development of the common law.257 
The lapsing of the right of usufruct clearly constitutes a deprivation. Assuming that 
usufruct is terminated as a consequence of noncompliance with the preservation 
requirement in cases of serious misuse, the arbitrariness test should be applied. 
The broader inquiry concerns whether there is a legitimate and valid public 
purpose for the lapsing of the usufruct in cases of serious abuse or disfigurement. 
According to the general principles which govern the relationship between the 
servitude holder and the servient owner, the exercise of a right must be civiliter, that 
is, in a civilized, considerate and the least burdensome way.258 Furthermore, in the 
case of personal servitudes such as usufruct, the usufructuary must meet the salva rei 
substantia requirement.259 To disfigure or abuse the usufructuary property is in direct 
contravention of these requirements260 and violates the very nature of usufruct as a 
limited real right. Furthermore, serious disfigurement or abuse would also place the 
property of the bare owner at risk and be detrimental to the interest of heirs who have 
the expectation of receiving their property in the same condition, subject to fair wear 
and tear. If the right lapses, the usufructuary can no longer endanger the property of 
                                                          
256 CJ Claassen (ed) Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases Vol 3 J-P (2 ed 1997) s v “lapse”. 
257 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 750. 
258 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 466. 
259 509, 516-520. 
260 519. 
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the bare owner or the interests of heirs involved. It seems that protection of the 
usufructuary property in the interest of the bare owner261 would be a legitimate and 
valid purpose for the deprivation.  
In terms of the narrower question, the relationship between the means (lapse of 
the usufruct) and the ends (protection of the usufructuary property) needs to be 
considered. There seems to be a strong connection between the two, as the lapse of 
the usufruct will result in the usufructuary being deprived of the usufructuary property. 
Therefore, further damage due to disfigurement or abuse of right can be avoided and 
the necessary repairs and restoration can be undertaken in order to restore the farm 
to a functional property. 
Secondly, the relationship between the affected property holder and the property 
needs to be considered. The usufructuary as affected property holder is often 
dependent on the property (the usufruct of the movables) to support him and to provide 
an income. Conduct amounting to abuse might indicate a different relationship 
between the usufructuary and the right of usufruct, namely that the usufructuary does 
not deem the usufruct an important means of support that needs to be sustained, since 
he abuses it to such an extent that protective measures are necessary. If the usufruct 
is terminated due to the abuse, the usufructuary will be deprived of this property right. 
In cases where the usufruct is established on a residence, the usufructuary may even 
be deprived of a home. 
Thirdly, the relationship between the affected property holder (usufructuary) and 
the reason for the deprivation (extinction of the usufruct due to abuse of the 
                                                          
261 Compare CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik (1990) unpublished LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University 216. 
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usufructuary property with the aim of preserving the corpus) needs to be taken into 
account. Again, the reasons seem to be twofold. Firstly, there seems to be a direct 
relationship between the usufructuary and the reason for the deprivation, since he is 
responsible for the conduct resulting in the termination. Secondly, the reason for the 
deprivation involves a policy consideration, namely the preservation of the property in 
the interest of the heirs. This reason is also related to the affected usufructuary, since 
his abuse resulted in the need for this preservation measure. Finally, the nature of the 
property (the usufruct) and the extent of the deprivation must be taken into account. A 
usufruct is a limited real right of limited duration, which usually continues until a 
relevant condition is fulfilled or a particular time limit reached or the death of the 
usufructuary. Since the usufruct is limited in time, it amounts to a limited restriction on 
the bare owner’s rights. The extent of the deprivation of the usufruct, on the other 
hand, is severe, but the severity might not be an issue for the usufructuary since his 
conduct does not lead to the conclusion that he values the usufruct. The usufructuary 
is deprived of his usufruct and all the entitlements associated with it. He may no longer 
use and enjoy the property and collect its fruits.  
If a usufructuary exposes property subject to a usufruct to serious neglect, 
reaching a degree which would impair or prevent the normal operations on the 
property to the detriment of the bare owner, and the latter intends to resume these 
operations on termination of the usufruct, the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation (protection of the usufructuary property and the interests of the bare 
owner) and the person whose property interest is affected would be relevant. 
Terminating the usufruct on the grounds of serious misuse could allow normal farming 
operations to resume where it clearly was not possible during the usufruct. The lapsing 
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of the usufruct would enable the bare owner who would eventually possess it to 
address the neglect, and to protect his property and his use and enjoyment thereof.262 
The relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the 
property and the extent of the deprivation is also of significance. For example, if the 
property subject to the usufruct is agricultural land, its nature would be of 
significance263 because agricultural land is a scarce and valuable resource central to 
economic growth, which has to be used in an optimal way for the benefit of the 
population as a whole.264 The extent of the deprivation is severe – where the usufruct 
lapses, the usufructuary is deprived of all her entitlements. Where the property is 
rented out, the livelihood of the usufructuary may also be at risk. However, it can be 
reasoned that the abuse indicates that this is not a significant concern for the 
usufructuary. Roux asserted that where the deprivation is not in the service of “land 
reform or other reforms aimed at broadening access to South Africa’s natural 
resources”, the general law of application is unlikely to be constitutional.265 In the case 
of a usufruct on immovables consisting of agricultural land, the preservation of the 
usufructuary property would be in the public interest, since it preserves natural 
resources. 266  
                                                          
262 Compare facts of CF Zietsman v KA Leeuwner NO 1986 K (case no 86/9797). 
263 CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University 146. 
264 Compare JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 201. 
265 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 (2 ed OS 2003) 
46-24. 
266 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 
100. 
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If these relationships are considered in the context of all relevant circumstances, 
the conclusion would probably be that the deprivation is justified by the reasons for 
terminating the usufruct (preserving the corpus in the interests of heirs or in public 
interest) and that it is therefore not arbitrary, especially if the salva rei substantia 
requirement is applied in a flexible manner and a court judges the deprivation to be 
justified based on the circumstances of the specific case. Since a judicial decision is 
involved entailing discretion that allows the court to consider all the relevant 
circumstances, the deprivation would not be arbitrary. Since there is no arbitrary 
deprivation and the FNB questions regarding expropriation are irrelevant,267 the inquiry 
ends here. 
According to some South African scholars, usufruct is extinguished when it 
becomes impossible to exercise a servitude.268 Instances where the usufructuary 
property is destroyed or fundamentally changed belong in this category.269 According 
to Van der Merwe, a servitude would only lapse permanently if it becomes perpetually 
impossible to exercise.270 However, since personal servitudes are not perpetual in 
                                                          
267 See s 5 3 3 n 283 above. 
268 CG van der Merwe CG & A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Du Bois F (ed), Bradfield G, 
Himonga C, Hutchison D, Lehmann K, Le Roux R, Paleker M, Pope A, Van der Merwe CG & Visser D 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 615; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 
534. 
269 CG van der Merwe CG & A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Du Bois F (ed), Bradfield G, 
Himonga C, Hutchison D, Lehmann K, Le Roux R, Paleker M, Pope A, Van der Merwe CG & Visser D 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 615 refer to D 7 4 2 pr; Grotius 2 37 5; Voet 
8 6 4; Wiener v Van der Byl (1904) 21 SC 92 at 95. 
270 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 535; CG van der Merwe CG & A Pope “Servitudes and 
Other Real Rights” in Du Bois F (ed), Bradfield G, Himonga C, Hutchison D, Lehmann K, Le Roux R, 
Paleker M, Pope A, Van der Merwe CG & Visser D Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 
591-629 615 refer to D 7 4 2 pr; Grotius 2 37 5; Voet 8 6 4; Wiener v Van der Byl (1904) 21 SC 92 at 
95. 
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nature, it is not readily accepted that a usufruct would revive where the servient 
property is restored in its previous condition.271 
A substantial change to the form of the usufructuary property results in the 
termination of the usufruct.272 Voet states that usufructuary property that has 
undergone a complete change of form results in the usufruct being lost just as if it has 
perished.273 This is the case irrespective of whether the proprietor or a stranger is 
responsible for the change.274  
In terms of the arbitrariness test, it would probably be debatable whether a 
deprivation in the form of a termination as a result of substantial change to the object 
of the usufruct would be constitutionally valid. What would for example happen if the 
usufructuary is able and willing to restore the usufructuary property to its previous 
condition? Would it not be possible to revive the usufruct by means of substitution of 
the previous object subject to the usufruct? It might be argued that sufficient reason 
does not in each case exist for terminating the usufruct. As far as termination of a 
usufruct due to the total destruction of the usufructuary property is concerned, the 
Kidson case provides an example which has received academic attention recently.275 
Although the case refers to the personal servitude of habitation, the principles 
applicable to the problem are similar. Van der Walt assumes that Scott is correct when 
he argues that a servitude of habitation is terminated when the dwelling is 
                                                          
271 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 535 refers to Voet 7 4 10; Huber HR 2 40 14. Cf D 7 4 23, 
24; Grotius 2 39 14; Van der Keessel Praelectiones on Grotius 2 39 14. 
272 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 535. 
273 Voet 7 4 9. 
274 Voet 7 4 9 refers to D 7 4 5 2. 
275 The most recent contribution is AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” 
(2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 which provides guidance on constitutional analysis of a dispute involving 
servitudes and critically reviews the articles by Sonnekus, Van der Merwe en Scott published previously. 
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destroyed.276 In the Kidson case a strict application of the common-law principle 
whereby the servitude is terminated ex lege in the event of destruction of the dwelling, 
would allow the bare owner to refuse rebuilding of the dwelling and consequently the 
continuation of the right of habitation.277  
According to the accepted common law position, usufruct would terminate ex 
lege where the usufructuary property is destroyed or substantially changed. Therefore 
the initial entitlement that was assigned to the usufructuary is terminated.278 The 
former bare owner then enjoys a right unburdened by usufruct. This might not meet 
constitutional muster if it compromises provisions in the Bill of Rights such as for 
example the right of access to adequate housing as appears from 5 2 3 above. 
However, this deprivation must also be tested against the criteria of section 25 of the 
Constitution as set out in the FNB decision. Since it has been established that there is 
a deprivation of property involved, it must be established whether this deprivation is 
arbitrary. In this particular case, relevant considerations include the relationship 
between the means (ex lege termination of the usufruct by destruction or substantial 
change) and the ends (protection of the bare owner’s right of ownership and advancing 
legal certainty). Van der Walt points out that in the light of Port Elizabeth Municipality 
v Various Occupiers279 courts must not primarily consider the interests of the owner 
above other rights in the property involved, but must take a contextual approach and 
reflect on the relevant circumstances and constitutional provisions. Secondly, the 
affected property holder, namely the usufructuary, and the property involved (the 
                                                          
276 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 732. 
277 746. 
278 Analysis based on AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 
SALJ 722-756 751-756. 
279 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
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usufruct) need to be taken into account. In cases of total destruction, the usufructuary 
would probably be deprived of at least a source of income in the form of rent and, in 
some instances, of a primary residence. In this case his right of access to adequate 
housing would be the primary constitutional ground for reviewing the deprivation, as 
appears from 5 2 3 above. Thirdly, the relationship between the affected property 
holder (usufructuary) and the reason for the deprivation (extinction of the usufruct due 
to destruction or substantial change based on breach of the salva rei substantia 
requirement) needs to be considered. In cases where the usufructuary was not at fault 
and could not prevent the destruction or substantial change, it might not seem 
equitable to terminate the usufruct. However, the property being lost, there is an 
inescapable reason for the deprivation, although the connection with the usufructuary 
may be strained. Finally, the nature of the property (the usufruct) and the extent of the 
deprivation must be taken into account. In this case the extent of the deprivation would 
be servere, since the usufructuary would be deprived of all enjoyment and fruits of the 
usufructuary property. 
If these relationships are considered in the context of all relevant circumstances, 
the conclusion would probably be that the deprivation is justified by the reasons for the 
termination of the usufruct and that it is therefore not arbitrary, especially if the salva 
rei substantia requirement is applied in a flexible manner and a court judges it to be 
justified in the circumstances of a specific case. Since a judicial decision is involved, 
entailing a discretion that allows the court to consider all the relevant circumstances, 
the deprivation would not be arbitrary. Since there is no arbitrary deprivation and the 
FNB questions regarding expropriation are irrelevant,280 the inquiry ends here. 
                                                          
280 See s 5 3 3 n 283 above. 
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In view of the analysis in this section the deprivation of property that occurs when 
a usufruct is terminated upon application of the various common law principles 
involved in the salva rei substantia requirement is generally not arbitrary, because 
there generally seems to be sufficient reason for it. In itself section 25(1) does 
therefore not require development of the common law in this regard, although it 
appears that the requirement is less likely to result in arbitrary deprivation if it is applied 
in a flexible manner. 
 
5 4 Constitutional assessment of the effect on the bare owner’s 
right if a flexible approach is followed 
It is clear from the preceding analysis that the Constitution may mandate development 
of the common law relating to the salva rei substantia requirement in so far as it 
infringes certain non-property provisions in the Bill of Rights, such as the right to 
equality or the right of access to adequate housing. Should the right of usufruct not be 
terminated because of one of these non-property constitutional rights, it inevitably 
leads to a more flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. It further 
appears that section 25 in itself does not require a development of the common law to 
protect the usufructuary’s right, although a flexible application of the salva rei 
substantia requirement is less likely to result in arbitrary deprivation of that right when 
the usufruct is terminated. However, from chapter 3 and 4 it appears that there are 
some comparative and theoretical or policy support for development of the common 
law towards a more flexible approach, which may result in a usufruct not being 
terminated in circumstances where rigid application of the requirement might have 
resulted in termination. If the right of usufruct does not terminate because of any of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
351 
 
these reasons, it has an effect on the right of the bare owner. The following section 
analyses the effect of such an extension of the right of usufruct on the right of the bare 
owner in terms of the property clause. 
According to the common law, usufruct would terminate ex lege where the 
usufructuary property is destroyed or substantially changed or seriously abused or 
disfigured. The former bare owner then enjoys a right unburdened by usufruct. 281 
Development of the common law which would lead to a flexible application of the 
common law principles, which might allow the usufructuary to exercise the usufruct 
even when the usufructuary property was substantially changed or destroyed. 
Development of the common law may be based on policy decisions, supported by 
comparative examples and theory. It might take place where an impecunious 
usufructuary is involved, by not enforcing obligations under the salva rei substantia 
requirement strictly, for example the duty to furnish security. Further, in instances 
where the value of the usufructuary property can either be maintained or increased, a 
measure of replacement or development of the property may be allowed. The bare 
owner is thus deprived of his the right to have the usufruct terminated ex lege upon 
destruction or substantial change of the usufructuary property and to enjoy ownership 
of his unburdened property. This deprivation through the development of the common 
law must be tested against the criteria of section 25 of the Constitution as set out in 
the FNB decision. 
Since it has been established that there is a deprivation of property involved 
when the usufruct is not terminated in circumstances where strict application of the 
                                                          
281 Analysis based on AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 
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common law would have resulted in termination, it must be established whether this 
deprivation is arbitrary. A deprivation would be substantively arbitrary if there is 
insufficient reason for it, to be determined on the basis of “a complexity of contextual 
relationships”.282 Relevant relationships according to the FNB decision include “the 
relationship between the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved, […] 
between the affected property holder and the property, between the […] affected 
property holder and the reason for the deprivation, the extent of the deprivation and 
the nature of the affected property”. The question can be rephrased: “is there sufficient 
reason, judging on the basis of the constitutional provisions involved, the historical and 
social context and all other circumstances to take the right to own land free of a 
servitude from the owner and transfer that right to the [usufructuary] in the form of 
continuation of the servitude”? Firstly, the relationship between the means (here the 
policy decision not to terminate of the usufruct despite destruction or substantial 
change of the property) and the ends (protection of the usufructuary’s right of 
ownership and advancing policy objectives) should be considered. Van der Walt points 
out that in the light of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers283 courts must 
not primarily consider the interests of the owner above other rights in the property 
involved, but must take a contextual approach and reflect on the relevant 
circumstances and constitutional provisions. Secondly, the affected property holder, 
namely the bare owner, and the property involved (the usufruct) need to be taken into 
account. If the usufruct is not terminated, the bare owner is deprived of the right to 
have the servitude terminated ex lege upon destruction or substantial change of the 
                                                          
282 See 5 3 3. 
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usufructuary property.284 He is therefore deprived of his right to enjoy his property 
unburdened by the usufruct. Considering the limited lifetime of a usufruct, the 
deprivation would not be of a permanent nature. Thirdly, the relationship between the 
affected property holder (bare owner) and the reason for the deprivation (non-
extinction of the usufruct despite destruction or substantial change for policy reasons) 
needs to be considered. In cases where the usufructuary was not at fault and could 
not prevent the destruction or substantial change, it would clearly not seem equitable 
to terminate the usufruct. Finally, the nature of the property (the bare owner’s right to 
have the usufruct terminated and to enjoy full ownership not burdened with the 
usufruct) and the extent of the deprivation must be taken into account. The bare 
owner’s ownership continues to be burdened by the usufruct until a relevant condition 
is fulfilled or a particular time limit of the usufruct is reached or the death of the 
usufructuary. Personal servitudes have a restricted duration, and although the extent 
of the burden will depend on the context, it is unlikely to be of very long duration. 
If these relationships are considered in the context of all relevant circumstances, 
the conclusion would probably be that the deprivation is justified by the policy reasons 
for continuing the usufruct and that it is therefore not arbitrary, especially if the 
requirement is applied in a flexible manner and a court judges it to be justified, based 
on the relevant policy considerations and the circumstances of a specific case. Since 
a judicial decision is involved, entailing exercise of a discretion that allows the court to 
consider all the relevant circumstances, the deprivation would possibly not be arbitrary 
                                                          
284 Compare AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-
756 751-752. 
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in most cases. Since there is no arbitrary deprivation and the FNB questions regarding 
expropriation is irrelevant,285 the inquiry ends here. 
 
5 5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the constitutional implications of the 
salva rei substantia requirement. The constitutional provisions that inform the analyses 
in this chapter are the equality clause, the housing clause and the property clause. In 
pursuit of this aim I rely on the principles and normative and methodological 
considerations developed in Van der Walt’s articles on the continued relevance and 
development of the common law to direct the inquiry.286 Furthermore, I utilise the 
classic two-stage approach and its particular application in the FNB decision to assess 
the outcome of the preservation requirement.  
In the first part of this chapter the impact of non-property constitutional provisions 
aimed at securing democratic liberty which are compromised by the rigid approach the 
Constitution are analysed. These provisions require mandatory development of the 
common law and a concomitant shift to a flexible approach. Where the right to equality 
and non-discrimination287 or the right of access to adequate housing288 is 
compromised by rigid application of the salva rei substantia requirement, development 
is required. Moreover, where the right of access to housing is involved, it usually 
                                                          
285 See 5 3 3 n 2 8 3 above. 
286 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756; AJ van 
der Walt “The Continued Relevance of Servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35. 
287 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9. 
288 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 26 
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impacts on the right to dignity.289 However, the usufructuary’s right of access to 
adequate housing is only threatened in limited circumstances, namely in a case 
involving the deprivation of a usufruct right due to noncompliance with the security and 
inventory duties and the usufructuary is “holding over”, or where his property right in 
the form of a usufruct is terminated due to the disfigurement, misuse or substantial 
change in form or destruction of the usufructuary object and his access to adequate 
housing is therefore terminated. In the case where the usufructuary is facing ejection 
due to unlawful occupation or “holding over”, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act290 should be used to prevent an illegal eviction and all 
relevant circumstances should be taken into account.  
I also consider the impact of a possible deprivation of the usufructuary’s right to 
property resulting from a rigid application of the salva rei substantia requirement. I 
have chosen to focus on the consequences of noncompliance with the salva rei 
substantia requirement as subject for constitutional scrutiny. Noncompliance with the 
requirement either wilfully or as a result of circumstances, result in termination of the 
usufruct where (a) the obligation to frame inventory and the obligation to provide 
security is not complied with in response to a court order, (b) the usufructuary property 
is subjected to disfigurement or serious abuse, (c) where the usufructuary property is 
destroyed and (d) where the usufructuary property is substantially changed. 
 In terms of all the expressions of the preservation requirement resulting in 
termination of the right of usufruct, the resulting deprivation generally does not present 
                                                          
289 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 10. Section 10 of the Constitution entrenches 
the right to human dignity – a right that might be adversely impacted by the loss of the right of access 
to housing. See also R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the 
National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 60 n 3. 
290 4 of 2000. 
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a problem. All the expressions of the preservation requirement result in termination of 
the right of usufruct and thus a deprivation of the entitlements of use, enjoyment and 
exploitation or disposal of the usufruct. In all cases the deprivation is properly 
authorised in terms of law of general application, namely the common law of usufruct 
and more specifically the salva rei substantia requirement. Should a court order 
provision of security or an inventory and be met with noncompliance, the bare owner 
is entitled to an order of ejectment.291 In these cases a deprivation authorised by the 
common law of usufruct pertaining to the preservation requirement would occur. The 
usufructuary would be deprived of his right of usufruct, since he will no longer be able 
to use, enjoy exploit or in certain limited instances dispose of the object of the usufruct. 
Again, in the case of termination of the usufruct due to destruction, substantial change 
or serious abuse of the usufructuary property, a deprivation occurs. The question is 
whether these deprivations are arbitrary. This question is answered with reference to 
the relationships identified in the FNB decision in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances.292 
If these relationships are considered in the context of all relevant circumstances, 
the conclusion would generally be that the deprivation is justified by the reasons for 
terminating the usufruct (preserving the corpus in the interests of heirs or in public 
interest) and that it is therefore not arbitrary, especially if the salva rei substantia 
                                                          
291 CG van der Merwe CG & A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Du Bois F (ed), Bradfield G, 
Himonga C, Hutchison D, Lehmann K, Le Roux R, Paleker M, Pope A, Van der Merwe CG & Visser D 
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) Cape Town: Juta 591-629 609 citing Grotius 2 39 
3, 30; Voet 7 9 1, 2; Van Leeuwen RHR 2 9 10; Van der Keessel Thes Sel 371; Furnivall v Cornwell’s 
Executors 1895 12 SC 6 at 10; Ex parte Pistorius 1920 TPD 297; Ex parte Newberry 1924 OPD 219 at 
223; Olivier v Venter 1933 EDL 206. Schoeman v Schoeman 1953 2 SA 441 (T) at 442; Ex parte Estate 
Wagenaar 1953 4 SA 435 (C); Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C). 
292 See 5 3 3 above. 
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requirement is applied in a flexible manner and a court judges the deprivation to be 
justified based on the circumstances of the specific case. Since a judicial decision is 
involved entailing discretion that allows the court to consider all the relevant 
circumstances, the deprivation would probably not be arbitrary. Since there is no 
arbitrary deprivation and the FNB questions regarding expropriation are irrelevant, the 
inquiry ends here. 
Section 25(1) does not in itself require development to protect the usufructuary. 
However development could be undertaken for policy reasons. When development of 
the common law is undertaken for policy reasons and the right of usufruct does not 
terminate, despite noncompliance with the obligations to provide inventory or security, 
destruction or substantial change of the usufructuary property, it also has an effect on 
the right of the bare owner. A discussion of constitutional considerations would not be 
complete without also reflecting on the consequences for the bare owner triggered by 
a shift to a flexible approach. Non-termination of the right of usufruct in circumstances 
where non-property constitutional provisions require development of the common law 
may also impact the bare owner’s right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property.293 The 
question is whether such a deprivation of the bare owner’s right is arbitrary. Although 
a deprivation occurs, it would probably, taking into account all relevant relationships 
and circumstances, not be arbitrary according to the FNB decision since a judicial 
decision is involved entailing discretion that allows the court to consider all the relevant 
circumstances. 
 
                                                          
293 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 25. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSION 
 
6 1 Introduction  
Legal transformation does not only hinge on altering the entrenched distribution 
patterns concerning property, but also requires changes in the law governing property 
rights.1 Moreover, legal reform is not restricted to interstitial development but might 
entail substantial changes to property rules, which may be detrimental to existing 
property rights and interests.2 In this sense, this dissertation adds to the body of 
literature questioning the absoluteness of property, and affirms that it is subject to 
limitations and restrictions, on the condition that these constraints must be legitimate, 
authorised and proportionate to their purpose.3 Scholars taking this stance have 
advanced reasons for questioning the absolutist idea of property and arguments in 
favour of restrictive regulation, bolstered by notions of morality and the public interest. 
Relating to this line of enquiry, the purpose of this dissertation is to reconsider 
the role of the salva rei substantia requirement in a constitutional legal order. As a 
measure of constraint aimed at protecting the property interests of the bare owner, this 
requirement has been questioned in both South African and foreign literature as part 
of a general trend to reconsider old legal constructs such as usufruct and their 
application in modern contexts.4 These enquiries generally incline towards a search 
                                                          
1 AJ van der Walt Property in the Margins (2009) 10. 
2 13. 
3 15. 
4 See for example C Mostin, A Culot, B Goffaux & J Thilmany L’Emphytéose et la Superficie (2 ed 2015 
forthcoming); BC Mouthaan Opstal en Erfpacht als Juridische Instrumenten voor Meervoudig 
Grondgebruik (2013); Sagaert V & Verbeke A (eds) Vruchtgebruik: Mogelijkheden, Beperkingen en 
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for flexibility, albeit not necessarily in service of a constitutionally driven transformative 
impulse. In step with this prevalent tendency, but specifically prompted by the need 
for transformation of the South African legal system in the constitutional context, the 
research question of this dissertation is whether there are sufficient reasons for moving 
towards a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. In view of the 
Constitution, some arguments in favour of flexibility hinge on the compatibility of the 
requirement with constitutional provisions premised on and guaranteeing the values 
of equality, freedom and human dignity. However, I also consider other arguments in 
favour of a flexible approach drawing from comparative material and policy and 
theoretical considerations to support this conclusion. 
Although the salva rei substantia requirement5 applies to the personal servitudes 
of usufruct,6 use7 and habitation8 I have chosen to focus on its application within the 
                                                          
Innovaties (2012); J de Jong & HD Ploeger Erfpacht en Opstal (3 ed 2008); G Blockx, F Lens & L 
Wynant Erfpacht, Opstal en Erfdienstbaarheden (2006); J Verstappen “Een Nieuwe Kijk op Drie Oude 
Zakelijke Rechten: Erfpacht, Opstal en Vruchtgebruik” in J Verstappen, K Verheyden, M Eeman, J 
Verhoeye, P van Melkebeke, E Spruyt & H Pelgroms Zakelijke Rechten en Fiscaliteit (2004) 13-98; A 
Verbeke Creatief met Vruchtgebruik M & D Seminars (2001); EB Berenschot EB, JM Hoekstra & JB 
Vegter (eds) Eigendom en Beperkte Rechten naar BW en NBW (1986); EB Berenschot “Enige 
Aspecten van de Plaats van het Vruchtgebruik in het Vermogensrechtelijk Systeem” (1983) 5730 
WPNR 170-179. 
5 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 10 uses the term 
“requirement”. PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property (5 ed 2006) 340 utilize the term “duty”. H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, 
J Pienaar & J van Wyk The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 250 and CP 
Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished 
LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University employ the term “obligation”. G Pugliese “On Roman Usufruct” 
(1966) 40 Tul L Rev 523-554 548 discusses Roman usufruct and also uses the term “obligation”. 
6 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 508. 
7 521. 
8 523. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
360 
 
context of usufruct9 as the most comprehensive personal servitude. In South African 
literature it has been described as the obligation of the usufructuary to use and enjoy 
the object of the usufruct “without impairment of the essential quality of things”.10 This 
rather vague definition can be traced back to problems inherent in defining the term 
substantia which leads to what might be described as conceptual slippage.11 The 
concept salva rei substantia has both a physical denotation and a teleological 
signification.12 Where it pertains to a physical object, it must in the first place be 
construed as a negative duty prohibiting or limiting interference with the substance, 
                                                          
9 The author defines the salva rei substantia requirement within the context of usufruct because it has 
been described as the “most comprehensive” personal servitude. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 
ed 1989) 506. 
10 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 
340. Case law from the constitutional era also recognises this obligation, see Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and 
Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC for Local Government and Housing in the 
Province of Gauteng, and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msundzi Municipality as Amici 
Curiae) 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 55 and Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 
JDR 0863 (T) 11. See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” rev CG van der Merwe in 
WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 24 (2 ed 2010) para 581 and CG van der Merwe & A Pope 
“Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C Himonga, D Hutchison, K Lehmann, 
R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser Wille’s Principles of South African Law 
(9 ed 2007) 591-629 604-605 for recent definitions incorporating the requirement. H Mostert, A Pope 
(eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The Principles of the Law of Property in 
South Africa (2010) 250-251 devote an insert to the salva rei substantia requirement, concentrating on 
its practical application. 
11 The term slippage is predominantly associated with Semiotics. S Simpkins Literary Semiotics: A 
Critical Approach (2001) 11 defined semiotic slippage as “the deferral of meaning inherent in a process 
of signification based on difference and relation as opposed to the transparent conveyance of meaning 
without mediation”. I use it loosely here to indicate that the bond between the phrase and the concept 
that it signifies is unstable and open to questioning and multiple interpretations. See for example the 
discussion of the etymology of the word substantia and its Greek counterpart hypostasis by Schön and 
debates about the translation of the term in French literature on usufruct referred to in chapter two. 
12 Reference in this section to CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-
20 10-12 unless otherwise noted. 
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form or physical configuration of the object during the usufruct and in the second place 
as a positive duty to maintain the object.13 In its teleological manifestation, the concept 
refers to the character or the economic destination of the object of the usufruct. The 
usufructuary must refrain from altering either of the two, even if such a change would 
not transform the matter or physical configuration of the object of the usufruct. Both 
the conceptual slippage and layering cause typological ambiguity in the sense that the 
requirement can be construed as both a limitation of the disposition powers of the 
usufructuary and as a general obligation informing and resulting in various specific 
duties allocated to the usufructuary.14 Moreover, it invites different interpretations of 
the concept and approaches to its application. 
In general two approaches are identified. A rigid approach would entail strictly 
prohibiting the deterioration or impairment of the object of the usufruct, without 
considering contextually relevant factors. It implies that the usufructuary would not be 
able to change the economic destination of the object of the usufruct, even if its value 
would be increased by the alteration.15 A flexible approach normally allows for some 
physical interference, provided that the economic destination of the object of the 
usufruct is not altered. Secondly, it might also entail replacing the salva rei substantia 
requirement with the more flexible salva rei aestimatione requirement.16 Finally, a 
                                                          
13 Beneke v Van der Vijver (1905) 22 SC 523 529 is an example of a decision where the usufructuary 
had a positive duty to maintain the corpus of flocks and herds from the increase yielded occasionally. 
14 See for example CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 516 and 519-520 where the salva rei 
substantia requirement is simultaneously listed as a main obligation restricting the use right of the 
usufructuary and a subobligation. See also CP Bezuidenhout Sakeregtelike Aspekte van Vruggebruik 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1990) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 101,115 and 
125-126.  
15 CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2 ed 1989) 14. 
16 CG van der Merwe “Regsbegrippe en Regspolitiek” (1979) 42 THRHR 9-20 15 explains the term as 
preserving the value of the usufructuary object. 
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flexible approach might also entail accepting economic gain (in the sense that it 
increases the value of the object of the usufruct) as a valid and sufficient reason for 
changing the economic destination of the object of the usufruct.17  
 
6 2 Current position 
In chapter two I establish the South African common law position regarding the salva 
rei substantia requirement within the context of personal servitudes, and specifically 
usufruct as the most comprehensive and prevalent personal servitude. The salva rei 
substantia requirement is still an element of the definition of usufruct. The requirement 
is related to the civiliter principle that is applicable to all servitudes, but the former fulfils 
a specialised regulatory function in terms of personal servitudes. This distinction is 
related to the differences between praedial and personal servitudes. The civiliter 
principle, together with the salva rei substantia requirement, determines the various 
entitlements and duties of the usufructuary and regulates the relationship between the 
usufructuary and the bare owner by restricting the use and enjoyment entitlements of 
the usufructuary.  
In terms of the entitlements allocated to the usufructuary, the use right of the 
usufructuary allows for administration and control of the usufructuary object. A 
measure of flexibility is evident from decisions taking into account contextual factors 
such as the locality, established practices in the area, the nature of the object of the 
usufruct and circumstances relevant to its enjoyment. However, these factors are 
nevertheless subject to both the destination and the bonus paterfamilias criteria. 
                                                          
17 R Zimmermann Das Römisch-Holländische Recht in Südafrika: Einführung in die Grundlagen und 
Usus Hodiernus (1983) 175. 
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Furthermore, it is not clear which juristic acts amounting to control and administration 
of the usufructuary property within these boundaries are compatible with the salva rei 
substantia requirement. Given that case law particularly discussing the entitlements of 
administration and control is scarce, it is therefore difficult to answer the question 
whether the regulation of these entitlements might in any way reflect a flexible 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. Nevertheless, it appears that they 
do not accommodate acts of disposition such as mortgage, pledge and sale of the 
usufructuary property. In this regard, South African law lacks the detailed discourse 
concerning these entitlements evident in comparative jurisdictions such as Belgium 
and Germany.18  
Decisions relating to the duties of the usufructuary generally show evidence of a 
rigid approach. This observation must, however, be qualified. Firstly, since case law 
on the salva rei substantia requirement is scarce, mostly dates from the 
preconstitutional era, and is predominantly restricted to provincial courts, it is difficult 
to gauge whether the previously established doctrinal positions will still be upheld by 
courts.19 Secondly, case law still does not reflect deference to the Constitution. These 
factors must lead to a circumspect assessment of the available material.  
The duties to frame inventory and to provide security are in theory open to rigid 
enforcement by severe measures such as the possibility to refuse delivery of the 
usufructuary property and ejectment. However, these sanctions have not been subject 
to constitutional scrutiny. It is doubtful whether such severe penalties will be upheld in 
the constitutional dispensation in cases where they compromise constitutional 
                                                          
18 See 3 3 2 and 3 4 2.  
19 See 1 1, 2 1 and 2 5 and chapter 2 in general. 
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provisions, for example by infringing the right to equality and non-discrimination or the 
right of access to housing. A few cases dating from the constitutional era indicate that 
courts are using the discretion allotted to them to reach equitable outcomes, 
particularly where the usufructuary is vulnerable or subjected to unreasonableness.20  
The importance of maintenance is highlighted by the courts’ response to 
situations where the lack of repairs and maintenance poses a threat to the usufruct 
and might lead to a breach of the salva rei substantia requirement. Although the 
usufruct is not transferable or heritable due to its personal nature and the usufructuary 
may accordingly neither alienate nor burden the object of the usufruct nor his real right 
to the object, judgements allowing mortgage to finance maintenance and repairs (but 
not improvements) point to strict adherence to the salva rei substantia requirement.21 
Furthermore, overreaching by means of improvements (as opposed to maintenance 
repairs), is met with restraint, since the usufructuary who effects improvements, does 
so at his own risk and is not entitled to compensation.22 Improvements may generally 
not be claimed, except where they also indicate a propensity to enable the 
usufructuary to comply with the salva rei substantia requirement. That is, where the 
improvement is of a permanent nature and has as its object the permanent 
preservation of the usufructuary property, compensation may be claimed.23 This 
concession reveals a slightly more teleological approach the salva rei substantia 
requirement. 
                                                          
20 See Van der Heever NO and Others v Coetzee and Another 2003 JDR 0863 (T) and Van Rensburg 
v Mulder 1998 JDR 0756 (T). 
21 See 2 4 3 1. 
22 See 2 4 3 1. 
23 See 2 4 3 1. 
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The availability of the actio negatoria as a remedy which enables the bare owner 
to insist on the restoration of the status quo ante might also be an indication of a rigid 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement.24 By permitting the bare owner to 
insist on restoration of the status quo ante it focuses on the physical denotation of the 
salva rei substantia requirement. Case law might eventually establish that this remedy 
has been superseded by the declaration of rights coupled with either a mandatory or 
a prohibitory interdict and where applicable, a claim for damages.  
The grounds for termination of the usufruct also indicate that the salva rei 
substantia requirement is important, although the threshold for termination seems to 
be high – impairment to the usufructuary object has to be fundamental. An abuse of 
right can still meet with the penalty of an interdict and the demand for security. The 
law as it stands, namely that usufruct terminates due to impossibility, still has to be 
subjected to constitutional scrutiny and might, as Van der Walt has argued in relation 
to the right of habitatio, require constitutional development.25 This ground for 
termination still exists in South African law and might theoretically indicate a rigid 
approach the salva rei substantia requirement.  
Therefore, it seems that doctrinally at least, taking into account the qualifications 
mentioned above, the salva rei substantia requirement is approached in a rigid way, 
                                                          
24 See CG van der Merwe “Ownership” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA vol 27 (2 ed 2014) 
para 241; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Ownership” in F du Bois (ed), G Bradfield, C Himonga, D 
Hutchison, K Lehmann, R le Roux, M Paleker, A Pope, CG van der Merwe & D Visser Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 469-556 541; SF du Toit “PC van Es De Actio Negatoria: Een Studie 
naar de Rechtsvorderlijke Zijde van het Eigendomsrecht” 2006 TSAR 431–432 431; PJ Badenhorst, 
JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5 ed 2006) 246. 
25 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 748-749. 
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although there seems to be indications that an equitable outcome would be favoured 
where a usufructuary is vulnerable and subject to unreasonable treatment. 
 
 6 3 Reasons for a flexible approach in comparative law 
In chapter three I investigate five jurisdictions, namely the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany, France and the state of Louisiana to determine whether there are reasons 
for a move towards a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. In 
jurisdictions where the issue of limited disposition has been addressed, the 
empowerment of the usufructuary has received attention as it impedes efficient 
management of the usufructuary property.26 Empowerment of the usufructuary has 
been achieved by various mechanisms. In more conservative jurisdictions,27 
advocates of a flexible approach to usufruct support devices such as foregrounding 
the destination of the usufructuary property as a standard for demarcating the 
disposition powers of the usufructuary, the application of the rules of usufruct to a 
universality of goods rather than a single usufructuary asset, and contractual extension 
of quasi-usufruct to all types of usufructuary objects.28 Although this approach allows 
for some flexibility, it still pivots on the disposition power of the full owner. Furthermore, 
                                                          
26 A Apers & A Verbeke “Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 TSAR 117-129 120 
citing A Verbeke, B Verdickt and D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in CG Van der Merwe & A 
Verbeke (eds) Time-Limited Interests in Land (2012) 33-56 54-55. For a discussion see chapter 3 of 
this thesis. 
27 Jurisdictions that maintain this approach include France and Belgium. See A Apers & A Verbeke 
“Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 1 TSAR 117-129 118. 
28 A Apers & A Verbeke “Modern Usufruct – Empowering the Usufructuary” 2014 TSAR 117-129 118-
119. 
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not all writers view the powers allocated to the usufructuary as disposition powers; 
some see them as powers merely resembling disposition powers.29 
In other jurisdictions a more radical approach is advocated, resulting in the 
central role of ownership being reconsidered and the disposition powers being shifted. 
In the Netherlands, this shift has amounted to a removal of the salva rei substantia 
requirement from the definition of usufruct.30 Since the introduction of the new BW in 
1992 the control and income may be fully vested in the usufructuary.31 Furthermore, 
the usufructuary may in certain circumstances dispose of and consume assets subject 
to the usufruct.  
Some jurisdictions have therefore expanded the disposition powers of the 
usufructuary. However, on a doctrinal level, it seems from the discussion of the various 
jurisdictions that limitations on the right to use are still prevalent: the duty to act with 
care or to exercise good control, to act as a bonus paterfamilias, bon père de famille, 
or prudent manager still demarcates the acceptable use of the usufructuary property.32 
Furthermore, destination still seems to be a significant consideration and indeed even 
the deciding factor.33 However, in terms of the latter, there are some divergence of 
views, for example in the German and Belgian literature on destination.34 
Consequently, writers who are in favour of a flexible approach to the destination 
requirement seem to view the powers of the usufructuary in a wider sense, allowing 
                                                          
29 See 3 4 2. 
30 See 3 2 3 
31 A Verbeke, B Verdickt and D Maasland “The Many Faces of Usufruct” in CG Van der Merwe & A 
Verbeke (eds) Time-Limited Interests in Land (2012) 33-56 36. 
32 See 3 2 3, 3 2 5, 3 3 2, 3 3 3, 3 4, 3 7, 3 6 2, 3 6 3. 
33 See ch 3 in general. 
34 See 3 3 and 3 4. 
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for disposition.35 On the other hand, other writers caution that these powers only seem 
similar to disposition powers but cannot be the same. 
By not including the salva rei substantia requirement in the definition of usufruct, 
some codes do seem to open up die possibility of a flexible approach. This is related 
to the abolition of the strict distinction between usufruct and quasi-usufruct. By 
establishing that usufruct can be granted on both consumables and nonconsumbles, 
the inevitable outcome is that the salva rei substantia requirement could not be 
incorporated in the more inclusive definition of usufruct.  
 In terms of the duties allocated to the usufructuary, some countries have 
mandatory entry requirements such as the duty to frame inventory and provide 
security.36 This at least provides legal certainty and prevents unnecessary litigation. 
At the same time, it emphasises the salva rei substantia requirement. Another 
development is that the duty to ensure has also became an obligation and thus 
supports the contention that the requirement is still of importance. However, it also 
reveals a more pragmatic approach to the risk involved in usufruct, since it would be 
a more viable alternative to a usufructuary who might struggle to provide surety and 
security. The obligation to ensure the usufructuary property seems to account for shifts 
pertaining to the prominence of the duty to provide security: in certain jurisdictions, 
such as Belgium, security is not viewed as mandatory law but rather as supplementary 
law, compared to the duty to frame inventory, which is law of public order.37  
                                                          
35 See 3 4 2. 
36 See 3 2 4, 3 3 3, 3 4 3, 3 5 3, 3 6 3 and 3 7. 
37 See 3 4 3. 
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Maintenance obligations are generally placed on the usufructuary.38 It seems, 
therefore, that apart from the Netherlands all other jurisdictions still value the salva rei 
substantia requirement, although there are arguments for a more flexible approach to 
it, particularly where it concerns limitation of the disposition powers of the 
usufructuary.39 However, general conclusions in this regard should be approached in 
a nuanced way. 
Secondly, in terms of societal changes, it seems that usufruct as an ancient 
property institution has experienced a revival due to legislative changes pertaining to 
the law of succession in different jurisdictions.40 These changes are not only linked to 
doctrinal flexibility concerns, but also reflect shifts in moral and societal views in terms 
of the growing importance of provision for the surviving spouse, compared to 
maintaining patrimony within the traditional family structure.41 Moreover, changes 
signal a shift in the composition of patrimony from predominantly immovable property 
to movables, with an emphasis on securities. Legislative changes were in part 
responses to these changes.42  
Pragmatic arguments have been forwarded, for instance in Louisiana, where 
legislative revisions were introduced in the service of practical considerations, 
adjusting the rights and obligations of usufructuaries.43 Particularly, the 1976 and 2010 
                                                          
38 See 3 7. 
39 See for example 3 4 2. 
40 See 3 2 1, 3 4 1 and 3 5 1. 
41 See 3 2 1. 
42 See 3 2 2. 
43 See 3 7. 
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revisions aimed to expand the rights of the usufructuary to “‘balance the interests of 
the usufructuary and of the naked owner and to reach desirable solutions’”.44  
It therefore seems that there are reasonably strong reasons for a shift towards a 
flexible approach to the preservation requirement in comparative law. However, a 
tension remains between measures increasing flexibility and measures tending 
towards rigidity in all systems. The question would finally be whether these reasons 
provide persuasive arguments for a flexible approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement in South African law. 
In South Africa, the legislator has not utilised usufruct as a legal concept within 
the law of intestate succession to provide for the surviving spouse. In this regard the 
South African Law Commission came to the conclusion in 1985 that it seldom happens 
that the surviving spouse is left destitute and that usufruct is not so commonly used in 
testaments as to be prescribed as a norm in intestate succession as a measure to 
provide for the surviving spouse. 45 However, usufruct still plays a role in the testate 
law of succession to provide for the surviving spouse. Thirty years have passed since 
the report by the South African Law Commission. One could ask whether, in a context 
where blended families are becoming more prevalent, a reconsideration of usufruct 
within the context of providing for the surviving should not be investigated. 
Secondly, one could ask whether the changing nature of patrimony might be an 
argument for a flexible approach to usufruct. It is still open to question whether the 
nature of patrimony in South Africa has changed in a way comparable to the change 
                                                          
44 AN Matasar “The Usufruct Revisions: the Power to Dispose of Nonconsumables Now Expressly 
Includes Alienation, Lease, and Encumbrance; Has the Louisiana Legislature Fundamentally Altered 
the Nature of Usufruct?” (2011-2012) 86 Tul L Rev 787-822 792. 
45 South African Law Commission Verslag oor die Hersiening van die Erfreg: Intestate Erfreg (1985) 19. 
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that took place in other jurisdictions. Thirdly, it remains to be seen if the distinction 
between usufruct and quasi-usufruct will be abolished.46  
Finally, pragmatic considerations might, like in other jurisdictions, prompt new 
applications of usufruct to address societal concerns. Proposals regarding the use of 
usufruct to restore cities in Louisiana might provide a point of departure in this regard.47 
Taking into consideration the dire need for housing, arguments have been made for 
expropriating a use right of inner-city buildings.48 Usufruct may also be potentially 
useful in this regard. 
A comparative perspective might be a useful point of departure for the 
reconsideration of usufruct as a legal concept in South African law and particularly 
whether the preservation requirement can be approached in a flexible way. 
 
6 4 Policy and theoretical reasons for a flexible approach 
In chapter four I examine policy and theoretical reasons for a flexible approach to the 
salva rei substantia requirement. Although arguments based on policy in favour of a 
flexible approach may be constructed, the material is scarce. Furthermore, using policy 
involves various challenges in terms of constructing a working definition, 
methodological issues and more broadly, in terms of its role in the legal system.49 
However, policy is undergirded by theoretical considerations. Consequently, I examine 
theoretical arguments in favour of a flexible approach to the requirement. These 
                                                          
46 See 3 5 2 n 334. 
47 See 3 5 1. 
48 See 3 5 1 n 334. 
49 See 4 2. 
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arguments can be grouped according to the general theoretical orientation ascribed to 
its proponents. The first group of arguments I discuss is based on the work of the 
information theorists or Law and Economics scholars.50 Starting from Coase, these 
writers progressively formulated models to enhance efficiency by incorporating 
increased flexibility. Coase formulated the seminal Coase theorem, indicating how 
bargaining takes place between parties in conflicting property use disputes.51 Although 
he indicates that courts should play a pivotal role in situations where transaction costs 
have an effect, he does not provide guidelines to courts to indicate how the initial 
allocation of property rights takes place. Furthermore, his work raises the question of 
how these entitlements should be protected once they are allocated. Calabresi and 
Melamed address the gaps in Coase’s theorem by developing guidelines that could 
structure the protection of property interests.52 They formulated the distinction between 
property and liability rules and indicate how and when these rules should be applied in 
the protection of property rights. However, as Bell and Parchomovsky argue, these 
rules do not account for all property protection disputes.53 Accordingly, they developed 
a theory of dynamic pliability rules that allow for a shift between property and liability 
rules based on the realisation of a changed condition. Their model takes account of 
protection afforded to property entitlements over time and is therefore less static. 
Based on these developments of property rules which allow for enhanced 
flexibility, I argue that the salva rei substantia requirement can also be interpreted 
flexibly.54 The flexible interpretation of the salva rei substantia requirement can be 
                                                          
50 See 4 3 2. 
51 See 4 3 2 1. 
52 See 4 3 2 2. 
53 See 4 3 2 3. 
54 See 4 3 2 3. 
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typified as a classic property rule. The relevant entitlement protected by a property rule 
is the right of the owner to receive the usufructuary property without impairment of the 
substance on termination of the usufruct. This right is protected by the salva rei 
substantia requirement functioning as a property rule. If a triggering event such as 
changed circumstances or even a passage of time occurs and the rule is interpreted 
flexibly, the classic property rule protection in the form of a declaratory order attended 
by an interdict may be suspended. The property rule may accordingly be substituted 
by liability rule protection.55 Other variations of this shift can be achieved by not 
mandating compliance with the duties of the usufructuary originating in the salva rei 
substantia requirement. In effect, this shift can lead to a flexible reconceptualization of 
servitudes and specifically usufruct as changing relationships between the 
usufructuary and the bare owner who exercise concurrent rights in the usufructuary 
property. From the development of this example it seems that application of the 
pliability rules paradigm concerns more than one property rule layer preceding the 
triggering event, namely the salva rei substantia requirement and the declaratory order 
accompanied by the interdict. The liability rule protection would entail the payment of 
compensation for impairment of the substance after the triggering event. 
The second group of arguments concern the work of Progressive Property 
theorists. Applying the work of Alexander, I argue that usufruct can also be construed 
as a form of governance property.56 Consequently, it also needs both coordination and 
enforcement mechanisms. The salva rei substantia requirement functions as such a 
device. Since the concept of governance property focuses on sharing, these devices 
are portrayed as mechanisms enhancing sharing and therefore less emphasis is 
                                                          
55 See 4 3 2 3. 
56 See 4 3 3 1. 
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placed on the restrictive qualities they possess than would have been the case in an 
exclusion-dominated paradigm. The salva rei substantia requirement is therefore 
construed as a constructive device facilitating sharing of governance property and in 
this regard an argument for a flexible approach that would enhance the use, 
management, investment and membership of usufruct as a governance institution 
could be made. Finally, I consider the work of Dyal-Chand,57 whose outcomes-based 
approach she provides for a dispute-resolution process that takes into account the 
interests of both owners and non-owners and which should not be constrained by rigid 
application of property remedies. In this regard I argue for a creative and flexible 
approach to remedies in disputes where the salva rei substantia requirement is 
concerned.58 The manner in which disposition in terms of usufruct is treated in other 
jurisdictions may also support arguments in favour of sharing. 
To conclude, both information theorists and Progressive Property theorists 
present arguments which can be developed within the context of usufruct to support a 
flexible approach to the salva rei substantia requirement. 
 
6 5 Constitutional reasons for and implications of a flexible 
approach 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the constitutional reasons for and 
implications of the salva rei substantia requirement. The constitutional provisions that 
                                                          
57 See 4 3 3 2. 
58 See 4 3 3 2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
375 
 
inform the analysis in this chapter are the equality clause, the housing clause and the 
property clause. 
In the first part of chapter five the impact of constitutional provisions aimed at 
securing democratic liberty which are compromised by a rigid approach to the salva 
rei substantia requirement are analysed. These provisions require development of the 
common law and a shift to a flexible approach. Where the right to equality and non-
discrimination59 or the right of access to adequate housing60 is compromised, 
development of the requirement is required. The exception to the duty to provide 
security which only permits a father who enjoys the usufruct of property of which his 
children are the bare owners, but still requires a mother to provide security, 
discriminates against mothers on the basis of gender.61 There does not seem to be 
compelling reasons for this discrimination. Consequently, this exception infringes the 
equality provision in the Constitution and is invalid. Development of the common law 
is mandated to allow parents in general to equally enjoy the advantage of the 
exception. Such a development will narrow the application of the salva rei substantia 
requirement since the duty would allow for more exceptions. In this sense it will result 
in a deprivation of the right of the bare owner to be safeguarded against impairment 
of the substance of the usufructuary property by the provision of security. However, 
this deprivation would not be arbitrary since the obligation to comply with the equality 
provision in the Constitution mandates the change of the common law.62  
                                                          
59 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9. 
60 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 26 
61 See 5 2 2 3. I have not developed the argument regarding stepparents in ch 5. See further n 88.  
62 See 5 2 2 3. 
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Where the right of access to housing is involved, limitations usually also impact 
on the right to dignity.63 The usufructuary’s right of access to adequate housing is only 
threatened in limited circumstances, namely in a case involving the deprivation of a 
usufruct right due to noncompliance with the security and inventory duties, following 
which the usufructuary is “holding over”, or where the usufruct is terminated due to the 
disfigurement, misuse or substantial change in form or destruction of the usufructuary 
object and access to adequate housing is therefore terminated.64 In the case where 
the usufructuary is facing ejection due to unlawful occupation or “holding over”, PIE 
should be used to prevent an illegal eviction and all relevant circumstances should be 
taken into account.65 This development could take place by means of an exception to 
the common law rule or by means of utilising a different principle.66 However, should 
it be achieved via an exception, judicial discretion should be involved to avoid arbitrary 
decisions.67 
When an infringement of the access to adequate housing provision takes place, 
the justifications for this infringement should be taken into account in each situation. 
Given the compelling effect of the constitutional provisions safeguarding the right of 
equality, or the right of access to housing coupled with the right to dignity, it is clear 
that development of the common law is mandatory. Nevertheless, this development 
would only be applicable in limited circumstances. 
                                                          
63 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 10. Section 10 of the Constitution entrenches 
the right to human dignity – a right that might be adversely impacted by the loss of the right of access 
to housing. See also R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the 
National Credit Act (2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 60 n 3. 
64 See 5 2 3 1. 
65 See 5 2 3 6. 
66 See 5 2 2 3. 
67 AJ van der Walt “Development of the Common Law of Servitude” (2013) 130 SALJ 722-756 749. 
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In the second part of the analysis, I subject the consequences of noncompliance 
with the salva rei substantia requirement to constitutional scrutiny. Noncompliance 
with the requirement, either wilfully or as a result of circumstances, results in 
termination of the usufruct where (a) the obligation to frame inventory and the 
obligation to provide security are not complied with in response to a court order, (b) 
the usufructuary property is subjected to disfigurement or serious abuse, (c) where the 
usufructuary property is destroyed and (d) where the usufructuary property is 
substantially changed. 
The question in this second part of the constitutional analysis is whether the 
impact of termination of the usufruct and the consequent deprivation of the 
usufructuary’s right to property require development of the common law. In terms of 
all the expressions of the preservation requirement resulting in termination of the right 
of usufruct, the deprivation of the usufructuary’s right does not constitute an arbitrary 
deprivation.68 All the expressions of the preservation requirement result in termination 
of the right of usufruct and bring about a deprivation of the right to use, enjoyment and 
exploitation or disposal (which is only possible to a limited extent) of the property.69 In 
all cases the deprivation is properly authorised by law of general application, namely 
the common law of usufruct and more specifically the salva rei substantia 
requirement.70 Should a court order be issued for the provision of security or an 
inventory and be met with noncompliance, the owner is entitled to an order of 
ejectment.71 In these cases a deprivation authorised by the common law of usufruct 
                                                          
68 See 5 3 3. 
69 See 5 3 3. 
70 See 5 3 3.  
71 CG van der Merwe CG & A Pope “Servitudes and Other Real Rights” in Du Bois F (ed), Bradfield G, 
Himonga C, Hutchison D, Lehmann K, Le Roux R, Paleker M, Pope A, Van der Merwe CG & Visser D 
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pertaining to the preservation requirement would occur. The usufructuary would be 
deprived of his right of usufruct, since he will no longer be able to use, enjoy, exploit 
or in certain limited instances dispose of the object of the usufruct. Again, in the case 
of termination of the usufruct due to destruction, substantial change or serious abuse 
of the usufructuary property, a deprivation occurs.72  
The question is whether these deprivations are arbitrary with reference to the 
relationships identified in the FNB decision, in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances.73 If these relationships are considered in the context of all relevant 
circumstances, the conclusion would probably be that the deprivation is justified by the 
reasons for terminating the usufruct (preserving the corpus in the interests of heirs or 
in the public interest) and that it is therefore not arbitrary, especially if the salva rei 
substantia requirement is applied in a flexible manner, with a court deciding that it is 
justified based on the circumstances of the specific case. Since a judicial decision is 
involved entailing a discretion that allows the court to consider all the relevant 
circumstances, the deprivation would not be arbitrary according to the FNB decision.74 
Since there is no arbitrary deprivation and the FNB questions regarding expropriation 
are irrelevant,75 the inquiry ends here. 
                                                          
Wille’s Principles of South African Law (9 ed 2007) 591-629 609 citing Grotius 2 39 3, 30; Voet 7 9 1, 
2; Van Leeuwen RHR 2 9 10; Van der Keessel Thes Sel 371; Furnivall v Cornwell’s Executors 1895 12 
SC 6 10; Ex parte Pistorius 1920 TPD 297; Ex parte Newberry 1924 OPD 219 223; Olivier v Venter 
1933 EDL 206. Schoeman v Schoeman 1953 2 SA 441 (T) 442; Ex parte Estate Wagenaar 1953 4 SA 
435 (C); Stain v Hiebner 1976 1 SA 34 (C). 
72 See 5 3 3. 
73 See 5 3 3. 
74 See 5 3 3. 
75 See 5 3 3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
379 
 
It was clear from the preceding analysis that the Constitution requires 
development of the common law when rigid application of the salva rei substantia 
requirement infringes provisions in the Bill of Rights such as the right to equality or the 
right of access to adequate housing. Should the right of usufruct as a result of the 
development not be terminated, it inevitably leads to a more flexible approach to the 
salva rei substantia requirement. Since the deprivation of the usufructuary’s property 
right resulting from a rigid application of the requirement is not arbitrary, development 
is not required by section 25, although the deprivation is less likely to be arbitrary if 
applied flexibly. 
When development of the common law is necessary and the right of usufruct 
does not terminate it also has an effect on the right of the bare owner. Furthermore, 
development could be undertaken on the basis of policy considerations, strengthened 
by comparative and theoretical argument. That might increase the incidence of flexible 
application of the requirement, so that the usufruct is not terminated in circumstances 
where it otherwise might have been. A discussion of constitutional considerations 
would not be complete without reflecting on the consequences for the bare owner 
triggered by such a shift to a flexible approach. Non-termination of the right of usufruct 
resulting from a flexible approach may impact the bare owner’s right not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of property.76 The question is, firstly, whether a deprivation of the bare 
owner’s right occurs and secondly, whether this deprivation is arbitrary. Although a 
deprivation occurs, it would probably, taking into account all relevant relationships and 
circumstances, not be arbitrary according to the FNB decision, since a judicial decision 
                                                          
76 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 25. 
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is involved entailing a discretion that allows the court to consider all the relevant 
circumstances. 
The constitutional analysis shows that in certain cases a shift to a flexible 
approach to the salva rei substantia requirement is inevitable and mandatory. When a 
shift is non-mandatory, courts may consider other reasons for a flexible approach. In 
both instances article 25(1) analysis is necessary to protect the rights of the 
usufructuary and the bare owner. Regulation and mandatory transformation are within 
the powers of the courts and can therefore be achieved. 
 
6 6 Concluding remarks 
Given the reasons stated above, an argument in favour of a flexible approach to the 
salva rei substantia requirement can be made based on comparative, policy, 
theoretical and, finally, on constitutional grounds. Only the constitutional arguments 
mandate a flexible approach in very specific circumstances, particularly where the right 
of equality or the right of access to adequate housing is infringed. In other 
circumstances, a flexible approach is not mandated by the Constitution, but where a 
deprivation resulting from the application of a flexible approach is not arbitrary, the 
Constitution does not prohibit a flexible approach. Therefore, a flexible approach may 
be used based on comparative, policy and mainly theoretical considerations. 
In the first chapter I discuss the questions underlying this dissertation. Firstly, I 
asked whether there are different interpretations and approaches to the salva rei 
substantia requirement. Doctrinally at least, different interpretations and approaches 
are possible, but in South African law, the requirement is approached in a rigid way, 
subject to certain qualifications. Nevertheless, there seems to be indications that an 
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equitable outcome would be favoured where a usufructuary is vulnerable and subject 
to unreasonable treatment. Secondly, I inquired whether a shift has taken place from 
a rigid to a flexible approach or whether these approaches co-exist. I have concluded 
that there is no clear indication of a shift. Therefore, I investigated whether there are 
reasons to promote a shift to a flexible approach. Reasons emerge from comparative, 
policy, theoretical and constitutional considerations. Among these reasons, non-
property constitutional provisions require a mandatory shift where the rights to equality 
and access to housing are infringed. This development cannot be postponed and must 
be realised by the courts. To conclude, a rigid approach to the salva rei substantia 
requirement is prohibited by constitutionally mandated considerations in certain 
circumstances. Moreover, comparative, policy and theoretical considerations provide 
additional reasons to pursue a flexible approach to the requirement. Constitutionally 
such a move towards a flexible approach is therefore possible. 
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